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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates under which conditions, how and why the agency of 
workers – in its relation to that of other social agents – shapes the development 
and operations of global automotive manufacturers in different locales of the 
Global South. It zooms in on the Mexican and Chinese subsidiaries of a German – 
and one of the largest – global car producers. Theoretically, it challenges the 
dominance of explanations of industrial development as products of government-
business interactions on the one hand, and the substitution of comparative statics 
for the tracing of historical changes on the other. Instead, it argues that worker 
agency becomes a constitutive factor by deflecting the strategic agency of 
managers and policy makers into unintended consequences. The comparative case 
study provides empirical evidence for the institutional and structural conditions of 
worker agency; how they interpret and act upon these conditions; and how 
through processes of relational agency workers induce institutional and structural 
change. This endeavour allows for a reassessment of the hypothesis that there will 
be converging developments of strong automotive labour movements in China and 
Mexico. And it provides new empirical evidence to address the puzzle of 
convergence and divergence between the “productive model” of the mother 
company and the operations of its subsidiaries in the Global South. 
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Then the supervisor moved us to a new aisle. We had been there 10 hours. 
“Before you begin,” the soup said, “I want to tell you something. Each tray of this 
type of mail must be stuck in 23 minutes. That’s the production schedule. Now, just 
for fun, let’s see if each of us can meet the production schedule! Now, one, two, 
three…GO!” 
What the hell is this? I thought. I’m tired. 
Each tray was two feet long. But each tray held different amounts of letters. Some 
trays had two or three times as much mail in them as others, depending upon the 
size of the letters. 
Arms started flying. Fear of failure. 
I took my time. 
“When you finish your first tray, grab another!” 
They really worked at it. Then they jumped up and grabbed another tray. 
The supervisor walked up behind me. “Now,” he said, pointing at me, “this man is 
making production. He’s halfway through his second tray!” 
It was my first tray. I didn’t know if he were trying to con me or not, but since I was 
that far ahead of them I slowed down a little more. 
 
– Charles Bukowski, Post Office 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.  Problématique and Research Question 
In her 2003 seminal study Forces of Labor, Beverly Silver famously argued that 
“where capital goes, conflict goes” (Silver 2003, p.41). Hardly any sector illustrated 
this dynamic better than the leading industry of the 20th century: automotive 
manufacturing. To evade profit squeezes and problems of labour control in the 
Global North, the big players in the industry began to relocate production to the 
South. Transplanting their industry-specific technological and organisational 
practices to new locales, they caused social transformations reminiscent of the 
problems haunting them in their home countries. Over time, automotive 
manufacturing in the Global South created similar working classes, with similar 
“structural power” in the workplace and marketplace, with similar dynamics of 
struggle. Silver hypothesised that this pattern of cyclical recurrence would 
concentrate in two nations in the decade of the 2010s: Mexico and China.  
 
“Mass production in the automobile industry has tended to recreate similar social 
contradictions wherever it has grown. […] If past dynamics are a guide to future 
trends, then we have good reasons to expect the emergence of strong, independent 
autoworkers' movements in Mexico and China during the coming decade.” (Silver 
2003, pp.41, 65) 
 
In short, Silver puts forward two bold hypotheses. First, she argues that there is a 
strong tendency towards convergence of industry-wide characteristics across 
automotive production in different locales. Second, this convergence conditions 
the emergence and power of labour movements in Mexico and China in similar 
ways. It is an engagement of these hypotheses in the context of the wider literature 
on global developments of the automotive industry that has informed a revisiting 
of the relationship between car manufacturing and labour in China and Mexico. I 
will briefly engage with these issues one by one. 
 
Pace Silver, it has been argued that rather than a converging trend towards one, 
namely “lean”, techno-organisational paradigm – as famously claimed in the 
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seminal study The Machine that Changed the World (Womack et al. 1990) – the 
global automotive industry is characterised by a multiplicity of company-specific 
“profit strategies” and “productive models” (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002; Freyssenet 
2009b). This argument has emerged in parallel to (or as a sub-debate of) 
comparative institutionalist concerns with the “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) (Hall 
& Soskice 2001; Hancké 2009a). Company-specific divergence is said to be the 
result of automotive manufacturers developing their internal rules and 
organisational principles in accordance with the national institutional incentive 
structure, or “matrix”, of their respective home country (apart from Boyer & 
Freyssenet 2002; and Freyssenet 2009b; particularly Streeck 1992; Streeck & 
Kenworthy 2005). The question that arises then is: What occurs when a 
transnational company with institutions and production processes modelled after 
the image of home country A opens a subsidiary in the different structural and 
institutional setting of destination country B? This tension between opposing 
tendencies towards convergence and divergence is aggravated by another 
recognition by both Silver and the institutionalists: transnational car 
manufacturers do not open foreign subsidiaries in order to operate in the same 
fashion as they did in their home countries, but “the strategic function of each 
plant is to maximize the exploitation of all local idiosyncrasies” (Pries 2003, p.56). 
What then, accounts for convergence and divergence in a car manufacturer’s global 
operations, and in industrial development of automotive production in different 
geographic locales?  
 
Two approaches are suggested in the literature. On the one hand, comparative 
modelling of institutional ideal types with converging and diverging characteristics 
is substituted for causal explanations of processes of becoming and change 
(Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997a; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké 2009a). On the other, 
the degree of convergence and divergence is explained as the result of interactions 
between policy makers and (transnational) enterprises (Johnson 1982; Evans et al. 
1985; Wade 1990; Amsden 1989; Amsden & Chu 2003; Cimoli et al. 2009). It is in 
these answers that a striking research gap persists – labour either plays a 
negligible role (Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké 2009a; Cimoli et al. 2009); is 
understood as a passive recipient of decisions made elsewhere (Amsden 1989; 
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Amsden & Chu 2003; Wade 1990); or at best, is factored in through the 
institutional parameters governing industrial relations (Jürgens et al. 1989; 
Streeck 1992). What has been said for the discipline of International Political 
Economy more generally is hence also true for the convergence/divergence debate 
more specifically; namely that it “retains a serious blind spot because it ignores the 
agency of non-elite groupings of people” (O’Brien 2000, p.89). 
 
This leads us back to Silver’s second hypothesis, which locates her work within a 
small group of outliers who have made labour issues an integral part of their 
analyses of the global political economy (apart from Silver 2003; e.g. Armstrong et 
al. 1991; Gavroglou 1998; Herod 2001; Dunn 2004; Paczyńska 2009; Chang 2008; 
2013; Selwyn 2012; 2014; Gray 2015). Elements of Silver’s work have been read as 
a recast operaist argument of “seeing capital as a function of the working class, or 
more precisely, the capitalist economic system as a moment of the political 
development of the working class” (Tronti 1974, p.189). However, actual 
processes of agency between labour and other social agents are subsumed under a 
pattern of systemic cyclical recurrences – and thereby reduced to mere 
executioners of an underlying logic. Silver’s work suffers from an underestimation 
of the impact of local conditions on worker agency (Schmalz et al. 2010) and more 
importantly, the lack of an open investigation of effects of processes of relational 
agency. The role of labour in the relocation of capital to certain locales or the 
adoption of one institutional setting or techno-organisational strategy over 
another remains unclear. 
 
This study derives its central research question from these considerations, namely 
under which conditions, how, and why the agency of workers – in its relation to 
other social agents – becomes a constitutive factor in the convergence and 
divergence of automotive development between different geographic locales.  
 
I will address this question through a comparative case study of the Chinese and 
Mexican subsidiaries of one of the largest global car manufacturers – German 
Company X. Silver’s expectation of the emergence of strong automotive labour 
movements in China and Mexico has inspired the choice of industrial sector and 
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countries – while the focus on a single transnational corporation (TNC) allows for 
an analysis of the role of labour in (not) shaping the intra-company tension 
between convergence and divergence.  
 
I argue that the role of labour in shaping the convergence or divergence in the 
operations and strategic development of TNCs stems from the ability of workers to 
deflect the strategies of managers and policy makers into unintended 
consequences in processes of relational agency.  
 
Convergence and divergence are broadly understood as development of similar or 
different qualities between the two cases. In this study, this pertains particularly to 
the institutions governing the production process; the technological composition 
of the production process; the organisation of the supply chain; and strategies of 
spatial expansion. Relational agency denotes that the respective actions of 
(factions of) collective social agents – in this study primarily workers, managers, 
union leaders and policy makers – occur not as isolated acts, but in relation to the 
actions of other agents. In the most immediate case, relational agency will take the 
form of inter-action, but I heuristically suggest the inclusion of a mediated 
alteration of the conditions for the agency of another party as an aspect of 
relational agency as well.  
 
This study “bings labour back in” not only from the receptive end, reduced in its 
agency to an adaptive response to changes induced elsewhere by other agents or 
by predetermined developmental patters, but also as a constitutive factor, a 
change-maker in the particular ways corporate strategies and industrial 
development unfold in certain locales of the Global South. Empirically, it challenges 
the wide neglect of labour and worker agency in our understanding of industrial 
change in the automotive sector. Theoretically, it engages with institutionalist and 
Silver’s World System Theory (WST) explanations of convergence and divergence 
of industrial development in search for a more inclusive research agenda. Socially, 
this study provides material for a strategic debate on labour politics in the 
automotive industry and beyond. 
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2.  Sub-questions and Relevant Literature 
This study involves a range of sub-questions. First, it needs to identify significant 
forms of worker agency, wherein significant should be understood in functional 
terms as “resulting in intended and unintended consequences and reactions by the 
company, other capitalists and/or policy makers – that is, having socio-economic 
and political effects”. These should explicitly include both cataclysmic moments of 
visible significance, for example strikes followed by managerial restructuring, and 
day-to-day processes of less visible significance, such as workers’ strategies of 
resilience, exit, evasion etc.  
 
The starting point for this study is an already existing body of literature on labour 
relations in the car industry in China and Mexico, some of which make direct 
reference to the case of Company X (for China: Huang et al. 2008; Nichols & Zhao 
2010; Lüthje et al. 2013; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2015; Lüthje 2014; for Mexico: 
Montiel 1993; 2001; 2007; Juárez Núñez et al. 2005; Middlebrook 1996; Tuman 
2003). Certain studies also provide deeper insights into worker agency proper, in 
particular in case of Company X’s operations in Mexico (for China: L. Zhang 2014a; 
for Mexico: Montiel 1991; Montiel 2010; Fraile Garcí́a 1999; Espinal Betanzo 2015; 
Healy 2008; Juárez Núñez 2006). Beyond a focus on the car industry, there is a 
growing body of micro-sociological and ethnographic studies on workers’ 
grievances and agency in China (e.g. Meisner 1999; Sheehan 1998; Chan 2001; 
Perry 2002; Lee 1998; 2007; Pun 2005; Pun et al. 2010; C. K.-C. Chan 2010; Pringle 
2011; Friedman 2014c). For the cases of Mexico and China there is hence no 
academic “farewell to the working class” (Gorz 1982), and the existing literature 
will be revised, enriched and expanded by primary data collected through 
observations and interviews (discussed below in section 4. ).  
 
As a side effect, this endeavour will allow for a revision of the hypothesis of strong 
automotive labour movements emerging in China and Mexico. While this 
prediction has been positively reconfirmed for the Chinese case by Silver’s student 
Zhang Lu (L. Zhang 2014a) – which, I will argue, requires qualification – it begs the 
question if the same holds true in the Mexican case. In fact, the development of 
strikes and labour protests in China and Mexico – though not disaggregated by 
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industry – has so far shown rather opposing trends (Figure 1 and 2). An analysis of 
the grievances and actions of automotive workers therefore not only provides 
empirical detail, but also allows for comparative evaluation and a reassessment of 
the likeliness of convergence of company strategy and worker agency in the two 
cases. 
 
Second, this study has to specify how, why and under which circumstances worker 
agency is significant (or why it is not); as well as the structures and institutions 
that have been mobilised by the involved agents, or could potentially be drawn on 
in processes of relational agency.  
 
This question pertains, on the one hand, to the institutionalist core assumption 
that behaviour is governed by, and therefore best understood through a 
specification of, formal and informal institutions (with different emphases North 
1990; Hall & Soskice 2001; Streeck 1992; Streeck & K. A. Thelen 2005). On the 
other hand it engages Silver’s approach to refrain from a closer analysis of agency 
proper and to instead relate the potential for worker agency in the form of sources 
of “structural power” to the statistical quantity of labour unrest (Silver 2003; also: 
Katznelson & Zolberg 1986; Wright 1985). I will engage these approaches through 
an empirical investigation of the actual institutional and structural conditions 
affecting the relational agency of workers and other agents, in juxtaposition to 
what these agents “actually do.” Where the empirical material allows for it, I will 
test how much institutionalist and structuralist approaches can contribute to an 
explanation of processes of agency.  
 
This involves, on the one hand, an initial specification of institutional and 
structural conditions for the agency of workers and other agents in the form of 
laws, formal organisations, demographic and economic conditions in Mexico and 
China. On the other hand, it requires a more detailed analysis of how Company X 
organises its production process, relation to suppliers, and processes of geographic 
expansion. Although the literature on the Mexican case covers the period since the 
1970s and therefore allows for historical tracing (Montiel 1991; 1993; 2001; 2007; 
2010; Juárez Núñez 2006; Juárez Núñez et al. 2005; Middlebrook 1996; Tuman 
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2003; Healy 2008; Espinal Betanzo 2015), the material available for the Chinese 
case is scanty and much more recent (L. Zhang 2014a; Lüthje et al. 2013; Lüthje 
2014). Given that my fieldwork dates from 2012/13, these questions will be 
addressed in genealogical form where primary and secondary empirical material 
allow for it, and in the form of comparative statics where my own observations are 
the sole reference point. An empirical desideratum in its own right will be a better 
understanding of how Company X operates in both cases.  
 
This is inseparable from the third question of how exemplary processes of 
relational agency have panned out; and what changes of structures and institutions 
they have triggered as intended or unintended consequences. 
 
Theoretically, this question pertains to the elaboration on elements for a more 
agency-centric research agenda, for which I draw on action theoretical (Mead 
1967; Horn & Löhrer 2010; Miebach 2014) and Marxist approaches from the 
traditions of Italian operaismo, Open Marxism and Political Marxism (Aston & 
Philpin 1985; Wood 1995; Bonefeld et al. 1992b; Tronti 1974; Alquati 1974; 
Wright 2002; and in particular Knafo 2010; and Konings 2010). From this 
perspective I will engage three issues in the literature. 
 
First of all, I will raise methodological concerns over the limits of comparative 
institutionalism to conceptualise processes of institutional change more generally 
(for recent self-criticisms see Streeck 2009; Crouch 2009). Secondly, I will discuss 
the usefulness of ideas of historical change as a “punctuated equilibrium”, in which 
periods of stable institutional matrices are intersected by historically open 
moments of agency that trigger path dependent trajectories (Mahoney 2000; 
Streeck & K. A. Thelen 2005). In the context of the idea of the automotive industry 
being characterised by certain “productive models”, this would imply the question 
of how these models are transformed. Thirdly, I will engage with Silver’s notion of 
capital adopting certain spatiotemporal “fixes”, such as geographical relocation or 
techno-organisational restructuring, to overcome profit squeezes or problems of 
insufficient control over the production process (Silver 2003). Here I will put 
particular emphasis on intrinsic limits on capital to flexibly mobilise “technological 
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fixes” in its favour; and on “spatial fixes” not only as unilaterally determined 
choices of capital, but as being shaped by the agency of workers. 
 
On the basis of the data collected during my fieldwork, I will then reconstruct 
significant processes and particular constellations between the agency of workers 
and other social agents, in order to evaluate how these have induced, shaped or 
forestalled institutional and structural changes. This involves reference to the 
existing state-centric explanations of automotive industry development in Mexico 
and China as outcomes of government-business negotiations (Bennett & Sharpe 
1985; Harwit 1994; Thun 2006; Chin 2010); the comparative statics provided by 
institutionalists (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002; Freyssenet 2009b); and industrial 
sociological studies on Company X (Jürgens et al. 1989; Jürgens 1998; Jürgens 
2009; Haipeter 2000; Pries 1993; 2000; 2003). Arguing that the most significant 
recent institutional changes caused by automotive workers have been those in the 
aftermath of the 2010 Southern Chinese strike wave in the autoparts industry, I 
will engage in a dialogue with the existing literature on labour unrest and union 
reforms in South China more generally (e.g. Friedman 2014a; Pringle 2011; 
Lyddon et al. 2015; Gray & Jang 2014; Lüthje 2014). I will generate empirical 
insights on how implementation processes of institutional change have panned out 
in the automotive industry in China and Mexico. This will allow for certain 
conclusions on how the agency of different stakeholders, particularly labour, has 
shaped their respective final results. 
 
Engaging with these questions as a crosscutting theme throughout all chapters 
should finally allow for an assessment of the degrees of convergence and 
divergence in the operations of Company X’s Mexican and Chinese subsidiaries. It 
will serve to demonstrate how, why, and in which context these have been 
conditioned by workers’ relational agency. In unfolding these issues I will finally 
argue for the virtues of an agency-centric research agenda, and how it could 
improve on existing theory.  
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Figure 1: Strikes in Mexico, 1994-2013 
Source: INEGI 
 
Figure 2: Labour disputes in China, 1996-2012 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook
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3.  The Case 
Founded in 1938 under a direct decree of Adolf Hitler, Company X developed into 
one of the largest global producers of low and medium-priced passenger cars after 
World War II. With sales of 5.04 million units in the first half of 2015 it was briefly 
the world’s largest car manufacturer (Cremer & Funakoshi 2015), uniting twelve 
independent motor vehicle brands under one company group and running 
production facilities in 21 countries. In the institutionalism-inspired literature on 
the automotive industry, Company X has been said to pursue a “volume and 
diversity” profit strategy, characterised by the mass production of a large range of 
models. This in turn rests on a “productive model” of polyvalently skilled workers, 
quickly adaptable machinery and a high degree of outsourcing (Boyer & 
Freyssenet 2002, chap.6). Company X has also been heralded as an archetype of 
German “neo-corporatism”, due to its public-private ownership structure and 
cooperative industrial relations (Streeck 1992; Jürgens 2009). The significance of 
these notions for the operations of the Mexican and Chinese subsidiaries will be a 
recurring question in this study.  
 
Company X opened its first Mexican and Chinese plants in 1964 and 1984 
respectively, mainly with the aim of accessing the shielded domestic markets of the 
two countries (Bennett & Sharpe 1985; Thun 2006; Chin 2010). Today, the 
company group operates three manufacturing plants in Mexico and fifteen in 
China, most of which were opened within the last three years (Figure 3). Shifts in 
Company X’s strategy in both cases occurred during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, linked to the decision of closing the only US manufacturing facility in 1987. 
The machinery from the US plant was sold to China, where it was installed with the 
foundation of Company X’s second joint venture in 1991 (Posth 2006, p.26ff.). The 
productive capacity of the Mexican plant, on the other hand, was supposed to 
cover the demand of the entire North American market. This decision to 
restructure the production process was forestalled by the Company X enterprise 
union, leading up to a cataclysmic conflict in 1992 that radically altered internal 
techno-organisational practices, industrial relations and the organisation of the 
supply chain. The long-term effects of this conflict even shaped the recent 
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foundation of new production sites in Mexico. While the Mexican main plant has a 
rich tradition of institutionalised union activity and clandestine and open 
grassroots activism, this has not extended to Company X’s Chinese subsidiaries. 
However, the 2010 strike wave in the auto parts industry in Southern China was 
the most significant case of labour unrest in the automotive sector worldwide in 
recent times (L. Zhang 2014b; Silver 2014; Lüthje 2014; Gray & Jang 2014) – not 
only in its quality and scope, but also in its implications for institutional change. 
These have indirectly also affected Company X. 
  
Company X’s operations in China and Mexico therefore provide a well-suited case 
for a comparative elaboration on how, why and in which aspects processes of 
workers’ relational agency have (not) shaped the development of global car 
manufacturing. Reviewing the developmental trajectories and operations of the 
Mexican and Chinese plants will then make it possible to assess if they lean more 
towards convergence or divergence amongst each other, and towards a company-
specific “profit strategy” and “productive model”. 
 
 
Figure 3: Company X corporate structure in China and Mexico, 2015 
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4.  Methods 
The historical-empirical investigation of Company X’s operations in China and 
Mexico in this study serves as a case anomalous to theory, with the aim of 
providing ground for a critique of existing theory and the claim that a more 
inclusive research agenda needs to be developed. This mirrors the aim of what 
Michael Burawoy has formulated for his extended case method: 
 
“Instead of discovering grounded theory we elaborate existing theory. We do not 
worry about the uniqueness of our case since we are not as interested in 
‘representativeness’ as its contribution to ‘reconstructing’ theory.” (Burawoy 1998, 
p.16) 
 
Though there will be new empirical insights generated in the actual case, they are 
not “directed at establishing a definitive ‘truth’ about an external world but at the 
continual improvement of existing theory.” (ibid. p.28) That is, while there will be 
empirical instances that suggest a causal relation between worker agency and 
company behaviour for individual spatiotemporal settings, this will be insufficient 
for a representative and positive generalisation holding true for other 
circumstances. However, they will be sufficient to point out the need for inclusive 
theorising given the insufficiency of existing theory under these specific 
circumstances. The argument will thus develop along the following lines: “this is 
where, when, why and how worker agency mattered in the specific case of Company 
X in China and/or Mexico, which allows us to draw certain theoretical and 
methodological conclusions as to where and why existing theory is: 1. not 
exhaustively explanatory in these cases, 2. thus of limited representativeness, 3. in the 
least significant case in need of theoretical supplementation for the empirical 
findings not explicable, 4 in the most significant case, in need of axiomatic theoretical 
reconstruction or refutation.” 
 
Such an elaboration necessitates both diachronic, within-case causal tracing, 
treating each single case study separately (the different plants of Company X in 
China and Mexico across time) (Gerring 2007, p.172ff.); as well as a comparative 
historical perspective for the Chinese and Mexican cases, involving elements of 
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“macro-causal analysis” (Skocpol & Somers 1994, p.78). A comparative-historical 
perspective is however confronted with certain problems: 
 
“The problem is that perfectly controlled comparisons are never really feasible. 
Societies cannot be broken apart at will into analytically manipulable variables; 
and history rarely, if ever, provides exactly the cases needed for controlled 
comparisons.” (Skocpol & Somers 1994, p.88) 
 
This implies that even though various factors in the comparison of the 
development of Company X in China and Mexico could artificially be held equal, it 
would be difficult to retrace the occurrence of certain events monocausally to 
worker agency without a context-specific analysis of other variables. When we 
deal with dynamic, (wo)manmade phenomena, the proposed causality between 
variables might change direction over time. For example, workers repeatedly 
disrupting the production process might cause techno-organisational change 
(A→B) – but once implemented, it will alter the capacity of workers to influence 
the production process in the future (B→A). It is therefore helpful to “move back 
and forth between alternative explanatory hypotheses and comparisons of 
relevant aspects of the histories of two or more cases” (Skocpol & Somers 1994, 
p.79). However, the problem of causality remains unsolvable within a positivist 
research design and thus necessitates both a historical and a relational 
understanding of causation itself, particularly where human agency is the research 
object. This will be of importance when analysing the relationship between 
institutional change and the agency of different social actors.  
 
Because this study deals with contemporary history that is still in the making, 
challenges arise not only from the problem of comparative case selection itself, but 
also from the asymmetry of available secondary data. This pertains in particular to 
the occurrence and detailed documentation of large-scale strikes at Company X in 
Mexico, compared to the generally limited information of Company X’s operations 
in China, especially regarding labour issues. In order to generate the findings for 
this study I therefore undertook fieldwork between August 2012 and September 
2013, divided into two approximately six-months periods in China and Mexico 
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respectively. I conducted 83 interviews, whose participants were chosen through 
“purposive sampling” (Merkens 2005): permanent and temporary workers, 
managers, and trade union personnel were identified as the main relevant 
stakeholders. Due to the closed nature of the automotive sector, interviewees were 
mainly contacted through snowballing techniques (Flick 2009, p.109).1  
 
Apart from twelve expert interviews with academics and NGO personnel, I 
conducted “problem-centred” interviews that aim at gathering subjective 
viewpoints on a problem posited by the researcher as central to the particular 
research focus. The interview is based on a set of questions on the interviewee’s 
perception of particular problems, facts or events (which might have to be 
reconstructed as part of the interview process). During the interview these 
questions function as orientation marks in a dialogical conversation, which should 
allow the necessary space for longer narrative (e.g. biographical) passages (Flick 
2009, p.160ff.; Witzel & Reiter 2012). The posited problem was the interviewee’s 
perception of his or her active role in the operations of Company X and their 
historical changes over time. This technique played out differently in various 
contexts. While I managed to apply it with near text-book procedure with workers 
in Mexico (including the triangulation of individual interpretative patterns through 
focus-group interviews), interviews with Chinese workers often relapsed into a 
question-and-answer schematic of a semi-standardised format, oriented along the 
prepared questions. On the other hand, problem-centred interviews with 
management, particularly those that had an engineering background, often 
involved passages on complex technological issues, whose detail made the 
conversation appear more like an expert interview. I conducted as many 
interviews as possible up to a point of saturation (Bauer & Gaskell 2000, p.43), 
when common themes appeared and information began to overlap significantly. 
Interviews were thematically evaluated through “concept-driven” codes taken 
from the existing literature, e.g. the role of technological change, wages, working 
hours etc., and “data-driven” codes (Gibbs 2007, p.44) where the information 
                                                        
1 All interviews were carried out in accordance with SOAS policy on research ethics; and all 
participants were informed of the content of this project and have given their consent to the 
anonymised use of interview data for this study. To the best of my knowledge I have respected 
explicit requests by some of my interviewees not to quote them on particular topics. 
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gathered through interviewees did not fit existing concepts or occurred only in one 
of the cases, e.g. the role of housing in China, or intra-union strife in Mexico.  
 
In addition, I undertook observations on the shop floor at Company X’s Mexican 
plant, one plant of Company X/JV1 and three plants of Company X/JV2 in China. 
White-collar workers or senior managers, who explained the operations on the 
shop floor in detail, were present during all these observations. These 
observations were documented in field notes and similarly reached a “point of 
saturation”. For purposes of triangulation, I reviewed secondary sources and 
interviewed academic experts in the field; evaluated annual reports and company 
records, where available; and drew on statistics compiled by national authorities 
and international databanks for the analysis of quantitative trends.  
 
In combination with a theoretically informed revision of the existing literature, 
these methodological considerations and the empirical material generated allow 
me to address the sub-questions posited above; and to answer under which 
conditions, how and why processes of relational agency between capital and 
labour have shaped the convergence and divergence of Company X’s operations in 
China and Mexico.  
 
5.  Key Findings 
Being located at the intersection of Development Studies, International Political 
Economy and Labour Studies, this study makes three interrelated scholarly 
contributions. Empirically, it firstly provides insights into the labour process of 
Company X and its changes in developmental strategy and local adaptation over 
time and space. Specifically, it demonstrates that the question of convergence or 
divergence between the Mexican and Chinese ventures, and between these two 
and an ideal-typical “productive model” associated with the German parent 
company – of techno-organisational processes, sales strategies, employment 
relations and conditions etc. – hinges on the influence worker agency. Concretely, I 
argue that those areas, in which management has been able to establish a 
unilateral prerogative over the decision making process – in particular the 
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technological composition of the production process – show a high degree of 
convergence. Areas in which workers have been able to practically exert their 
influence on the other hand show a higher degree of divergence and variation over 
time, such as remuneration systems, time regimes, training processes, and other 
organisational aspects of production. In short, convergence and divergence hinge 
on how relational agency between management, workers and policy makers pans 
out in reality. Secondly, this insight serves as an entry point to challenge 
structuralist and institutionalist explanations of company performance and 
convergence/ divergence, which due to their lacuna of processes of relational 
agency ultimately remain unable to explain the phenomena they observe. In 
particular, these accounts cannot account for dynamic change – and its explanation 
– in a consistent fashion. Thirdly and finally, this makes room for the development 
of elements for an agency-centric theory of institutional change; and its 
methodological mirror image in the form of a labour-inclusive research agenda.  
 
6.  Structure of the Argument 
I engage with the research question mainly through a reconstruction of the role of 
worker agency in the developmental trajectories and operations of Company X’s 
Mexican and Chinese subsidiaries. Apart from two initial theoretical and historical 
background chapters, the bulk of this study will be structured in the form of 
thematic comparisons derived from themes central to the existing literature, which 
coincide with the concept-driven coding of my fieldwork material.  
 
Chapter two will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this study in more detail. 
I will revisit how the question of convergence and divergence has been addressed 
in mainstream economics, certain strands of Marxism, comparative 
institutionalism and Silver’s variant of World Systems Theory (WST). I will subject 
each grand approach – in particular the leitmotifs of institutionalism and WST: 
ideal-types and long cycles – to a revision of its explanatory capacity for 
convergence and divergence. Arguing that these approaches suffer from 
theoretical and methodological problems to conceive historical change as dynamic, 
open and (wo)manmade, I suggest a more consciously agency-centred approach as 
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a heuristic alternative. Emphasising the notion of relationality I will give a brief 
elaboration on the role of workers and class relations in this approach.  
 
Chapter three will provide necessary background information on the case study in 
focus. The history of Company X and its internationalisation process will be briefly 
discussed, with a more detailed elaboration on the particularities of its productive 
model and industrial relations. The emergence and specifics of automotive 
manufacturing in China and Mexico will be presented from the dominant vantage 
point of government-business interactions. This will provide a template for the 
analysis carried out in the following chapters – when, where and how processes of 
agency between capital and labour have shaped, altered and moved beyond 
developments attributed solely to government-business interactions. Finally, 
questions of structural power and institutions supposed to govern the behaviour 
of capital and labour will be reviewed for both cases, in order to outline in broad 
terms what political and economic resources the respective agents could mobilise 
for their respective strategies.   
 
Chapter four will analyse the 1992 conflict at Company X in Mexico as a 
cataclysmic event of relational agency. It puts forward the argument that the event 
created a certain path dependency for the strategic development, institution 
building and geographic expansion of Company X in Mexico by reshaping the 
conditions for managerial and worker agency. I will demonstrate how a particular 
side effect of this conflict was the emergence of clandestine groups of worker 
dissidents, who consciously defied the newly installed system of industrial 
relations. This resulted in persistent, albeit latent, inconformity within the plant. 
As nothing of the kind has occurred at Company X’s Chinese plants, I will present 
this moment of relational agency as the first and most visible instance that sets the 
two cases apart.  
Chapter five is the first chapter analysing in detail how processes of relational 
agency between managers and workers have shaped the day-to-day operations at 
Company X in Mexico and China. I will begin by outlining workers’ grievances to 
understand how worker agency has shaped and been shaped by three institutions 
governing the organisation of the production process. I will show how similarly 
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designed remuneration systems in China and Mexico function differently due to 
the persistent union influence over collective wage setting in Mexico. For the case 
of teamwork and lean production principles, I will elaborate how an impasse 
between managerial authoritarianism and workers’ evasive coping strategies has 
rendered these institutions defunct in both cases. Finally, I will argue that the exit 
strategies of a particular section of the workforce in China have caused an 
alteration in Company X’s hiring strategies and training schemes to a degree that 
runs counter to assumptions about the necessity of high-skilled labour for 
Company X’s profit strategy.  
 
Chapter six will addresses the technological and temporal side of Company X’s 
production process. Broken down into an analysis of a car factory’s main 
manufacturing departments, I argue that – although an unchallenged prerogative 
of management – particular machine operations not only constrain the agency of 
workers, but also impose certain limits on management to flexibly alter the 
technological composition of the production process. In the second half of the 
chapter, I will elaborate how Company X employed different time regimes to 
organise production in China and Mexico. For both themes, I will analyse how 
workers’ and managers make strategic use of the existing conditions, and how and 
why certain alterations have taken place.  
 
Chapter seven demonstrates how increased outsourcing has shifted cost pressure 
into the supply chain, causing inferior working conditions and pay than at terminal 
assemblers. I will demonstrate that more recently, visible moments of worker 
agency in the form of wildcat strikes have occurred in the supply chain in both 
cases. Reconstructing the events, and analysing in more detail the responses by 
policy makers, management and trade unions, I will demonstrate how new 
institutional arrangements have emerged as an unintended consequence of worker 
agency. This will be discussed in particular for the Chinese case, where these 
changes have occurred on a more significant scale after the 2010 strike wave.  
 
Chapter seven will analyse the spatial organisation of Company X’s operations in 
Mexico and China. I will demonstrate how worker agency has deflected and ex 
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negativo determined Company X’s decisions about the geographical location of 
new projects in Mexico. In the Chinese case, on the other hand, labour 
considerations, even in the sense of lower wage costs, have not played a significant 
role. Instead, driven by the search for new markets, Company X/JV2 opened a new 
plant right in the hotbed of the 2010 strike wave – which in turn indicated a 
reconsideration of its internal managerial practices for this plant.  
 
I will conclude in chapter eight by summarising the empirical findings and taking 
them back to the question of convergence and divergence and institutional change. 
The wider theoretical repercussions of this study will be assessed and an outlook 
on policy implications and scenarios given. Finally I will address limitations of the 
analysis presented to outline possible avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Workingman’s Dead? – Worker agency and 
the Convergence/Divergence Debate 
What accounts for the different performance of national economies and 
transnational companies? Are those that perform “better” the future of the “worse” 
performing latecomers? Is the emergence of new leading global players, industries 
and companies only a recurring shift in the centre of gravity within an otherwise 
systemically unequal global political economy? Or is the global political economy 
bound together by market exchange but fundamentally fragmented by local 
political and cultural idiosyncrasies? This chapter will review the answers given to 
these questions by mainstream economics, various strands of Marxism, 
institutionalism and World Systems Theory, before arguing that although they 
present invaluable insights that can be productively drawn upon, in the majority 
they theoretically miss and/or methodologically underrate the importance of 
historical change and process as a product of human agency, due to a pre-
occupation with abstract laws of development, long-term cycles or ideal-typical 
modelling. I argue that a shift towards an agency-centred mode of inquiry is 
necessary, which recognises the existence of behaviour-affecting constraints and 
enabling mechanisms, but does not stop at charting and comparing these factors at 
the expense of an analysis of agency proper. I argue that structural and 
institutional factors by themselves might provide a helpful starting point to map 
the playing field for human action, but can by themselves not explain dynamism 
and change, because their relevance only becomes a historical force when acted 
upon by human beings. An explanation of the dynamics of economic convergence 
and divergence can therefore be satisfactorily developed neither through the 
comparison (and potential incommensurability) of static ideal types, nor through a 
reduction to expressions of a systemic logic – but should rather proceed through a 
careful historical analysis of processes of relational agency that might have causal 
motivations, purposeful orientations and unintended results, going beyond the 
structural and institutional factors that are presumably conditioning them.  
 
In the following I will give a brief overview of arguments about global (political) 
economic convergence – or the lack thereof – present in neo-classical economics 
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and certain structuralist or logicistic readings of Marx, before contrasting them 
with the more relevant arguments for this study: that of inter-national and intra-
industry institutional divergence put forward by scholars of the institutional and 
Régulation School traditions; and that of patterns of cyclical recurrence of 
capitalist expansion and labour unrest in WST, which entails arguments for both 
convergence and divergence. I will briefly point out the benefits and shortcomings 
of the latter two approaches and argue that it is necessary to move beyond 
comparative statics and patterns of cyclical recurrence towards a conscious 
methodological prioritisation of relational agency over structural imperatives. I 
will therefore draw out certain heuristic elements of an agency-centred mode of 
inquiry, before clarifying in more detail the category of the “worker”.  
 
1.  Varieties of Convergence – Varieties of Divergence 
1.1.  Mainstream Economics  
It is fair to say that the issue of convergence continues to inspire debate within, 
and constitutes a leitmotiv of, development economics. In its neoclassical and 
Keynesian versions it is mainly framed in terms of a long-term levelling of income 
between different economies – i.e. in terms of global inequality. The linchpin of this 
topos is the so-called ‘catch-up effect’. Due to higher marginal productivity of 
capital (or: less diminishing returns to unit of employed capital) less developed 
economies have a higher growth potential and should therefore grow faster, thus 
closing the gap towards the more developed economies (see e.g. Krugman & Wells 
2006, p.603ff.; Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1992). In light of contradicting empirical 
evidence, various aspects of the catch-up assumption have revised, considering for 
example the lower capacity of developing countries to generate capital through 
savings and investment (Harrod 1952; Domar 1957); the limits of technology 
transfer and industrial change (Rodrik 2011); or all kinds of methodological 
problems pertaining to the adequacy of chosen variables, measurements and 
algebraic models (Sutcliffe 2005).  
Both strength and weakness of this approach to convergence stem from its 
grounding in the extremely restricted axioms of neoclassical economics – which 
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are also widely shared amongst (Post-)Keynesians (a notable exception being the 
hybrid approach of mainstream economics and Marxist political economy 
provided by Michał Kalecki 1939).2 Besides its intra-paradigmatic refinement, 
mainstream debates of convergence are therefore subject to general critiques of 
neoclassical economics abstracting from any form of historical concreteness, social 
power relations, political structures, property-relations etc. that might condition 
human behaviour. Instead, agency is reduced to individual, instrumental – that is, 
utility maximising – behaviour, from which higher-level phenomena are supposed 
to be extrapolated as aggregations of individual acts. This renders neoclassical 
modelling ahistorical, unspecific and static. Developmental differences are 
explained only as short-term divergences – “late” development – from an 
abstractly deduced economic modus operandi, which are caused by market-
interfering ‘external’ factors (such as factor endowment or institutions) and should 
level out in the long run. In order to explain real-historical change, neoclassical 
economics therefore constantly has to turn to theory-external factors – usually in 
the form of “exogenous shocks” or institutions (to be discussed in section 1.3. ), 
which are recast in terms of methodological individualism and algebraic 
modelling, in order to fit the neoclassical edifice (a process that Fine and Milonakis 
term “economics imperialism”; Fine & Milonakis 2009b). At best, these approaches 
offer a rigorously constructed theoretical template – and usually large datasets – 
from which to develop a more socially grounded, explanatory and causal critique. 
However, for an explanatory approach, a broader political economic framework is 
required, which, as I shall argue, is sensitive to processes of relational agency and 
social power relations. 
 
                                                        
2 Larger economic phenomena are conceived as aggregations of rational, utility maximising acts of 
individual behaviour. Value derives not from production costs – especially not from living labour – 
but from scarcity; and price is a judgement of value in exchange: an effect of individual choices. 
Under assumptions of perfect competition, symmetric information, no increasing returns to scale, 
and no barriers to market entry, the sum-total of these choices will lead to an equilibrium between 
demand and supply. Combined, partial equilibria for separate markets are supposed to add up to a 
general equilibrium describing national economic dynamics and allowing for mathematical 
modelling. This equilibrium is as a rule Pareto-optimal, respectively allocatively efficient (Teschke 
& Wenten 2016). Neoclassical economics not only postulates universal applicability, but that 
economic phenomena not only can, but must be explained as deductions of these basic principles. 
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1.2.  Convergence/Divergence and the Problem of Agency in Various 
Strands of Marxism 
Ironically, a notion of convergence similar to that of the economics mainstream is 
reflected in certain writings of Marx and Engels and particular strands of Marxism. 
In Marx’ writings we essentially find two grand narratives of national 
developmental pathways with the emergence and spread of capitalist social 
relations. One, formulated in earlier writings and canonised in the Communist 
Manifesto, predicted a global convergence of disparate social relations. Driven by 
an intrinsic need for expanding markets the bourgeoisie “compels all nations, on 
pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production” (Marx’ earlier term 
for the capitalist mode of production) and would eventually span the entire globe 
(Marx & Engels 1976, p.489f.). In contrast, a notion of divergence and diversity 
emerged after the failed 1848 revolution and the different national developmental 
pathways amidst a reshuffled European geopolitics. Now, Marx and Engels 
believed, responses to the unfolding contradictions of capitalism would primarily 
be determined by the socio-economic, political and cultural particularities within 
individual nation states – translating capitalist imperatives not into global 
convergence, but disparate “unevenly” developing social formations (Soell 1972; 
Teschke 2010).  
 
At the danger of oversimplification, the majority of the Marxist literature on 
international political economy today – with important exceptions (e.g. van der Pijl 
1998; Teschke 2009; Lacher 2006) – still draws heavily on either one or the other 
of these narratives. This is manifest in, on the one hand, accounts that extract a 
uniform “logic of capital” from Marx’s mature writings in order to explain 
historical-empirical phenomena as expressions of this underlying logic (Harvey 
2001; 2006) and see, similar to neoclassical economics, a uniform drive towards 
capitalist “globalisation” at work (e.g. with different emphases: Hardt & Negri 
2000; Robinson 2004; for an overview see Rosenberg 2000). On the other hand, 
there is an emphasis on the developmental logic of capital not leading towards 
convergence but reproducing “uneven and combined development” (e.g. 
Rosenberg 2010; Anievas 2009; 2014). Though these narratives are powerful, in 
 40 
particular against anthropological and culturalist particularism, both accounts run 
danger of delivering historical findings as a variation on a theme, binding the 
openness of historical processes, agency and politics back into an overarching pre-
determined logic of capitalism (see also Teschke & Wenten 2017). 
 
This is connected to a tendency in the Marxist literature to emphasise the second 
half over the first in Marx famous dictum that “men make their own history, but 
they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past not under conditions of their own choosing” (Marx & Engels 1979, 
p.103). The fundamental problem of structure and agency has in the Marxist 
tradition often been sought to be resolved through unravelling its “dialectic” on 
deeper theoretical and ontological levels (e.g. Bhaskar 2008; Jessop 2007; Wight 
2006). For the tradition of “Critical Realism” this has come at the conscious 
expense of methodological questions. While acknowledging that it was impossible 
to distinguish the determining relevance of agency as the change making force 
versus that of explanatory structural determinants for individual empirical cases, 
these approaches maintained an “illusory assumption that one can distinguish 
agency from structural determination” on an ontological level (Knafo 2010, p.500). 
Structural determinants and agency could in principle still be mapped as separate 
factors – although this separation would have to be determined for each case 
through historical analysis. Agency, in these cases, would ex negativo become that 
moment which escapes structural determination. In other words, agency is the 
explanatory residual after, and only if, structural explanations have been 
exhausted. However, to paraphrase Althusser, “the lonely hour of agency never 
comes”, because it is possible to extend the reach of structural explanations ever 
deeper, down to neurological processes within the human brain (see e.g. the 
debates in Horn & Löhrer 2010).   
 
Three further Marxist attempts to address the structure-agency question should be 
briefly mentioned, as they provide a productive template for the account proposed 
in section 2. “Open Marxists” have emphasized that “structure should be seen as a 
mode of existence of class antagonism and hence as result and premise of class 
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struggle” (Bonefeld 1992, p.93). Here, the task of the researcher is to “dwell upon 
critique and the movement of contradiction as making clear, for its own part, the 
‘forms’ that class struggle may take” (Bonefeld et al. 1992a, p.xvi). Although this 
approach seems to shift emphasis to the side of agency, it limits itself through the 
insistence on structures being clearly identified as capitalist, and agency as class 
struggle. This insistence on capitalist social forms has not led to an explanation of 
their emergence, reproduction and transformation through a detailed empirical 
and historical analysis of class agency in its complexity and contradictions, but 
instead produced the pretext to approach agency primarily through a conceptual 
matrix derived from Marx’ mature writings. In confrontation with their critics, 
Open Marxists have thus slipped back into logical-deductive, rather than historical 
arguments (Bieler et al. 2006). 
 
A similar tendency has been visible within what has become known as “Political 
Marxism”. Here, an explicitly historicist approach to capitalist development was 
put forward in praxi through an explanation of the emergence of capitalist 
property relations as an unintended consequence of human agency. Relational 
processes between politically constituted class agents transformed feudal social 
property relations and thereby individual rules for reproduction (Brenner 1985; 
Wood 2002; Teschke 2009; drawing implicitly or explicitly on Thompson 1968; 
1978). This productive endeavour has more recently been thwarted by some 
Political Marxists emphasising (not unlike Open Marxists) that once the new – 
capitalist – set of social property relations was in place, social dynamism was best 
explained by structural imperatives ascribed to capitalism (Brenner 1997; 2005; 
2006; Wood 2005). Agency becomes of historical relevance only in cataclysmic 
events and large-scale shifts of social property relations and developmental 
patterns (we will revisit this mode of perceiving change as a “punctuated 
equilibrium” in section 1.3.1. ). This structuralist relapse therefore equally limits 
the explanatory power of “Political Marxism” for intra-capitalist variety and 
change as a result of processes of human agency.  
 
Finally, the works of Italian operaists are a useful reference point in this study – not 
so much for their particular theoretical interventions (Tronti 1974), but for their 
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historical research on worker agency, struggles and labour movements beyond 
official trade unions and parties. In particular their gearing of sociological methods 
towards the aim of improving workers’ leverage in the given struggles has 
provided a tool that moves research on labour under capitalism away from logical 
deductivism towards actual historical-empirical enquiry. I will take these issues up 
in more detail in section 2.  
 
To sum up these very rough sketches, the Marxist tradition offers fruitful 
theoretical and methodological tools to engage the question of capitalist 
convergence and divergence as a result of human agency driving a “structured 
process” (Thompson 1978, p.148). But caution must be applied to ensure that 
historical-empirical inquiry does not get subsumed under structural-logical 
deductivism. The methodological issues involved in such an endeavour will be 
engaged in more detail again in section 2.  
 
1.3.  Institutionalism 
One of the strongest claims of a global developmental divergence not only as an 
effect of an underlying contradictory logic – as in the uneven development theme – 
but of a sui generis multiplicity of different entities making up the global political 
economy has come from the institutionalist tradition. It rests on the argument that 
economic performance of national economies or individual companies depends on 
the agency-guiding incentive structure provided by formal and informal 
institutions and their social sanctions. Two broader strands of inquiry exists – that 
of national political economic performance and “Varieties of Capitalism” (North 
1990; 2005; North et al. 2009; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké 2009a; Streeck 1992; 
2009; Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997a; Boyer & Yamada 2000), and that of company 
(or sector) performance (Streeck 1987; Freyssenet et al. 1998; Boyer & Freyssenet 
2002; Freyssenet et al. 2003; Freyssenet 2009b; de la Garza Toledo & García 1993; 
de la Garza Toledo 2006). For reasons of clarity and the particular company focus 
of this study, I will recapture institutionalist arguments for the divergence of 
national economic performance only briefly, and then pay particular attention to 
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intra-industry divergence between different companies or subsidiaries. These 
ideas offer a productive starting point for the empirical enquiry laid out in the 
following chapters – although, as will be argued below, there are distinct 
theoretical and methodological limits to this approach, due to its reliance on 
comparative statics, an insufficient disaggregation of the empirical evidence, and a 
certain self-validating circularity.   
 
What all institutionalist approaches share is an emphasis on the behaviour-
structuring impact of formal and informal rules, norms and customs – in short, a 
focus on institutions. Most approaches also differentiate institutions from 
organisations, that is, social entities made up of individuals with shared purposes 
and that are usually characterised by certain membership-defining procedures. 
Beyond that point institutionalism mainly splits into two large camps (leaving 
aside its International Relations offspring for the time being): one firmly based in 
methodological individualism and rational choice, in which institutions are seen as 
more or less functional responses to obstacles in the individual pursuit of utility 
maximisation, such as transaction costs, uncertainty or coordination (Coase 1960; 
Williamson 1987; North 1990; 2005; North et al. 2009; Hall & Soskice 2001); and 
one based in broader, reflexive social scientific methods, mainly concerned with 
comparative studies. The latter camp can be roughly divided into a “historical 
institutionalism” focusing on large macro-phenomena and changes across space 
and time (classically Polanyi 2001; but e.g. also Tilly 1990; Skocpol 1994; Evans 
1995; or Schmitter 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990); and a “sociological 
institutionalism” investigating how certain (organisational) practices emerge not 
from rational choices, but from actors interpreting and acting upon meanings 
emanating from historically grown cultural and political traditions, customs, rules 
and norms (e.g. Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Scott et al. 1994; with more sensitivity to 
power relations Streeck 1992; Streeck & K. A. Thelen 2005). All these approaches 
find their limits in the conceptualisation and/or investigation of change and social 
agency, as will be discussed in the following.  
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1.3.1.  Problems of “Typologism” 
Ideal types and comparative statics 
Institutionalism is fundamentally based on the construction of institutional 
“matrices” in the form of ideal types – and its strengths and weaknesses are to a 
large degree the result of this methodological choice. An ideal type “is generated by 
the one-sided augmentation of one or some aspects; and by an amalgamation of a 
plethora of diffusely and discretely present – here more, there less, sometimes not 
at all – singular appearances, which conform to these one-sidedly emphasised 
aspects in the creation of one uniform construct of thought.” (Weber 1988, p.191) 
The concepts of institutionalism are, in other words, subjectively posited 
extrapolations of certain empirical phenomena to type-characterising abstractions 
around which other phenomena are logically and coherently arranged. An ideal-
type then becomes a tool that gives meaning to a complex reality by providing a 
template against which historical analogies and deviance can be “comparatively 
measured” (ibid. p.199). The limits of this method were clear to Weber (ibid. 
p.204), and have also been pointed out in self-criticisms within the institutionalist 
tradition:  
 
“There is confusion between ideal types and cases, with the latter being seen as 
exemplifiers of the former, rather than the former being seen as constituents of the 
latter.” (Crouch 2009, p.94) 
 
In other words, the method of ideal-type construction bears the danger of 
“telescoping theory and history” (Weber 1988, p.204), that is, of tailoring history 
to the properties of the ideal type. Weber’s solution to this problem was to 
emphasise that logical conceptualisation and empirical reality were two radically 
different and incommensurable domains. This notion seems to be shared by at 
least some proponents of the institutionalist tradition. Hollingsworth and Boyer 
for example argue that ideal types “are not meant to be descriptive statements 
about specific firms, industrial sectors, or individual firms at specific periods of 
time. Rather, they are heuristic devices to sensitize us to possible 
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interrelationships that might exist among a broad set of variables or social 
categories.” (Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997b, p.20) 
  
On this basis Weber suggested a methodology shared by the institutionalist 
tradition that I shall call typologism: “comparative measuring” will have to result in 
the construction of new ideal-types, or at least sub-types, in each case of historical 
deviation.3 Reality is ordered through an ever-increasing number of types, models 
and regimes, which combine common elements in different ways. Discussions tend 
to shift away from questions of causality and explanation to comparative statics 
and a certain intra-paradigmatic esotericism in the form of questions as to how 
many types there actually are (compare for example Soskice 1999; to Jackson & 
Deeg 2006; and to Streeck 2010; Crouch 2009).    
 
The fundamental problem of this method is the incommensurability of static ideal 
types and historical process. As Adorno has pointed out:  
 
“it is impossible for an ideal type to possess anything like a tendency to change 
from one into another, because it is something entirely monadological and 
invented ad hoc, in order to subsume certain phenomena.” (Adorno 2003, p.207) 
 
Weber therefore had to leave his own method behind, when explaining processes 
of transformation (ibid. p.207ff.). The solutions that institutionalists have 
proposed are twofold: either dynamism has to become an intrinsic property of the 
ideal-type itself; or the observation of change requires a methodological shift 
towards an inquiry of human agency and power relations. The first solution will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section. The second seems to be 
suggested by scholars such as Jackson and Deeg (Jackson 2005; 2009; Deeg 2005; 
Deeg & Jackson 2007; 2008); and is particularly present in the later works of 
Streeck (Streeck 2009, p.4ff.). These approaches arguably present the most 
promising attempts to devise an agency-sensitive framework that could be 
                                                        
3 In another self-criticism, Hancké has pointed out: “One of the problems with such expanding 
typologies is that ultimately one could claim that every capitalist country has produced its own 
‘variety’, in which at least one institution or combination of institutions is historically specific, and 
therefore different from other related types.” (Hancké 2009b, p.15) 
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reflected in empirical research, but there is only so much room to expand the 
notion of agency and power before leaving the institutionalist paradigm behind 
altogether (and arguably before becoming a Political Marxist). I will discuss the 
question of agency in more detail in section 2.  
 
Change and agency 
What dominates within institutionalism are approaches that map out the static 
elements and reconstruct change not as practical-political processes, but as a 
sequence of comparative cross-sections. As Streeck and Thelen have self-
diagnosed, there has been a “prevailing emphasis on institutional stability even in 
the face of indisputable and important change” (Streeck & K. Thelen 2005, p.6) in 
the institutionalist tradition. 4  This problem has given rise to two intra-
paradigmatic attempts of theorising historical change. 
 
One proposed solution has been that of a “punctuated equilibrium” (Weingast 
2002), respectively of “path dependency” (Mahoney 2000), which accentuates that 
periods of relatively stable, self-reinforcing institutional matrices are interrupted 
by exogenous shocks (North & Weingast 1989; North et al. 2009), or “contingent” 
events (Mahoney 2000), that trigger the emergence of a new institutional matrix. 
While in the punctuated equilibrium model there is no necessary connection 
between an exogenous shock itself and the properties of the new institutional 
matrix, in order to speak of path dependence, Mahoney argues that a “relatively 
determined” developmental pathway must be retraceable to the triggering, 
contingent event. Here, the problem remains that the explaining causes of change 
and process remain theory-external, and have to be integrated ever again on an ad-
hoc basis (also pointed out by Streeck 2009, p.18).5  
 
                                                        
4 An indicator for this problem is the following example from an edited volume by Hollingsworth 
and Boyer (Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997a). Instead of addressing the question of the causalities and 
means of explaining change, the introductory chapter called “How and why do social systems of 
production change?” simply states that there is a variety of types of these systems (Hollingsworth & 
Boyer 1997c).  
5 A more comprehensive critique of Mahoney’s idea of “path dependency” will be provided in 
chapter 4. 
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These approaches have been criticised for their rigid dichotomy between moments 
of critical junctures and periods of stable institutional reproduction (Streeck & K. 
Thelen 2005). Streeck and Thelen stress that a “grounded, ‘realistic’ concept of 
social institutions […] emphasizes their being continuously created and recreated 
by a great number of actors with divergent interests, varying normative 
commitments, different powers, and limited cognitions.” (Streeck & K. Thelen 
2005, p.16) However, even Streeck and Thelen cannot resist the temptation to 
formulate their ‘realistic’ approach in ideal-typical terms, binding the open and 
process-oriented emphasis on an inquiry of institutional change, “which may be 
fully understood only with hindsight” (ibid.), back into five types of gradual, 
formative change born out of the endogenous properties of institutions themselves 
(ibid. p.19ff.). Change might therefore be the result of (1) institutions being in 
conflict with each other, leading to a displacement of one institution by another; 
(2) becoming more resilient to change over time with more agents utilising it, 
thereby making other institutions with similar functions obsolete; (3) drifting 
towards new purposes as an effect of failed institutional “maintenance”; (4) being 
consciously redirected towards new purposes; or (5) incentivising behaviour that 
over time undermines the rules it was based on (ibid. 19ff.). These attempts 
succeed in making dynamism an effect of the internal properties of institutions, 
and present a huge intellectual advancement over “punctuated equilibrium” or 
“exogenous shock” models. 
 
Institutionalist explanations of historical change however remain limited due to at 
least two problems of conceiving the relationship between institutions and agency. 
The first problem resides in the focus on institutions itself. What sounds like a plea 
for an inquiry of processes of agency that change institutions in the account 
proposed by Streeck and Thelen (2005), instead becomes a quest for properties 
intrinsic to an institution, or a contradictory or mutually enforcing web of 
institutions, that could explain the direction of change. Institutions are supposed to 
evolve through processes of behavioural adaptation and institutional remodelling, 
but agency is essentially reduced to an executor of developmental trajectories 
programmed into the institutional matrix. This notion is further aggravated by the 
fact that in rejecting a universally applying logic of agency as individual utility 
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maximisation, historical and sociological strands of institutionalism have usually 
stressed constraining over enabling institutional effects, for example when they 
argued that “economic coordinating mechanisms place severe constraints on the 
definition of needs, preferences, and choices of economic actors” (Hollingsworth & 
Boyer 1997b, p.3). Agency did therefore not only disappear behind a 
preoccupation with the specification of an institutional incentive structure, but 
more particularly behind its agency-constraining effects.  
 
The other problem is an extra-paradigmatic limitation of the perceive- and 
thinkable, which is arguably an effect of the shadow that mainstream economics 
has cast over the social sciences (for a good elaboration: Fine & Milonakis 2009b; 
2009a). Agency, if explicitly addressed at all, is ascribed to certain sets of actors 
only, which is particularly pronounced in rational choice approaches such as New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) and VoC: the agents of change are entrepreneurs 
and policy makers. This is in most cases simply assumed without further 
discussion (North 1990; 2005; Hall & Soskice 2001),6 meaning that “the core 
theoretical claims of the VoC approach seem oblivious to or, indeed, downplay the 
significance of the distribution of power among socio-economic groups” 
(Pontusson 2005, p.164). In other cases the focus on elite agents is justified by the 
argument that an understanding of institutional (and more broadly political-
economic) change requires a focus on those actors that possess the highest 
degrees of social, economic and political power – as this is equated with the 
highest potential to induce change (North et al. 2009). The impact of the agency of 
non-elite groupings of people is axiomatically excluded and has, if recognised, to be 
re-integrated ad hoc. These strands of institutionalism have bereft themselves of 
exploring the implications and explanatory capacities of asymmetrical power 
relations for historical change.  
 
The focus on institutions is therefore a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
ideal-typical patterns of social order allow for more complex entry points to 
perceive and order the convoluted mass of empirical facts the researcher is 
                                                        
6 “The agent of change is the individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the 
institutional framework.” (North 1990, p.83) 
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confronted with, thus avoiding the one-fits-all approach of convergence-oriented 
neoclassical economics or capital-logic Marxism. On the other hand, starting from 
an analysis of the institutional playing field tends to falls short of seeing the 
multiplicity and contradictory agency involved in its creation, because it tends to 
order reality according to a limited range of pre-defined ideal-types. The latter is 
not an automatism, and could arguably be avoided by a deliberate focus on deviant 
behaviour or those historical routes not taken (Streeck & K. Thelen 2005, pp.15, 
20),  but this is rarely the case in the actual research carried out. What dominates 
is the expectation of a validation of ideal typical models through historical 
evidence – very much like in structuralist Marxist accounts.  
 
1.3.2.  Institutionalism-inspired Industrial Sociology 
For this study it is particularly institutionalism’s company focus that is of interest. 
Here, it is arguably the VoC approach that is most prominent, which develops two 
ideal types of national economic institutional matrices – coordinated and liberal 
market economies – whose particular features should explain the constraints, 
potentials and means for firms to pursue their interests (Hall & Soskice 2009). This 
approach builds on the Régulation School-inspired concept of “social systems of 
production” (SSP) and is in its components nearly identical – the major difference 
however being VoC’s more rigid foundation in rational choice, which allows for 
game-theoretical modelling. In the following I will focus mainly on the SSP-
approach, not only because it offers a more productive point of entry for the 
theoretical-methodological approach developed below, but also because, in 
contrast to VoC, its main proponents are industrial sociologists specialising in 
research on the automotive industry.   
 
An influential way of framing and comparing the performance of global automotive 
manufacturers have been the twin-concepts of “profit strategies” and “productive 
models” popularised by an international group of industrial sociologists formed in 
the 1990s – the GERPISA. Similar to the emphases of NIE and VoC, profit strategies 
and productive models are firm-level responses to uncertainty problems arising 
under capitalist relations of production: market and labour uncertainty. Market 
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uncertainty forces companies to devise strategies to either correctly estimate 
demand and create a competitive advantage or niche; or to rely on a stabilisation 
of demand in a coordinated national “growth mode”. Labour uncertainty, i.e. the 
risk of not obtaining “from their employees the output that they desire (on time, 
with good quality and at a low cost)” (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002, p.5), confronts 
capitalists with essentially two choices: to separate execution and design and 
establish strict hierarchies; or to establish “a contract of lasting trust with wage 
earners” (ibid. p.6), receiving access to their know-how and co-operation in 
exchange for a higher monetary compensation. These elements are reflected in the 
dichotomy of “liberal” and “coordinated market economies” in the VoC approach. 
 
The concept of the “profit strategy” is a remodelled version of Porter’s 
“competitive strategy” (Porter 1985, p.11ff.) – it denotes the deliberate plan and 
projected development of a company to deploy its resources and organise its 
activities towards the generation of a surplus (or in Porter’s words: towards a 
competitive advantage). Profit strategies are a response to the uncertainty 
problems described above, and are perceived as a result of managerial decision-
making. Following Porter, Boyer and Freyssenet argue that there is only a limited 
range of possible strategies stemming from a combination of decisions on scale, 
quality, product diversification, innovation, flexibility and cost reduction (Boyer & 
Freyssenet 2002, p.14). A “productive model” – with slightly different emphases 
sometimes also called “productive regime”, “industrial” or “work” model (Soskice 
1999; Freyssenet et al. 1998; Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2009) – on the other hand 
denotes how broader institutional conditions, power relations, resources, 
machinery, personnel, knowledge and other means are to be utilised, structured 
and developed in the pursuit of a particular “profit strategy”. Productive models 
are “company governance compromises” (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002, p.20), i.e. their 
coherence hinges on the involved stakeholders agreeing on, or at least not 
obstructing, decisions on the deployment of the means to realise a particular profit 
strategy. Where profit strategy and productive model are compatible, sustainable 
profitability is likely; where they are not, crises may occur. Moreover, a productive 
model is supposed to be “sticky”, i.e. not easily transformable, even if a different 
profit strategy is deemed more viable. Productive models often receive company 
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or country specific labels – for example the “Japanese model” associated with lean 
production; or the “German model” associated with neo-corporatism. That is, to a 
certain extent the concept of a “productive model” blends over into, or can be said 
to be a subdivision of, comparative institutionalist inquiries into “varieties of 
capitalism” (e.g. Streeck 1992; 2009; Soskice 1999; Hancké 2009a). 
 
As Boyer and Freyssenet are keen to emphasise, the identified productive models 
are the result of decades of inductive research and should be taken as “a largely 
unintentional process for creating an external relevancy and internal coherency 
for […] technical, organisational, managerial and social changes” (Boyer & 
Freyssenet 2002, p.23) arising from the transformation of a preceding productive 
model. Although the particular logic behind the “profit strategy”-“productive 
model” combinatory arguably owes more to the Althusserian heritage imported 
through the employed Régulation School framework than to institutionalism alone, 
the same benefits and limitations of ideal typical modelling apply, i.e. a 
downplaying of agency and difficulties to explain change without turning to the ad 
hoc inclusion of theory-external factors.  
 
However, despite these limitations, scholarship from this tradition has produced 
some of the most compelling studies on the automotive industry (Boyer et al. 
1998; Freyssenet et al. 1998; Freyssenet 2009b; Jürgens et al. 1989). It has also left 
its particular mark on the convergence-divergence debate by refuting one of the 
most influential arguments of industrial convergence in the autosector. In 1990 a 
team of MIT researchers published their seminal study on the Japanese car 
industry, entitled The Machine that Changed the World, which not only coined the 
term ‘lean production’, but also proclaimed “that the fundamental ideas of lean 
production are universal” (Womack et al. 1990, p.9). Lean production was 
understood as combining the virtues of mass and crafts production through a 
philosophy of waste-, and thus of cost-reduction. To Womack et al. a ‘lean’ 
production process was ideal-typically characterised by outsourced component 
production; just-in-time supplies and delivery, reducing storage costs; production 
in teams that were also responsible for detection of defects and constant quality 
improvement; and increasing automation. The study famously argued that there 
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would be “a necessary transition from mass production to lean” (ibid. p.12), in 
order for those automotive manufacturers lagging behind in productivity and cost 
effectiveness to improve their performance. Similar to the original proponents of 
the VoC approach, the MIT study was primarily interested in providing scientific 
findings for the purpose of improving company performance – i.e. explicitly 
oriented towards managerial circles (Womack et al. 1990, p.3ff.), where it gained 
substantial influence.  
 
Carried out in conjunction with the MIT study, however, was a project led by a 
team of German researchers, which rather pointed to a diversity of techno-
organisational responses to the Japanese competitors (Jürgens et al. 1989). By the 
late 1990s the GERPISA network (including Jürgens et al.) had solidly established 
that the predictions by Womack et al. of a convergence towards lean production 
were untenable. Instead, from the multiplicity of company-specific case studies, 
they concluded that individual companies rather transferred the “productive 
model” developed in their home-countries to their foreign subsidiaries:  
 
“Companies’ profit strategies and conceivably their productive models will have 
been constructed in a framework enabling the growth strategy and model 
typifying their country or region of origin. The only chance they have for lasting 
profitability is if these strategies and productive models are compatible with the 
growth strategies and models found in the countries where they move.” 
(Freyssenet 2009a, p.4) 
 
In sum, institutionalism, and in particular industrial sociology on the automotive 
industry, provides a useful framework for static and logical mapping of conditions 
on and beyond the shop-floor that shape the conditions under which the social 
agents engaged in production operate. Despite their methodological limitations 
these studies will in the following chapter provide the background information for 
a more detailed discussion of automotive manufacturing at Company X in Mexico 
and China throughout the entire study. The expectation of Company X transferring 
its “productive model” to its subsidiaries renders a productive template to 
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critically engage with the question of intra-industry, respectively intra-company, 
convergence across space and time.   
1.4.  From Convergence to Cyclical Recurrence of Unevenness: World 
Systems Theory and the Works of Beverly Silver 
As outlined in the introduction, a major reference point for this study are the 
works of Beverly Silver. Silver’s arguments are founded on a WST framework 
based on the works of Wallerstein and in particular Arrighi, whose major narrative 
on the development of the global political economy needs to be quickly restated.  
 
As an effect of geo-commercial transformations between the 14th to 16th century 
the global political economy has taken the shape of an organically integrated 
system, characterised by an international division of labour between sovereign but 
interdependent nation states. The relationship between these states is not one of 
mutually beneficial comparative advantage, but of inherent inequality: Areas 
concentrating high value activities – the core – use their economic advantage to 
maintain and strengthen their international position by contracting out lower 
value activities to politically weaker and economically less developed areas – the 
semi-periphery and periphery. Regions within the latter two categories are thus 
“exploited” through resource transfers to the core, reinforcing their subordinate 
position in the hierarchy of states (Wallerstein 1974; 2004). Recurring cycles of 
successive hegemonic states (Genoa/Venice, Holland, Britain, and the United 
States) – invariably characterised as capitalist – periodically alter intra-core 
hierarchies, rearranging and realigning geo-commercial core–(semi-)periphery 
relations (Arrighi 1994). Hegemony is here grounded in innovations in capital-
intensive “labour regimes” (which spill over into commercial and then financial 
superiority), allowing hegemonic states to position themselves at the summit of 
the international division of labour. Hegemonic transitions are decided by intra-
core wars between rising challengers and declining status quo powers (further 
elaborated in Teschke & Wenten 2016).7 
                                                        
7 Arrighi has elaborated his argument with a focus on US-American development (Arrighi 1994) 
and later extended it to East Asia (Arrighi et al. 2003; Arrighi 2008). 
 54 
 
Within this framework “Beverly [Silver] took over the work on labour” (Arrighi 
2009, p.74). Arrighi and Silver argue that cycles of inter-state 
confrontation/hegemonic stability coincide with intensified social conflict/ 
periods of productive social cohesion. A hegemonic cycle is thus characterised not 
only by particular inter-state relations, but also by a specific “historical 
compromise” on the pacification of social tensions. The commercially and 
financially driven concentration of wealth during the ascend of a new hegemon 
produces and recomposes “excluded” social groups and classes – here Arrighi and 
Silver pay tribute to operaist Marxism – whose conflictive potential is first latent, 
but becomes acute when the historical compromise becomes economically and 
politically exhausted, culminating in internal and external crises manifest in 
revolutions and wars. The transition from one hegemonic power to the next occurs 
when a new hegemon is able to (re-) establish a new social compromise – on the 
basis of a more extensive, and finally global, scale (Arrighi & Silver 1999; Silver 
2003, chap.4).  
 
This pattern of cyclical recurrences is linked in the works of Silver to a theory of 
industrial development, drawing on Vernon’s product cycle argument: with the 
maturation of a product profit margins within the respective industrial sector 
begin to shrink, as an effect of increasing competition (Vernon 1971). This limits 
the economic and political space for compromise between labour and capital, and 
the likeliness of social conflict increases. Borrowing from Harvey, Silver theorises 
that capital reacts to these pressures by adopting certain “fixes”, i.e. 
spatiotemporally limited solutions to lower costs and/or increase managerial 
control. These fixes can take the form of spatial fixes – geographical relocation of 
production to regions with lower costs for resources and/or labour; technological 
fixes – changes in the organization of production; product-fixes – a shift of capital 
from one line of production to another or a dissection of a formerly integrated line 
of production; and financial fixes – a transfer of industrial capital into finance 
(Silver 2003, p.38ff.). Capital shifting sectors or relocating from the core to the 
periphery has an impact on workers’ power at the old and new locales. Following 
Wright (1985) Silver argues that workers have mainly two sources of power: 
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structural power that stems from the strategic position workers employ in the 
“marketplace” (higher in case of a labour shortage) and “workplace” (higher in 
case of processes that are disruption-sensitive or rely on a particular group of 
workers); and organisational power based on associational cohesion and a 
collective potential to act. The decline of structural and organisational power – and 
with it a re-composition of the working class – in the old sectors/locations 
coincides with the emergence of a new working class and power potentials at new 
industrial sites, correlating with respective defensive and offensive labour 
struggles. Such crises of profitability and control are then linked back to the 
hegemonic cycle, by interpreting them as symptoms of a political-economic decline 
of one hegemon and the beginning of a transition period towards a new leading 
industry and a new leading global power emerging from the semi-periphery. The 
cycles Silver describes concern textiles and Great Britain for the 19th century, 
automobiles and the US for the 20th century, and arguably semiconductors and 
China for the 21st century (Silver 2003).  
 
Silver is mainly interested in the diffusion and alteration of the structural and 
organisational power of the working class with spatial, technological, product and 
financial fixes, as well as with geopolitics and war. Similar to Harvey, Silver’s – and 
Arrighi’s – theories of global political-economic development locate the prime 
mover in an intrinsically expansive dynamic of capital, respectively the necessity 
to constantly re-invent solutions to profitability constraints. Even though Silver’s 
works are crucial in bringing in a labour perspective, this is essentially addressed 
through a stimulus-response pattern in which the agency of capital is conceived in 
the ideal-typical form of certain “fixes” and that of labour essentially reduced to 
unrest. Silver’s work thus transcends WST in certain regards, but suffers from an 
underestimation of the relational constitution of power between capital and 
labour; and of how local material, political, institutional and subjective 
idiosyncrasies are mobilised by these actors in the pursuit of their respective 
strategies. Why certain locales become a destination for capital relocations; why a 
certain intra-sectoral restructuring of relations between terminal assembly plants 
and suppliers emerges; or why one techno-organisational fix is chosen over 
another thus remains outside the explanatory scope of her theory. The problem 
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with the WST framework is essentially that of a systemic logic predetermining the 
possibilities of social change in such a way that historical transformations do not 
appear as potentially open processes with altering effects on the systemic logic 
itself, but rather as functional responses to the internal contradictions of the 
system (for a detailed elaboration of this critique see Brenner 1977). In the worst 
case, such arguments are highly functionalist and teleological: certain historical 
developments prevail over others, because they suit the functionality of the world-
system as a whole – even if this functionality should only realise itself in the future.  
 
1.5.  Interim Conclusion 
To sum up, the approaches discussed above suffer from two main shortcomings. 
Despite sophisticated attempts to reconcile structure and agency on a theoretical 
level – through institutional evolution or dialectics – most accounts, with the 
exception of certain agency-centred strands of Marxism, give priority to structure 
over agency when approaching history and empirical reality. This has given rise to 
mechanistic understandings of historical change, tending towards interpretations 
of history as expressions of an underlying logic, static comparisons or cyclically 
recurring variations on a theme.  
 
Nevertheless, some of the theoretical tools developed in these traditions offer a 
productive starting point for a historicist and agency-centred inquiry, because they 
allow for a mapping of structural and institutional factors that might be relevant to 
the “agentic capacities” (Konings 2010) of the actors in focus. Three concepts will 
therefore be heuristically drawn upon in the following analysis. First, the concept 
of a “productive model” will be used for a static depiction of how Company X ideal-
typically combines elements relevant to the profitable running of an automotive 
factory. This will provide a starting point for an agency-centred analysis, as it 
draws a roadmap towards potentially significant areas of relational agency in the 
historical development and day-to-day operations of the company. Secondly, the 
question of workers’ “structural” and “organisational” power will be used not as 
explanatory factors in their own right, but as a descriptive tool for an 
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understanding of certain power potentials that agents might draw upon in their 
particular spatiotemporal context. Third and finally, the idea of capitalist “fixes” 
will be used as orientation marks to analytically structure the processes of 
relational agency shaping the development of Company X in China and Mexico.    
 
2.  Agency, Process and Change 
The relationship between structure (institutional, political and economic) and 
agency constitutes a longstanding sociological puzzle. As we have seen in the 
discussion of institutionalism – and much of that is true for a large part of the 
Marxist tradition – attempts to reconcile the two poles have tended to emphasise 
(the constraining effects of) structure over agency, reducing the latter either to an 
executor of pre-determined logics, or to that which escapes the structure, i.e. a 
theory-external, exogenous factor that breaks with and changes the structural logic 
in cataclysmic events and ruptures. If attempts to solve this puzzle on an 
ontological level – for example through “dialectics” or “structuration”8 – have 
repeatedly lapsed back empirically into an advocacy of structure over agency, then 
it might be more productive, though also not ideal, to shift the emphasis away from 
an ontological to a methodological level and make a conscious choice for 
prioritizing relational agency. In proposing the latter, I am drawing on Knafo’s 
argument that:  
 
“The agency/structure debate is thus ill defined because it examines the issue in 
terms of a dual relation between structure and agent, when in fact we are dealing 
with a social relation between agents which is only mediated by structures. […] 
There is simply no way around this incompatibility of structural power and 
agency. One can seek to make this relationship as dialectical as possible, but there 
                                                        
8 The ambiguity between structure and agency is exemplified by Gidden’s theory of structuration 
and the critiques it received. Giddens argues that “the constitution of agents and structures are not 
to independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the 
notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and 
outcome of the practices they recursively organize. Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as 
memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more ‘internal’ than 
exterior to the activities in a Durkheimian sense.” (Giddens 1984, p.25) This notion of internalised 
structures has been criticised as both voluntarism (e.g. Archer 1982; Callinicos 1985; Layder 2006) 
and determinism (Bauman 1989) – and finally, in light of this ambivalence, unable to inform 
empirical research in a meaningful way (Gregson 1989).   
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will always be a choice to be made even if it is a reluctant one” (Knafo 2010, 
pp.504, 506). 
A choice for agency is however not without problems – as it remains highly 
obscure what “agency” as a sociological category should denote. Philosophically, 
agency has mainly been discussed under the dichotomy of causality and teleology – 
i.e. the question whether an action is explained by its causes or by its purpose. 
Leaving the more complex debates aside I propose to interpret teleological agency 
as a form of causal agency for the time being (for details see Horn & Löhrer 2010). 
In other words, I heuristically suggest that an agent fulfils an action in order to 
realise an intention, because there are reasons why he or she would do so (see also 
Mele 2010). This does not say anything about the action leading to the intended 
result; nor should it preclude a priori cases of actions being unintentional and 
therefore only open to causal explanations.  
 
More important for this study than these questions – which are geared towards the 
problem of single, individual actions – is however how agency unfolds in a process 
involving multiple agents, in which the actions of some agents affect those of other 
agents, either immediately through these actions, or mediated through an 
alteration of certain circumstances these agents share. That is, beyond the abstract 
philosophical considerations on explanations of agency we enter the realm of 
complex sociological debates on questions of social agency. However, the 
dichotomy of teleological and causal explanations of agency still pertains to 
sociological action theory, in the form of a spectrum from structural-determinist 
explanations resting on causal explanations to rational-choice explanations 
retracing aggregate structures or institutions to the intentional agency of utility 
maximising individuals (for a good overview see Miebach 2014). 
 
For the practical purpose of this study, I again follow Knafo in his suggestion that:  
 
“Structural constraints do not materialize as imperatives for one agent if there is 
no other agent who threatens to act upon these constraints. […] What appears to 
be a product of structural constraints should thus be analysed as a product of 
agency. The reason for this is that one gets a richer picture of social dynamics 
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when taking into account the people who exploit structures, rather than simply 
those who are constrained by them. The focus is then set on what is being achieved 
through these structures, rather than simply on the product that results from these 
actions. In other words, we examine the process of social construction, rather than 
limiting ourselves to its outcome.” (Knafo 2010, p.504f.) 
 
In a sense this notion takes up the Open Marxist idea of structures as a social form, 
or “mode of existence” of relational agency again, but avoids an a priori definition 
of these structures as “capitalist” and the agency as “class struggle”. This makes 
room for an investigation of relational agency in historical and empirical terms 
without assuming that it corresponds to an ideal typical capitalist form – but also 
without precluding that it might. It is, so to speak, a methodological stratagem to 
ensure that the knowledge of “the internal organization of the capitalist mode of 
production, its ideal average, as it were” (Marx 1991, p.970) is taken in the 
historical analysis as nothing but a guiding heuristic, whose concrete existence 
needs to be proven and in its specificity explained in each instance and ever again. 
The research focus is on social processes, in which structures (and institutions) are 
treated as the historical products of relational agency, whose social function and 
significance is not explained by defining its particular constraining or enabling 
effects, but by analysing how social agents act through mobilising these structures 
as mediators and thereby reinforce, defy, destroy, reinterpret, or transform them. 
This includes an investigation of the question “enabling for whom through 
constraining whose agency?”  
 
Crucial to this agency is the act itself, which does not have to correspond to the 
properties of the institution/structure that is mobilised, as any such act might 
always involve conscious or unconscious re- or mis-interpretation. That is, agency 
involves, as theories of symbolic interaction prominent in institutionalist 
reasoning emphasise, an interpretative element. Actors “make sense” of their 
surroundings and the agency of others on the basis of past experiences, 
knowledge, available interpretative patterns (stemming, at least in part, from 
institutions) and as effects of the interaction process itself (developed into a 
proper theory of action by Mead 1967; but present also in, for exemaple, Giddens 
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1984). However, the potential to act and realise those actions, the formation of 
collective actors, as well as the final results of interactive processes cannot be 
sufficiently explained by symbolic or discursive interaction alone (for an 
unconvincing attempt at the latter see for example Laclau & Mouffe 1985). 
Material aspects, such as the ownership of or access to economic and political 
resources, are critical – and the most prominent example of this is the relationship 
between the ownership of the means of production and the formation of social 
classes (Marx 1983). This implies that agents will have different levels of ‘agentic 
capacity’ – or power: 
 
“some actors can avail themselves of capacities that give them access to a much 
wider menu of opportunities. […] Such inequality of capacities is never fully 
expressed in the abstractness of social forms themselves.” (Konings 2010, p.70) 
 
Differential power relations between agents do not per se emanate from the 
properties of the institutional matrix itself – although some institutions or 
structures constrain the agency of one group of agents versus that of another 
already by design – but from the process of agents (trans-) forming the relations 
between them in their acting upon and within such institutions or structures. As 
should be clear from this perspective, this is not a voluntaristic argument, negating 
the social relevance of structures and institutions. The point is rather that a focus 
on structures, recurrent patterns or institutional matrices – as valid as it might be 
as a heuristic tool to chart the social playing field – is unable to offer causal 
explanations to questions of social process and change. The direction of agency is 
therefore not explicable by the institutional or structural matrix, and even less so 
is the result of the actions taken. Instead the process of relational agency, in which 
agents draw on – and in that process might reshape the social implications of – 
structural and institutional factors is something to be understood in its own right, 
something that reveals its explanatory power only through detailed historical and 
empirical inquiry.   
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2.1.  Who are the Workers? 
As the main focus of this study is the inquiry of processes of worker agency in their 
interrelation with those of capital, a brief reflection on the sociological category 
“working class” is in order. I follow Ellen Wood in her argument that “there are 
really only two ways of thinking theoretically about class: either as a structural 
location or as a social relation.” (Wood 1995, p.76) In light of the focus on 
relational agency elaborated above, I embrace the latter notion of class, to which 
an emphasis on its internal “composition” is added, in order to account for intra-
class dynamism and differentiation. 
The writings of Marx have not left us with an unambiguous concept of class. In The 
Poverty of Philosophy Marx emphasizes that class formation takes place through 
the practical creation of structural conditions in which direct producers find 
themselves as a mass of wage labourers – it only exists as a class versus capital in 
their shared existence as workers. The formation as a “class for itself” takes place 
over the course of struggle, through which their multifaceted interests gain a 
collective form of class interest (Marx & Engels 1976, p.213). Here we can find 
“almost all elements essential for an analytical concept of social practice (in the 
sense of the Theses on Feuerbach), in which the working class is created by certain 
external conditions in as much as it creates itself” (Vester 2008, p.739f.). Class thus 
designates a social relation between producers and appropriators of the social 
product – and class formation and practice can only be observed as historical 
process.  
 
However, in Capital Marx claims that “the characters who appear on the economic 
stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between 
them” (Marx & Engels 1996, p.94) and could be “discerned” from the economic 
structure, respectively be identified through their economic location (Marx & 
Engels 1998, p.750). This has given rise to a rather large body of neo-Marxist 
literature attempting to define class in terms of abstract criteria such as that of the 
ownership of means of production, waged work, control over production and other 
factors (to name only the two most prominent accounts: Poulantzas 1978; Wright 
1985). The procedure is thereby similar to Weber’s construction of ideal types: 
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class is a group of individuals that shares certain interests in the market place due 
to their shared social “location” defined by the ownership or non-ownership of 
goods, the latter being empirically identifiable by the researcher as the class-
defining feature (Weber 2002, pp.177, 532). Though a static picture of class 
structure enables us to unravel and quantify certain aspects of class (such as: 
which sectoral occupation, which income, which degree of control over production 
etc.), it does not allow for any causal explanations, because the essential aspect of 
historical genealogy as an effect of human practice is lost. The question at stake 
here is however how class processes themselves affect and influence history. 
 
In order to understand the agency of the working class in the force field of 
imperatives imposed by capital and “autonomous” working class behaviour, the 
Italian operiasts employed the useful concept of class composition: 
  
“What is essential is […] the dialectical relation between the structure of the whole 
of labour as it is determined by capital; and processes of the advancing autonomy 
and endemic subordination of the working class – or […] between the technical 
(taking place fully within capitalist determination) and political (being located 
fully outside of capital) composition of the working class.” (Bock 1973, p.4; see also 
Wright 2002) 
 
Theoretically, a focus on class composition does not transform the “classic” 
Marxian idea of class as mentioned above. It rather serves as a more nuanced lens 
through which to analyse class processes, so that internal differentiations and 
concrete historical determinants of class will not be missed: relations of gender, 
nationality, ethnicity etc. At the same time, the focus on class composition brings in 
the agency of workers not as mere reflection or response to economic necessities 
but as a more complex social expression of subjective experience and desire, and 
practical processing of external circumstances. It should thus be clear that even 
though this study is empirically concerned with the archetype of the 20th century 
worker – men doing manual labour in a car factory – the workers being the objects 
(and to a certain degree subjects) of this study should be understood as only a 
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particular segment of much more diverse working class.9 Finally, it should be 
added that the same holds true for the composition of the capitalist and 
managerial class, which does not present itself as a monolithic bloc, but is in its 
class-agency also determined by its particular internal composition, which might 
change in the process of horizontal and vertical class agency. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
I have argued that the convergence-divergence debate suffers from a theoretical 
and methodological underestimation of constitutive agency more generally, but of 
that of non-elite social groups, in particular workers, more specifically. This is due 
to an overwhelming preoccupation with abstract assumptions on human 
behaviour or economic laws in the cases of neoclassical economics and structural 
Marxism; historical macro patterns of cyclical recurrence in World Systems 
approaches; and the properties of institutional matrices conceived as static ideal 
types within institutionalism. Notwithstanding awareness and development of 
creative theoretical remedies for these problems within each theoretical paradigm, 
a bias towards an empirical analysis of structures, governing laws and institutions 
instead of processes of agency remains.     
 
As a heuristic measure I have therefore proposed that the historical significance 
and social effects of structures – and institutions – are best understood not 
through a specification of their behaviour-structuring properties alone, but 
through an analysis of processes of agency in which these properties are 
“mobilised”, that is, interpreted, used, acted upon and potentially changed. I 
propose that, as a rule, these processes imply that the agency of one set of agents 
co-constitutes – constrains or empowers – the agency of other agents. That is, this 
study undertakes the practical attempt to base the analysis of historical and 
empirical evidence more firmly in a notion of relational agency. 
 
                                                        
9 To capture this diversity, Marcel van der Linden suggests the – arguably somewhat bulky – 
definition: “the ensemble of carriers of labour power whose labour power is sold or hired out to 
another person under economic or non-economic compulsions, regardless of whether the carrier of 
labour power is himself or herself selling or hiring it out and, regardless of whether the carrier 
himself or herself owns any means of production.” (van der Linden 2014, p.80)  
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The extra-individual existence of structures and institutions is therefore not 
denied, ignored or reduced to “spontaneous orders” as an aggregate result of 
individual acts. The argument is simply that the existence of structures and 
institutions by themselves tells us nothing yet about how people act within them – 
and that therefore a focus on structures and institutions alone can chart the 
conditions for human agency, but not explain historical change (including change 
of the structures and institutions it uses to describe the conditions of agency). 
Though more theoretical work needs to be done to develop a more precise notion 
of these rough propositions, caution is demanded when trying to solve these 
questions within the realm of theory alone. Ultimately, the historical significance of 
human agency can only be assessed in concrete spatio-temporally situated 
contexts – and arguably for reasons of practicality, a necessarily limited number of 
cases – through historical-empirical investigation.  
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Chapter 3: Setting the Scene – Social Conditions for 
Agency 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background information on 
the particular case study. It will describe certain macroeconomic, demographic and 
institutional factors relevant for an understanding of the developmental dynamics 
of Company X in both China and Mexico. In doing so, it also addresses in more 
detail how certain theoretical assumptions presented in the preceding chapter, 
translate into the defining features of Company X’s “productive model”. It also 
approaches attempts to decipher workers’ “structural and organisational power” 
(Wright 1985; Silver 2003) through a brief overview on labour markets, labour 
laws and union culture in China and Mexico. That is, this chapter outlines the 
structural and institutional conditions for worker agency before putting their 
explanatory value for the concrete developmental strategy of Company X in China 
and Mexico to the test through a more detailed analysis of how they have been 
mobilised – and some of them altered – in processes of relational agency between 
capital and labour. 
 
I will first discuss how the operations of Company X are understood in the relevant 
literature as a particular “Company X model”, which is a necessary precondition for 
an analysis of convergent and divergent dynamics at its Mexican and Chinese 
subsidiaries. A historical overview of the development of automotive production in 
both countries should then provide the necessary context for my case studies and 
exemplify explanations based on government-business interactions, which 
dominate in the literature. Before I discuss formal institutional and organisational 
conditions to worker agency in the form of labour laws and trade unions in both 
countries, I will give an overview of the composition of the workforce at Company 
X in China and Mexico, and, more particularly, of management at Company X in 
China. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the issues most relevant for 
the further analysis.  
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1.  The Company 
Any theoretical paradigm creates – in a somewhat self-referential manner – 
problems of its internal consistency and coherence that are born from, pertain to 
and are intelligible only within its own particular theoretical-methodological 
edifice (that is, problems that are likely to be resolved through theoretical 
refinement rather than paradigmatic abandonment of the established core 
axiomatic: see the still relevant debate in Lakatos & Musgrave 1970). An approach 
resting on the construction of typologies is confronted with two essential issues: 
the choice of type-characteristic criteria; and, as a substitute for a theory of 
historical change, the sequencing of individual types in time and space. In the 
literature on Company X the former issue has resulted in the ideal-types of a 
“volume and diversity” strategy (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002, chap.6), and “neo-
corporatist” industrial relations (Streeck 1989; 1992). The latter issue has led to 
some debate over how and on what grounds to divide the (international) 
development of Company X into characteristic periods (Wellhöner 1996; Haipeter 
2000; Jürgens 1998; 2009), with interim results being concisely summarised by 
Pries (2003). In the following I will briefly outline the main parameters of the two 
aforementioned ideal types. I will then give a short overview of historical changes 
in Company X’s engagement with the world market, before providing the 
necessary background information on its operations in China and Mexico. 
 
1.1.  “Profit Strategy” and Industrial Relations at Company X 
1.1.1.  The “Volume and Diversity” Strategy 
The origins of the “volume and diversity” strategy go back to General Motor’s 
strategic positioning in the US automotive market of the 1920s, when Ford 
produced a single model at high volume (“volume” strategy) and other car 
manufacturers specialised in customised models, oriented at small upper market 
segments (“diversity” strategy). After extending its model range through mergers 
and acquisitions, GM began to combine the extended variety of available designs 
with the assembly of standardised, mass-produced, non-visible components across 
different models. Essentially, this was the birth of the “platform” strategy that most 
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global car producers adopted sooner or – in case of Company X – later (in the mid-
1970s). Different bodies (or “hats”) with different visible designs and technical 
features could be attached to a shared “platform”, that is, a substructure with 
standardised length and width for the placement of axes, motor, powertrain and 
other core parts. This allowed for variation across models, while at the same time 
reducing costs through the utilisation of standardised parts.  
 
According to Boyer and Freyssenet, this “volume and diversity” strategy finds its 
limit in two main factors: the company-internal “productive model”, and the 
structure of its target markets. To produce a wide product range at high volume, 
polyvalent machinery and workers are required on the shop floor; innovations by 
competitors need to be copied and integrated quickly; and the pool of supply firms 
has to be diverse or flexible enough to adapt to the changing mix of required parts. 
A large, non-polarised but finely stratified market is required, accepting different 
price levels for models that share components and only differ in design and 
accessories. Growing working class consumption after World War II made this 
model viable in the US. But by the late 1960s it ran into crisis when the market was 
saturated and the model range did not seem attractive to consumers anymore; 
productivity growth slowed, limiting the redistributive capacities of the firm; and 
workers’ resistance to the monotonous form of work soared (Boyer & Freyssenet 
2002, chap.6).  
 
Amongst a range of European, US American and Japanese car makers, Company X 
has been said to be the only one “that was apt to implement this strategy durably 
in a profitable way” (Freyssenet & Lung 2004, p.88). The assumption is that it will 
attempt to implement this strategy in its foreign subsidiaries.    
 
1.1.2.  “Neo-Corporatism” at Company X 
Until their unilateral dissolution by the social democratic-green governing 
coalition in the 1990s (Streeck 2009, chap.4), Germany’s national social policy and 
industrial relations have often been characterised as “neo-corporatist” – a term 
that in the 1970s and 80s attracted much attention by sociologists researching the 
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institutional matrices of Western European states (and by extension their 
comparative performance with other advanced capitalist countries) (for the 
German context e.g. Schmitter 1974; Lehmbruch 1977; Streeck 1992). The core 
feature of neo-corporatism was the governmental orchestration of relations 
between social interest groups – in particular capital and labour – through the 
provision of institutional rules and regulations within which these respective 
groups had relative autonomy in conducting their affairs (Streeck & Kenworthy 
2005).10 In the German case, the “social partnership” characterising industrial 
relations in the automotive sector was the flagship example of this arrangement:   
 
“Nowhere else has the German industrial relations system performed better than 
in the automotive industry, and no industry has in the past contributed more to the 
evolution of the system.” (Streeck 1992, p.176) 
 
In the broadest terms, this model was characterised by national employers’ 
federations and industrial unions agreeing to confine direct economic action – 
strikes and lockouts – to the realm of collective bargaining over remuneration and 
working conditions. Politics were left to lobbying and donations; parity 
representation in certain legislative bodies on social policy; and to ad hoc 
consultations by the government. Unions recognised private property, were 
closely aligned to the social-democratic party, and based their largely cooperative 
behaviour on governmental concessions on inclusive welfare policy. Depending on 
size and sector, works councils, as the representative bodies of the workforce on 
the shop floor, were granted the right to information, consultation or to co-
determination of managerial decisions (regulated by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 
of 1952, amended 1972).  
 
                                                        
10 See also the seminal definition of corporatism given by Schmitter: “Corporatism can be defined 
as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.” (Schmitter 
1974, p.93f.) 
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Company X has always employed a particular position in this system, due to its 
combined public-private ownership structure; and its exemption from national 
collective agreements, which resulted in a more extensive system of “co-
determination”, involving the company’s works council in critical decision making. 
The latter, in turn, has strengthened the role of the IG Metall trade union in 
Company X’s internal and external affairs, as members of the works council are de 
facto bound to also be union members (on the latter see Speidel 2005). Effectively, 
relocation of production or the founding of subsidiaries requires the support of the 
employee representation; and an external acquisition of Company X or strategic 
changes in capital procurement require the support of the Northern German 
federal state, whose holdings provide it with a blocking minority (for recent legal 
disputes around this issue see Ritter 2011; Der Spiegel 2013). 
 
Despite the post-1990s changes in German industrial relations on a national level – 
declining union membership and ever fewer industry-wide collective agreements – 
works council and union have retained a strong position within Company X’s 
corporate governance structure. Streeck for example has famously argued that the 
high degree of works council/union involvement in company decisions entailed 
“beneficial constraints”: the prevention of short-term cost-cutting through mass 
lay-offs and wage reduction compelled management to embrace strategies of 
quality-improvement and product diversification to position itself in global 
markets (Streeck 1989); led to training beyond immediate production necessities; 
involved workers in decisions on corporate strategy; and caused a “humanization 
of work” (Streeck 1992, p.32f.). More recently, Haipeter, Speidel and Jürgens have 
discussed how these particular industrial relations affect and are transformed by 
Company X’s answers to increasing competitive pressure (Haipeter 2000; Speidel 
2005; Jürgens 2009). A determining relation between labour-capital relations and 
company behaviour is thus acknowledged, although this is usually bound back into 
a focus on the rules and regulations governing industrial relations, rather than on 
the processes of agency in which these institutions are mobilised and changed.  
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1.1.3.  The Emergence of a Global “Volume and Diversity” Strategy at 
Company X 
As suggested in the institutionalist literature discussed above, and widely 
replicated in company-specific industrial sociological accounts, the particular 
“Company X model” is arguably best characterised by high volume production, 
high wages, public-private ownership and in particular the strong co-
determination of company strategy through the formalised influence of workers’ 
representations (Jürgens 2009).  In the following I will briefly recapture the 
historical development of the “Company X model” and the implications for its 
global operations.  
 
Large-scale passenger car production at Company X only took off in the mid-1950s. 
Until the mid-1970s Company X mainly followed what Boyer and Freyssenet 
characterise as a “volume” strategy (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002, chap.5) – it sought 
to reduce unit costs through standardised mass production of a limited product 
line (until the late 1970s just one sedan car model) and continuous productivity 
increases based on technology intensive production with a deep vertical range of 
manufacture. It mirrored the US “Fordist” experience, although, differing from US 
auto firms, Company X was always more dependent on foreign than on domestic 
demand. Already in 1955 Company X exported more than 50% of its overall 
production – compared to merely 5% of US auto firms (Wellhöner 1996, pp.181, 
193).  
 
During this period the employee representation at Company X developed a 
cooperative stance towards management, based on increasing rationalization and 
automation – the substitution of machinery for living labour – at stable labour 
intensity and rising wages (Haipeter 2000; Jürgens 1998). Industrial relations at 
Company X were put to the test after the 1974 oil crisis and the preceding end of 
the Bretton Woods system. Generally sluggish demand for its single model, and the 
appreciation of the German mark strongly contracted Company X’s exports. Similar 
to GM in the 1920s Company X acquired another German car manufacturer – 
which today has become the Company Group’s upscale brand – in order to exit 
from the crisis via a diversification of its product range. This strategy, however, 
 71 
came too late to match the entry of Japanese cars into the same lower segments in 
US and European markets. Company X entered a serious crisis and responded by 
announcing mass layoffs – and by setting up a production site in the US, in order to 
become more independent of exchange rate fluctuations in the future. In response 
to management’s changing preference towards cost-cutting and the growth of 
foreign manufacturing sites, works council and union at the German headquarters 
intensified their pro-active cooperative stance, making employment security in 
Germany and equal risk allocation between different production-sites their 
primary aim:  
 
“Job security for increased performance and innovation was the exchange formula 
of the collective agreements. […] Business policies of employment, cost reduction, 
organisation and internationalisation all became matters of industrial relations. 
Thereby, industrial relations gained a direct influence on the company’s strategic 
decisions.” (Haipeter 1999, pp.163, 157) 
 
The layoffs could finally be avoided through compromise agreements. Such capital-
labour accords, in particular on a combined reduction of working hours and 
salaries (Kurzarbeit), would later be heralded as Germany’s “miracle” solution to 
prevent job losses in times of economic crises (Economist 2010). They were 
essential to the gradual shift of Company X’s corporate strategy towards the ideal 
type of a “volume and diversity model” strategy in the 1980s and early 1990s: 
Technologically, the introduction of robotics aimed at a flexibilisation of 
production in terms of volume and product variety; and the use of 
microelectronics at improved logistics. Company X began to develop shared 
components and platforms for various models, which would allow for increasing 
returns to scale with an extended model range. Because cost reduction of fixed 
capital was extremely limited due to the introduction of new technology, savings 
were instead to be achieved through lower operating cost. The number of 
employees in administration and logistics was reduced, as was the vertical range of 
manufacture by way of outsourcing. Finally, cost reduction began to gain more 
importance relative to market access as a driving factor behind 
internationalisation (Haipeter 2000, p.177ff.; Pries 2003).  
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The employee representation played an ambivalent role in these processes, 
particularly in the growing global operations of the company. Manufacturing in the 
Global South was increasingly undertaken not to circumvent import barriers – as 
for example in the establishment of its subsidiaries in Mexico in the 1960s – but for 
reasons of export-oriented component production to supply other Company X 
locations. From the 1980s onwards Company X expanded internationally through 
the acquisition of foreign car manufacturers (e.g. in Spain and the Czech Republic), 
which led for the first time to competition between different locations producing 
one and the same model for the same markets. The employee representation at the 
Germany headquarters pushed for the formation of a European works council, 
which set out to pressure the company not to engage in a competitive downward 
spiral of cost reduction between different locations. However, even though the 
German works council reached out to foreign subsidiaries, at crucial points in time 
its strategy remained nationalist, respectively Eurocentric. The closure of the US-
American subsidiary that reshaped the operations of Company X in China and 
Mexico, for example, was not an immediate economic necessity, but rather an 
effect of Company X’s works council pushing for employment guarantees in 
Germany. Instead of reducing production in Germany and increasing it in the US – 
which would have been the more cost-effective strategy – management instead 
agreed to close the US plant (Haipeter 1999, p.156).  
 
While Company X was expanding between the 1970s and early 1990s, “problems 
had been piling up since the late 1980s: poor productivity, negative returns to 
sales, and a break-even point exceeding 105% of normal production capacity at 
some stage pointed to serious weaknesses in the organisation of production.” 
(Jürgens 2009, p.229) At the peak of the apparent crisis, in 1993, Company X hired 
a new CEO, who negotiated a deal with the works council to reduce overstaffing 
through Kurzarbeit. He also embraced a radical cost-cutting strategy that 
effectively tilted the structural power between works council and management 
further to the latter. Under the influence of Womack et al.’s MIT study the new 
management pushed for a reduction of the vertical range of manufacture through 
further outsourcing – which in a second step entailed the re-integration of 
independent suppliers under the same roof as assembly operations (obviously at 
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lower cost). This process would eventually peak in 2001, with Company X 
founding a separate subsidiary under its own roof. This subsidiary undercut 
existing collective agreements in terms of working hours, pay, unpaid training 
obligations and other regards. Employee representatives and the Northern federal 
state gave their approval to the deal, as it created 5000 new jobs in Germany. This 
replicated on German soil a strategy surfacing in the 1990s of Company X 
benchmarking all its production sites – nationally and internationally – against the 
one with the lowest cost. Pries succinctly summarised these developments:  
 
“The strategic function of each plant is to maximize the exploitation of all local 
idiosyncrasies and to optimize intra-consortium competition and learning 
processes.” (Pries 2003, p.56) 
 
Corporate governance increasingly took the form of multi-centred intra-company 
group competition, with semi-autonomous brands operating under the 
concentrated decision-making power of the main brand’s German headquarters. 
Product and market strategies became increasingly integrated with the cross-
brand extension of shared platforms throughout the 1990s. This, in turn, implied a 
trans- rather than multi-nationalisation of production and a certain 
homogenisation of techno-organisational processes, so that economies of scale 
could be exploited to a sufficient extent, and models produced more flexibly at 
different locations (Jürgens 2009, Pries 2003).  
 
The aforementioned processes accelerated in the new millennium. Company X 
began to acquire shares of other car and truck manufacturers that it deemed to 
have strategic value; and it extended its platform strategy to these brands. By 
2004, 95% of Company X’s cars were produced on the basis of shared platforms 
(Jürgens 2009, p.231). One year later, this was taken a step further by the 
“modularisation” of production: different platforms were broken down into 
smaller standardised components that could be combined across models to allow 
for more differentiation while maintaining standardised mass production 
(discussed in detail in chapter 6). As Jürgens emphasizes, the “savings that could 
be achieved through this strategy were far greater than those that even the most 
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stringent rationalisation measures could have brought” (ibid. p.232). 
Modularisation gave Company X a competitive edge over other global car 
manufacturers after the mid 2000s, but it could not prevent the impact of the 2008 
crisis. The slump in its European and US export markets caused it to lay off all of its 
16,500 temporary workers in Germany (Der Spiegel 2009; Kuntz 2010) – although 
it recovered more quickly than its rivals, which was mainly attributable to its 
lucrative China business (discussed in more detail in section 3.2.2. ).  
 
To sum up, Company X has been said to pursue a particular profit strategy of 
combining high volume production with flexible design. This gains plausibility 
with its more recent push towards a “modularisation” of production. The 
“Company X model” was however not solely technical in nature, but rather 
fostered by a particular capital-labour accord at the German headquarters: the 
works council cooperated in technological changes and co-managing the 
internationalisation of the company in exchange for employment security and job 
creation in Germany (the quality of these new jobs being ambivalent at best).  
 
In light of the initially discussed assumption that transnational companies seek to 
replicate their profit strategies and productive models in their subsidiaries gains 
leverage from the fact that platform strategies and modularisation tend to 
delocalise the assembly of specific models, due to the large number of shared 
components. On the other hand, if technological processes become standardised 
between locations, the aim of “exploiting all local idiosyncrasies” has to stem from 
other factors. This dilemma prefigures what will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters, namely the role that industrial relations and worker agency 
play in processes of convergence and divergence between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Before we turn to these issues, I will briefly review emergence of 
automotive production in China and Mexico, and that of Company X’s subsidiaries 
more specifically. 
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2.  The Political Economy of the Automotive Industry in China 
and Mexico 
Transnational corporations do not encounter a blank slate when they open foreign 
subsidiaries, but rather a system of local institutions, power relations and 
interests. This has most prominently been discussed under the question of the 
declining political and economic relevance of the nation state versus the rise of 
TNCs or ‘globalised capital’ (e.g. on the rise of global private actors/or an 
impersonal, deterritorialised capitalist “empire” at the expense of sovereign nation 
states: Hardt & Negri 2000; Robinson 2004; for a retained dominance of the 
national, e.g. Weiss 1998 and the comparative institutionalist literature). Here, 
however, I will limit the focus more specifically to the historical emergence of 
automotive production in China and Mexico, which has mainly been understood as 
a negotiated result between the interests of global car producers, domestic policy 
makers at local and central levels, and (in some cases) local capital (for Mexico see: 
Bennett & Sharpe 1985; Micheli 1994; Tuman 2003; Arteaga 2003; for China see: 
Harwit 1994; Thun 2006; Chin 2010; L. Zhang 2014a; the idea was formalised in 
the concept of a “triple alliance” by Evans 1979).  
 
To oversimplify the existing narrative somewhat, policy makers were primarily 
interested in steering industrial policy towards the development of an 
internationally competitive national automotive sector; and TNCs in first gaining 
market access and, at a later stage (e.g. in the Mexican case), favourable conditions 
for export-oriented production. That the actual development of the automotive 
sector in Mexico and China panned out rather differently could then be explained 
as the result of institutional matrices shaping the interests of policy makers and 
TNCs (Thun 2006), respectively the power relations and actual bargaining 
processes between them (Bennett & Sharpe 1985; Chin 2010). These accounts are 
compelling and empirically rigorous, yet, they suffer to a greater or lesser degree 
from an underestimation of the social force-field in which these strategies 
unfolded, i.e. the relationship between industrial policy and broader class 
processes in the respective countries, and labour more particularly.  
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I will discuss the emergence of automotive production separately for the Chinese 
and Mexican cases, following for the time being the argument that they were the 
result of state-TNC bargaining processes. I will then give a brief overview of 
Company X’s corporate structure in China and Mexico as of 2015, before exploring 
the commercial interrelation between the two locations and the reality of 
competitive pressure stemming from China. 
 
2.1.  China  
Maoist China produced only a single model and a limited number of passenger 
cars, designed for the higher political echelons. The small motor-vehicle industry 
focused on the production of commercial vehicles, i.e. trucks (Zhongguo 
Gongchengyuan & National Research Council (U.S.) 2003, p.38f.). At the onset of 
political-economic reforms in 1978 production was dispersed to 56 small and 
medium sized assembly plants, which produced 2,640 sedan cars annually (Thun 
2006, p.54). In the same year the Chinese government began to engage global auto 
manufacturers on the basis of two objectives. It planned to mould existing 
domestic productive capacity into large-scale conglomerates and a domestic pool 
of suppliers in order to increase efficiency and economies of scale – and ultimately 
export capacity. And it sought to do this by promoting joint ventures between 
domestic SOEs and foreign car manufacturers, with the aim of modernising 
technology and upgrading managerial skills and research and development.  
 
Timing proved to be crucial. By the late 1970s it became obvious that technological 
and organizational advantages would allow Toyota to out-compete any other car 
manufacturer in the medium term. While Toyota – though approached first by the 
Chinese government – was itself unwilling to share this advantage with any other 
Asian country, focusing instead on expanding in US and European markets, the 
leading manufacturers in the latter regions, especially in the US, were pre-occupied 
with finding adequate responses to increasing competition in their home markets 
(Chin 2010, p.60ff.). GM and Ford mainly embraced strategies of cost-cutting, 
which also involved (threats of) capital relocation – however, not to new markets, 
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but rather to regions with established supply networks and qualified (non-
unionised) labour (the South of the US and North of Mexico). This left European 
carmakers as the more eager addressees – arguably, because they felt less 
pressure than GM and Ford to secure their (anyway smaller) home markets. Of the 
three first joint venture agreements in the auto sector two were formed with 
European brands, of which only one survived: Company X (ibid.).  
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s the power of central policy makers was constrained 
due to the high degree of de facto autonomy of local governments in industrial 
policy making and the means to direct shrinking finances towards strategic 
sectors.11 Instead, central policy makers used their control over what should 
ultimately become four large and four medium SOEs to steer mergers and 
acquisitions and, more importantly, foreign investment into the desired direction 
(Thun 2006, chap.2). FDI took off in the mid-1980s and leaped after an extension 
of special economic zones in 1992. It played a major role in the Chinese economy 
of the 1990s, although its relative contribution to the formation of new physical 
capital, such as plants or machinery, declined steadily (Figure 4). In the initial 
stages nearly all FDI entered China in the form of joint venture agreements, the 
terms of which were determined by local states in cases of smaller and medium 
ventures, but under central control for designated “pillar industries” such as the 
auto sector (Naughton 2007, p.410ff.; Thun 2006, p.64ff.). From the 1990s 
onwards global car manufacturers realised China’s growing market potential and 
were eager to set up production facilities (while exports to China were strictly 
limited by an ISI-like tariff policy, Naughton 2007: 384f.). Chinese policy makers 
steered this renewed interest into two channels that have shaped the structure of 
the auto sector today: on the one hand they increased competition amongst foreign 
car makers by limiting the number of joint ventures approved at a time; on the 
other hand they sought to partner each of the four largest, consolidated 
automotive SOEs with at least two foreign partners, to foster internal competition, 
                                                        
11 In the 1980s the Chinese state was not short on finance in absolute terms – China had (and has) 
one of the highest saving rates in the world – but it allocated these funds to SOEs irrespective of 
their economic performance, in order to maintain social stability. Other obstacles were that the 
gradual move towards decentralised market mechanisms contradicted the continuity of planned 
resource allocation; and that up to major fiscal reforms in 1995 budgetary revenue steadily 
declined with the softening of central control over the public sector (Naughton 2007, p.96f., 100ff.).  
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technology transfer and learning capacity towards the end of building up efficient 
and competitive domestic-brands (Thun 2006, p.63ff.; Chin 2010). As Thun has 
argued, beyond these measures the actual shape of the car industry today has been 
determined by local institutions and policy in their differential capacity to develop 
the deep and broad supply chain requirements of terminal car assemblers. 
Emerging coordination problems were resolved with more success in the 
institutional setting of Shanghai’s “local developmental state” than in “laissez-faire” 
approaches in Beijing and Guangzhou or “firm-dominated” coordination in Wuhan 
and Changchun (Thun 2006, chaps.4–6). These differences were significant in the 
initial stages of auto sector development and have created certain path-
dependencies in the organisation of the supply chain (ibid.) – but local 
idiosyncrasies notwithstanding, all areas have dynamic auto clusters today. 
 
Up until the mid-1990s the automotive industry operated under conditions of soft 
budget constraints, a protected market and low competition – and therefore little 
market-induced pressure on productivity and efficiency. This changed with China’s 
preparation for WTO accession. Profitability in the state-owned sector reached an 
all-time low in 1996 – near zero – and new regulations had been enacted in 
1994/95 to address this issue. From 1996 onwards SOEs were transformed into 
corporations (i.e. state ownership into shareholdings) with the central government 
retaining control over, restructuring and further enlarging a few conglomerates – 
including the “big four” of the car industry – and leaving it to local governments to 
privatise, merge or close smaller public enterprises under their control. The 
remaining SOEs were subjected to stricter profitability criteria; and the banking 
system was reformed in order to address the growing volume of nonperforming 
loans (if they were not simply written off and compensated for by the government) 
(Naughton 2007, p.301ff.). This had grave social consequences as the number of 
SOE employees was drastically reduced – also in the automotive sector where 
employment dropped by 25% between 1997 and 2001 (L. Zhang 2014a, p.36).  
 
While initially Chinese policy makers urged joint ventures to generate foreign 
exchange through the export of engines, this need became less important with 
expanding exports from light industrial sectors that could offset a growing balance 
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of trade deficit of the auto sector12 – which began to increase due to the import of 
finished cars when a dramatic reduction of tariff and non-tariff import barriers 
came into effect in 2006 as part of China’s 2001 WTO accession.13 At the same 
time, competition increased with ever more car producers expanding in China. The 
effect is well-illustrated by the example of Company X. While newer models with 
shared platforms were gradually introduced in China (and Mexico) Company X 
continued to produce models whose technology was long out-dated. In the 1990s 
Company X sold a 1980s model at prices well above world-market level (166% in 
1996, Zhang 2014a, p.33) – and continued production of that model until 2013. 
With increasing competition, however, the entire automotive industry in China 
experienced a drop in profit margins (from 11-12% in 2000 to 4-5% in 2005);14 
and Company X/JV1’s market share fell from 54% in 1996 to less than 18% in 
2005 (ibid. p.37f.).  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2.2. the world economic crisis of 
2008/09 did not hit the automotive sector in China as hard as in other countries, 
mainly because repercussions on the Chinese economy were cushioned by a 
governmental stimulus package. Asked if Company X experienced a slump in 
demand in 2009, German senior manager Pongrac of Company X/JV 2 explained: 
 
“Not at all. Everyone said: ‘It won’t be felt so strongly in China, but it will be felt at 
some point.’ So from January to March we produced a smaller number of cars, 
because we expected lower sales later. Hence, we reduced storage a little bit, 
because it was expected to fill up later again anyway when we would sell fewer 
cars. And what happened? People continued to buy anyway. So in April we did not 
have enough cars! The reverse effect! Already in November the diagnosis was that 
we could have sold around 80,000 additional cars, had we produced at full capacity 
                                                        
12 That is to say, the central government invested heavily into the auto industry (RMB 235 billion 
under the tenth Five-Year Plan 2001-2005, (Anderson 2012, p.62) – and it could do so, because of 
the foreign exchange generated by non-auto exports.  
13 The majority of these imports are SUVs and other luxury cars not produced domestically (Sun 
2012).  
14 Profits climbed up to nearly nine percent in 2011, with a small slump during the 2008 crisis (L. 
Zhang 2014a, p.37). 
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earlier that year. So and so much profit slipped through our fingers. No one 
expected that, but it happened.”15 
 
In recent years the Chinese government has released new guidelines for the 
expansion of global car manufacturers in China, pertaining mainly to the further 
consolidation of automotive firms in China, the promotion of new-energy vehicles 
and the increase of the market share of domestic brands, all of which aggravates 
the competitive pressure on foreign car makers in China (Tang 2012). The 
implications for Company X’s recent expansionary drive will be discussed in 
chapter 8.  
 
 
Figure 4: FDI, economic growth and capital formation16 
Source: World Development Indicators; UNCTAD 2015. 
                                                        
15 Interview (2) senior manager Pongrac 
16 The contribution of FDI to gross fixed capital formation presents slightly overstated results, due 
to the inclusion of investment into non-physical assets in the FDI figure. 
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Figure 5: Automotive sector balance of trade, China and Mexico 
Source: World Industry Service.  
2.2.  Mexico 
Company X entered the Mexican market in 1964 (relocating to its current main 
production site in 1967) – at a point in time when the government had carved out 
a compromise with global auto companies to manufacture, rather than to import, 
cars in Mexico. Aiming at the protection of an domestic infant car industry, the 
sector was subject to a range of tariffs, import quota, subsidies and special decrees 
(Bennett & Sharpe 1985; Jenkins 1977; 1987). However, as the Mexican market 
was rather small, competition between different auto producers was fierce. 
Ultimately, Mexican industrial policy was unable to level the playing field between 
domestic producers and large global auto manufacturers, which were simply too 
far ahead in their supplier and sales networks, access to capital, technology and 
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managerial skills. Of the six fully and one partially Mexican-owned companies in 
1962 only three remained in 1970 (Tuman 2003, p.25f.; Bennett & Sharpe 1985).17 
 
However, the Mexican government succeeded in keeping local procurement at a 
quota of 60%. This led to the emergence of a large network of Mexican suppliers 
that were either fully Mexican-owned or joint ventures with Mexican majority 
holdings. Yet, global auto producers continued to enjoy enough leverage to 
pressure the government to allow imports of the most capital and technology 
intensive parts. Although between 1958 and 1969 imports of intermediate and 
capital goods dropped by 45%, the automotive sector ran a growing trade deficit 
(Bennett & Sharpe 1985, p.189f.). Two governmental decrees (in 1972 and 1977)  
that aimed at making the imports of foreign automotive producers contingent on 
the fulfilment of certain export quota failed to render the desired results. In the 
first case this was mostly attributable to global car producers’ domestic market 
orientation. The second decree was met with less resistance, but failed not only 
because after the oil crisis global demand was comparably sluggish, but also 
because the domestic supplier industry proved unable to respond flexibly to the 
changing demand for parts with the introduction and shorter life-cycle of new 
models. The macroeconomic implication was that towards the end of the ISI period 
the share of the automotive sector in Mexico’s ever growing trade deficit increased 
from 26.3% in 1978 to nearly 58% in 1981 (Arteaga 2003, p.119).     
 
The automotive sector was however not the only worry of the Mexican 
government. Throughout the 1970s domestic credit expansion and foreign 
borrowing led to increasing inflation and a growing current account deficit. Apart 
from increased social spending, one important factor was that the discovery of 
large oil reserves in 1976 – that promised a counterbalance to the trade deficit in 
the manufacturing sector – required an expansion of extractive and oil-processing 
industries, which was financed by foreign borrowing (Cockcroft 1983, chap.7; 
                                                        
17 These were Diesel Nacional (DINA), with 100% government ownership; Vehiculos Automotores 
Mexicanos, with 60% government ownership and 40% equity owned by American Motors; and 
privately owned Fabricas Auto-Mex, with Chrysler having increased its equity to 45% (Bennett & 
Sharpe 1985, p.119). Chrysler increased its share in Auto-Mex to 100 percent in 1971; and DINA 
was privatised in the 1990s. 
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Morton 2011). In 1982 Mexico’s debt reached USD 80 billion, while inflation stood 
at over 100%. When the country defaulted on its 10 billion USD short-term debt in 
the same year, the preceding decade of macroeconomic imbalances indicated that 
the problem “was not a solvency or liquidity crisis, but instead manifested the 
unsustainability of ISI” (Dussel Peters 2000, p.48).  
 
Although the failure of ISI policies in Mexico is a more complex issue than can be 
debated here (see e.g. Cockcroft 1998; Dussel Peters 2000; Haber et al. 2008; 
Morton 2011), by the 1980s it became obvious that the trade deficit of the 
automotive industry had posed an ever-increasing risk to ISI as a whole. In the 
neoliberal period that followed, global automotive producers began to 
paradigmatically shift their domestic market orientation towards making Mexico a 
cheap-labour export hub for the North American market (Zapata 1990; Garcí́a 
Gutiérrez 1993; Micheli 1994; Middlebrook 1996; de la O 1998; Morris 1998; 
Tuman 1998; 2003). This had a structural basis in the crisis-induced austerity 
measures first embraced by the de la Madrid government (1982-1988) , which 
came to fruition under Carlos de Salinas (1988-1994).  
 
In a first response to the debt crisis the government cut public spending; privatised 
SOEs; devalued the peso (twice, in 1982 and 1983); and capped wages that 
severely lagged behind inflation. In fact, the consistent real decline of working 
class incomes between 1982 and 1987 had such a long-lasting impact that they did 
not reach their 1981 level again until 2013 – while in comparison they were 
growing almost every year in China, albeit on a much lower level (Figure 6).18 The 
de la Madrid government also took an unusual gamble: instead of tightening 
import controls, it began to liberalise trade and applied for entry to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These strategies proved largely 
ineffective and failed to stimulate exports or economic growth, mainly because the 
expected foreign investments did not materialise. Faced with a growing fiscal 
deficit, an inflation rate of 159% and international pressure on debt servicing, 
                                                        
18 Under the de la Madrid government cumulative growth of GDP was -12.1%, but of real 
manufacturing wages -37.8%, indicating that “wage earners in the formal economy were 
disproportionally suffering the cost of the initial adjustment to the debt crisis.” (Samstad & Collier 
1995, p.14). 
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“december 1987 marked the culmination of the crisis of ISI and the beginning of a 
new socioeconomic development strategy: liberalization strategy.” (Dussel Peters 
2000, p.48f.)  
 
 
Figure 6: Inflation-adjusted annual compensation per employee in China and Mexico 
Source: IHS Global Insight, own calculations 
 
The implications for the automotive sector during this period were ambivalent. 
Domestic sales dropped by 44% between 1981 and 83 (Tuman 2003, p.2). The 
government issued a new decree raising local content requirements, but offered 
subsidies to exporting companies and sanctioned wage arrears and restructuring 
programmes. Firms with low export potential were forced into bankruptcy, but 
larger producers – including Company X in the late 1980s – raised investments in 
order to prepare for exports, which did indeed increase from the mid-1980s 
onwards (ibid. p.29ff.). While many industrial sectors went into dramatic decline, 
the automotive industry was amongst the few exceptions that benefited from the 
new policies (Haber et al. 2008, p.68ff.). 
 
The neoliberal turn culminated in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) of 1994 – which is usually cited as the turning point for the large-scale 
restructuring of the automotive sector (e.g. de la O 1998; Weintraub & Sands 
1998). However, as Haber et al. (2008) have argued, NAFTA was primarily a 
political manoeuvre by the Salinas government to move neoliberal reforms a scale 
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upwards, from the domestic to the international level, in order to prevent their 
future revocation. The crucial tariff reductions had already been agreed in the 
1980s and early 1990s – so that despite a short-term spike in FDI inflows and its 
significant contribution to fixed capital formation, including automotive terminal 
assembly (Figure 4), NAFTA had only a limited effect on further liberalisation and 
“no discernible marginal effect on Mexican growth rates.” (Haber et al. 2008, p.79)  
 
This assessment is confirmed for the auto sector. In 1989 the Salinas government 
had offered tax breaks to car manufacturers in exchange for reduced prices on 
small and medium cars, while directing banks to issue private loans for car 
ownership, which had stimulated domestic demand. But at the same time, exports 
took off – mainly due to the strategic reorientation of automotive producers, rather 
than as a result of further policy measures, which were in nature very similar to 
the preceding decrees (Haber et al. 2008; Dussel Peters 2000). Exports of finished 
vehicles increased more than 17.5 times between pre-NAFTA 1986 and 1993, as 
compared to 4.3 times between post-NAFTA 1994 and the year 2000, after which it 
increased again by 2.7 times until 2014 (INEGI various years).  
 
That is to say, NAFTA essentially catalysed and formalised developments that were 
already underway in the Mexican automotive sector prior to 1992. However, the 
substitution of NAFTA-regional for domestic procurement quota; the lowering of 
import restrictions and export requirements; and the elimination of tariffs on 
autoparts meant that competitive pressure in Mexico increased significantly. 
Smaller and medium-sized non-maquila autoparts producers closed or downsized 
– indicated by a 6% drop in employment between 1993 and 1996 – while larger 
terminal assemblers, as well as first tier suppliers and the export-oriented maquila 
production of autoparts received FDI of USD 4 billion, respectively USD 3.3 billion 
(Tuman 2003, p.34f.). Finally, NAFTA lead to the creation of a regional trade block, 
with rising US and Canadian imports from Mexico implying a reduction of imports 
from other regions. These changes, as well as the devaluation of the peso in yet 
another financial crisis in 1994, drove up automotive exports from Mexico, which – 
in sharp contrast to the ISI-period – emerged as a stable net-exporter of finished 
vehicles with roughly balanced trade in autoparts (Figure 5).  
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Throughout the post-NAFTA period the surviving global auto-producers extended 
their investment; restructured their production processes through new work rules 
and outsourcing; fostered the emergence of regional supply clusters; and adjusted 
their product range to US demand (Juárez Núñez 2005a). In drastic contrast to the 
problems of ISI, increasing dependence on exports and transnational production 
networks backfired for the Mexican automotive sector in the crisis of 2008. When 
automotive production in the US and Canada dropped by 19.2, respectively 19.5 % 
in 2008 (Juárez Núñez 2011, p.128f.), Mexican autoparts exports registered a 
dramatic decline (responsible for the decline in net-exports, Figure 5). Juárez 
Núñez estimates that in 2008 alone about 27% of the 270 thousand workers in the 
autoparts maquiladoras lost their jobs (Juárez Núñez 2011, p.134f.). Terminal 
assembly firms, such as Company X, began to impose paros técnicos in 2009 
(Reuters 2009; El Economista 2009a) – temporal uncompensated leave for parts of 
the workforce (discussed in more detail in chapter 6, section 3.2.). Yet, however 
severe the impact of the crisis appeared in the short run, the bleak prediction by 
Sturgeon et al. did not materialise:  
 
“With the current severe recession in the United States, the Big 3 at the brink of 
declaring bankruptcy, and many Japanese plants temporarily shut down to 
forestall the build-up of additional excess inventory […] investing further in Mexico 
may be a political impossibility for some time.” (2010, p.18) 
 
Quite the contrary, the majority of global automotive producers invested heavily in 
Mexico in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Covarrubias 2012).19 Company X 
also announced new projects in Mexico at that time – and their development will 
be addressed in detail in chapter 8. Overall, throughout the ups and downs of 
automotive sector development in Mexico, Company X – alongside US-American 
and Japanese enterprises – has remained one of the strongest global players. The 
original governmental aim of developing an internationally competitive domestic 
auto industry, however, never materialised. 
 
                                                        
19 This included investment of US manufacturers, arguably to the further detriment of their 
operations (and related employment) in their home market. 
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2.3.  Interim Conclusion 
There is good reason to believe that the particular form of global automotive 
production in China and Mexico owes a lot to how the particular interaction of 
state and transnational car manufacturers panned out in each case. Measured 
against the aim of protecting and developing an infant domestic car industry, 
“success” depends on the potential of policy makers to “discipline” global 
automotive manufacturers and “steer” sector-wide development.  
Once Mexican policy makers had allowed fully or majority foreign owned 
enterprises to operate in the domestic market early on, they had a hard time 
making them comply with industrial policy. The result was a growing trade deficit 
and domestic industries exposed to unsustainable competition. The more 
“successful” Chinese strategy of carefully selecting foreign car manufacturers and 
pairing them with state-owned enterprises allowed for a higher level of state 
control and transfers of skills and technology. In this context, timing was crucial. 
When transnational companies began their engagement with China, the 
international climate was very different from when they first moved to Mexico. 
The world economy was in transition towards a more neoliberal outlook, marked 
by the end of the Bretton Woods system, the relative decline of the US economy, 
and the exhaustion not only of ISI and Maoist developmental strategies, but also of 
“Fordism” in the global North. In the auto sector more specifically, the rise of 
Toyota and other Japanese (and later South Korean) car producers exerted 
increasing pressure on the traditional players and diminished their overall 
bargaining position. The advantage of Chinese over Mexican policy makers in the 
late 1970s and 1980s resides to a large degree in the fact that at a moment of 
internationally increasing competition and declining demand none of the global 
car manufacturers were present in China yet. This increased the leverage of 
Chinese policy makers to make selective decisions. Another important issue is of 
course that the larger Chinese market provided a bigger incentive to automotive 
TNCs and arguably increased their willingness to compromise. In this context, as 
we will see in chapter 8, Company X pursues two distinct developmental 
strategies: using Mexico as an export hub for North American markets; and tapping 
the huge domestic market potential in China through rapid expansion. 
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3.  Class Composition and Conditions for Relational Agency 
This section outlines “objective” conditions for the agency of the social agents in 
focus: workers and managers. The conceptual instruments drawn upon by Beverly 
Silver have determined the choice of factors under scrutiny, namely class 
composition, and forms of structural and organizational power. I will first discuss 
the composition of the workforce in terms of employment status, gender, age – and 
in the Chinese case household registration (hukou)20 – on the basis of data 
gathered during my fieldwork. Accounts of “structural” and “organisational” power 
will be subdivided into implications of demographic change and profitability, 
respectively organisational and institutional conditions in the form of unions and 
labour laws. Although, as I have emphasised, these aspects alone are no substitute 
for an analysis of processes of agency proper, it is important to outline them, in 
order to understand constraints and resources different agents face and mobilise.  
 
3.1.  Class Composition at Company X in China and Mexico 
Given that the particular composition of the workforce has been said to have a 
strong impact on the character of workers’ grievances and agency – in particular 
the segmentation into permanent and temporary workers (a central argument in L. 
Zhang 2014a) – a review of the data on Company X’s labour force seems in order. 
In both cases, China and Mexico, the number of workers at the main production 
                                                        
20 The system of household registration (hukou) was introduced in China in 1958 as a response to 
grain shortages, which were blamed on rural to urban migration. It made residential rights and 
access to public welfare conditional on the place of origin: rural residents were provided land for 
subsistence farming, respectively a place in the people's communes, while the urban hukou 
guaranteed lifelong employment, fixed wages determined by regional price levels and social 
welfare provision. Changing a hukou was exceptional, for example in cases of military service or 
higher education. This system has undergone various reforms since the 1980s. More recently, in 
2001 small towns began to abolish settlement limits for rural dwellers having employment and 
accommodation; and medium and large cities changed immigration criteria and widened their 
quotas (Huang & Zhan 2005, p.72f.). This was extended to national policy in 2014 (Xinhua 2014). 
As Chan and Buckingham (2008) have argued, the major aspect in these reforms concerned 
administrative responsibility for a change of the hukou: The central decision about a change from a 
rural maintenance claim to an urban one – which was the decisive factor up to the late-1990s – has 
been abolished and replaced by locally set immigration criteria. With the latest reforms, the 
institutional divide between the rural and urban population remains of relevance in large cities, but 
is losing its meaning for small and medium towns. However, this has not led to the anticipated 
urbanization push in the latter two, because rural migrants are increasingly unwilling to relinquish 
their land titles (Li & Liu 2014).  
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sites was quite high by contemporary standards, with the automotive industry’s 
typical male-dominated gender composition and segmentation of the workforce 
into permanent and temporary workers. Relevant differences resided mainly in 
the average age of the workforce and the use of interns in the Chinese case. This 
paragraph provides a quantitative overview, with more detailed discussions of its 
implications on worker agency and the organisation of production following in the 
coming chapters. 
 
Company X’s two largest factories in China were the headquarters with JV1 (East 
China) and JV2 (North China), employing 13,431, respectively 14,997 “direct”, i.e. 
production workers, and 6,180, respectively 5,670 “indirect”, i.e. specialised white 
collar, administration and service workers. The workforce at Company X/JV2 was 
divided into 10,854 formal and 4,143 dispatch workers (72.4/27.6%). The 
younger plants were “leaner” and – with the exception of the smallest far-Western 
plant – had projected workforces of around 6,000 to 8,000 workers. None of these 
plants had reached full capacity at the time of my visit, the furthest being the 
Western plant of Company X/JV2 with slightly over 7,000 workers. The average 
age of production workers throughout all plants of Company X/JV1 was 31 years, 
respectively 29 at Company X/JV2.21 Four, respectively two percent of the 
workforce were women. This rate was about twenty percent higher for 
administration and service workers, who were on average also five years older 
than production workers (Table 1).22 The ratio of female workers was thus far 
below the 10% to 20% average for terminal assembly plants that Zhang observed 
(L. Zhang 2014a, p.61). The majority of workers at Company X in China were 
permanent workers with a local hukou. According to a trade union official, at 
Company X/JV2’s main plant about 90% of the production workers were local 
                                                        
21 The low age of workers is a consequence of the continuous new recruitment with each round of 
Company X’s rapid expansion. In the newer Western plant, for example, 93% of the workers were 
younger than 25 years. That workers at Company X/JV1 were generally slightly older than at 
Company X/JV2 is similarly a historical result of the former having commenced operations in China 
seven years earlier (1985) than the latter (1992). 
22 Official company data, email of September 10th 2013. The higher ratio of indirect female workers 
was a consequence of gendered hiring practices: women were employed in a higher proportion for 
office jobs and services, cleaning, catering etc.; and only in low numbers for production work. In 
fact, that there were any women employed in manufacturing at all seems to be the result of certain 
externally imposed quota. Author’s field notes, interview worker Lun. 
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residents.23 Not included in the figures are student interns, who worked on the 
production line for periods of six to twelve months as a degree requirement of 
their technical colleges and were employed by the thousands (Zhang estimates 
interns at Company X/JV2 to make up 30% of workers on the production line 
(2014, p.70); more details in chapter 5, section 4.1.). 
 
In the winter of 2012, Company X had about 18,750 employees in Mexico. At its 
main plant 13,173 were “direct” workers, divided into 9,906 permanent workers, 
or trabajadores de planta, and 3,267 temporary workers, or trabajadores 
eventuales (75.2/24.8%). About 5,400 were “indirect workers”. Company X’s 
Mexican main plant is therefore the largest outside of Germany. At its newly 
opening engine plant in the North of Mexico – which was just beginning to launch 
production at the time of my fieldwork – Company X employed 234 workers, half 
direct, half indirect (Table 1).24 The average age of the workforce at the main plant 
was 47 years in 2012 (García León & Pintle 2012) and the ratio of female workers 
in production was slightly higher than in China, but for indirect workers it was 
only half the Chinese level.25 Nearly all direct workers of the main plant came 
either from the nearby 1.4 million inhabitants strong city or its surrounding areas; 
and in rare cases from neighbouring states.26  
 
In sum, in both cases and in all plants, the workforce was clearly segmented into 
core and peripheral groups of workers. In the Mexican case this divide ran 
between permanent and temporary workers, who were all direct employees of 
                                                        
23 Interview Chairman Peng; I was unable to verify the numerical composition of Company X’s 
Chinese workforce by hukou through official data. However, all formal workers I met at the Eastern 
main plant had a local hukou, while at the newly opened subsidiaries I was told by managerial staff 
that cohorts of experienced workers had been (or would be) relocated from other locations of 
Company X in China. Interviews dispatch worker Ping, worker Lun, worker Lu, German white-collar 
worker Hensch, German senior manager Wendler.     
24 Numbers are based on a presentation by HR personnel during a factory visit, November 19th 
2012; and on statistics on union membership of December 2012 provided by the enterprise union, 
January 19th 2013.   
25 Montiel states the share of women amongst the direct workforce as being 3.86% for the year 
2004; and the average age as 28 years (2010, p.266). In the absence of access to any more up to 
date official statistics on the average age of the workforce, but in light of recent news reports on 
deliberate attempts of Company X to reduce the average age through early retirement schemes 
(Rodriguez 2015), as well as my observations on the shop floor, the 47 year figure seems to be 
closer to reality than the 28 years.   
26 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez; Author’s field notes. 
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Company X, whereas the workforce in the Chinese case was divided threefold 
between directly employed or “formal” workers; agency or “dispatch” workers; 
and interns. The ratio of temporary/formal to temporary/dispatch workers was 
slightly, but insignificantly, higher in China than in Mexico – indicating that “labour 
force dualism” (L. Zhang 2014b, p.12) is not a particularity of the Chinese car 
industry.27 We can therefore assume that (if) differences in employment status are 
relevant to workers’ grievances and agency (they will be so) in both cases. 
 
The age-composition of the workforce was however significantly different. The 
much older Mexican plant employed a core workforce that was to a large part 
hired in the late 1970s, withstanding waves of layoffs in the 1980s and 1990s and 
2000s – and it was therefore comparably old. In China, on the other hand, due to 
Company X’s near-continuous expansion (a short contraction occurred in 2004/05, 
Zhang 2014a, p.33), there has been a constant inflow of new workers. Though not 
as pronounced as in the Mexican case, these new entrants, particularly dispatch 
workers, were as a rule younger than the average core worker. Student interns, in 
the Chinese case, were even younger than dispatch workers, usually between 18 
and 21 years of age. Here, possible implications for worker agency follow from 
different generational life experiences. Many Mexican workers at Company X were 
hired during or shortly after the Mexican boom period of offensive labour 
militancy and leftist rhetoric, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, shaped the 
experiences, desires and demands of certain groups of workers. In the Chinese 
case, the younger age of the workforce suggests less experience at work and with 
labour conflicts, the implications of which will have to be evaluated in the 
particular cases, given that historically young inexperienced (rural to urban 
migrant) workers have been at the forefront of working class struggles (e.g. in the 
West European automotive industry of the 1970s, e.g. Alquati 1974; also Silver 
2003, p.51ff.). 
 
                                                        
27 Zhang actually estimates the figures for temporary workers at Company X/JV1 and -/JV2 to be 
much higher than indicated by official statistics – namely 48% and 60% respectively (L. Zhang 
2014a, p.43).  
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 Mexico 
main  
Mexico 
engine  
China JV1 
main 
China JV 1 
East 1 
China JV 1 
East 2 
China JV1 
East Coast 
China JV1 
Far West 
China JV2 
main 
China JV2 
West 
China JV2 
South 
Permanent/ 
formal workers 
9,906 117 13,431 
 
3,941 
 
2,156 
 
808 
 
223 
 
10,854 6,758 
 
1,685 
 
Temporary/ 
dispatch 
workers 
3,267 
(24.8%) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4,143 
(27.6%) 
0 0 
Indirect 
workers 
5400 117 6,180 
 
539 
 
486 
 
351 
 
137 
 
5,670 
 
412 
 
229 
 
Average age 47 - 31 (prod.)* 
36 (ind.) 
* * * * 29 (prod.)* 
34 (ind.) 
* * 
Share female 
workers 
5% (prod.) 
12% (ind.) 
- 4% (prod.)* 
24% (ind.) 
* * * * 2% (prod.)* 
21% (ind.) 
* * 
Table 1: Composition of workforces at Company X in Mexico and China 
*Numbers are for all plants in total; excluding temporary/dispatch workers  
Data for Mexico as of December 2012; data for China as of September 2013  
Source: Company data, interviews. 
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Management 
In most cases, the notion of class composition has been applied to analyses of the 
working class, but there have been important studies pointing to the relevance of 
the composition of management or capital for international relations (e.g. van der 
Pijl 1998; Harris 2009), and the particularities of shop-floor relations (e.g. Lee 
1998; Kim 2013; also: Chua 2008). Although due to a lack of data on the Mexican 
case no comparison can be drawn here, access to management in the Chinese case 
allows me to present heuristic hypotheses for how managerial class composition 
shaped capital-labour relations at Company X in China.  
 
There was a particular German-Chinese division of labour amongst managerial 
staff. In the relatively new Western plant 8 of a total of 28 managers were German; 
of the twenty Chinese managers about two thirds were from the local 
municipality.28 The leading positions of plant manager and department heads were 
equipped with a parallel structure of Chinese and German managers. Human 
resources, sales and the enterprise trade union had no German personnel. With the 
exception of Chinese-Japanese joint ventures, where foreign managerial personnel 
is represented in all departments, including human resources (L. Zhang 2014a, 
p.103; Lüthje et al. 2013, p.95) this division of labour reflects a general trend in the 
industry. This leads to the ambivalent situation that the German side has no direct 
control over hiring practices and wage setting – but also no formal responsibility.  
 
Company X in China also functioned as a training ground for management of its 
joint venture partners. In order to acquire broader personal networks and 
technical and managerial know-how to increase the competitiveness of its own 
brand, Company X/JV2’s managerial personnel rotated positions within the joint 
venture and between Company X and other global car manufacturers that JV2 had 
joint ventures with – e.g. one year prior to my visit at the Northern main plant, the 
former union chairman had become the head of one of the assembly 
departments.29 German managers have complained about this, because the lack of 
experience and period of settling in at the new positions leads to interruptions and 
                                                        
28 Interview Chairman Peng. 
29 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
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sometimes the termination of on-going processes.30 In the example mentioned, an 
informal division of labour emerged, in which the German side took care of 
technical decisions, while the Chinese side dealt with issues of work organisation 
and personnel questions.31 I.e. the Chinese-German division of labour on the plant 
level was informally replicated on the department level as a spontaneous coping 
strategy. 
 
Though this cannot be elaborated here at the scope it deserves, its actual 
composition is important for how managerial personnel perceives and interprets 
shop-floor relations – and how it seeks to cope with, adapt and restructure them. 
The majority of German managers I interviewed in China were engineers and/or 
had first hand work experience on the production line – the exception being supply 
chain and logistics managers, who were economists by training. Often they had 
worked their ways up to their current positions over decades of employment 
within the Company X group (only one manager I encountered had recently 
transferred from another German car manufacturer). 32  Though it is not a 
requirement to have an engineering degree for managing a manufacturing 
department, all department heads I encountered had a profound understanding 
not only of the technological and technical issues involved in car production, but 
also of its organisational and social factors. However, there was a dominant notion 
to interpret the latter as effects of the former, that is, to understand the production 
process as being driven by technological requirements, to which social and 
organisational factors had to adapt. Vice versa, if problems occurred that were 
primarily of social or organisational nature, a solution would usually be sought in a 
technological or technical response. As will become clearer in the following 
chapters, German managers were not shy to point out problems in working 
conditions and work organisation – and did occasionally display sympathy for 
ordinary workers – but they would explain them as requirements of the 
technologically determined organisation of production, which, consequentially, 
also required a technological “fix”. This was connected to a primary managerial 
motivation not of profitability (as one might have expected), but of quality, 
                                                        
30 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview German senior manager Bohnert. 
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respectively of perfecting the final product. Techno-organisational issues were 
primarily understood in terms of efficiency, and measured against an ideal 
standard, which was derived either from experiences of the German main plant or 
theoretically and technologically feasible, but under the current social or financial 
constraints impossible, standards.33  
 
These statements should be taken as nothing but a heuristic guideline for the 
reader, in order to evaluate quotes by managers throughout this study. A more 
systematic analysis of managerial interpretative patterns would be required, 
which is however beyond the focus and scope of this project. 
  
3.2.  Economic Room for Manoeuvre 
3.2.1.  The Power of Demographics: Labour Surplus and Shortage 
A popular way to assess the potential for worker agency to induce change is 
through an analysis of their “structural power”. One of the two criteria offered by 
Erik Olin Wright and taken up by Silver is “marketplace bargaining power”, 
accruing to workers through their strategic position in the labour market (the 
other source of structural power being “workplace bargaining power”, discussed in 
chapter 5). The argument is straightforward: in times of labour surplus, workers’ 
structural power is low, because individual workers can be easily replaced; in case 
of a labour shortage, workers’ structural power is higher, because either 
employers cannot find enough workers on the labour market and need to increase 
incentives through higher wages; or because employers are open to concessions to 
the workers they have already employed, in order to keep them from quitting.  
 
A look at demographic and macroeconomic data for the Mexican and Chinese cases 
reveals the following: In the Chinese case, growth of the employable population 
(year over year change) in China begins to slow down continuously after a 1.36% 
tipping point in 2003 until it falls below zero for the first time in 2011, sustaining 
its downward sloping trend to the present. In other words, the size of the 
                                                        
33 For example: interviews German senior manager Pongrac, Wendler, Rordorf. 
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workforce in China has been shrinking in absolute terms since 2011. This contrasts 
with the case of Mexico, where, though decreasing since the late 1980s, growth of 
the employable population has remained at a stable 0.5% since the late 1990s – 
the peak tellingly being the year of the second debt crisis in 1987. That is, the 
workforce in Mexico has been growing continuously over the last 30 years, albeit 
at a slower pace (Figure 7). More importantly though, China has shown positive 
economic growth since 1988, while Mexico has suffered multiple crises and 
negative GDP growth rates in 1982/83, 86, 95, 2001 and 2009. This also means 
that there has been a substantial gap between high economic and low employable 
population growth in China, whereas this ratio has been lower, and at times 
negative, in Mexico. It is thus likely, and has in fact been observed since 2004 
(Holland 2004), that structural labour shortages occur at least in certain 
economically dynamic regions or sectors in China, but less so in Mexico – implying 
that workers’ “marketplace bargaining power” in China is higher than in Mexico. 
What this assessment tells us for individual cases – such as the autoparts sector or 
Company X – will be discussed in chapter 7 and 8.  
 
Figure 7: Growth of national economy and employable population, China and Mexico 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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3.2.2.  Profits  
Another factor Silver stresses is the linkage between profitability and capital’s 
room for material concessions to the workforce (SILVER 2003). In the following I 
therefore briefly discuss the development of Company X’s profits, with particular 
attention to the Chinese case, where data on the individual joint-ventures is 
available.  
 
Profits of the Company X Group have been positive for the post-2000 era, though 
low for the period of 2003 to 2006, as well as severely affected by the world 
economic crisis, plummeting in 2009, but recovering in 2010 to pre-crisis levels 
(Figure 8). Though fluctuating – and in fact turning negative for the year 2005, 
mainly as an effect of increasing raw material prices and competition from an East 
Asian car producer entering China in Company X’s main market segment 
(Earnshaw 2005, p.117) – the contribution of Company X’s Chinese operations to 
its overall profits has ranged between 23% and 45% since 2009. It peaked in the 
crisis-ridden year of 2009, implying that profits from China offset the slump in 
other markets. Most recently it has remained significantly high, with 37, 
respectively 40% of overall profits being generated in China in 2013, respectively 
2014 (Figure 9). Profit rates (before tax) for Company X/JV1 were 18% in 2013, 
respectively 19.5% in 2014; for Company X/JV2 they were 14.8%, respectively 
14.9%.34 It is also important to emphasise that, after all, Company X is a company 
group, meaning that the domestic retention of profits at its Chinese subsidiaries is 
only partly guaranteed by the share of profits that accrues to the Chinese joint 
venture partners. Potential concessions to the workforce in China would find their 
structural desideratum therefore not only in high profits retained by the Chinese 
joint venture partners, but also through the strategic importance of the China 
business to the Company X Group’s overall profitability. This has, on the other 
hand, repercussions on labour-capital relations in Germany, where the potential 
“China threat” is counteracted with a material argument:  
    
                                                        
34 Calculations based on Company X Annual Report 2014. 
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“The main and upscale brands each make around forty percent of their sales and 
profits in China. So of course that has to be seen as positive. One has to explain to 
the workers [in Germany] where half their wage comes from, that it does not only 
come from Germany.”35 
 
In sum, the profit margin of the Company X Group has been comparably tight at 
times (2003-06, 2009) and is increasingly dependent on the Chinese ventures, 
with potential implications for the maintenance of the German capital-labour 
accord. The Chinese joint ventures on the other hand display substantially higher 
profit rates and can therefore be assumed to have greater room to react to worker 
agency with material concessions. 
 
 
Figure 8: Profit rate of Company X Group 
Source: Company X annual reports ((various years), own calculations 
 
                                                        
35 Interview senior manager Schütte. 
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Figure 9: Company X Group operating profit and share of Chinese ventures 
Source: Company X annual reports, own calculations 
 
3.3.  Political Room for Manoeuvre 
There is no fundamental difference between Western and Chinese 
trade unions, but the Chinese union stands between the workers’ 
and the enterprise’s interest. It is not against the company as in 
the West. 
– Union chairman at Company X/JV2’s Western plant 
 
Our line is about the balance of not tilting to one side, it is about 
the enterprise winning, and the worker winning – that there is an 
equilibrium. 
– Member of the union’s executive committee at Company X’s 
main plant in Mexico 
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3.3.1.  Unionism and Industrial Relations in China and Mexico 
Company X operates as a closed shop in both countries: all “direct” workers – and 
in the Chinese case, all employees, including managers – automatically become 
union members upon signing their contracts. However, the degrees of 
“associational power” (Silver 2003, p.13; Wright 1985) that the institutional 
structure of formally recognised unions provided to workers at Company X 
differed between the two cases.  
 
3.3.1.1. Mexico: 
The history of the labour movement in Mexico is deeply shaped by the rift between 
large state-allied corporatist union federations – such as the Confederación de 
Trabajadores de México (CTM), Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) or 
Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), to name the three 
largest – and smaller independent enterprise unions and federations. The post-
revolutionary authoritarian regime in Mexico depended to a large extent on the 
inclusion of the corporatist labour organisations into the ruling coalition, in 
particular during the ISI period. The state assured their allegiance by granting 
material benefits to the unions’ rank and file and political influence to its 
leadership, expecting in exchange that the latter constrained the wage demands 
and activism of the former. To this end, corporatist unions were included in 
tripartite commissions on social security, minimum wages and profit sharing – 
similarly to the German system (Bensusán & Middlebrook 2012; Middlebrook 
1995, chaps.2, 3). Union members were thus expected to have an interest in the 
continuity of close ties between union leaders and government as long as the 
resulting material gains increased.  
 
This arrangement faced two challenges: a political one from the 1970s onwards; 
and an aggravating economic one in the 1980/90s. The first one was driven by 
increasing rank and file protest against the authoritarianism of corporatist unions, 
which lead to the emergence of rival ‘independent’ unions and the expulsion of 
corporatist unions in certain industries and enterprises. The second challenge 
resided in corporatist unions failing to oppose neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, 
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which not only cost them further political legitimacy, but implied less and less 
material gains to redistribute, due to privatisation and an overall reduction of 
social spending (Middlebrook 1995, chap.8; Bensusán & Middlebrook 2012, p.34; 
Roxborough 1984; Alvarez Béjar 1990). 
 
Though under pressure, the corporatist union sector had become an integral part 
of the PRI-dominated state apparatus – and the political-economic changes of the 
1980s and 1990s could not be implemented against, but only within, existing 
union structures. In the absence of a labour law reform, and due to the wide 
application of collective agreements, labour flexibilisation unfolded mainly 
through two interrelated measures: “ghost unions”, i.e. unions controlled by 
management or local political elites, mainly within the confines of one of Mexico’s 
corporatist trade union federations (CTM, FROC, CROC, CROM); and “protection 
contracts” (contratos de protección patronal), i.e. employer-friendly collective 
agreements, usually negotiated by one of the aforementioned unions (Bensusán & 
Middlebrook 2012, p.24). The aggravating rift between corporatist and 
independent unions and its implication for worker agency have been summarised 
by Tuman as follows:  
 
“Where democratization movements succeeded, the level of worker’s political 
participation in union government rose sharply. As a result of their participation, 
many workers improved their political efficacy and became more interested in 
politics generally. In addition, union democracy allowed workers to articulate and 
channel their demands for higher wages and stronger work rules. At the same 
time, where democratization movements were defeated, the CTM re-established 
control over the workforce by resorting to repression and authoritarianism.” 
(Tuman 2003, p.45f.) 
 
Although we will see throughout this study that these boundaries are not so clear 
cut, and that independent unions can display a profound paternalism as well, this 
statement serves as a helpful frame of reference in determining the character of 
the Company X union. This union has a rich history of engaging in conflicts with 
management, but also in internal factional strife over political affiliation, 
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orientation and practice. It has also been characterised by a constant tension 
between the leadership and the rank and file. The details of the manifold studies 
on its history cannot be reproduced here (Montiel 1991; 2001; 2007; 2010; Fraile 
Garcí́a 1999; Tuman 2003; Juárez Núñez 2006; Healy 2008; Espinal Betanzo 2015), 
but these issues will be taken up continuously throughout this study, in particular 
in the following chapter. Here I will instead give a brief overview of the 
institutional structure of the Company X union at the time of my fieldwork.  
 
In 2012, the Company X union was formerly governed by statutes implemented in 
1992 after a watershed conflict, which is discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter. As an independent enterprise union it exclusively represented the 
workforce at Company X’s main plant. The workforce was split between unionised 
workers (those listed as “direct personnel”) and non-unionised personal de 
confianza (“trusted personnel”, such as service and administration workers, but 
also high-skilled technicians). For ordinary workers, Company X was a closed shop, 
which was formally based on the “exclusion clause” (Error! Reference source not 
found.).  
 
 
Figure 10: The "exclusion clause" 
 
A fifteen member strong central committee was elected every four years from a 
usually rather large number of electoral platforms by anonymous majority vote. 
Although re-elections were formally possible, they only occurred once in case of 
The “exclusion clause” 
 
The cláusula de exclusión was a stipulation in the Federal Labour Law (§ 395), 
which was removed with the reform of November 2012 (see below for more 
detail). It limited employment to union members, making most enterprises in 
Mexico de facto closed shops. Vice versa, and arguably more importantly, it also 
allowed the leadership of an enterprise union to ask the employer for a 
termination of contract of workers who had been expelled from the union. In 
other words, it provided union leaders with a powerful weapon to get rid of 
undesired troublemakers. The Mexican National Supreme Court ruled against 
this clause as being unconstitutional in 2001. However, it continued to be 
present in many collective contracts, including that of Company X, in 2012. 
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the central committee of 2000-2004 and 2004-2008. As a rule, the new leadership 
invoked the exclusion clause against members of the old central committee, whose 
members would thereby be forced to terminate employment at Company X. This 
“tradition” is something unique amongst car manufacturers in Mexico (Miljanic 
2010). With ambivalent effects, the implications are twofold: on the one hand, a 
continuity in leadership has always been unlikely, which provided a safeguard 
against the development of a small clique running the union; on the other hand, 
while enterprise managers could draw on years of experience in dealing with the 
union, with the dismissal of union leaders from the enterprise important 
experiences would not be passed on. As a member of the central committee of 
2012-2016 explained: 
 
“The advantage or disadvantage is that they are lawyers and we are workers, who 
have to prepare ourselves two months prior to the negotiations. They have all the 
experience in the world, having had their positions as labour lawyers for years – 
while the union is always changing; there is no continuity.”36 
 
On the intermediate level, the plant was divided into divisions of a minimum of 
500 workers, who elected one divisional secretary and three divisional delegates 
every four years, the former being full-time union members, the latter receiving 
two paid hours for union work at the end of each working day. In addition, 
members of certain task-based commissions were elected, who convened at 
special occasions, most importantly the revisions of salaries (annual) and the 
collective agreement (biennial) (more detail on collective contracts will be given in 
chapter 5, section 2.).  
 
The highest official bodies of the union were, in hierarchical order, the “general 
council” made up of the central committee and the eleven divisional delegates; the 
“general congress” made up the general council plus the 33 divisional delegates 
and members of the various commissions; individual divisional assemblies (of all 
workers in that division); and the central committee. Compared to other 
                                                        
36 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee, Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016). 
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automotive factories in Mexico, particularly the ones organised under the roof of 
the CTM, this structure was relatively democratic (Montiel 2001; 2010). However, 
when compared to the union statutes in effect until 1992, the union had suffered a 
tremendous weakening of rank and file control over internal affairs (Company X 
union (Mexico) 1972; 1992).  
 
3.3.1.2. China 
A lot has been written on the historical and current role of China’s only legal trade 
union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) – and there is general 
scholarly agreement that workers’ influence and room for manoeuvre within the 
organisation is extremely curtailed, to say the least. This is due to the ACFTU’s 
Leninist heritage of functioning as a transmission belt for Party requirements; its 
leadership positions being staffed with civil servants; its top-down bureaucratic 
centralism; its staffing of enterprise unions with members of management; its 
obstruction of enterprise-level union elections; and the general focus of enterprise 
unions on increasing productivity, organising leisure activities, and – at best – 
mediating labour conflicts, in order to resume normal operations (for detailed 
accounts see Taylor et al. 2003; Pringle 2011; also Sheehan 1998; Li & Metcalf 
2005; Wang 2008; Howell 2008; Lau 2012; Chan & Hui 2012; Friedman 2014c). 
This is not to say that the ACFTU is a monolithic and static block. On the contrary, 
in some regions – particularly Guangzhou/Shenzhen and in Zhejiang – it has been 
rather dynamic, keen to transform into a more inclusive organisational set-up, 
experimenting with enterprise level elections and collective bargaining procedures 
(Pringle 2011; Friedman 2014c; 2014b).  
 
The unions at Company X/JV1 and X/JV2 were however no exception from the 
rule: due to the Chinese joint venture partners being SOEs, these unions operated 
under top-down policies dictated by multiple higher-level union entities. Decisions 
by the chairman of the enterprise union at Company X/JV2’s Western plant, for 
example, had to take into account the demands of the leaderships of three separate 
ACFTU branches: the municipality; JV2’s SOE group; and Company X/JV2 and its 
subsidiaries. At the same time, the union chairman at the Western plant held 
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multiple additional positions: he was also chairman of the enterprise’s party 
branch, production manager, and – not without irony – head of the disciplinary 
commission.37 The enterprise union was not only structurally constrained, but its 
leader also personally unwilling to open it to any meaningful influence from 
grassroots workers. As he was keen to emphasise, the union would neither initiate 
nor support strikes, nor would it vote against the enterprise’s decision to increase 
overtime – the latter being a constant source of workers’ disaffection.38  The tasks 
of the union were instead identified as: 1) implementation of union structures 
within the enterprise: selection of group leaders and lower level officials; 2) 
regulation of social security and benefits; 3) implementing and monitoring 
occupational safety and health standards; 4) organisation of social and cultural 
activities for the workforce; 5) mobilising workers for improved participation in 
production, and work on improving labour productivity.39 
 
There was a collective contract for formal workers, based on the main parameters 
that were enacted under consultation of the German side when the enterprise 
commenced operations in 1992. However, there was no collective bargaining, 
because “wages are adapted according to the development of the company; and it 
develops steadily, so no such negotiations are necessary”40 – or, more simply put: 
“wages are already higher than workers can hope for.”41  
 
Overall, the union in both places was well aware of workers’ common complaints: 
excessive overtime, bad canteen food, insufficient shuttle services, bad 
accommodation etc.42 The union at Company X/JV2 in the West engaged with 
workers through the online forum baidu tieba, and had a white board on the shop 
floor for workers to write down complaints. The union at the Northern main plant 
on the other hand used the company’s intranet for these purposes. Indicated by 
comments in internet forums, workers sometimes utilised such official 
mechanisms to make their complaints heard, but usually with meagre results, as 
                                                        
37 Interview Chairman Qiao. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Interview Chairman Peng. 
41 Interview Chairman Qiao. 
42 Ibid. 
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even the union chairmen admitted.43 Zhang also observed that workers filed 
official petitions (L. Zhang 2014a, p.139).  
 
In short, the union at Company X/JV2 – and at -/JV1 (Zhang 2014a) – was a 
paradigmatic case of the hierarchical, party- and management-dominated legacy of 
the ACFTU and had little to offer to workers. As we shall see in chapter 8, this 
created a ‘turf war’ when Company X/JV2 opened a new subsidiary in the territory 
of the “reformist” ACFTU faction in South China. The Mexican Company X union 
was a comparatively more ambivalent case. While it had been restructured 
towards a more centralist bureaucratic apparatus after 1992 – and the leadership 
of 2012-16 displayed a clear tendency towards cooperation with management and 
elite politics – its 1970s-80s heritage of wide-spread rank and file militancy 
continued to be relevant for both union and enterprise strategy (to be discussed in 
the following chapter). Clearly, the different role of unions in Mexico and China is 
related to divergent institutional and legal frameworks – in particular the formal 
legality of independent unionism in Mexico and its illegality in China. It is therefore 
necessary to briefly recapture the development of labour laws in both cases.   
 
3.3.2.  Labour Laws 
Both Mexico and China have undergone important labour law reforms in the past 
decade. In the following the most crucial changes will be briefly outlined in order 
to provide an indicator for the different developmental trajectories of labour 
regulation in the two countries, and a foundation for understanding the 
constraining and enabling capacities offered by the respective legal institutions.  
 
Mexico 
Mexico’s labour law was revised for the first time since 1970 in November 2012. 
This reform was preceded by decades of debate, kicked off by the Salinas 
government in 1988. The lengthy negotiation process in the Mexican 
parliamentary system has been summarised by de la Garza Toldeo as follows: 
 
                                                        
43 Interviews Chairman Qiao, Chairman Peng. 
 107 
“In this long history the specific content of the projects or demands has changed, 
but one single notion has remained the entrepreneurial line; and with increasing 
detail it has crystallised in the most important point: the flexibility of labour 
relations.” (de la Garza Toledo 2012, p.404) 
 
The 2012 amendment to the labour law introduced hourly pay (the banco de horas, 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6); probation and training periods; a cap on 
compensation for dismissal;44 rest days conditional to production requirements; 
an abolition of seniority wages; polyvalent work descriptions; and eased 
subcontracting. The two largest Mexican parties, PRI and PAN, were in agreement 
on most of these issues, but differed in one crucial respect. The PAN, with the aim 
of increasing employer control over labour relations, intended to raise the 
quorums for strike declaration and collective contract recognition; and to 
introduce mandatory arbitration after strikes of more than six months. However, it 
also sought to force unions to elect leaders in universal, direct and anonymous 
ballots; make these results as well as the content of collective agreements public to 
the membership; and to condemn the “exclusion clause”. The PRI on the other 
hand, due to its close linkage to the corporatist union sector, was explicitly 
opposed to stipulations that would have increased the transparency of union 
finances, leadership selection or collective contract recognition (de la Garza Toledo 
2012, p.412f.).45 After some parliamentary back and forth, the clauses regarding 
union reforms were stripped from the new draft.  
 
Though not receiving the detail the issue deserves, the 2012 labour law reform 
boils down to an extremely employer-friendly amendment, which deregulates the 
formal sector of the economy, intensifies work, reduces employment security, 
eases hiring and firing and reduces overall labour costs. In addition, no regulations 
have been passed for atypical employment conditions and the informal sector – 
                                                        
44 Mexico has no unemployment benefits. Instead, workers are supposed to be comparably 
generously compensated in cases of dismissal.  
45 The PRI conceding to the interests of the CTM does not mean that the latter would become an 
obstacle to the implementation of neoliberal labour market reforms. The CTM had for example 
opposed legal reforms of the Federal Labour Law in the 1980s and 90s, but at the same time signed 
agreements with the Mexican Employers Confederation on more flexible work rules (Bensusán & 
Middlebrook 2012, p.23f.). 
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which makes up an estimated sixty percent of employment in Mexico (Anon 
2012c). No significant amendments to the role of the corporatist union sector have 
been made – instead, the right to strike has been further curtailed and the role of 
the state in intervening into labour conflicts strengthened (STPS 2012; de la Garza 
Toledo 2012).  
 
China 
With the gradual dissolution of state-led resource allocation and its replacement 
by market mechanisms, China enacted new labour laws under Jiang Zemin, such as 
the Trade Union Law of 1992 and the Labour Law of 1994/95. The Labour Law 
gave employers a lot of flexibility in terms of contractual content and termination 
of employment (see esp. §25, 26, 27 and 29); regulated contractual relations as 
individual matters; remained highly discriminatory against rural-urban domestic 
migrants; and lacked rules of enforcement (Geffken 2005). These issues were 
tackled with at least three significant laws enacted in the first decade of the new 
millennium: the Trade Union Law of 2001 (TUL), the Labour Contract Law of 2008 
(LCL), and the Dispute and Arbitration Law, also of 2008 (DAL). In broad terms, 
these laws present a contrasting trend to the Mexican case, in the sense that they 
push towards the increasing formalisation of wage-labour relations. The LCL 
strengthened employment protection (§42, 46); regulated temporary employment 
and promoted collective labour contracts (§14, 97); stipulated adherence to local 
minimum wages (§55); sanctioned wage restraints and eased workers’ legal 
proceedings against their employers through union mediation or lawsuits (§6, 41, 
43, 56, 78). More generally, it extended the labour law beyond the urban 
workforce towards more generalised coverage, including for migrant workers. The 
TUL and DAL have reinforced the latter aspects by strengthening the role of the 
ACFTU as a supervisory organ, resting on an extension of its involvement in the 
regulation of labour relations on the shop floor and especially in mediating labour 
conflicts. The particular role of the ACFTU is on the other hand reinforced by the 
absence of freedom of association and the right to strike, which was removed from 
the constitution in 1982.  
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If we strictly confine the argument to an intra-legal discourse and compare the 
recent labour laws to both the Mexican case and Chinese status ante, they indicate 
certain concessions towards labour that point in the direction of increasing 
formalisation, rather than deregulation. Similar to the Mexican case, however, the 
LCL did not apply to all forms of labour relations – the crucial exemption in this 
case being subcontracting, or what in the Chinese context is called “dispatch 
labour” (Wang 2008) – which was however rectified by amendments in 2013. The 
bottom line of these legal changes is that procedures for dealing with workers' 
grievances are now defined and conditioned by legal standards; and that certain 
loopholes that could have allowed for the formation of workers’ shop-floor 
association outside the control of the ACFTU have been closed (§ 33 of the 
1995/95 Labour Law versus §51 of the LCL) – clearly demarcating workers’ legal 
room for manoeuvre and providing legal and organisational means for pre-
emptive intervention through the ACFTU. The question however remains to what 
extent these legal changes have had a real impact. Recent studies indicate that the 
“rule of law” in China is still characterised by strategic (local) governmental non-
enforcement or broad interpretation that prioritises informal agreements (Chen 
2013; Chan & Nadvi 2014; Lee & Zhang 2013); and that in particular the DAL has 
had the effect of dispersing collective disputes into multiple individual cases (Chen 
& Xu 2012).46 Labour laws are therefore an ambivalent issue for workers, offering 
protection of individual rights within a realm defined by the state, but 
discouraging or illegalising collective action. 
 
To sum up, the most recent changes in labour legislation in Mexico and China point 
in different directions: a flexibilisation of labour relations in the Mexican case, and 
increasing formalisation and regulation in China. Although a detailed explanation 
of these differences is beyond the scope of this study, at least four aspects have to 
be considered. First of all, initial conditions were rather different. While Mexico 
had one of the most labour-friendly legislations when enacted in 1970 (La Botz & 
Alexander 2003), China’s 1994/95 Labour Law allowed capital huge flexibility, 
                                                        
46 In a long-term perspective the spike in registered arbitration cases in 2008/2009 is therefore an 
outlier triggered by the enactment of the DAL, a related waving of fees for workers entering 
arbitration procedures and a governmental instruction for courts to open more cases (Enjuto-
Martínez 2015).   
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provided workers with hardly any employment security, and had practically no 
sanctions. Secondly, while Mexico embarked on a journey towards liberalisation 
and deregulation of its economy – or more precisely: capital-friendly re-regulation 
– and has not strayed from this path since the 1980s, China by the mid-2000s 
announced a programmatic turn towards the increase of domestic demand and a 
“rebalancing” of the economy after a decade of market-liberalisation under Jiang 
Zemin. Legal change has to be understood as part of this shifting macroeconomic 
context. Thirdly, while Mexico’s economy has experienced multiple and severe 
crises since the 1980s, China’s continuous economic growth allowed capital and 
state more room for manoeuvre. And fourth and finally, while Mexico has 
witnessed a constant decline in labour militancy since the 1980s, China has 
experienced rising pressure from below, pushing policy makers to devising 
adaptive measures, of which a reformed legal system, arbitration procedures and 
extended union coverage are important aspects. All these measures were already 
in place in Mexico as a result of its particular revolutionary heritage.       
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided essential background information in the three areas of 
Company X’s “profit strategy”, its industrial relations in Germany and its 
international development; the political economic development of the automotive 
sector and Company X in China and Mexico; and basic parameters for the 
structural and organisational power of workers in the two respective countries.  
  
I have analysed the “volume and diversity” strategy and internationalisation 
process of Company X and discussed the “beneficial constraints” stemming from 
the role of its cooperative workers’ representation in managerial decision-making. 
This information provides a template for an assessment of the convergence and 
divergence of the operations of Company X’s Mexican and Chinese subsidiaries. As 
a by-product I have shown a first instance of labour shaping the strategic 
behaviour of Company X, when the focus on employment security in Germany led 
management to close the US manufacturing site, which in turn was crucial to the 
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restructuring of the Mexican subsidiary and the opening of Company X/JV2 in 
China. 
 
As another necessary background condition I have reviewed the development of 
automotive manufacturing in China and Mexico from the dominant perspective in 
the literature, namely an analysis of government-TNC interactions. I have 
emphasised that although both geared towards the development of national 
terminal car assemblers, for reasons of timing, ownership structures, competition, 
and macro-economic instability, policy makers in Mexico were unable to discipline 
and steer the behaviour of global automakers and thereby protect a domestic 
infant industry. China’s strategy of pairing up multiple foreign firms with state 
owned enterprises turned out to be more “successful”, although this was clearly 
aided by the contingent factors of China’s large domestic market potential, its 
closed economy until the late 1970s and broader global changes reshaping the 
strategies of global auto-makers at the time. Acknowledging these factors I will in 
the chapters to follow bring in a constitutive factor neglected in these accounts, 
namely how worker agency has shaped the development of Company X in both 
countries, in particular in Mexico, through a deflection of the agency of 
management and political authorities into unintended consequences.  
 
In the third part of the chapter I analysed the class composition of the workforce at 
Company X in China and Mexico, and that of management for the Chinese case. I 
have shown that “labour force dualism” is a phenomenon in both cases, although 
the modalities in China are slightly different, which will be taken up again in the 
chapters to come. The major difference between the two cases is the average age of 
the workforce – and I will argue throughout this study that this has had an impact 
on the strategic agency of workers. I have furthermore hypothesised that the 
managerial division of labour in Company X’s Chinese ventures, as well as the 
engineering background of most German managerial personnel, has an impact on 
how day-to-day operations are managed, which will be discussed in detail in 
chapters 5 and 6.  
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I also discussed arguments that in structuralist and institutionalist accounts 
provide substitutes for analyses of historical processes of agency. I have shown 
that due to declining, and since 2011 negative, growth rates of the employable 
population and continuously positive economic growth the “marketplace 
bargaining power” of labour in China is higher than in Mexico, where positive 
employable population growth combines with multiple economic crises. I have 
also demonstrated the high profitability and strategic importance of the Chinese 
ventures for the Company X Group’s overall economic performance, which 
suggests that both the willingness and the financial ability to concede to workers’ 
demands in China will be relatively high.  
 
I then discussed the institutional matrix governing workers’ political room for 
manoeuvre, outlining two contrasting trends. In Mexico, labour laws have been 
comparably “labour friendly”, allowing for strikes and freedom of association, but 
worker agency has been constrained by the predominance of state-aligned 
corporatist unions and their capacity to set up “protection contracts”. However, 
Mexico also has a larger number of independent enterprise unions, such as the one 
at Company X, which operate under different internal rules and conduct 
enterprise-specific collective bargaining. A recent reform of the labour law has 
flexibilised work rules, hiring and firing procedures and wage levels, thus 
undermining the prerogative of collective bargaining agreements regulating these 
issues. As will be discussed throughout the following chapter, the union at 
Company X provides a contested terrain for worker agency. 
 
In China on the other hand, the “associational power” of workers appears to be 
lower. There is no formal freedom of association or right to strike and union life is 
dominated by the ACFTU. The room for manoeuvre for workers within its confines 
is extremely curtailed, so that in most cases the union is either a straightforward 
constraint on or simply irrelevant to worker agency. There are exceptions to the 
rule, primarily in southern China, but the Company X union is an entirely state- and 
management-controlled organisation. On the other hand, labour laws in China 
have recently been reformed towards an increasing formalisation of labour 
relations. That is, as a first conclusion, Mexican policy makers have used legal 
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reforms to curtail union-influence at the workplace, while in China the same 
process has strengthened the role of the ACFTU as a state-aligned intermediate 
organisation between capital and labour.     
 
So far I have presented certain historical events as culminating in a grid of 
abstracted parameters that allows for a static comparison between the two cases. 
As outlined in the preceding chapter, this procedure is helpful to build a heuristic 
map of similarities and differences between the cases – or of convergence and 
divergence – but it lacks explanatory capacity. I have argued that this critique can 
be extended to accounts that give primacy to the mapping of structural and 
institutional forms of power – e.g. market place, associational or workplace 
bargaining power – in order to explain social change (e.g. Wright 1985 and Silver 
2003). The danger in these cases is that a priori abstracted laws of motion, 
patterns and categories are substituted for the reconstruction of open-ended 
historical processes from an analysis of processes of relational agency (including 
an analysis of those historical routes potentially available, but not taken). 
Structural power becomes a placeholder in the form of a ‘container’ that is ‘filled’ 
with isolated instances of agency that should demonstrate its historical relevance. 
Processes of agency thereby become merely illustrative examples in a historical 
process that is already preconceived as cyclical and recurrent – and in its driving 
forces and components (e.g. the different forms of structural power) unchanging. A 
genealogical form of inquiry would on the other imply that it is the category of 
structural power that has at best illustrative value, while it is open-ended 
processes of relational agency that provide the explanatory value.  
 
In the following chapter a first step towards a closer inquiry of these processes will 
be the analysis of a cataclysmic labour-capital conflict central to the restructuring 
of Company X’s internal and external productive relations at the Mexican plant – 
setting the case apart from its Chinese counterpart. In the remainder of this study I 
will then analyse the day-to-day operations of the company as outcomes of more 
subtle forms of relational agency, the increasing relevance of worker agency in the 
supply chain to the operations of terminal car assemblers, and the impact of 
labour-capital relations on the geographical expansion of Company X.  
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Chapter 4: 1992 – Rage Against The Machine that 
Changed the World 
 
When in the summer of 1992 – the release year of their debut album – Rage 
Against The Machine shouted “We’re gonna take the power back!” at agitated 
crowds, workers at Company X in Mexico were attempting just that. In an 
embittered struggle against management and union leaders they sought to fight off 
the application of ‘leaner’ work rules modelled after the image of Womack et al.’s 
The Machine that Changed the World. The 1992 conflict can hardly be 
overemphasised in its significance for both the subsequent – and somewhat 
traumatic – reorientation of the labour movement at Company X (and arguably in 
Mexico more generally), and the enterprise’s quantum leap in reorganising its 
internal industrial relations and production processes, as well as external 
commercial and supply networks. It has consequently been discussed intensely 
amongst (mostly Mexican and German) scholars, commentators and participants 
(Othón Quiroz & Méndez 1992; Montiel 1993; 2001; 2007; Juárez Núñez 1993; 
2006; Pries 1993; Tuman 2003; Healy 2008; Millones Espinosa 2012; Espinal 
Betanzo 2015). There is hardly any disagreement on the actual course of events, 
but different emphases on particular circumstances and actions have lead to 
varying interpretations and political-strategic evaluations.  
 
Having laid out the theoretical foundations and necessary background information 
in the previous chapter, I will make two historically and empirically informed 
arguments in this chapter on how to think about the relationship between 
structure/institutions and agency from a perspective of relational processes of 
agency. In a first step I will argue that the 1992 conflict represents a cataclysmic 
event of relational agency – or “acute” class struggle – that resulted in institutional 
change. This should not be understood as a contingent time window open to 
agency between two otherwise stable periods of self-reproducing institutional 
matrices – that is, as a punctured equilibrium – nor as an outcome of particular 
properties of the pre-1992 institutional set-up, which necessitated its own 
displacement. Neither before nor after, nor during that event did management, 
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union leaders or rank and file workers show behaviour that could in any 
meaningful way be deducted from the incentives provided by the institutional 
matrix. Instead, all agents mobilised institutional and structural factors in creative 
and differential ways – which in their particularity, as I will argue, were driven by 
strategic aims, past experiences, and quintessentially the relation to the agency of 
the respective other parties. This, pertaining to the arguments elaborated in the 
following chapters, created a certain path dependency in Mexico, although not in 
the – in my view overly deterministic – sense that Mahoney and other 
institutionalists have in mind (Mahoney 2000; 2001; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 
2003).  
 
A second argument that will be taken up time and again throughout the following 
chapters concerns the conflict’s long-lasting effects on day-to-day shop floor 
relations, supply networks and even the geographic expansion of Company X in 
North America. In this chapter, I will argue more specifically that the conflict 
redefined relations between workers, union and managers; changed the 
institutions supposed to govern these relations; and thereby created new limits 
and potentials for agency on both sides. Because this transformation altered 
institutions very much in favour of capital at the expense of labour, the potentials 
for workers to mobilise existing formal institutions became increasingly limited. 
However, in the long run this did not, as institutionalist reasoning might predict, 
result in workers following these new rules, but rather in them drawing their 
agentic capacity from factors beyond that formal institutional matrix – respectively 
from ‘self-instituting’ (Castoriadis 1980) clandestine organisational forms under 
their immediate control.  
 
This chapter demonstrates how the agentic capacities of workers at Company X in 
Mexico are deeply shaped not only by vertical relations between labour and capital 
(and the state), but in particular by the relation between union leaders and rank 
and file workers. This is arguably also the case in China, but as I have shown in the 
preceding chapter, this relationship is essentially defined by the limited relevance 
of trade unions as vehicles of rank and file agency (for the time being; “reform” 
efforts in certain areas of China will be addressed in chapter 7 again). For this 
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reason, and because so far no in-depth research has been undertaken on workers’ 
clandestine organising at Company X in Mexico, this chapter will zoom in on and 
illuminate relations between union and rank and file workers in Mexico. Before 
developing the analysis of the lead-up to the events of 1992 and the strike itself, as 
well as its implications, it is necessary to briefly discuss how the idea of path 
dependency in institutions is more conventionally understood and draw out why 
such conceptions are ill-suited to support such an analysis or generate greater 
insight. 
 
1.  A Note on Path Dependency 
The notion of path-dependency in institutionalist reasoning rests on the attempt to 
ground changes in institutions over time in hard criteria that move it from a loose 
notion of “earlier events influence later ones” to a clearly defined analytical tool 
that is capable of explaining the emergence of certain institutions. Mahoney 
suggests the following: 
 
“Path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which 
contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties. The identification of path dependence therefore involves 
both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events, and 
showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be 
explained on the basis of prior historical conditions.” (Mahoney 2000, p.507f.) 
 
First of all, path-dependency should describe a causal chain of events in the lead-
up to the outcome under investigation, in which earlier events have a much greater 
influence than subsequent ones. In other words, the point in time of an event 
determines its explanatory value to the outcome in question. Second, the initial 
event is “contingent” – it cannot be traced back to other initial conditions. Third, 
once the initial “contingent” event has taken place, subsequent events should 
follow a “relatively deterministic causal pattern” (Mahoney 2000).  
 
Despite the popularity and influence of Mahoney’s article, the attempt to establish 
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hard analytical criteria for “path dependency” fails. The latter two of these three 
criteria turn out to be suggestive, incoherent and ill defined – and while the first 
one contains a useful idea, the allocation of explanatory value to individual events 
remains subject to interpretation.  
 
On the question of contingency, in a “strong” version it would refer to contingency 
of the initial event proper: certain phenomena occur that cannot be explained 
through antecedent causes. Although Mahoney persistently treats his historical 
examples as “real” contingencies, he admits that logically this notion cannot be 
upheld.47 He therefore turns to a weaker, theoretical-methodological, version: 
 
“Contingency refers to the inability of theory to predict or explain, either 
deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific outcome.” (ibid. 
p.513) 
 
Thus refined, the notion of contingency simply denotes the incapacity of a certain 
theory to causally explain certain historical events. This is more consistent, but 
much less powerful. What appears contingent in one theoretical approach might 
appear as a determined outcome in another. Ironically, the bottom-line of this 
notion is that the less explanatory power a theory possesses, the more contingency 
and path dependency we see.48 The notion of contingency is therefore fully 
inadequate to establish path dependency as a “hard” methodology.  
 
The criterion of a relatively determined chain of events, however, is even more 
volatile. Apart from the semantic fact that the formulation “relatively 
deterministic” is a contradictio in terminis, it becomes clear quite quickly that by 
allowing for this determinism to take the shape of either an expansive 
                                                        
47 “To argue that an event is contingent is not the same thing as arguing that the event is truly 
random and without antecedent causes.” (Mahoney 2000, p.513) 
48 In order to define an event as contingent, we could for example assume away (or ignore) the 
theoretical approaches that could explain and predict this event, start with one that cannot – and 
then bring in the theoretical explanations initially withheld as an ingenious solution to the problem. 
The knowledge would reside in a self-fulfilling prophecy – albeit one that most likely shatters the 
theoretical assumptions of the initial theory to which the event appeared as contingent. One could 
argue that this is what New Institutional Economics has done to neoclassical economics with the 
idea of institutions (assuming away centuries of classical and Marxist political-economic 
scholarship on essentially the same issues).  
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reproduction of the initial momentum or a reactive sequence of events and 
counter-events – that even allow for a reversal of path dependency – Mahoney is 
unable to specify wherein the actual determinism resides (ibid. p.508f.).  
 
However, in a “soft” notion of path dependency, Mahoney’s first criterion of a 
stronger historical relevance of earlier events over later ones still serves as a 
productive research suggestion to look for counter-intuitive or surprising 
historical events as the starting point for an analysis of how established patterns of 
agency and institutions changed subsequently. Again, however, what is said to be 
an initial event depends on the theoretical angle taken and the theory-internal 
justification of the chosen point in time at the beginning of the analysis.  
 
In the following I will treat a large-scale conflict between capital and labour at the 
Mexican plant of Company X as such an initial event. Although the event might 
appear as contingent from an institutionalist perspective, the notions of 
contingency and determinism appear too rigid (and, as I have argued, incoherent), 
while the much “softer” focus on human agency under particular historical 
conditions warrants a more promising approach, as it forces us to reconstruct 
history in open-ended terms. The impact of the initial event is in this context better 
understood as a rupture of the established rules of the game – conscious or 
unconscious – that reshuffles the balance of forces. 
 
2.  Power Relations at Company X in Mexico Towards the End of 
the 1980s 
Before we turn to a detailed analysis of the watershed events of 1992, it is 
important to emphasise the preceding dynamics that led up to the particular 
power constellation between Company X, union leaders and rank and file workers 
– and, at a certain point, local and national authorities. Throughout its history, the 
labour movement at Company X in Mexico has been shaped by deep rifts between 
and within the union leadership and the rank and file – tellingly across periods of 
different union statutes and political constellations.  
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When the plant was first opened in 1967, the union was installed as a branch of the 
CTM. Already in the early 1970s small clandestine groups of workers began to 
push for the formation of an independent electoral platform, which finally defeated 
the CTM in regular union elections. Although encapsulated in formal procedures, 
this disaffiliation process was driven by heightened tensions between grassroots 
groups and PRI-affiliated union leaders. A worker of Company X remembered:  
 
“I have an uncle who was part of the CTM at Company X. And after they had lost the 
titularidad [recognition as the only union representation in the enterprise], 
someone came to his house and shot him; they didn’t kill him, but shot him. We 
don’t know who it was, but we suspect it was some other workers. My cousins 
came to live with us, and my uncle moved to another city […] because he was 
afraid of another attempt on his life.”49 
 
Although after 1972 the CTM would not gain a foothold at Company X again until 
the opening of the Northern engine plant in 2013 (discussed in chapter 8), 
tensions between leadership and rank and file resurfaced soon enough. The new 
executive committee decided to affiliate with the Unidad Obrera Independiente 
(UOI), a union federation that became 200,000 members strong in 1983, was 
independent of any party affiliation (including the Communist Party of Mexico) 
and embraced an ideology and strategy that is probably best characterised as 
radical syndicalism (Fraile García 1999).50 Under the UOI the union at Company X 
established important new internal structures that shaped union life until 1992: a 
large number of directly elected section stewards (214 in 1992); the installation of 
the (conjoint sectional and) general assembly as the highest authoritative organ; 
and the possibility of union bargaining over work-rules in individual departments 
(Montiel 1993, p.158ff.; Tuman 2003, p.55). The 1970s saw multiple union-led 
strikes, vibrant rank and file militancy and broad participation in union life. 
However, this activism continued to be curtailed by the power of the union’s 
general secretary and the influence of the national leader of the UOI in his function 
                                                        
49 Interview worker David. 
50 There have been discussions on the actual political line of the UOI, which has also been 
characterised as “anarcho-syndicalist” (Tuman 2003, p.51) or “reformist-bourgeois, but not 
communist, as often claimed” (Lastra Lastra 2002, p.84).  
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as asesor juridico (juridical advisor).51 The asesor not only dominated union-
enterprise negotiations, but also kept external relations with non-UOI unions or 
political organisations to a minimum, and established a paternalistic leadership 
style more generally. As a senior worker remembered: 
    
“The union had always been run from above, but to conceal the situation there 
were these assemblies, where however nothing happened apart from an approval 
of whatever they wanted to see approved. They gave you only very vague 
information, but somehow they always managed to play a trick, so that people 
said: ‘Well, yes, that sounds convincing!’”52 
  
By the end of the 1970s, resentment with the authoritarian leadership was 
growing amongst ordinary workers. Tensions rose when in 1980 the general 
secretary re-negotiated the collective contract – allowing the “polyvalent”, i.e. 
flexible, disposition of workers to diverse positions and tasks, as well as new union 
bylaws that permitted his re-election – without convening, as had been required, 
either the revision commissions or a general assembly. In a tumultuous year of 
union infighting, the old leadership was expelled; and in a process of further 
rivalry between two dissident groups the union disaffiliated from the UOI. 
Although it thereby became an enterprise union without any larger affiliation, the 
Company X union left the statutes of 1972 intact and did not carry out any 
significant structural reform (Montiel 1991).  
 
In sum, during the UOI period the Company X union established a new internal 
governance structure that formally empowered the grassroots and intermediate 
levels of the union. But neither did the leadership respect the formal decision-
making power of the rank and file, nor did the grassroots show contempt for an 
authoritarian leadership style. As local and central authorities did not interfere 
with regular collective bargaining between union leaders and Company X 
management, the actual historical effect of these new institutions materialised 
                                                        
51 The asesor juridico is not a formally elected member of the union, but as the title denotes, an 
informal consultant to the union.  
52 Interview worker Fernando. 
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through internal clashes between leadership and rank and file over the direction of 
union politics.  
 
After the disaffiliation from the UOI, the Company X union experienced a ten-year 
period of stronger rank and file control over its internal affairs – but factional rifts 
persisted within the workforce, as well as amongst the leadership: the general 
secretary of the 1981-84 central committee sought communication with the CTM, 
while the second in the union hierarchy, the Secretary of Work, had ties to the 
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (a fusion of Marxist-Leninist parties). The crises of 
the 1980s – not only of the Mexican economy and its automobile industry, but also 
of the Company X Group on a global scale – put the union on the defensive. It tried 
to fight off (and managed to ameliorate) large scale dismissals, achieved a 
reduction in weekly working hours (from 44 to 42.5) and maintained control over 
techno-organisational changes of the production process (Tuman 2003, p.83f.). It 
was particularly the latter that Company X sought to implement in order to deal 
with its competitiveness problems and to shift from production for the domestic 
market towards greater export orientation – coinciding with the start of 
governmental policies aiming at market liberalisation and export promotion, and 
the announced closure of the US manufacturing site, as outlined in the preceding 
chapter.  
 
At the beginning of 1987 Company X began to prepare for a major confrontation, 
demanding overtime in order to build up a stock of vehicles and components, 
which it stored far away from the main plant. In May it declared an “economic 
conflict” to the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board, in which it projected 
losses of $30 billion for 1987 (inflation standing at nearly 130% that year), 
justifying a 15% wage cut; the dismissal of 723 unionised workers; and further 
reductions of benefits, bonuses, vacation time etc. Company X sent its non-
unionised personnel on vacation; tried to circumvent the union by making direct 
deals with its members; launched a nationwide media campaign; coordinated its 
efforts with other foreign automotive producers, who were engaging in similar 
strategies; and could rest reassured of governmental support under a national 
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policy of “industrial reconversion”, calling for the restructuring of organisational 
and industrial relations in the manufacturing sector (Montiel 1993, p.192ff.).  
 
The union reacted with a 57-day strike, driven by broad rank and file coordination 
and involvement.53 Seven general assemblies were held; three large marches 
carried out locally and two in the capital; the motorway and Company X vendors 
were temporarily blockaded. The union also managed to mobilise international 
support, with workers at the German plants refusing to substitute for parts 
normally produced in Mexico. Ultimately, the enterprise had to retreat from its 
“economic conflict” and grant workers a 78% wage increase. Montiel has summed 
up the result as follows: 
 
“That is, workers’ resistance put a halt to the enterprise’s offensive of 
restructuring; and it allowed the union organisation to link up with its 
counterparts in other countries, particularly Germany, which translated into 
additional strength.” (Montiel 1991, p.199)     
 
The 1980s ended with a sound defeat of Company X’s attempts to implement its 
desired changes on the shop floor – and with an activated rank and file, that had 
gained increasing influence over the union since its disaffiliation from the UOI. The 
lesson that management had to draw from the 1987 confrontation was that as long 
as the rank and file was able to force the union to refuse its consent to a 
restructuring of the production process – and could de facto prevent it through 
direct action – all such plans were either bound to fail or had to be implemented by 
force. Against the background of the deliberate preparation for the 1987 conflict, 
the writing was on the wall: the enterprise would use any means at its disposal to 
implement its plans on the shop floor.  
 
                                                        
53 The strike was led by elected 70-, 121-, and 30-member committees for directive, strike, and 
external coordination. 
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3.  The 1992 Conflict 
The conflict erupted against the background of Company X’s global productivity 
problems vis-à-vis its competitors; a foreseeable future increase of competitive 
pressure due to the on-going NAFTA negotiations; the formulation of a “National 
Accord on Productivity and Quality Increases” between the Mexican government 
and various national union federations (Pries 1993, p.14); and, of course, the 
preceding history of at least five years, of strike action preventing the enterprise 
from implementing the changes it desired (Tuman 2003, p.82ff.; see also chapter 
4). A new union leadership took office in 1992 and was immediately put under 
pressure to agree to measures to increase productivity, quality and labour 
flexibility. It also faced a strong opposition within the workforce, having been 
voted into office by a mere 80-vote margin over its rival group. This constellation 
proved to be explosive enough to create a paradigm-shifting labour conflict at 
Company X.   
 
In the regular biennial contract revisions of late June/early July 1992 the union 
negotiated a fifteen percent wage increase plus a five percent productivity bonus – 
at an inflation rate of 15.58% in 1992 (Junta Federal de Conciliaciòn y Arbitraje, 
Secretariat Auxiliar de Huelgas Estalladas 1992). It briefly misrepresented these 
results to the workforce as a twenty percent direct increase in an unofficial 
convocation in the plant’s parking lot – only mentioning in passing other 
amendments made to the contract. A few days later the union stated in a 
communiqué that it had signed a secret additional clause, permitting the 
enterprise to trial-run changes in the organisation of production: group work, 
work intensification, and changes of the seniority wage system (Watling & Nauman 
1992; Juárez Núñez 1993, p.143).  
 
When these changes were initiated about two weeks later, 175 of the 214 section 
stewards (representantes seccionales) called for a strike on July 20th (ibid., numbers 
given as 170 of 204 in Healy 2008, p.121). Workers convened an assembly outside 
the factory (as the company prohibited it within the compound) and collected 
about 9,000 signatures to demand the dismissal of the union leadership. They 
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launched a formal complaint at the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board in 
Mexico City, arguing that the executive committee had violated union by-laws in 
signing the agreement without consulting the general assembly. As a reaction to 
the wildcat strike, the company locked out all 14,233 workers and sacked 14 
leaders of the opposition movement with aid of the central committee, who 
invoked the exclusion clause. It also approached the Arbitration Board, arguing 
that the shut down of the plant was caused by intra-union turmoil, to be 
interpreted as a case of force majeure – and therefore justifying the full rescinding 
of the collective contract (Watling & Nauman 1992; Healy 2008, p.123f.).  
 
The conflict lasted for nearly a month, in which workers formally convoked a 
general assembly on August 15th and collected 9,031 signatures to demand re-
elections in accordance with legal procedures (Juárez Núñez 1993, p.143; number 
given as 9,301 in Healy 2008, p.125). Multiple appeals and hearings were held 
before the Arbitration Board, which finally ruled in favour of the enterprise: the 
contract was revoked on August 17th and the entire workforce fired.  
 
The conflict officially ended the day after, when a new collective agreement was 
signed between the company, the union’s asesor juridico and the leader of the 
Federación de Sindicatos de Empresas de Bienes y Servicios (FESEBES). During the 
conflict, the latter had supported – and now spoke on behalf of – the central 
committee, in his doing so being deliberately encouraged by the Company X 
management (Healy 2008, p.128f.; Othón Quiroz & Méndez 1992).54 The union 
then asked workers to be rehired under the new conditions. In a desperate 
attempt, throughout the next three days the dissident faction tried to stop trucks 
with rehired workers from entering the factory, finally leading to violent 
confrontations with federal police forces on the motorway and in the city centre. 
For the participants, the events became a cornerstone of their collective political 
memory and identity as grassroots activists:   
                                                        
54 The FESEBES was a union federation supported by (and supporting) the Salinas government to 
decrease the overall influence of the CTM. It later turned away from its neoliberal agenda and 
became a driving force behind the formation of the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT), a 
merger between independent unions into a national federation (La Botz 1997). From 1992 to 2001 
the union of Company X was affiliated to the FESEBES and thereafter to the UNT.  
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“I was helping the dissidents. We were there until the last days – when they had 
already begun to bring in new people – trying to stop the trucks. […] I remember 
that I was at the Maria [a motorway junction on the way to the plant], where we 
wanted to gather to build barricades or something, in order to stop the trucks from 
getting through. We arrived at five in the morning and I was very surprised to see 
the entire two lanes of the highway bridge being cramped with police. At that time 
the city did not have its own riot police, but they had dogs. […] We were five in the 
car; and when we got out of the taxi, we saw some people gathering where the 
petrol station is today. Not many, I think we might have been an opposition of 
around 500 people, waiting for the trucks to arrive. And when they came […] we 
stopped them, climbed up and tried to convince people to come down and not to 
enter the factory. The police assumed formation, put up fences and began to push 
us back. At that moment there wasn’t a big problem, they simply pushed us back to 
make way for the trucks. […] When they had pushed us as far as to the outward 
road, the compañeros started to become desperate. There were some that had 
prepared for this: a station waggon arrived, loaded with bottles and rocks – they 
became our weapons. We saw that the police had us on the retreat, so the action 
we wanted to pull off was – actually I don’t really know what the plan was… We 
began to attack: someone threw the first bottle and then we all did. That was when 
they unleashed the dogs on us. I remember how everyone started running, 
everyone running! An image that I still have in my mind is that some compañero, I 
cannot remember well who it was, was struggling with a dog that had locked his 
jaws into his leg. I was running towards him; and what I did out of the dynamic of 
the moment was to grab a bottle, break it and shove it into the dog; and I killed it. 
Well, I suppose I killed it, at least it let go of him and then he ran, and the only thing 
I can remember then is running, running, running so they wouldn’t get you.”55 
 
Eleven workers were arrested in this clash, but released after a meeting between 
their lawyers and the local government, the latter agreeing to cover their medical 
bills. Company X continued with the re-hiring – not without blacklisting around 
1,000 workers – while at the same time posting a newspaper advertisement with 
the title “Home sweet home” (Healy 2008, p.126). Even the most dedicated 
                                                        
55 Focus group interview workers Miguel, Santiago, Fernando. 
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members of the opposition realised that they had been defeated on all fronts by a 
concerted effort of the company, the union leadership with its aides of the 
FESEBES, and the local and federal authorities in their juridical and repressive 
capacities. Some of them now tried to be rehired as well:  
 
“When I already thought everything lost, they rehired me. […] I never thought I 
would go [to one of the stalls that were all over the city] because I thought: ‘Me? No 
way they will rehire me.’ […] And when I went, I went with fear. […] I saw they had 
lists with marked names, but when I queued I realised: ‘Ah, there is the guy from 
upstairs!’ And he grabbed me and said: ‘All good, present yourself at the plant 
tomorrow.’ […] And then it was me on the truck. […] We stopped and some 
policemen climbed up, those that they call policia ministerial today but were the 
policia judicial back then [Federal Police Forces]. They cocked their guns and: ‘No 
one leaves the truck until we reach the plant!’ Fucking hell, what was going on!? 
[…] [At the plant] there were groups of workers being instructed. The bosses were 
giving the impression that we had entered a completely new factory, that we were 
freshly hired and that everything that we lived through before had never existed. 
‘From today on things are different; and this is how we will work.’”56  
 
Things were rather different indeed. Rehired workers were forced to sign an 
agreement in which they renounced the execution of their constitutional and 
labour rights against any actions enterprise, state and union had taken (Montiel 
2001, p.114). The new collective contract had been modified in 53 of its 72 clauses 
(Montiel 2007, p.35; numbers given as 40 of 100 in Healy 2008, p.125). Amongst 
other changes, group work and quality circles had been introduced; seniority 
wages abolished in favor of merit assessments; workers’ tasks range and mobility 
within the plant increased; and the use of third-party providers on the shop floor, 
as well as large scale outsourcing were permitted – the latter immediately taking 
effect for the assembly of wire harnesses (Juárez Núñez 2006).  
 
Labour relations moreover changed dramatically with new union bylaws agreed 
on August 18th. The union’s Executive Committee was enlarged from 10 to 15 
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
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members, its legislative period increased from 3 to 4 years, and the possibility of 
re-election introduced. The number of participants in the revision committee for 
the collective contract was reduced from 56 to 30; and the one for salaries from 30 
to 20 – in both cases including the fifteen members of the executive committee. 
The most dramatic changes however concerned the dismantling of “the real source 
of friction” (Tuman 2003, p.84) by curtailing the grassroots representation. Juárez 
Núñez explains: 
 
“In his function as worker representative in the production process, the section 
steward was the spinal column of the capacity to negotiate and dispute the power 
of the enterprise on the production line. The union leadership could have been 
docile, willing to negotiate or confrontational, but in the application of the contract, 
particularly the Relative Work Norms, it always had to consult, convince or corrupt 
the section stewards.” (Juárez Núñez 1993, p.145)  
 
The pre-1992 number of 214 assistant secretaries and section delegates was now 
reduced to 8 divisional secretaries (Juárez Núñez 2006, p.13).57 While drastically 
cutting down the structure of union delegates directly elected and removable by 
majority vote of the workers in the respective administrative section, a new layer 
of section and team-leaders (called coordinadores and facilitadores) accountable to 
the enterprise was introduced (Juárez Núñez 2006, p.13). The institution of the 
general assembly was entirely abolished. As one of the strike participants 
remarked: 
 
“It was not merely about changes in the collective contract, but about the 
enterprise gaining control over the union, to have a union organisation that 
allowed the enterprise control over four, five important people and the rest being 
subordinate to them. So they cut the grassroots representation to a minimum.”58  
                                                        
57 There is some confusion about the actual number of intermediate-level representatives 
remaining after 1992. Montiel (2001, p.116) argues that already in 1992 there were 11 divisional 
secretaries with three assistants each, i.e. a total of 44 delegates, which make up the union 
structure today. Juárez-Núñez on the other hand points out that initially there were only eight 
divisions with one secretary each, which were later restructured to eleven, and only after a strike in 
2000 enlarged by the three additional assistant representatives (Juárez Núñez 2006). 
58 Focus group interview Miguel, Santiago, Fernando. 
 128 
Moreover, the 1992 conflict marked a watershed in multiple areas of Company X’s 
internal and external relations, underlined not only by the restructuring of the 
union, but also by the replacement of the general and production manager after 
the conflict (Montiel 2001, p.115). These transformations were not only apparent 
to workers and managers, but also to external observers. The diverging 
interpretations on the rationale and effects of the conflict caused severe tensions 
amongst Mexican sociologists and economists at the time. In hindsight, three lines 
of reasoning can be identified.    
 
One interpretation, shared by the enterprise and some academic observers, saw 
the root cause in a “conflict between two groups of the union” (Montiel 2001, 
p.111; also 1993; 2007; Schreiber 1998). However, even the official company 
history admits that “the Board of Directors of Company X in Mexico […] took 
advantage of the opportunity offered by the strike to create a new and positive 
relationship between the union and the management” (Schreiber 1998, p.204). 
That the internal affairs of the union merely offered the pretext for the company to 
pursue its long-standing agenda of restructuring the production process is also 
reaffirmed by the fact that once the rival union factions had agreed to resolve their 
conflict through re-elections, the company still insisted in a full revocation of the 
collective contract (Watling & Nauman 1992). 
 
A contrasting interpretation is that of a “conflict between worker and employer” 
(Juárez Núñez 1993, p.143), which emphasises the central committee’s complicit 
role in the company’s choice of strategy versus the majority decisions of the 
workforce. It gains plausibility against the background of a central committee 
which had not been mandated to agree to the changes (Watling & Nauman 1992) 
and the suspiciously short one-day period between the Arbitration Board’s ruling 
of August 17th and the signing of the entirely new collective contract and work 
rules on August 18th. Variants of this line of reasoning point to the intervention of 
the FESEBES and governmental authorities on the side of the enterprise (Othón 
Quiroz & Méndez 1992); and the functional necessity for the latter to create an 
escalating conflict:  
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“In 1992 I was a member of the revision commission (comision revisora) and I have 
no doubt that the conflict was a creation of the enterprise, because at the end of 
the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s, it launched an export programme, letting the 
domestic market go. For that it had to modify its work system, which was 
negotiated in 1992: greater participation of workers, performance wages and a 
higher mobility in productive processes.”59 
   
Though nearly all observers condemn the drastic measures through which the 
company implemented the desired changes, a particularly academic position 
around the time of the conflict was to argue that the competitive problems of 
Company X necessitated a transformation of the Mexican plant’s productive model 
in one form or another. The chosen path was then interpreted as unfortunate, 
because “to obtain productivity and quality in a conjoined manner, it requires the 
consensus of the workforce. To achieve this aim the enterprise administration 
needs to cede a part of its authority in order to involve the worker in the 
organisation of production, and to stimulate him to bring in ideas of how to 
improve the quality of the product.” (Montiel 1993, p.138) In other words, the 
failure to resolve the conflict through a compromise could jeopardise the entire 
project of emulating systems of lean production (Pries 1993, p.20).  
 
The most plausible explanation seems to be that the rank and file activism at 
Company X in Mexico throughout the 1980s did not allow the enterprise to 
implement its desired solutions to the ongoing crisis prevalent in the Company 
Group as a whole. As a response it sought to curtail worker agency through two 
measures, in which it was aided by the authorities: it blacklisted a large number of 
activists; and transformed the institutional setting governing its internal labour 
relations. To achieve these aims it embraced a multifaceted strategy during the 
summer of 1992. In a first phase it sought to co-opt the newly elected union 
leadership, whose consent was required under the given rules and routine 
practices, which had been in place since the early 1970s. When this provoked a 
conflict between the central committee and rank and file workers, in a second 
phase it seized the opportunity to escalate the tension towards a final stand off 
                                                        
59 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
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with the workforce, which it won by mobilising the local and federal judicial 
system and police force. 
 
These events were therefore neither contingent nor predictable, but followed on 
from antecedent causes and conditions – institutional and structural – that 
provided the different agents with various forms of leverage and power, which 
they mobilised against each other, and adapted to, over the summer of 1992.60 
That the result reflected not a compromise but the unilateral imposition of the 
interests of the company has to be seen not as an instrumental effect, but as the 
result of the particular power constellation at the end of the conflict. 
 
4.  Transforming Conditions for Worker Agency after 1992 
In the immediate post-1992 four-year term of the enterprise-installed central 
committee, grassroots activity within union confines was practically non-existent. 
This committee was not re-elected in 1996. The new committee put an enterprise 
proposal for new work schedules to a referendum in 1997 (it was soundly 
defeated), but rank and file activism in its pre-1992 form remained severely 
impaired – despite a spike in sabotaged cars in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict (Montiel 2001, p.114). The first open confrontation between union and 
management did not occur until the year 2000. To a large extent this was due to 
the elimination of the intermediate union levels – the section stewards –, which 
polarised leadership and rank and file relations. In structural terms, the new union 
statutes dramatically increased the power of the central committee versus the 
grassroots. This had a paradoxical implication: on the one hand, it became even 
more relevant who controlled the central committee – and, as we shall see in the 
chapters to come, this could at times of ‘benevolent leadership’ open up a room for 
manoeuvre for the rank and file, as under the central committee of 2000-2008. For 
                                                        
60 Of all contemporary observers, it was only Pries that had a similarly non-structuralist, non-
functionalist and non-instrumentalist understanding of the conflict, when he argued that the 
conflict “cannot be understood in terms of static and singular strategies and interests, but from the 
dynamic perspective of the strategic collective actors in a game of intra- and inter-organisational 
negotiations.” (Pries 1993, p.21) However, pace Pries, I would argue that neither process nor result 
are adequately characterised as ‘negotiations’, but rather as acute and conflictive power struggles.   
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most of the time, however, rank and file participation within the confines of the 
union remained severely constrained, so that on the other hand, more radical 
sections of the workforce turned towards clandestine organising and agency. The 
reprogramming of the institutional matrix was only one factor in this equation. 
Arguably more important was the learning effect for workers that the enterprise 
had embarked on a zero-tolerance course towards ‘troublemakers’ and in doing so 
would be backed by the political, legal and repressive apparatuses of the 
government. As an academic expert on the history of the labour movement at 
Company X explained:    
 
“Of the 1,100 or something compañeros that were fired in 1992 the majority were 
activists. The enterprise tried to cut all possible heads off. Those that did not have 
to leave could not stick their necks out, could not speak up. This lasted for four 
years. But finally they did again – they appeared yet another time, compañeros that 
were part of the committee of 2000-2008, of 2008-2012 and will be in the new 
one. […] Of course, all those that make themselves visible, that speak up, that 
organise, will be fired – but some will remain. And they are there, many, 
thousands.  
 
It is impossible for the enterprise’s intelligence to figure out exactly who the 
communists are – ‘How did the ‘Moscow Gold’ get here?’61 So, there is a tradition of 
struggle with socialist roots, leftist roots, anti-capitalist roots. I have been told that 
the new central committee [2012-2016] will be a pretty bad one again, but there 
are people inside who are waiting for the right moment. An answer from these 
compañeros seems possible at any time – it is difficult right now, but there are 
organising efforts.”62 
 
Although it is impossible to assess the validity of such, rather bold, statements, it 
seems plausible that the efficacy of union politics at Company X depends much 
                                                        
61 ‘Moscow Gold’ refers to the transfer of the major part of Spain’s gold reserves to the Soviet Union 
during the Spanish Civil War. The term was used as an anti-communist catchphrase during the Cold 
War era to discredit the Soviet Union’s financial support for communist movements in other parts 
of the world.  
62 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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more on clandestine currents mobilising the rank and file, than is usually 
acknowledged – also in the existing historical accounts on the union at Company X 
(less so in Montiel 1991; Fraile Garcí́a 1999; Juárez Núñez 2006; than in Montiel 
2001; 2007; 2010; Tuman 2003; Healy 2008; Espinal Betanzo 2015). In the 
following section, I will therefore discuss the motivation, practices, and stance 
towards the union of a group of dissident workers. I will show how their agency 
extends beyond the realm of formal institutions and organisations. I will argue that 
worker agency is therefore neither subsumable nor replaceable by an analytical 
focus on union activity. On the contrary, it constitutes a relevant factor in the 
overall development of Company X in Mexico.  
 
4.1.  Clandestine organising in Mexico  
 
Unionism has an objective, right? If we take the stipulations of 
the law seriously, it says that the union has the mission to 
educate, to defend and to improve the rights of workers. Well, 
there is no education, there is no defence – and the last thing the 
union will do is improve things. 
– Fernando, Company X worker 
 
While the 1970s and 80s were characterised by open political debate and factional 
struggle – at least on the level of ideological strife, if not always manifest in 
different practices – the 1992 restructuring drove the manifold leftist currents 
underground. The group of workers I met on a regular basis was a product of this 
change, formed by individuals of different political tendencies and ideologies, who 
however shared concerns about the dynamics inside Company X and its union. One 
worker summed up the group’s historical context, purpose and parameters of 
activism: 
 
“What we wanted was to revive those small currents that existed in the 80s, when 
there were workers who apart from criticising also contributed; contributed ideas, 
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contributed opinions that in the best case were neither welcomed by the 
enterprise nor by the union, but tried to contribute something to the compañeros, 
so that we would no longer take the vantage point of the government or the 
enterprise, but always see another option: namely that the workers would provide 
an informed viewpoint themselves. But let me emphasise this: all this happens 
clandestinely. Why? Because you know that with all the [political] work we do, we 
can lose our jobs. So everything is done clandestinely, up to this date, and it 
continues to be like that.”63 
 
The group was formed in the mid-1990s on the initiative of one worker, who 
began to communicate with colleagues he thought would share his concerns. The 
group spread in the same manner to a size of about 15 to 20 workers, of whom 
however less than ten participated actively on a regular basis, and a wider network 
of sympathisers. These workers were between 42 and 53 years of age. Using the 
facilities of a local social centre, the group met every second weekend in the early 
morning.64  
 
Issues of concern 
The concerns and debates of the group can be categorised threefold as concrete 
day-to-day tactical issues; intermediate strategic visions; and more abstract 
discussions about political worldviews. Concrete issues could be an exchange of 
work-experiences and the situation in different departments, such as workloads, 
line speed, technical problems at work, relationship to colleagues and union 
personnel, problems with superiors etc. At the time of my fieldwork, the group for 
example discussed how to organise a collective response in their work teams and 
departments to the parallel assignment of high workloads and mandatory vacation 
time that Company X used to flexibly react to fluctuations in orders.65  
 
Strategic debates mostly concerned the direction of the labour movement at 
Company X – particularly the question of the union, how to engage with and 
                                                        
63 Interview worker Miguel. 
64 Author’s field notes. 
65 Author’s field notes. 
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potentially change it. The group studied the union statutes of the pre- and post-
1992 eras in detail, in order to develop a collective stance and communicate it 
within the plant. Broader political developments of local and national scope in the 
autumn of 2012 were for example questions of how to participate in protests 
against the Labour Law reform; and whether to draft a statement on the issue.66 
 
Abstract political issues were of particular interest to at least some of the group’s 
members. Mostly individually, they would study the history of revolutionary 
movements (particularly the Russian and Cuban revolution) and the political 
writings of Marx, Lenin and other socialist classics. This knowledge would inform 
debates within the group, but sometimes also carry them far beyond applicable 
politics, which some of the members criticised.67  
 
In short, the group deliberately sought to synthetize everyday experiences with 
purposeful strategy and a broader analytical, political and moral worldview. In 
this, it not only resembled the experiences of the Mexican labour movement of the 
1970s and 80s, which they explicitly referenced, but also those of small worker-
activist groups in other spatio-temporal contexts (e.g. Alquati 1974; Bock 1976; 
Roth 1976; Birke 2007).  
 
Activities 
In terms of practice, the group – as a collective entity – was mainly engaged in self-
education, information-gathering and dissemination; and forging alliances with 
other grassroots activists and movements, locally and internationally. All members 
of the group were particularly active on the shop-floor and involved in day-to-day 
struggles with the enterprise or the union, either independently or as grassroots 
union delegates. For security reasons, they however did not act as a visible group 
in these contexts.  
 
 
 
                                                        
66 Ibid. 
67 Interviews worker Daniel, Fernando. 
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Information gathering and dissemination  
Individually and collectively, the group’s members worked towards an improved 
understanding of their conditions of existence – both within and outside the 
factory. They gathered information on the development of Company X through 
publicly available material, data obtained by the union (accessible through 
personal contacts), as well as through meetings with academics of the local 
university.68 Individually, they read books on history and political theory – and for 
a while the group ran an independent evening reading circle on the works of Paulo 
Freire.69 
 
Members of the group would disseminate their knowledge and political 
propaganda by word-of-mouth. Around the time of union elections, the group 
invited other workers for sessions to debate the programmes of the respective 
electoral platforms.70 For a while it also published an irregularly appearing 
bulletin. During the period of the 2000-2008 executive committee, this paper could 
be distributed openly, even though it was critical of the union. But after 2008 
“came an executive committee that was very sensitive to critique, and it began to 
have a lot of compañeros sacked – so we decided to put the issue on hold for the 
time being, because they were bothered by our newspaper and they knew we were 
behind it. […] Now we have to do it clandestinely, for security reasons.”71 
 
Although most members (but not all) identified with a socialist cause – i.e. derived 
the legitimacy of their broader moral and political viewpoints from parameters 
outside the belief system of the Mexican status quo – when dealing with concrete 
issues, they made regular reference to the existing rights, laws and formal (union) 
procedures. As one worker explained, framing company strategies as “unjust” and 
mobilising a narrative of legal entitlements was an important strategy in face-to-
face interactions with colleagues:   
  
                                                        
68 Author’s field notes. 
69 Interview worker Miguel. 
70 Author’s field notes. 
71 Interview worker Daniel. 
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“I set myself the task to do research, reading a lot of newspapers, books, and trying 
to make the compañeros understand their rights, assisting them in conflicts with 
the bosses or the union.”72 
 
This should however not be confused with compliance with legal standards. When 
asked what to do in cases of legal procedures that he perceived as injustices, this 
worker said that he would resort to extra-legal moral standards to justify his 
standpoint.73 Besides moral and political arguments, knowledge of legal and 
formal realities was merely one factor amongst others, fulfilling an instrumental 
purpose to draw colleagues into political debates and create additional leverage in 
conflicts with superiors.  
 
To bring the issue back to the initial theoretical propositions, the group made 
deliberate attempts to interpret and appropriate their surrounding conditions in a 
meaningful and dialogical manner – and to communicate their results with other 
workers.  
 
Networking  
Depending on political conviction members of the group were individually 
engaged in political activism beyond the shop-floor, for example in the leftist party 
PRD,74 the MORENA movement,75 or other social movements. The group however 
remained independent, seeking instead informal networks with mutual help 
networks and support groups for other political movements and groups in Mexico: 
 
“On the local level, in our solidarity group, we have also worked with people 
outside the automotive sector, with other social actors, who always need some 
kind of support, educational, logistical or moral support. […] Hence, our group has 
                                                        
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 The Partido de la Revolución Democrática is a left-socialdemocratic party that lost the 2006 
national elections by a 0.56% margin to the conservative PAN, raising allegations of electoral 
irregularities and fraud. 
75 The Movimiento Regeneración Nacional is a left-wing reformist party in the tradition of the social-
corporatist policies of the Mexican Revolution under president Cardenas. It was founded by the ex-
presidential candidate of the PRD, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, after his defeat in the 2006 
elections.   
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branched out to other aspects and groups, such as [Worker Group A, Worker 
Group B] and other collectives in which we participate individually. One of those is 
the [Collective A], through which we have supported the compañeros in Atenco, in 
Oaxaca in 2006, and in other conflicts.”76  
 
The group had also established an international web of contacts, initiated by 
automotive labour activists in Germany: 
 
“We are in touch with an automotive worker of [another German car 
manufacturer] who has contacts to a political group here. […] She invited us to 
German City Y, where we got to know other workers in the car industry, and 
particularly of Company X, who are also restless and fighting from below. This is 
something very important for us, to get to know other workers from other car 
plants, who are also fighting to defend themselves and trying to understand all the 
arbitrary actions within the automotive industry, particularly within Company X. 
[…] It is very important, because one begins to consolidate links, links of work and 
communication, coordinated up to a certain point, by workers from below, who are 
doing something for the compañeros. The exception were the compañeros from 
Spain, who belonged to different levels of the CGT union leadership. […] We know 
these compañeros from the grassroots, and with these workers we could launch 
various actions, at best simultaneously, like leafleting in all the plants, and these 
kinds of things.”77 
 
These networks lent important moral support and legitimacy to the group, 
although when asked about their practical implications for the activism at 
Company X in Mexico, answers remained vague and did not go beyond the aspect 
of information-exchange. Rather surprisingly, the group had not established any 
form of regular contact to workers of automotive manufacturers of different 
brands and in other areas of Mexico. Its activism was focussed on the Company X 
group – albeit on a global scale – and the local level, through contacts to Company 
                                                        
76 Interview worker Miguel. 
77 Ibid. 
 138 
X’s suppliers and other social movements. Activism in other areas of Mexico rather 
developed as ad hoc expressions of mutual help and solidarity. 
 
Working within and against the union 
That the group developed its activities outside the realm of the union does not 
imply that it held anti-union attitudes. Unions were generally regarded as positive 
and legitimate tools for the advancement of working class interests – but the union 
at Company X, in particular its leadership and the post-1992 statutes, was harshly 
criticised.78 As one worker explained:  
 
“Sometimes we don’t know if, when you enter the union leadership, you end up 
being one of the two: bought off and corrupted; or being threatened. There are no 
other explanations for this lack of social activism. The union of Company X has a 
great history in Mexico and locally, when in the 70s and 80s it played an important 
role in the labour movement, and in turn in a broader national social movement. 
The conflict of 92 is at the root of this problem, it practically erased this kind of 
union activism.”79 
 
This form of critique, combining personal accusations against the leadership and 
organisational issues stemming from the 1992 transformation, were typical for the 
members of the group. They moreover found their perceptions confirmed through 
the international exchange with grassroots activists from other countries, who 
shared their concerns. Another worker explained: 
  
“Some of us went to Germany, to the Consejo [the meeting of grassroots unionists 
in the car industry, organised by a political group in Germany], and we realised 
that they have the same complaints in Germany. That means it is a structural issue, 
that is: union leaders assume that the people at the bottom will follow – but they 
won’t, they will not do it. As for our union, it is not personal, it is not simply that 
some officials are suckers and bad for us – no, it is structural as well, because 
unfortunately we have unions in Mexico that are charros, that are not on the side of 
                                                        
78 Focus group interview Miguel, Santiago, Fernando. 
79 Interview worker Miguel. 
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workers, which is an attitude that becomes infectious, like a rotting apple. […] So 
we have the feeling that it is a structural issue, that union leaders are on the side of 
the enterprise and that on the bottom we do not have the means to undo that.”80 
 
In short, it is fair to say that against the background of their experiences, workers 
in the group shared a thorough scepticism towards the higher union levels and 
consciously chose not to partake in them. Group member Santiago explained how 
he had been asked to join an electoral platform for the central committee elections 
in the late 1990s. Observing the formal and informal hierarchies under which the 
platform operated, he chose to decline the offer:  
 
“Some [of the union representatives] are idealists, but of those few… let’s say, there 
are no conditions in place that prevent this idealism from turning into 
opportunism. You realise that there are four or maybe five people who steer the 
whole group, whose opinions count – and I did not like that, which is why I did not 
participate.”81 
 
In light of these shared feelings, members of the group preferred to work as 
directly elected and recallable sectional or divisional delegates within the union 
confines – that is, despite their pessimistic to cynical views of the union, they 
engaged it in an essentially pragmatic manner, utilising the formal lower ranks of 
the union: 
 
“We are the first instance when it comes to supporting the compañeros in 
defending themselves. Defending themselves, educating themselves, providing 
them some culture, knowledge and training, all to the best of our abilities. This is 
part of my work now. It is contractually regulated.”82 
 
In fact, they would have liked to see an extension of (or reversion to) direct-
democratic structures: 
 
                                                        
80 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
81 Interview worker Santiago. 
82 Interview worker Miguel. 
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“My vision is to make changes in the union structure so that the people get back in 
control, able to say: ‘You are useless, you are corrupt – fuck off, let someone else 
come.’”83 
 
Considering that a return to the pre-1992 structure of grassroots delegates seemed 
unlikely, a large part of the group’s activism consisted in substituting for the 
perceived passivity of the union leadership – with a short exceptional period under 
the 2000-2004 central committee – by building informal networks based on 
friendship and personal loyalty amongst the colleagues: 
 
“I think that usually after a period of around three months people begin to 
understand, and we identify with each other, identify as workers. […] We have a 
saying, which is ‘You spend more time at work than at home’ – so you begin to see 
each other as family. And on that level it works well – but that does not mean that 
people get interested beyond that point, for example in the union. […] Most people 
just do their job and fall into some kind of sickish apathy. So, if I manage to awake 
the consciousness of ten people that is more than enough.”84 
 
Some, however, were sceptical of successfully organising the grassroots – and felt a 
lack of appreciation by their colleagues: 
 
“We are only a few workers who actually take up the fight, and often we achieve 
successes that benefit everyone; once the results and benefits are there, everyone 
is happy – but the 11,000 workers don’t even know the process and the fight it 
took, which makes me quite angry, because the compañeros don’t have the 
consciousness, nor the information, they don’t get active. That is a problem that we 
need to tackle with our group.”85 
 
In sum, the group had a profoundly instrumental view of the union. Working as 
grassroots delegates gave them paid time to organise their colleagues – activities 
that they however also pursued when they had no formal representative role. 
                                                        
83 Interview worker Santiago. 
84 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
85 Interview worker Daniel. 
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Quite crucially, mobilisation unfolded through personal contacts, communication 
and practical problem-solving on the grassroots, rather than through electoral 
campaigns, support for certain union leaders or other channels for workers’ 
participation in union life provided by formal institutions. However, most 
members of the group remembered the pre-1992 union structure and used it as a 
reference point for a critique of current trade union affairs.  
 
Visions of the future 
 
One can sum it up very simply; this sentence says it all:  
Each day we are worse off. 
– Worker Miguel, Company X in Mexico 
 
Despite their activism – and the pride and satisfaction they took in it – most 
workers in the group were disillusioned about the future. Nevertheless, they were 
equally convinced that the only hope for improvement lay in their continuous 
activism. In the following I will give room to the some of these workers’ rather 
poetic statements, not only because they arguably say most about the character 
and spirit of the group, but also because they allow for some – speculative, rather 
than representative – conclusions on the significance of groups like this to the 
development of worker politics within and beyond Company X in Mexico.   
 
A common denominator when speaking of the present and future situation was the 
distant or not-so-distant past. This could take the form of invoking dark images of 
the past in a cyclical notion of “history repeats itself”: 
“I can only sum this up as involution, because one cannot call this evolution 
anymore. For the company, yes – but for the workers it is involution, every day 
more pronounced. We are regressing to a period that we call the porfiriato.86 The 
only thing missing is a supervisor that cracks the whip.”87 
                                                        
86 The period of the dictatorship under Porfirio Diaz that preceded the Mexican Revolution is 
generally referred to as the Porfiriato. It was characterised by political repression, capitalist 
modernisation through foreign investment and an extreme increase in social inequality and class 
antagonism, in particular in rural areas. 
87 Interview worker Miguel. 
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The past however also functioned as positive reference point for a negative 
evaluation of the present. Particularly the oldest worker in the group took near-
masochistic joy in comparing the current situation to his experience of – and 
nostalgia for – the period of the 1970s and 80s:  
 
“It is definitely worse today, wherever you look. As far as labour relations are 
concerned, as union members we are defenceless, we do not have the means to act 
in an organised manner. Things are simply imposed on us and applied. […] Also, 
the economic situation was better; our wages were worth more. That is, there are 
external influences as well; it does not exclusively depend on us. We also had 
universities back then that addressed these issues, issues of exploitation. But the 
universities have prostituted themselves as well – and although they call this 
‘excellence’, what it is in reality, is education after the image of big industry.”88 
 
Passing over in silence the statement on the contemporary role of higher 
education, the gloomy image that workers painted of the present and future was 
on the other hand countered by a strong sense of perseverance – very much in the 
Gramscian sense of “Pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will.” (Antonio 
Gramsci 1971, p.175) The following statements are indicative of individual and 
social motivations, as well as a messianic hope, at work within the group:  
 
“The knowledge of what is going on is what allows you to keep going – that is, for 
sure, we are losing and in no way are the leadership levels going to organise us. 
Therefore the only alternative is that from the bottom we are beginning to get to 
know the reality. And I believe that ultimately it will be like this: if a movement 
should arise, it has to be from the conscious grassroots.”89 
 
 “Today I have no idea who should lead a revolutionary movement. In a global 
perspective, the working class has led these movements – but the working class 
here is very oppressed and I don’t know if we are up to the job. We have to 
continue our political work; and maybe at some point the proper conditions will 
                                                        
88 Interview worker Fernando. 
89 Ibid. 
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arise in which people are fed up and a movement can develop. And I don’t know 
how it will be done, armed or as a social movement.”90 
 
In short, workers in the group had comparatively realistic ideas about their 
surrounding conditions, power relations and limitations to their activism. Yet, they 
refused to accept these circumstances or to become discouraged by the rather slim 
chances of a short- or medium-term realisation of their aspirations.  
 
Relevance and impact 
Clearly, this group only represents a tiny minority amongst the large workforce of 
Company X. Overall, the practical impact of such groups can hardly be adequately 
determined, also because it is unknown how many similar currents and groups 
exist apart from the one discussed above. Moreover, as a group its collective 
activities basically narrow down to information gathering, communication, 
propaganda and networking. However, as individuals the group members have 
been on the forefront of smaller and larger struggles within the plant – which we 
will encounter throughout the following chapters – making the group a nodal point 
in the web of personal and political relations amongst Company X workers. The 
relevance of the group should be seen more in constituting a point of contact and 
coordination substituting for the limitation of an exchange of political ideas with 
the union.     
 
5.  Absence of Comparative Movements at Company X in China 
In 1992 Company X/JV1 had just recently commenced serial mass production and 
was still struggling with the local supply industry, while at Company X/JV2 
workers were just unpacking the last machines relocated from the United States 
(Posth 2006). It would take another 18 years until a comparable cataclysmic event 
would occur in the automotive sector – and it was located in the automotive supply 
chain, rather than in terminal assembly plants. The subtitle of Zhang Lu’s seminal 
monograph on the automobile industry in China – The Politics of Labor and Worker 
                                                        
90 Interview worker Daniel. 
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Resistance – is thus to a certain degree misleading: terminal car assemblers in 
China have been rather stable, compared to the Mexican case, the Chinese light 
industry, or even the automotive supply chain. From her fieldwork between 2004 
and 2011 Zhang reports three incidents of strikes in two of the seven factories she 
researched – none of them at Company X.  
 
The strikes reported by Zhang were short-lived – for one shift or only a few hours 
– and showed patterns known from strikes in other industries in China: secretly 
organised, seemingly spontaneous and quickly reacted to by management (L. 
Zhang 2014a, p.141ff., 153ff.). To this day only one larger-scale strike has been 
observed at a terminal assembly plant in China – in 2012 at a light truck assembly 
plant of a US-American TNC and JV2 (Qiao & Lin 2012). That there is little public 
knowledge of strikes (and clandestine groups) in terminal assembly plants might 
of course also be a result of these brand companies exercising a tighter media 
control over their internal affairs – including heavily and formally restricted access 
for journalists and researchers – than smaller enterprises in the supply chain. 
However, if large scale conflicts of the form witnessed in the electronics industry 
or the automotive supply chain should occur, it would hardly be possible, even for 
a very cautious enterprise like Company X, to contain information from spreading 
to the public – in particular, because as we will see in chapter 5, workers make 
extensive use of the internet to report from the plants. In short, it seems safe to 
assume that the degree of open conflict at Company X in China is comparably low.  
 
The information on strikes at Company X in China that I could obtain narrows 
down to two incidents: my interviewees in the Eastern main plant of Company 
X/JV1 reported a strike by dispatch workers in 2011, which lasted for 2 hours and 
concerned unequal wage levels paid by a labour agency.91 In the Northern main 
plant of Company X/JV2 there were conflicts about working hours in 2009, with 
formal and dispatch workers protesting against excessive overtime.92 As an effect 
of the particular interview situation (including my obvious outsider position, 
accompanied by a translator, and a lack of follow up contacts to interviewees) it 
                                                        
91 Interview migrant dispatch workers Lie and Xun. 
92 Interview workers Chengdu. 
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was generally difficult to gather more information on strikes. Most interviewees 
said they had never heard of strikes at Company X, while one worker, although 
voicing his discomfort with the topic, remarked that:  
 
“There are only few, but of course there are strikes. It is inevitable.”93 
 
The relative absence of open conflict does however not mean that workers were 
docile. Zhang observed acts of pilferage, sabotage, refusal to partake in company 
rituals, petitioning, informal bargaining with team leaders etc. at multiple terminal 
assembly plants (Zhang 2014a, chap.5, 6). Though ultimately an academic issue of 
limited practical relevance, it begs the question if all these acts are rightly 
subsumed under the term “resistance”, as Zhang seems to suggest. Most of these 
acts – arguably apart from sabotage and pilferage – are clearly “acts of defiance” (a 
term also embraced by Zhang), but their confrontational nature, as well as the 
impact on the enterprise is indirect at best. These acts might be better understood 
as strategies to ease the pressure at work, respectively of refusal and evasion. It is 
these forms of “chronic class struggle” that will be the topic of the following 
chapters.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks  
Despite the fact that workers at Company X were not able to prevent the 
implementation of new work rules and a restructuring of the union, the 1992 
conflict and its preceding history indicate, at minimum, that managerial strategy is 
not simply implemented, but has to overcome obstacles imposed by worker 
agency. In a more significant reading the concrete result of the implemented 
changes – which will be the object under scrutiny in the following chapters – is 
itself an outcome of the relational agency between capital, labour and the state in 
the concrete moment of the summer 1992. Although it is undeniable that these 
results manifested to the largest extent the interests of management – rather than 
a “negotiated” compromise – it is insufficient to explain these as an unfolding logic 
                                                        
93 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
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of capital. The particular changes of the union structure indicate that management 
was well aware of the danger stemming from a larger political room for 
manoeuvre for ordinary workers – and it therefore devised new institutional 
constraints. Giving the example of a clandestine group of worker activists formed 
in the aftermath of the 1992 conflict, I have argued that while these new 
institutions did indeed reshape the conditions for worker agency they did not do 
so in a way deducible from the institutional matrix itself. For even though the 
institutional matrix allowed management closer control over a smaller and more 
centralised union and eradicated the formal recognition of rank and file activism 
through shop floor representatives, they did not achieve a general pacification of 
grassroots activism – instead, those dissidents that were not fired formed 
underground currents within the company. The unintended medium- and long-
term consequences were, as we shall see in the following chapters, more complex. 
Worker agency polarised between official union politics and increasing clandestine 
activism and more subtle forms of day-to-day defiance – what I term “chronic class 
struggle”.  
 
In short, the 1992 conflict was a process of relational agency unpredictable by the 
institutional matrix in place prior to 1992, which caused institutional changes – 
and these institutional changes provided new conditions for worker agency, to 
which some of them reacted with defiance, that is, in ways equally unpredictable 
by the new institutional matrix. The crux is that the institutions governing 
industrial relations only tell us basic parameters for how capital-labour relations 
would ideal-typically function if all actors involved abided by the rules – but that in 
reality, this set up is constantly transcended by the agency of all parties involved, 
who draw their interests, power and strategies from other sources.  
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Chapter 5: Organisation of Production – Conditions 
for and Results of Relational Agency  
In the preceding chapter I interpreted the 1992 conflict at Company X in Mexico as 
a cataclysmic event of relational agency. I showed how it marked a watershed in 
the internal and external relations and operations of Company X in Mexico, gearing 
them towards export production and a reorganisation of the production process. 
In this chapter I will shift the emphasis to the contemporary organisation of 
production and the less visible day-to-day processes of relational agency – not only 
in Mexico, but also in China.  
 
Does Company X embrace the same institutions to govern the labour process in 
China and Mexico – or does it “exploit local idiosyncrasies” to diverging degrees? 
How do these institutions perform in the reality of the shop floor – and how do 
capital-labour relations shape the actual outcomes of this performance? I approach 
these questions through an analysis of three institutions central to the governance 
of shop floor relations: remuneration systems, the organisation of work, and hiring 
and training strategies. For each of these institutions I compare how processes of 
relational agency between managers and workers shape their actual operations. I 
will first reconstruct the institutional set up in order to infer how these institutions 
should ideal-typically function. I then analyse how workers and managers at 
Company interpreted and acted upon these institutions. This allows me to infer 
how and why processes of relational agency concur with or evade, undermine or in 
other ways change, the operative logic of workplace institutions. Where historical 
data is available I retrace processes of institutional change in their emergence and 
transformation; where my fieldwork observations from 2012-2013 are the sole 
reference point, I pursue arguments of static comparative nature.  
 
I argue that on the level of intentional design the institutions governing shop floor 
relations in China and Mexico converge to a high degree. In practice, however, they 
perform differently, as the agents governed by them differently interpret and act 
upon the constraints or potentials they face. I therefore argue that processes of 
relational agency on the shop floor represent another instance in which human 
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behaviour does not necessarily follow the incentive structure provided by the 
institutional matrix. Herein lies one explanatory factor for institutional changes, 
whose cataclysmic form I have analysed in the preceding chapter, and whose more 
evolutionary and gradual form I will analyse in the following.94 
 
I hypothesise that against this background three different processes can be 
observed that have shaped the practical relation between institutions and agency. 
First, engaging the notion of (soft) path dependency I argue that institutional 
heritage matters. I explore how the introduction of meritocratic remuneration 
systems in China and Mexico has led to different outcomes, due to the maintenance 
of collective bargaining in the Mexican case after the 1992 conflict. I argue that 
even in situations of rather drastic institutional change, certain institutions of the 
status quo ante might remain in place, while others are remodelled but leave their 
traces in the new institutional matrix. While institutionalists seek to the reasons 
within the design of the transforming or replaced institutions, the crucial point 
carved out in the preceding chapter is that these changes are not an intrinsic effect 
of an institutionally inscribed path dependency, but result of power relations at the 
time of the implementation of new institutions. I therefore argue that the concrete 
ways in which remuneration systems at Company X in Mexico and China work are 
indeed affected by the institutional setting – in particular the functioning of the 
trade union – but only insofar as different stakeholders are making strategic use of 
it.  
 
Secondly, I argue that the agents, whose behaviour is supposed to be governed in 
specific ways by the institutional matrix, might intentionally deviate from these 
                                                        
94 In a sense, this notion of change is what institutionalists, particularly in the rational choice 
tradition, have in mind when they speak of “adaptation”. In these cases, individual utility 
maximisation is a given constant, and institutions developed as constraints that gear this behaviour 
to a greater or lesser extent into a desired direction. This implies that deviant behaviour can be 
expected from individuals whose utility is not maximised by the institutional matrix. This idea is 
behind NIE explanations of the existence of institutions that govern the labour process. They are set 
up to ameliorate the transformation problem of labour power into actual labour, or in the words of 
NIE, to compensate for the insufficiency of market relations to address “hidden action” problems 
(Bates 1995). The crucial difference in the route taken here is that rather than individual utility 
maximisation it is relational processes between collective actors with different potentials to 
mobilise institutions, structures and resources shaping their capacities for agency – or power – that 
determines how individuals behave towards institutions.   
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prescriptions and therefore obstruct the functionality of the institutional design. I 
demonstrate this through an analysis of the work organisation proper, in 
particular concepts of teamwork and “continuous improvement” (kaizen) applied 
in China and Mexico. Here the emphasis is placed on how in both cases persistent 
managerial authoritarianism has been detrimental to a functional application of 
lean production systems.  
 
Third, I argue that how agents mobilise resources outside the institutions that 
govern the shop floor has repercussions on how these institutions are enforced. I 
discuss how within the particular class composition in China and Mexico one 
group of workers – migrant dispatch workers in China – stands out in its coping 
strategies with the factory system, grounded in mobilising the possibility of 
alternative strategies of reproduction/sources of income. This had particular 
repercussions on the training programmes in China. 
 
Before I provide an in-depth empirical analysis of each of these instances, I briefly 
outline the grievances of workers at Company X in China and Mexico, in order to 
provide a background understanding of the motivations that might inform worker 
agency on the shop floor. This is based on the premise that that the immediate 
experience of discontent – causally or teleologically (Horn & Löhrer 2010) – 
informs worker agency.95 I therefore first give an overview of the common 
complaints amongst workers at Company X in China and Mexico. I then go through 
the three identified institutional settings and processes of agency, before 
concluding with an empirically enriched evaluation of the hypotheses posited 
above. This allows me to draw inferences for the overarching question of the role 
of relational agency (between capital and labour) in processes of institutional 
change.  
                                                        
95 Broadly speaking, the relationship between discontent and agency could be interpreted as causal: 
worker agency is (at least in part) a reaction to grievances; or teleological: workers’ actions are 
purposefully directed at overcoming or improving a situation of discontent. While the former 
leaves room for a more complex interpretation of particular acts – the agents might also act due to a 
particular routine, mental dispositions, prejudice, misinformation, peer pressure etc. – the latter 
establishes an immediate connection between felt discontent and action. Suffice it to say that we 
can assume a connection between grievance and agency, although a causal, multifaceted 
perspective seems more plausible when dealing with the specifics of certain individual and in 
particular collective acts. 
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1.  Complaining, Ranting, Socialising 
8-10 hours a day!? The time account is totally cheating! Everyday 
someone quits and someone new is coming in! Only after 15 years 
can you become a formal worker! You truly are a German 
company, you Nazis! You are the scourge of the Chinese people! 
Petty wages! No benefits! No holidays and vacations! You are the 
Foxconn of the car industry! You modern Nazis!  
– Company X/JV1 worker in an online forum, 201296 
 
Concurring with findings on auto workers’ grievances across space and time 
(Alquati 1974; Kamata 1983; Seidman 1994; Milkman 1997; Wildcat 2007) – 
including the seminal studies on my two cases (L. Zhang 2014a, chaps.5, 6; Montiel 
1993; 2001; 2010; Juárez Núñez 2006) – the overwhelming majority of workers’ 
complaints in China and Mexico concerned similar, if not exactly the same, issues 
(Table 2).97 Only internal union affairs in the Mexican case; and housing, food and 
transportation in the Chinese case, were issue of concern that were not present in 
the respective other case.  
 
Workers complained about salaries; working hours, shifts and rhythm; physical 
exhaustion and other health issues; the monotonous and unchallenging character 
of work; and “unfair” treatment by superiors. These complaints applied to all 
categories of workers irrespective of whether they were temporarily or 
permanently employed, migrants or local residents, young or old, male or female, 
in Mexico or in China. For example, a statement of Chinese worker Ping was 
representative: 
 
“If I really had to complain about something it would be the long working hours 
and the humble wage. And also the workload. There is a general negative feeling 
                                                        
96 (Baidu Tieba 2012) 
97 In the following, complaints are registered in a binary mode of present (+) or absent (-). No 
conclusions can be inferred as to the quantitative distribution of these findings amongst the 
workforces of Company X; nor to the implications for a general sense of contentment or 
discontentment. The results are therefore not mathematically, but analytically representative: 
workers of all employment categories have been interviewed to gather these results. 
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about the mismatch between the long work and low wages. […] Also, the workshop 
is simply too hot to work there for long hours.”98 
 
However, the complaints varied by degree: some workers would deem the wage 
level to be low in absolute terms, but acceptable when compared to alternatives 
open to them;99 others found it was not worth staying at Company X.100 Not 
surprisingly, certain issues were particular to (or more pronounced by) female 
versus male, temporary versus permanent, and Mexican versus Chinese workers. 
For example, in China, formal workers with a certain seniority were unsatisfied 
with their inability to become promoted or receive substantial pay rises while 
temporary workers complained about the income gap with formal workers,101 and 
the time and luck it took to be made permanent (for those with a local hukou).102 
These complaints were similar for permanent and temporary workers in Mexico. 
However, significant differences emerged in the form of country-specific 
complaints of Mexican workers about union affairs, and of Chinese workers about 
housing, food and transportation. This was due to the relative importance of the 
union to workers’ lives in Mexico, while Chinese workers regarded it mainly as 
negligible (discussed in more detail in section 2.2. ). On the other hand, while 
transport and food were in both cases provided by the Company, housing in the 
Mexican case was regarded as a private issue, while in China access to apartments 
under the administration of the enterprise or housing in dormitories made it a 
work-related issue.103 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
98 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
99 Interviews dispatch worker Ping, workers Santiago and Arturo.  
100 Interview migrant dispatch workers Liu and Xun. 
101 Interviews migrant dispatch workers Liu and Xun, worker Bo. 
102 Interview worker Ping, see also Zhang (2014a). 
103 More research needs to be done on the actual arrangement in this case. Formal workers at JV2’s 
main facility in North China received housing allowances and were in the late 1990s granted 
priority access to privatised company housing (Rithmire 2015, chap.6), while migrant dispatch 
workers at Company X/JV1 lived in company dormitories, and formal workers had a housing 
allowance and private accomodation; Interviews with migrant dispatch workers Liu and Xun, 
dispatch worker Ping; author’s field notes.   
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Grievances Mexico China 
P T P T 
Wages + + + + 
Working hours + + + + 
Workload/-rhythm + + + + 
Promotions + + + + 
Nature of work + - + - + + 
Superiors + + + + 
Relation to colleagues - + - - 
OHS + - + - + - + - 
Housing  - - + + 
Food - - + + 
Transportation - - + + 
Union + + - - 
Table 2: Workers' grievances  
Source: Elaboration from author’s field notes and interviews (P/T indicates permanent/temporary 
workers; +/- indicates present/absent) 
 
Before analysing the nature of these complaints throughout this and the following 
chapters, as well as what workers chose or intended to do as a consequence, a brief 
note is required on the act of complaining itself. In both Mexico and China, I found 
that complaining fulfilled a social function of information exchange and the 
strengthening of collective cohesion if carried out amongst peers that share similar 
conditions of existence. Workers vented their anger verbally and in writing in both 
of my case studies, though the forms I could observe differed between Mexico and 
China. 
 
In the Mexican case the typical place for workers to talk about their work 
experiences was over an evening beer in one of the many cantinas in the city. 
Conversations shifted from complaints about the workload, corrupt union bosses 
or issues of national politics to jokes, tales and anecdotes of family, friendship and 
love – the wild mix of political and casual topics forging bonds not only of shared 
political agendas but also of personal empathy and understanding. These 
conversations function as a safety valve to blow off steam and return back to 
business as usual – but they also add to collective cohesion.  
 
My observations confirm the importance of extra-workplace relations for class 
formation (Thompson 1968; Cumbler 1979; Benson 1989), in particular 
 153 
Hoffrogge’s argument that the existence of working class pubs is a crucial element 
in the development of working class collectivity, political consciousness and 
agency (Hoffrogge 2011, p.106ff.). To be sure, a pub is not a gender-neural place, 
and, as in the cases I observed, was almost exclusively frequented by men, whose 
partners stayed at home.  
 
In the Chinese case, the physical terrain for extra-workplace interaction was small 
restaurants, shops, majiang gambling halls or simply public streets and squares 
(Lee 2007, p.133; C. K.-C. Chan 2010, chap.3) – and, in the case of migrant workers, 
the dormitory (Pun 2005; Pun & Smith 2006; 2007; C. K.-C. Chan 2010). Pun and 
Smith have shown for the dormitory – and Chan for (urban) migrant villages – how 
shared geographic space can aid in developing kinship-based mutual aid relations 
(C. K.-C. Chan 2010, chap.3); or in bringing workers together to devise collective 
strategies against managerial mistreatment (Pun & Smith 2006, p.1465ff.). Migrant 
workers I met at their dormitories in Eastern China – dispatch workers of 
Company X/JV1; and at a different dormitory migrant workers employed by a 
Company X/JV1 supplier – had formed smaller peer groups amongst which they 
discussed future decisions and carried them out together: primarily the question if 
and when to leave the factory and return home.104  
 
Although there are online forums in Mexico, in which workers exchange their 
experiences – mostly to provide potential new entrants to the plant with 
information on training possibilities, wage levels, working conditions etc. – it is 
ironic that, given tighter surveillance and censorship, Chinese workers made more 
extensive use of online message boards and other tools, such as the messenger 
service QQ, to express their anger. Though clearly not representative, online 
commentaries were a good indicator of the degree to which workers at Company X 
were infuriated. Milder versions concerned ironic swearing:  
 
“Company X/JV1 = work + eat + shit + sleep + work until you die of exhaustion”105 
 
                                                        
104 Author’s field notes; Interview migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu, migrant workers Wang 
and Zhao. 
105 (Baidu Tieba 2009b). 
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However, there were also threats of physical violence, 
 
“Everyday you are so exhausted, you feel like dying – but the pay is so low! I swear: 
next time the team leader is looking for trouble, I’ll give him a beating. Why are 
workers’ lives treated as being so worthless?”106  
 
and cynical joy over the death of a senior manager at Company X/JV1, who had a 
car accident on a business trip: 
 
“But I am still glad to hear that Qiao Wang is dead. Haha, when the rich die, then 
I’m happy!”107  
 
Whatever one might think of these statements, it is obvious that although different 
in form, workers in both Mexico and China deliberately sought ways to 
communicate their experiences and grievances with their peers. Socialising and 
complaining did not necessarily follow a conscious rationale – for instance aiming 
to propagandise certain viewpoints or to mobilise support – but rather served as 
an end in itself. Important for the following analysis are two inferences. Firstly, 
workers in both cases formed small groups of friends with whom they shared and 
exchanged opinions and plans; or they spoke anonymously to a larger online 
community. In both cases, these contacts and networks provided increased social 
cohesion, a feeling of not being isolated and the occasional exchange of relevant 
information, all of which were intangible factors that could be mobilised when 
coping with situations of distress (individually or collectively). Secondly, in both 
cases there was a basic level of discontent that was not immediately visible but 
omnipresent. These issues should be kept in mind when evaluating the following 
sections.   
 
                                                        
106 (Baidu Tieba 2009c). 
107 (Baidu Tieba 2010). 
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2.  Contracts, Wages and Incomes 
The existing literature has attributed a crucial role in affecting worker agency to 
two factors – employment security (mostly understood in terms of contract 
periods), and wage differentials (Silver 2003; L. Zhang 2014a). This section will 
outline contractual relations and remuneration systems at Company X in China and 
Mexico and show in more detail what constraints and limits they provide to the 
agency of managers and workers – and how the particular system itself has been 
shaped by this agency.  
 
At Company X in China there are two types of contracts that apply to workers. One 
has the status of a universally applicable collective contract; the other is signed by 
the individual worker with the company or a labour agency and specifies rank, 
tasks and actual remuneration.108 This was also common practice in China at other 
terminal car assemblers and in the supply chain (Lüthje 2014). Collective contracts 
of this sort formulate certain ground rules for management-union relations and 
proceedings. As they do not go into details on work rules, tasks or salaries, critical 
voices have argued that “the content of collective contracts largely remains 
worthless” (Luo 2011, p.55). According to a trade union representative at 
Company X/JV2 the collective contract for the joint venture had not been revised, 
not to speak of being subject to negotiation, since its implementation during the 
foundation of the enterprise.109 The collective contract at Company X in China was 
of little practical value to workers. All questions of employment period, status, 
working hours, remuneration etc. were regulated through individual contracts. As 
outlined in chapter 3, in the Chinese case, a clear contractual divide ran between 
formal and dispatch workers. Formal contracts with Company/JV1 and -JV2 – 
apart from those for white collar workers or strategically important blue-collar 
workers – did not stipulate life-long employment, but were rather customarily 
renewed after one- or two-year periods (Author’s field notes, L. Zhang 2014a, p.63; 
Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2015). The difference between the employment security 
for formal and dispatch workers was not a contractual effect, but one of the 
enterprise customarily prioritising the renewal of contracts of formal workers 
                                                        
108 Interview Chairman Peng. 
109 Ibid. 
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over the re-hiring of dispatch workers (Jürgens & Krzywdzinski 2015). As a formal 
mechanism for permanency, both formal and dispatch workers could earn “stars” 
through good performance and/or seniority – one after three years; and then one 
for each two years – of which five were needed to apply for a permanent 
contract. 110  In other words, the contractual design gave high leverage to 
management to tamper with hiring practices and individual salaries, providing 
workers relatively little “formal” employment security (further discussed in 
section 4.1. ).  
  
In Mexico, the collective agreement was a real benchmark for individual workers, 
as it stipulated working hours, work rules, wages, premiums and bonuses, benefits 
and allowances, and the responsibilities and influence of union representatives. 
Salaries and the entire agreement were subject to regular negotiations between 
enterprise and union (see also section 2. ). Employment for core workers was 
indeed permanent, while temporary workers were covered by the collective 
agreement but had fixed-term contracts. There were no formal rules that obligated 
the enterprise to give permanency to temporary workers after repeated rehiring, 
but in cases of contracts not being renewed, it had to pay the dismissed worker a 
50% bonus on top of the regular compensation.111 Most permanent workers I 
interviewed had gained their “planta” after three to four years of working as an 
eventual. Generally speaking, ordinary and specialist workers were unionised 
personnel, whereas the majority of service and administration workers, certain 
white collar workers, as well as managers were referred to as “trusted” personnel 
(empleados de confianza), who had no union rights and whose employment 
relations and pay were regulated outside the collective agreement. The existence 
of a “real” collective contract provided the union an important role in wage setting 
and safeguarding work rules, although its role in the latter was reduced drastically 
after the 1992 conflict.  
 
                                                        
110 “Stars“ could also be earned through good performance evaluations; interview dispatch worker 
Liao. 
111 §22, Company X Mexico Collective Contract 2010-2012. 
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2.1.  Income Composition and Remuneration Systems 
In both cases, Company X had implemented meritocratic wage systems that 
however worked differently, with more managerial discretion in the Chinese case, 
and a continuous relevance of the collective agreement as a reference point for 
union-led wage bargaining in Mexico. The 1992 conflict in Mexico was crucial to 
the emergence of this new system. In both cases, the real workings of meritocratic 
remuneration depended on their implementation in the particular force field of 
management-worker relations – and as these differed, so did the use and effects of 
broadly similar remuneration systems.  
 
In the Chinese case, at both Company X/JV1 and -/JV2 wages were subdivided into 
three (respectively four) categories of base pay, benefits and allowances and the 
so-called “floating wage”, which referred mainly to efficiency wages and premiums 
(Ji 2013, p.136).112 A large share of workers’ monthly income therefore stemmed 
from a combination of overtime payments; individual efficiency wages and 
premiums; benefits and allowances; and profit-shared monthly bonuses – 
sometimes in the form of “double wages”, which, as in the case of Company X/JV1, 
could be sustained for periods of over a year.113 The overall yearly income could 
increase significantly due to profit-shared half- or end of the year bonuses.114 That 
is, even though the “floating wage” was supposed to stand at 40% at Company 
X/JV1, and at 50% at -/JV2115, if efficiency wage and bonuses were compared to 
base wage, benefits and allowances, the stable elements of an average permanent 
workers’ wage bill at Company X/JV1 came down from 60 to 50%; and from 50 to 
40/45% at -/JV2.116 In short, at least half of workers’ income depended on 
                                                        
112 In some cases “floating wage” also includes aspects of a “functional wage”, i.e. premiums based 
on a worker’s rank (Lüthje et al. 2013, p.67). The term “floating wage” dates back to China’s 
economic reforms in the 1980s that allowed SOEs to retain a certain percentage of their profits for 
redistribution amongst the workforce. The percentage of the floating wage in the overall wage bill 
was supposed to be fixed – initially at no more than 5%, which by 1993 had already increased to 
23.3% on average (Meng 2000, p.83f.). 
113 In these cases formal workers can earn up to ¥8,000 to ¥10,000 per month, while the bonus for 
dispatch workers only amounts to ⅕ to ¼ of what their formally employed colleagues receive; 
interviews migrant dispatch Xun and Liu, worker Lun. 
114 Interview German white-collar worker Hensch. 
115 Interviews Chinese managers Li, Wang, Zhang; Chinese managers Bo, Peng.  
116 Calculations based on workers’ payslips; author’s field notes; interviews with Chinese workers; 
Chinese managers Li, Wang, Zhang; German senior manager Rordorf. 
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individual or company performance. Seniority played a certain role, but was more 
pronounced at Company X/JV1, where years spent at the factory increased the 
monthly base wage, than at -/JV2 (for further detail see L. Zhang 2014a, 
p.104ff.).117 The retained seniority element at Company X/JV1 is rather exceptional 
amongst automotive manufacturers in China, most of which employ fully 
meritocratic remuneration systems (ibid.), which in turn reflects a global trend in 
the automotive industry.  
 
In monetary terms, in the summer of 2013, the base wage for ordinary workers at 
Company X/JV2 was ¥1,300 – which, though ¥200 above the minimum wage level 
in the Northern province, did not even reach the legal minimum wage at the 
Southern location of its new plant. The base wage was higher at Company X/JV1, at 
¥2000, but in a similar range of ¥200 above the local minimum. Ordinary 
permanent/dispatch workers’ (and interns’) monthly net earnings at Company 
X/JV1 were about ¥4,000-5,000/3,000-4,000 and at Company X/JV2 in the area of 
¥3,500-4,500/2,800-3,200 (Table 3). A dispatch worker of Company X/JV1 said 
that monthly wages for his employment category were capped at ¥4,000.118 Wages 
at Company X compared favourably to Asian (i.e. Japanese and Korean) joint 
ventures with workers’ median annual cash income being ¥42,732, but were 
rather low if compared to other European and American companies (¥62,354) 
(Puxin Management Consulting Co., in L. Zhang 2014a, p.76). 
 
Wages in Mexico were directly regulated by the company-specific collective 
agreement. In 2012 workers were grouped into 23 sub-levels of twelve pay grades 
(the tabulador), ranging from $5,280 to $18,156 per month, depending on work 
area, status (worker, specialist, team leader) and performance (Table 3).119 On 
average, including bonuses, premiums and allowances, production workers at 
                                                        
117 For dispatch workers this increase was a quite substantial ¥1000 per month after the first year, 
which was arguably an incentive to keep newly recruited workers on the job and labour turnover 
down (see also section 4. ); interview dispatch worker Ping.   
118 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
119 Ordinary workers can climb up a scale of sixteen levels; and their team leaders an additional 
four. Specialists have an entry salary equivalent to the tenth level for ordinary workers and can 
increase their salary along another eleven levels. Specialist team leaders are grouped into two 
levels at the top of the pay grade. The lowest level salary for an ordinary team leader is 2.3 times 
that of the lowest level salary for an ordinary worker; for specialists the ratio is 2:1.  
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Company X had a monthly net income of about $18,000 (£915).120 These wages 
were the second highest in the automotive industry in Mexico (Covarrubias 2014), 
and obviously well above the 2012 Mexican minimum wage of $1,911 per 
month.121 Each year the wages stipulated in the tabulador would be revised in 
collective negotiations. 
 
Performance evaluations at Company X in Mexico took place every month; and 
every nine months a comprehensive assessment of “knowledge, skill, experience, 
talent, efficiency and attitude”122 of each worker was undertaken for the preceding 
period. In order to climb up a sub-level of the tabulador, apart from having the 
necessary formal training and a minimum seniority, workers had to have 
performed all assigned tasks satisfactorily; followed designated job rotations; 
actively attempted to improve the productivity of their department; followed rules 
of discipline, safety, order and cleanliness; helped in the training of other workers; 
and been 99% punctual (which also gained workers additional premiums). As 
worker Ricardo explained:  
 
“So, every year the union negotiates wage increases for all wage levels – but every 
nine months there are performance evaluations, in which certain people can rise 
within their tabulador. If you are already on the top but you receive a good 
evaluation, you get a lump sum of $2,300, $2,400.”123 
 
Although both Chinese and Mexican remuneration systems were strongly based on 
performance evaluations, their actual functioning compares quite differently. The 
Chinese system split the wage bill into a stable and a fluctuating income, partly 
depending on individual evaluations and partly on company performance. This 
split was important because certain extra-payments were calculated as 
proportions of the base wage – for example the payment of the one-and-a-half-, 
double- and triple rates for overtime, work on rest days or national holidays, 
                                                        
120 Interview workers Ricardo, Miguel, Santiago.  
121 Different from China, it is not difficult but sheer impossible to survive on the Mexican minimum 
wage as a single source of income. 
122 §26, Company X Mexico Collective Contract 2010-2012. 
123 Interview worker Ricardo. 
 160 
respectively. Only the seniority effect at Company X/JV1 made for an increasing 
base wage and therefore higher overtime pay, while at Company X/JV2 this 
element was less pronounced. In Mexico wages depended fully on individual 
performance evaluations but were stabilised through a wage scale predetermined 
by the collective agreement. Additional benefits and allowances, bonuses and 
premiums were calculated as ratios of the respective worker’s daily salary, which 
increased with yearly wage negotiations. In this regard, temporary workers had 
formally the same entitlements as permanent workers – i.e. they were not 
exempted from full benefits and bonuses as was the case for dispatch workers in 
China – but these were naturally lower in monetary terms, as eventuales entered 
the factory on the lowest pay grade. In both cases, however, meritocratic 
remuneration systems did create income gaps between individual workers not 
only according to their status as formal/permanent and as dispatch/temporary 
workers, but also within these categories. In sum, wages at Company X in both 
China and Mexico were comparably high within the sector, and even more so in 
relation to minimum wage levels. As will be discussed in section 4. this played a 
crucial role in workers choices for resilience or exit.  
 
On the other hand, the remuneration system enlarged the room for manoeuvre for 
management, mainly through relieving cost pressures. As a rule, meritocratic 
remuneration reduces the size of the overall wage bill, as wage increases have to 
be granted only to a smaller section of the workforce. In fact, the contribution of 
wages to overall costs at Company X was comparably low. Material costs alone 
made up about half the market price of an average Company X car in China, not 
including labour, administrative and distribution costs.124 In Mexico, the 1992 
transformations reduced the share of labour costs in total costs from an average of 
8-12% to 4-5% – or 2%, if only direct workers are concerned (Juárez Núñez 2006, 
p.14) By 2010, it was estimated at 4.5%, or 3% respectively (Juárez Nuñez in: 
Juárez Galindo 2010). This is quite important, as it indicates that whatever the 
political stance on wages – to lower or to increase them – they are simply not that 
relevant an item in the overall costs of Company X, in particular in Mexico. Not only 
does this imply that Company X can actually afford to pay average or above 
                                                        
124 Interview German senior manager Schütte. 
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average wages within the sector – which it does, though more so in Mexico than in 
China – but also that the cost pressure Company X exerts on other non-labour 
inputs is high. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7., the pressure to 
control costs is transmitted into the supply chain, through which Company X 
outsourced much of its labour intensive component production in the 1990s; and 
where, as a rule, labour costs make up a higher percentage of overall costs (a 
Mexican expert on the automotive industry estimated an average share of about 
25%125). In short, the scope that Company X had to adjust wages upwards (if 
necessary) rested on the fact that it passed cost pressures on to its suppliers. 
 
 Mexico main plant Company X/JV1 Company X/JV2 
Permanent/ 
Formal workers 
$5,280-18,156; average net 
income: $18,000  
(£267-920, average net 
income: £915) 
¥4,000-5,000  
(£420-525) 
¥3,500-4,500 
(£365-470) 
Temporary/ 
Dispatch workers 
¥3,000-4,000 
(£315-420) 
¥2,800-3,200 
(£290-335) 
Minimum wage $1911 (£97) ¥1,620  
(£170) 
¥1,300  
(£135) 
Table 3: Monthly wages/income at Company X in Mexico and China 
Source: Interview data, collective contract (Mexico) 
Figures for Mexico are based on collective contract wage tabulators, excluding benefits and bonuses 
(net income includes all bonuses, premiums, benefits and allowances); figures for China are 
average net incomes for ordinary workers, including benefits and bonuses  
 
2.2.  Emergence and Gradual Change Through Management-Union 
Relations 
In the Mexican case the implementation of the current remuneration system was 
the result of the union’s defeat in the 1992 conflict. While the union’s role in co-
determining work rules was drastically reduced (discussed in section 3.1. ), 
bargaining over annual wage increases and overall wage grades were retained, but 
overshadowed by the 1992 trauma: strikes for higher wages only resurfaced with 
the central committee of 2000-2008.  
 
After two strikes in 2000 and 2001 – one successful (discussed in section 3.1. ) and 
one ending inconclusively – in 2002 the enterprise laid off 1,250 temporary 
workers and threatened to relocate future projects to China as a response to a 
                                                        
125 Interview Lourdes Alvarez. 
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slump in US demand (Juárez Núñez 2006, p.13). As a consequence, the union 
decided to agree to the introduction of five new wage grades at the bottom of the 
tabulador, allowing for new entrants to earn salaries fifty percent below the 
hitherto existing lowest entry salary. In exchange Company X promised to bring 
some workers from the suppliers back in house, and to build a new model in 
Mexico – none of which materialised in the agreed form. Alejandro, general 
secretary of the union at that time, summarised: 
 
“Huge conflicts have not occurred since 1992, because with us the enterprise 
achieved a new agreement – the new wage levels that allowed it to lower labour 
costs. Why did we sign this agreement in 2002? Because we thought it was better 
to make a deal than to risk another conflict.”126 
 
Although the union struck again in 2004 and 2006, in a climate of declining sales 
wage increases just about compensated for inflation – a trend that continued with 
the new union leadership that was elected on the outbreak of the world financial 
crisis in 2008, meaning that by the time of my fieldwork, real wages for workers at 
Company X had hardly increased at all.127 Between 2008 and 2012 the workforce 
at Company X was confronted with a tough managerial stance caused by the ripple 
effects of the world financial crisis on the global automotive market. During the 
first negotiations with the new committee, the enterprise proposed a pacto de paz 
social (pact of social peace), in which it sought to fix annual wage increases at one 
percent above inflation and suspend collective negotiations until 2011, as well as 
revoke the right to strike until 2010. It also pushed for the implementation of time 
accounts. While the former was put to a referendum resulting in a “no” vote, the 
latter was straight-out rejected by the union (Toledo 2008).128 Similarly, the union 
managed to fend off a pay freeze in 2009 after a four day strike (Anon 2009).  
 
                                                        
126 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
127 Interview Huberto Juárez Nuñez 
128 In retrospect, the monetary gains for the workforce between 2009 and 2011 would (in theory) 
have been higher with the paz social than were actually realised – which is a result of the impact of 
the financial crisis not yet anticipated in the summer of 2008.   
 163 
In short, despite the drastic change from seniority to meritocratic remuneration, 
collective bargaining remained a significant institution in wage determination in 
Mexico, and began to be accompanied by strike action again with the central 
committee of 2000-2008. This contrasts quite sharply with the Chinese case. 
 
In the absence of sufficient historical data, little can be said about the role of 
worker agency in the genealogy of the remuneration systems in Company X’s 
Chinese plants. Zhang has shown that the switch from a seniority to a merit system 
at Company X/JV2 in 2006 caused older workers to write a petition to the 
enterprise’s party secretary and union representative, resulting in the introduction 
of a compensatory stipulation that allowed them to retain their prior wage levels, 
in cases where the new system had implied a reduction (L. Zhang 2014a, pp.105, 
139). However, given that HR is the responsibility of the Chinese joint venture 
partner – who, as shown in chapter 3, also exercises tight control over the trade 
union – no long-term institutionalisation of workers or union influence in wage 
setting occurred. The ambivalent effects of wage setting being a solely managerial 
responsibility will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3.  Worker agency and the Effects of Meritocratic Wage Systems 
This section outlines the constraints and potentials of the particular remuneration 
systems at Company X in China and Mexico for the agency of managers and 
workers. The particular wage systems in both cases were designed to discipline 
the workforce and increase the leverage of management over the determination of 
workers income, in particular in relation to productivity and output. However, its 
real effects were more ambivalent, partly because of the institutional heritage of 
union involvement in the Mexican case, and partly because of a general frustration 
with how management applied performance evaluations in both cases. 
 
“Floating wage” and performance evaluations should not be confused with an 
individualised version of a Fordist linkage between productivity and wage 
increases. Neither in China nor in Mexico did higher output automatically increase 
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workers’ salaries – in fact, the usual implication was an uncompensated 
intensification of work or more overtime. One implication of these wage systems 
was therefore higher discretion of management over wage setting and flexible 
adjustment. While in the Mexican case “rewards” for work intensification would be 
a result of an ad hoc informal agreement between workers, the union and the 
enterprise (for details see chapter 6, section 3.3.), in the Chinese case they were at 
the sole discretion of the enterprise – e.g. in paying bonuses in the form of double 
wages, or half- and year-end lump sums.129 The Chinese system produced two 
ambivalent results. The increasing importance of profit-shared bonuses was 
intended to foster workers’ identification with the company and a wider logic of 
profitability: an interest in double wages meant an interest in higher sales. It also 
allowed managers flexibilisation in reducing labour costs in the event of economic 
downturns. However, with large sections of the workforce being significantly 
affected, German white-collar worker Hensch speculated about the social 
sustainability of this system in the long run: 
 
“This is certainly what [Company X/JV2] does on purpose, that they say: ‘Well yes, 
your base level is low, but the bonus payment, aha!’ And that’s an issue that 
everyone works towards, that the bonus is lucrative. I’m just wondering what will 
happen when at some point they really say: ‘This year there won’t be a bonus.’ 
Then there’ll be blood and thunder!”130 
 
The other problem for management resided in an unintended response of workers 
to the (managerially intended) disciplinary effects of performance evaluations. The 
increasing importance of efficiency (and in particular overtime) bonuses implied 
that workers’ incomes would only be sustainable by continuously hard work, 
compliance with and even pro-active improvement of managerial rules. This was 
aided by the fact that with each round of evaluations only a predetermined 
number of workers could receive the highest evaluation – Zhang speaking of ten 
                                                        
129 Migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu interpreted this practice as the enterprise creating the 
illusion that it benevolently redistributed money to the workforce: “They simply find any excuse to 
add some money to our income, because it looks better when our incomes are higher than last year, 
making us feel better.” Interview migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu. 
130 Interview German white-collar worker Hensch. 
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percent for Company X/JV2 (L. Zhang 2014a, p.109), two of my interviewees 
speaking of five percent for Company X/JV1131 – with the intention to increase 
competition amongst individual workers. The power of such an effect was clearly 
visible in the opinion of local dispatch worker Ping of Company X/JV1: 
 
“I think highly of the evaluation system, because it drives us to improve and 
creates benign competition. […] I think it is good because with evaluations those 
who work more will gain more.”132 
 
The adequacy of the meritocratic logic of “higher pay for better work” appeared to 
be so self-evident (which, to borrow from Althusser, is the central characteristic of 
an ideological effect, Althusser 2001) that of all my interviewees in both China and 
Mexico, only worker Fernando – who was also the interviewee with the longest 
work experience in the factory – criticised meritocratic remuneration per se:  
 
“In terms of solidarity the old system was better, that is, in some way we identified 
more with other compañeros. The system of group work broke this… well, this 
harmony. Putting us in a competitive dynamic – that is the idea, right? – to 
dissociate us from our compañero, to create the ambition of striving for personal 
gains.”133 
 
However, all workers I interviewed, including Ping, had a strong opinion on the 
prevalence of nepotism and absence of transparent evaluation criteria. In both 
Mexico and China workers complained about the difficulty of getting promoted and 
the feeling that it depended on personal favours and good relations to the team 
leader, rather than on performance.134 A representative statement by a Mexican 
worker was the following:  
   
                                                        
131 Interview worker Lun. 
132 Interview dispatch worker Liao. 
133 Interview worker Fernando. 
134 Interviews dispatch worker Ping; migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu; workers Jesús, 
Fernando, Miguel.  
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“The evaluations are not really carried out as evaluations. They are very biased, 
because the one who evaluates is the coordinador [similar to a line manager], and 
the coordinador has his preferences and dislikes. He gives a good evaluation to 
those that suit him, and fails those that do the actual work.”135 
 
That implied that some workers would never get an income raise. Female worker 
Lun explained: 
 
“It is the tenth year of my career; and I have my permanency.” 
And how much has your wage increased in this period? 
“Not the smallest bit. We only have an evaluation system here where five percent 
can get an income raise. So, I have not received one in ten years. I guess that 
because I am the only woman in the team, maybe the team leader thinks women 
do not contribute as much as men, so I never get an income raise.”136 
 
Apart from this being an obvious case of gender discrimination – linked to Lun 
being systematically allocated “easier” tasks within the team, which in turn meant 
that she could not excel in the evaluations – cases like this could have an 
unintended consequence for management: over time sections of the workforce 
would become disillusioned and reduce their efforts to the necessary minimum. As 
worker Jesús explained: 
 
“We have a profile that stipulates what we have to do and how the work is to be 
distributed, what each of us has to do. Well, what I do then is to see that I do what 
is written in my profile, right? But the coordinador wants me to do more – but no! – 
but there are compañeros who do it, and that divides the whole situation. They 
enter into a conflict with me, who refuses to do more – and then you can guess 
whom the coordinador prefers, me or them?”137 
 
                                                        
135 Interview worker Daniel. 
136 Interview worker Lun. 
137 Interview worker Jesús. 
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This behaviour was amplified by the particular organisation of work – and in the 
following section I will discuss workers’ coping strategies in more detail in that 
context. Suffice it to say at this point that although overall wages in both Mexico 
and China compared favourably sector-wide and within the respective localities of 
the plant, meritocratic remuneration failed to produce sufficient material 
incentives for teasing out extra efforts from the workforce.  
 
In sum, in Mexico the continuous relevance of the union in collective bargaining 
procedures created a co-determined mechanism for regular wage increases that 
ran parallel to an otherwise individualised meritocratic system. This created a 
certain buffer between managers and workers and channelled workers agency in 
more or less predictable and routinized forms. However, it still depended on the 
actual constellation between union leadership, rank and file workers and 
management to what effect these institutions were actually mobilised. As we shall 
see in the next section, the 2000 to 2008 union leadership surprised management 
by defying the post-1992 status quo by reviving certain grassroots-empowering 
institutions. In China, on the other hand, management retained full discretion over 
wage setting and rather chose to keep workers motivated by redistributing 
bonuses at will. This system seemed to have worked considerably well, given that 
Company X in China has – apart from 2004/05 – grown continuously, but rested on 
a fragile compromise, whose taxing in the event of an economic downturn would 
not be cushioned through intermediary channels.  
 
In both cases, however, workers displayed strong grievances with the way 
performance evaluations were carried out. Though this is impossible to quantify, 
my observations on the shop floor suggest that the phenomenon of sloppy work 
and reduced effort was more pronounced in the Chinese case, which is arguably 
also linked to the organisation of work and the particular training arrangements 
discussed in the next to sections, which in turn is connected to the technological 
organisation and time regimes of the production process that are the topic of the 
following chapter.    
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3.  Work Organisation and Control – A Case of “Lean 
Production”? 
On the surface, work organisation in Mexico and China followed the Company X 
standard as designed in Germany, bearing a superficial resemblance to lean 
production philosophies of team work and kaizen (also known as Continuous or 
Continual Improvement Process, CIP).138 However, in practice these rules were 
rarely applied by the book. This was attributable to at least three issues. Firstly, 
the technological composition of the production process was not particularly well 
suited to kaizen processes, at least in the Chinese case (discussed in the next 
chapter). In China, and to a lesser degree in Mexico, this was related to the largest 
sections of the workforce receiving comparably little “polyvalent” training. Thirdly, 
in both Mexico and China the enterprise thwarted workers’ proactive contribution 
to kaizen processes through insufficient monetary and career incentives and in 
particular through sustained authoritarian hierarchies. In the following I discuss 
the teamwork concepts at Company X in China and Mexico and compare them to 
the role of teams under lean production and in Company X’s system of industrial 
relations in Germany. I then discuss how workers – and in the Mexican case the 
union – attempted to (re-)gain control over production, respectively to evade 
managerial pressure. I argue that a particular stalemate emerged, in which 
management’s insistence on unilateral control over work rules jeopardised the 
functionality of lean production principles – on the other hand, for a brief period 
between 2000 to 2004, it also triggered a certain revival of rank and file activism 
within the union in Mexico.   
 
Although within the global automotive industry teamwork has been applied in 
manifold forms (Babson 1995; Kochan et al. 1997; for a conceptual overview on 
team work see Schaper 2014), in ideal typical terms the team in a lean production 
paradigm should be the responsible unit not only for the fulfilment of immediate 
productive operations, but also for task assignment (including job rotation), 
quality control (including responsibility for mistakes), self-evaluation, and 
improvements of the production process. This is based on polyvalent task ranges 
                                                        
138 It also followed the ISO 9000 norm on quality management. Interview German senior manager 
Schütte, Pongrac; Company X (Mexico) 1994. 
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and multi-skilled workers within each team; and a cooperative “client and 
supplier” ideology between individual workers, teams and managers. Briefly after 
the publication of The Machine that Changed the World, in which these principles 
were heralded as a win-win situation for both workers and managers (Womack et 
al. 1990, p.256), critical voices characterised team work under lean production as 
“management by stress” (Parker & Slaughter 1990). This critique unfolded on the 
ground that lean production essentially aimed at the reduction of buffers, both in 
time and personnel; self-management under continuous hierarchical decision 
making; the increase of peer pressure and competition; an elimination of seniority 
rights; workers’ proactive role in work intensification; and cooperative unionism 
(ibid.). All these points of critique apply to both the Mexican and Chinese case. 
 
The implementation of teamwork at Company X’s German plants in the early 
1990s unfolded against the backdrop of the IG Metall having developed concepts 
for teamwork in the mid 1970s that resurfaced in a recast managerial version in 
the wake of the success of the MIT study (Haipeter 2000, p.173ff.; Jürgens 1997; 
Roth 1997). Although workers representations in Germany objected to managerial 
interpretations of kaizen and teamwork as primarily a cost-cutting instrument, 
they took a pro-active stance in installing team concepts and managed to negotiate 
productivity linkages, team-based wages, and co-determination of personnel and 
task allocation (Haipeter 2000, p.425ff.). As Jürgens explains: 
 
“In every case in which teamwork has been introduced, the works councils have 
been involved through plant or company-level agreements, and joint steering 
groups have been set up to monitor the process. Thus, implementation has been a 
fully codetermined process.” (Jürgens 1997, p.112) 
 
This contrasts sharply with the Mexican and Chinese cases, where teamwork was 
introduced and organised in a top-down fashion, either against explicit union 
resistance as in Mexico in 1992 – or without worker involvement in the gradual 
enlargement of productive capacity during the 1990s, as in the case of Company 
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X/JV2.139 In both Mexico and China workers were grouped into teams of variable 
sizes (usually 1:10 or 1:15), depending on the department and workstation. Each 
team had a skilled worker as a team leader (facilitador in Mexico, often also called 
portavoz, “spokesperson”), whose responsibilities were summed up by a Mexican 
facilitador as follows: 
 
“I am essentially a mediator. Very often I have to steer through the demands of the 
boss and those of the workers without crashing. It is enough to distribute the tasks 
and ask them to do the job, offering help if they have doubts about how to do it. But 
there are bosses who are messing with people, yelling: ‘Ey cabrón, get to work, this 
is what you are paid for, you son of a bitch!’.”140 
 
Unlike in the German plants of Company X, the team leader was in both China and 
Mexico not elected by the team members. In Mexico, he – all team leaders I saw on 
the shop floor in Mexico and China were men – was the worker with the highest 
pay grade in his team, given that he fulfilled certain performance criteria and was 
approved by the enterprise (Company X (Mexico) 1994). In China advanced 
workers could enter a pool of potential team leaders if they fulfilled performance 
criteria and passed examinations, and would be selected by the shop manager if a 
vacancy opened up (L. Zhang 2014a, p.110). The team leader was accountable to a 
group leader (coordinador in Mexico), who supervised multiple work teams and 
represented the lowest level of management. In both cases quality circles were 
formally in place; and workers asked to submit monthly suggestions for process 
optimisations, which counted towards their regular performance evaluations.141 
While this system seemed to work to a certain degree in Mexico – in particular 
because individual workers would receive extra premiums, such as vacations or 
conference trips142 – in the Chinese case, according to both workers and managers 
the relevance of quality circles was negligible (this was to a large extent the result 
of particular hiring and training strategies, discussed in section 4. and the 
                                                        
139 Insufficient data is available on how this process unfolded at Company X/JV1. 
140 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
141 Author’s field notes; see also L. Zhang 2014, p.138; Montiel 2001, p.175ff. 
142 Interview worker David; see also Montiel 2001, p.175ff. 
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technological structure of the production process, discussed in the following 
chapter).143  
 
The team leader was responsible for supervision and instruction as well as the 
evaluation of the team members’ individual performance – the latter having an 
immediate effect on wages and promotions. He also had the freedom to re-assign 
tasks within his group, while higher levels in the hierarchy could re-assign tasks 
across groups and overrule the decisions of team leaders. Neither in Mexico nor in 
China was job rotation scheduled by a transparent procedure. It occurred on an 
informal basis – in China for example in particularly strenuous jobs, such as the 
installation of the wiring harness144 – at the discretion of the team leader after 
consultation with, or orders from, higher level managers. In addition, and against 
the principle of “waste reduction”, teams at Company X/JV2 were usually staffed 
with a higher number of workers than required for immediate productive 
operations, so that there was a certain flexibility for mutual help or substitution in 
the event of toilet breaks or the like. This was arguably a result of the larger 
amount of inexperienced workers on the production line (for more details see the 
section 4. ). As German senior manager Pongrac explained:  
 
“If one has a team of 15 workers, not all 15 are productively working on the car. It 
would rather be 13, 13.5 at max.”145  
 
Considering the very limited range of tasks ordinary workers were trained for in 
China – often one particular task for two or even one model only (see section 4. ) – 
more than anything else the purpose of work teams was forming smaller units of 
control:  
 
“Well, team-work as one knows it from Germany? Not really. There are group 
leaders, yes, but that there is job rotation, no. There are some consolidated 
divisions, but the background is not really the same as in Germany, that one says: 
more task changes to avoid one-sided physical stress. That is not so much the aim, 
                                                        
143 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac, interview worker Zhang. 
144 Interview German senior manager Näher. 
145 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
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but to have smaller units below the level of the foreman, obliged to report and 
headed by a group leader. […] This here is a strict hierarchy.”146 
 
In the Chinese plants a sense of hierarchy was also facilitated through other 
measures, such as colour-coded overalls for different employment statuses, or the 
practice of snappily lining up workers at the beginning of each shift, making them 
respond in unison to the team leader as he gave out the orders of the day.147 
 
In sum, in both Mexico and China was teamwork embedded into a strict 
managerial hierarchy that severely curtailed autonomous decision-making within 
the teams. As we will see in the following, Pries’ (1993) concern that the 
unilateralism of the 1992 transformation could jeopardise lean production 
principles did indeed materialise – whereas teamwork in the Chinese case was 
distorted to such an extent that it becomes doubtful to speak of “lean” production 
at all. 
  
3.1.  Managerial Resilience Against Grassroots and Union Pressure 
The hierarchical work organisation in both China and Mexico did not remain 
uncontested. Particularly in the Mexican case did workers and the union attempt 
to re-establish immediate, respectively institutionalised control over day-to-day 
work organisation. In China more subtle forms of evasion persisted amongst 
workers, while the union sided with management and focussed its activities on 
productivity increases and cultural events. In neither case did these forms of 
agency induce significant institutional change, indicating that unilateral command 
over labour formed the hard core of managerial strategies in both cases. This 
implied, on the other hand, that Company X in both cases chose to operate under 
conditions of persistent discontent and pressure from below and refrained from 
installing union- or other measures that could function as safety valves. In the 
following I will demonstrate how this constellation resulted in a stalemate 
                                                        
146 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
147 Author’s field notes. 
 173 
between management and workers regarding the application and exercise of work 
rules on the shop floor – which made the institutions designed to govern these 
relations largely dysfunctional. To exemplify this, I will review a significant 
episode of union activity under the 2000-2008 central committee in Mexico, 
contrast it to the role of the Chinese union and then discuss workers’ coping 
strategies with shop-floor authoritarianism.  
 
In 2000 a new central committee was elected at Company X in Mexico that began 
to challenge managerial decision-making and reinstate some of the intra-union 
institutions lost in 1992. Though its vision was not particularly radical, the scant 
margin of the electoral result148 – as well as the behaviour of the enterprise in the 
collective contract revisions of 2000 – induced the central committee to convoke 
general and divisional assemblies, consult the rank and file during negotiations 
with the enterprise, distribute information and follow an open-door policy. When 
the new committee took office, it recognised the discrepancy between the post-
1992 unilateral institutionalisation of work rules, and the failed adaptation of 
workers’ behaviour. What it proposed was a more inclusive co-determination, 
modelled after the experience of the German IG Metall, with which the new 
committee had regular exchanges.149 Alejandro, the general secretary of the 2000-
2008 central committees remembered: 
 
“In 2000 and 2004 [the two times when he was elected general secretary] there 
was still strong resistance against this new system, because it was imposed; 
because everything followed the line of management, with very little union 
participation. We intended to do things differently in 2000, thinking that if the 
enterprise has embarked on this journey and cannot turn back, we might have to 
follow it – but we thought the results would be better if workers were more 
involved. And the measure to involve workers properly is to pay them for their 
efforts in a productivity-based remuneration system.150 Company X never wanted 
                                                        
148 The election was characterised by a large number of competing electoral platforms, which 
spread the votes, meaning that the new committee only won by a margin of about 200 votes. 
149 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008).  
150 The union proposed more autonomy and union control for work teams and the introduction of 
productivity bonuses in exchange for relaxed overtime regulations and compliance with production 
targets (Espinal Betanzo 2015, p.205).  
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to enter this debate, to develop a programme through the union, even if it meant 
that the enterprise retained its plans and the union simply improved it. The 
enterprise in Mexico has this idea of subordination, not of cooperation; it thinks 
that the worker has to obey, whatever the actual result. […] If you allow me to 
repeat this, not in a single moment has Company X involved the union in these 
cases. It operates in a unilateral fashion – and that works, but what has always 
remained is a state of inconformity amongst the workers.”151   
 
The union essentially signalled the enterprise a cooperative stance in work 
organisation, which might have provided management with more legitimacy 
amongst the workforce, an organisational buffer in times of intensified grassroots 
pressure, and more generally a vehicle to establish a more functional lean 
production system – but its advances were met with little managerial interest. This 
became immediately apparent in the collective contract negotiations of 2000, 
which unintentionally catalysed the revival of “grassroots-friendly” union politics. 
In the negotiations the union demanded more control over work rules and a 
substantial wage increase. When the enterprise responded with nothing but a 
monetary offer that only met inflation and was below achievements at other car 
manufacturers (Montiel 2010, p.287), the union called for a strike.152 Local 
authorities immediately declared the strike illegal on the grounds that it was 
announced one minute after the formal registration deadline. With the events of 
the 1992 lockout in mind, and still wary of the fact that its support amongst the 
lower union levels was not unified, the central committee convoked a general 
assembly: 
 
“The enterprise was to blame, because actually, we had not really thought about 
returning to calling for all workers to gather in a general assembly – prior to 2000 
the union committee simply signed the agreement with the approval of the 
                                                        
151 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
152 The confrontational course with management began earlier that year over the announcement 
that the company would share its profits with the workforce – a legal obligation under Mexican law 
that can however be circumvented by special accounting – but at a level that was far below a 
realistic reflection of the 48% growth in sales in 1999. In response the new union leadership filed a 
formal challenge to Company X’s tax returns with the Ministry of Treasury and Public Credit (Juárez 
Núñez 2006, p.17).  
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revision committee, ratified it with the authorities and informed the workers of the 
result. People have always been angry about this procedure and never accepted it. 
First we thought about doing it the same way. But when the enterprise played this 
joke on us [of declaring net losses and offering a 9% wage increase], it forced us to 
call for a strike. And control over the strike passed over to the workers, because we 
thought they have to participate actively for the strike to be effective. That year 
provided an important learning effect, because the government declared the strike 
inexistent [illegal], you remember. So the workers… well we didn’t say it so 
directly… First we called off the strike and asked everyone to resume work; 
secondly, workers continued actions on the assembly lines – working slow, 
damaging the cars, and all that – which made the enterprise burst of internal 
pressure and forced them into renegotiations, driving up their offer to the 18% 
result. The learning effect was that we avoided the type of large conflict the 
enterprise is always waiting for.”153 
 
That is, the union leadership adjusted its tactics within a more hostile institutional 
setting, but not by adapting to, but by defying the new institutional parameters 
designed to govern its behaviour. From the events of 1992, it drew the conclusion 
that a frontal confrontation with management could backfire easily due to the 
compliance of the local labour administration with managerial interests. It 
therefore turned to the tactic of avoiding an officially recognised strike altogether, 
turning to slowdowns and sabotage, providing management a more fragmented 
and dispersed target. Rank and file workers were eager to comply, as there was 
widespread contention after 1992 and, as outlined in the preceding chapter, 
clandestine groups of workers willing to engage in direct action on the shop 
floor.154 The strike ended with an 18%, increase in wages and 3% in benefits, as 
well as the concession to re-enlarge the intermediate union levels by granting each 
divisional union representative three elected assistants (Juárez Núñez 2006). No 
substantial amendments to union control over work rules have been made 
thereafter. 
 
                                                        
153 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
154 Around the same time there were strikes at three of Company X’s suppliers, creating a situation 
of revived grassroots activism more generally (Juárez Núñez 2006).  
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Hardly surprising, to workers at Company X’s Chinese joint ventures the relevance 
of the management-controlled unions in the organisation of work – and, in fact, 
more generally – resided mainly in their absence. To the question of the role of the 
enterprise union, workers I interviewed either answered along the lines of: “Hm. 
No idea really”155; or: “The union is not concerned with workers’ day-to-day work 
issues, but rather organises some work-external activities.”156 That most workers 
either did not know about the existence of the union or perceived it as largely 
irrelevant confirms other studies on worker-union relations, particularly for 
automotive manufacturers with SOE involvement (Nichols & Zhao 2010; CLB 
2014). Consequently, the union at Company X/JV1 and -/JV2 was of little practical 
value to workers when dealing with immediate problems on the shop floor: 
 
Would it be an option for you to turn to the union if you have any problem at work? 
“Of course not! To put it his way: we have no direct connection to the union.”157 
 
Workers would rather turn to their team leaders or line-managers if they wanted 
to see problems on the shop floor addressed – a strategy that was encouraged by 
the union.158 That the union was irrelevant to workers does however not mean 
that it fulfilled no function in production. As indicated in chapter 3, the union saw 
itself as a co-manager; and to this end it not only organised social events (for 
example mass weddings for workers at Company X/JV2),159 or handed out gifts on 
national holidays, but also held regular skill contests amongst workers with the 
aim to increase overall productivity. To fulfil its duty to “mobilise workers for an 
improved participation in production; and to improve labour productivity” for 
2013 the union at the Western plant of Company X/JV2 had scheduled 88 of these 
contests.160 
 
Correlating with the union in China being dysfunctional and in Mexico – despite its 
brief moment of grassroots-revitalisation between 2000 and 2004 – unable to 
                                                        
155 Interview worker Ping. 
156 Interview worker Zhang. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Interviews worker Zhang, Ping, Lun; interview chairman Peng.  
159 Interview (3) senior manager Pongrac.  
160 Interview chairman Qiao.  
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establish an institutional shift to increasing decision making power of union 
personnel over work rules, workers sought other ways to deal with the pressure. 
 
A general tendency in the Chinese case was a reduction of effort. Judging by my 
observations on the shop floor, interviews with workers and evaluation of online 
chat rooms in China, workers hardly displayed any enthusiasm at work – the 
general tenor was that the work was strenuous and did not offer much of a career 
perspective.161 Instead of improving productivity and reducing buffers, I observed 
that workers used any possible second for a chat with their colleagues or even a 
quick glimpse at their smartphones, when their supervisor was not looking.162 This 
seems to be consistent with what Zhang observed in multiple automotive 
companies in China, namely that workers ridiculed the continuous improvement 
process by submitted nonsensical suggestions, refused work or other activities 
exceeding the contractual or customary minimum (L. Zhang 2014a, p.138ff.) 
 
In Mexico, my interviewees criticised the particular work organisation for two 
basic reasons: a more general sense of increasing competition, and a more specific 
frustration with the responsibility for job rotation and alteration of work rules 
being at the sole discretion of the enterprise. Worker Arturo explained: 
 
“Before 92 the organisation of labour was more of a Fordist kind: you put a screw 
in, and your boss would not tell you ‘But do it well, because your colleague is doing 
it much better’. At the root of these organisational changes within the plant is the 
ideological emphasis on entrepreneurial competitiveness.”163 
 
Competition between individual workers and teams had clearly increased after 
1992, but a functional team required at least a minimal sense of collective 
cohesion. As worker Santiago explained, management therefore sought measures 
to strike a balance between functionality and control: 
 
                                                        
161 Interviews workers Lun, Ping, Zhang, Xun and Liu. 
162 Author’s field notes. 
163 Interview worker Arturo. 
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“It creates a kind of brotherhood. […] The competition amongst the groups 
becomes one where one protects each other. […] They try to break your sentiment 
of belonging, by making you part of a group but preventing the formation of a 
proper team: ‘They forced this guy upon us; we don’t like this cabrón; I can’t stand 
this cabrón’s face’ etc. You know, they suddenly put you there, change your group, 
change your shift, change your tasks.”164 
 
Reassigning workers was used as a strategic weapon to punish workers or teams 
in Mexico. Worker’s complaints therefore not only concerned the actual issue of 
being reassigned, but also the unilateral and authoritarian form under which it 
occurred. My interviewees reported multiple incidents in which silent dissent 
turned into open refusal, when managers violated what workers perceived as fair 
treatment in the already fragile and tense situation. Essentially, these perceptions 
were grounded in workers’ spontaneous task allocation amongst themselves, 
which did not follow principles of polyvalent tasks and job rotation, but rather a 
mutually agreed division of labour. The following anecdote, told by the same 
worker, is worth quoting at length, also for its entertaining form of “informing qua 
storytelling”, which provides a bloomy but necessary context to the factual issues 
at stake; and which was very common amongst my interviewees in Mexico:  
 
“Those specialists, those who adjust and repair the press, had a boss – he died – 
who, even though he had a bad temper and was a fucking despot, at the end of the 
day protected his people. Every time they wanted to reassign his people, he said – 
even to the director – ‘You know what? I know why I have this and this person 
here at that post, and if they fail in their service, let me know; but if not, do not 
touch them, they are my people, OK?’ He defended them against anyone; and he 
came over every weekend to hang out with those who worked overtime. That is, in 
a certain way his attitude was ‘Well, yes, I yell at them, I boss them around, but I 
give them the chance [to earn money]’. Because many of them make, or rather 
made, good money by working a lot of overtime. So this mate boasted that he 
drank two six-packs, 12 cans of beer, for lunch. He had a belly, I am telling you, it 
was huge; he had such an enormous belly – horrible! [laughing] We saw him and 
                                                        
164 Interview worker Santiago. 
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thought: ‘This cabrón is prone to get all kinds of diseases!’ Infarct, diabetes, 
whatever, right? He was taking it too far with everything, right? He used to 
suddenly fall asleep – in fact, he crashed into the plant once, because he fell asleep 
behind the wheel – so you can imagine the severe condition of his health. The fact 
is that ultimately he had a respiratory arrest and kicked the bucket. So they 
brought in a Brazilian, who did not have the same attitude: ‘Whatever you want, 
we do it, we do it!’ He completely, radically changed what they were accustomed to 
in the work area, which is made up of 100, 110 people. So, they did not like this, 
particularly that he cut their overtime very drastically. He also began to remove 
people from their workstations, while they were used to a manner of ‘I dedicate 
myself to this, and someone else will do that.’ Suddenly one person was supposed 
to attend to two, three things, so finally they said: ‘You know what!?’ – and they 
organised themselves, without going to the union, and suddenly said: ‘We will not 
do anymore overtime.’ So they began to abstain from overtime, all of them. It 
developed to the point that the boss… they put down everything in writing and 
submitted it to the board of directors; they did a lot of things, actually. The bottom 
line is that they demanded the boss’s head and that they were on the brink of 
blowing it off. […] But he was like: ‘No, wait muchachos, calm down, we will do it 
like this.’ And he doubled the number of workers – but that was only temporary 
and he began to fuck with them again, removing and relocating the people who 
were the ‘leaders’ of the group. Actually, just today the union has its monthly 
meeting in which they negotiate this and try to reach some accord.”165  
 
Multiple crucial issues can be pointed out in this anecdote – the violation of 
informal agreements triggering open conflict; the ambivalent role of bringing in an 
outside manager, who was less hesitant to induce changes, but also more likely to 
face dissent; the use of overtime as a strategic weapon; and the direct form of 
action outside the union – but the crucial point is that because management chose 
to sustain a primacy of hierarchy and authority, the institution of teamwork in 
Mexico aggravated workers’ tensions with management, rather than incentivising 
their self-management. In both Mexico and China there was a constant low-
intensity confrontation between management and workers, in which the former 
                                                        
165 Interview worker Santiago 
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tried to retain as much direct control over the production process as possible and 
the latter embraced evasive or confrontational tactics to alleviate control and 
pressure from above.   
 
In sum, the recurring back and forth between managerial authoritarianism and 
workers’ strategies of compliance, evasion, or resistance were the determining 
factor in how institutions of teamwork and kaizen actually materialised. In practice 
these interactions counteracted the ideal typical institutional effects and resulted 
in a blocking stalemate, in which neither side was able to implement their 
respective ideas in a new institutional matrix. This also implies that it is rather 
dubious if labour relations at Company X in Mexico and China – but particularly at 
the latter – can meaningfully be termed “lean”. They were, in effect, rather 
hierarchical, unilaterally top-down organised and offered little participation or 
autonomous work organisation to workers.     
 
4.  Resilience and “Exit” Strategies, Hiring and Training  
 
Some workers like us may quit without a word’s notice, but the 
formal workers at Company X/JV1 hardly do this. […] More than 
half of us have left; and they usually leave after receiving their 
half-year bonus. 
– Migrant dispatch worker Xun, Company X/JV1 
 
This section explores the relationship between workers’ choices to stay with or 
leave the factory when they are disaffected and Company X’s hiring practices and 
training schemes. I argue that the higher likeliness of one particular segment of the 
workforce to opt for an exit strategy resulted in Company X in China developing a 
selective hiring and training policy. I first discuss workers’ choices for resilience or 
exit in both Mexico and China, and then engage Company X’s responses. 
 
Across all employment statuses of my blue-collar interviewees in both Mexico and 
China, leaving the factory was a strategy thought feasible exclusively by Chinese 
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migrant dispatch workers. Although dispatch workers in China essentially shared 
the same working conditions and salaries – irrespective of their hukou166 – 
different from local urban workers, rural-to-urban migrants still had access to a 
plot of land in their home region. In Mexico on the other hand, workers were 
almost exclusively locals, and even when they lived in the surrounding rural areas 
and had access to land, would not deem voluntarily leaving the factory a viable 
option. Temporary workers, however, developed yet another strategy to make the 
most of their precarious situation by utilising Company X’s training schemes in 
their favour.  
 
Generally speaking for the Chinese case, the socioeconomic gap between migrant 
and non-migrant workers – though still substantial – has decreased over the last 
decade or so (Li 2013). Compared to the beginning of the millennium, migrant 
workers today have, at least in theory (CLB 2013), increasingly better access to 
social infrastructure (Gransow & Zhou 2010; Schnack 2010) and insurance 
schemes – though with around 45 million workers being covered by basic pension, 
50 million by basic healthcare, and 71 million by workplace injury insurance, 
numbers are still low if compared to the total migrant workforce of 269 million in 
2013 (Li & Peng 2015, p.219; National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014). To be 
sure, migrant workers still agglomerate in low paid, low skilled and low status jobs 
(Li 2013); and despite a relaxation of hukou-regulations in small and medium 
cities, restrictions on residential rights in large Chinese cities remain strong (Z. 
Zhang 2014). But – running counter to central and local governmental plans to 
foster the development of agribusiness (Andreas & Zhan 2015) – with the benefits 
of an urban hukou declining relative to the safety net provided by persisting 
usufruct rights for rural residents, migrant workers seem increasingly unwilling to 
trade in their land titles for urban residency (ibid., Li & Liu 2014).  
 
These developments put the rationale of local and migrant dispatch workers to 
stay with or leave Company X into a perspective quite different from narratives of 
                                                        
166 Author’s field notes. 
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an increased vulnerability of Chinese migrant workers in urban job markets:167 
migrant workers were not so much “pushed” out of the factory by discriminating 
working conditions, pay or career options, but “pulled” by the at least temporally 
viable option of a return to the countryside – while locals had no alternative but to 
compete in the urban labour market (with most jobs available to them offering 
worse conditions than Company X). Most local workers I spoke to at Company 
X/JV1 therefore intended to do their job for a longer period of time. However, their 
aspirations differed according to their employment status. A high-skilled worker 
with a university degree working in quality control desired to ascend to the ranks 
of management;168 a female worker with ten years of work experience in the press 
shop had just acquired her long-awaited transferral to an office job and could 
imagine continuing there;169 a local dispatch worker’s aspiration was oriented at 
the medium term of gaining a permanent contract.170 Indicative for local and 
migrant workers’ different stance towards leaving the factory are also their 
following responses to the question of how they would deal with work-related 
pressure and grievances: 
 
Migrant dispatch worker Xun: 
 “If we could get promoted we would maybe work here for longer, but if there are 
no improvements in the near future, we will consider quitting. As this job does not 
develop our professional skills, quitting won’t do us any harm.”171 
 
 Local dispatch worker Ping:  
“Self-adjustment.”172 
                                                        
167 Labour ethnographic studies since the late 1990s have emphasised the complexity of Chinese 
migrant workers’ coping strategies and everyday struggles to counter grand narratives of 
victimhood and passivity in light of discriminatory state policies and capitalist exploitation (Lee 
1998; Pun 2005; C. K.-C. Chan 2010). However, the latter notions resurfaced in overtones of 
analyses on the post-2008 crisis, with migrant workers being laid-off on a large scale (e.g. K. W. 
Chan 2010). 
168 Interview worker Zhang. 
169 Interview worker Lun; Strategies like this also explain the higher age of indirect workers. Not 
only was the managerial preference for young, able-bodied workers not that pronounced when it 
came to administrative and service jobs (Interview German senior manager Bohnert), but older 
workers often sought in-house transferral into non-manual jobs after a few years on the assembly 
line. 
170 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
171 Interview migrant dispatch workers Lun and Liu 
 183 
Contrasting with insufficient skill development as a reason to quit the factory, 
temporary workers in Mexico embraced the peculiar strategy of making use of 
Company X’s training programmes, with the aim of acquiring as many skills as 
possible before an already anticipated dismissal. I met independent mechanics, 
workers in the supply chain and – probably the oddest encounter – a taxi driver 
who had been hired as a production worker for the sole purpose of playing for 
Company X’s enterprise football team, all of whom had (in part successfully) 
attempted to enrol in special training courses offered by Company X during 
employment periods of one or more years as eventuales.173  
 
While temporary/dispatch workers in China and Mexico therefore devised 
alternative strategies of reproduction to deal with voluntary or involuntary 
quitting, permanent/formal workers and local dispatch workers chose – or had no 
better options than – to stay with Company X. Most of them were well aware that 
alternative employment in their area and line of trade meant worse conditions. 
This notion was particularly pronounced in Mexico, where higher age, 
mortgages/home ownership and family obligations limited mobility, so that 
quitting would most likely result in precarious self-employment or a job with one 
of Company X’s many low-wage suppliers. Worker Santiago explained:  
 
“Actually, for some reason people usually do not leave Company X. Not like at the 
suppliers, where they are more like: ‘Pah, fuck your mothers and off I go; better to 
that one that pays ten pesos more.’ […] Generally, people stay – they suffer, protest 
and whatever, they throw a tantrum, but that’s about it. This is what happens to 
most of us, and we don’t really agree – but either way, it has become a way of life; 
that’s how it is.”174 
 
In sum, Chinese migrant dispatch workers mobilised resources outside the labour 
process – their access to alternative sources of income – to increase their agentic 
capacity and make “exit” a viable strategy. Two implications can be drawn from 
this. First, we can assume ex negativo that in the absence of viable exit options the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
172 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
173 Author’s field notes. 
174 Interview worker Santiago. 
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agency of other groups of workers moved on a scale from passive endurance to 
open resistance, with manifold hybrid forms in between. Second, the existence of 
an aggregate labour shortage in China did not materialise at Company X. Instead 
Company X’s continuously expanded the hiring of new workers, and even made a 
virtue of high turnover rates amongst sections of its workforce (discussed in 
chapter 8). That migrant dispatch workers were however prone to choose an exit 
strategy left its mark on Company X’s hiring strategies and training schemes in 
China.  
 
4.1.  Hiring Practices  
Workers’ particular coping strategies in China and Mexico gave management 
different options to flexibilise hiring practices. In Mexico, Company X gradually 
raised the entry criteria for permanent workers and mainly used its pool of 
temporary workers as a buffer in times of low orders. In China on the other hand, 
Company X had more discretion and used short-term contracts, dispatch workers, 
and, in the case of Company X/JV2, student interns. I briefly discuss the hiring 
practices in Mexico and China, before moving to an analysis of training 
programmes in both places.  
 
Historically it had never been easy to get hired by Company X in Mexico, due to low 
labour turnover amongst permanent workers and the high degree of employment 
security provided by the collective contract. Pre-1992 it required the 
recommendation of a worker within Company X – usually a relative – and several 
knowledge and skill tests, as well as a medical examination to enter the factory 
(Montiel 1991, p.83). An older worker remembered:  
 
“It is very difficult to get hired by Company X. It took me four months, in which I 
practically slept in front of the union office [where the hiring takes place] – I 
arrived at seven in the morning and stayed until seven in the evening, with my bag 
of sandwiches, until they finally hired me.”175 
                                                        
175 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
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Though personal ties are still relevant today, formal barriers have increased 
through tougher entrance examinations (Espinal Betanzo 2015, p.93). Essentially, 
Company X adjusts the size of the workforce through its pool of eventuales, which 
is periodically drained in periods of low orders;176 and since 1992 through the 
outsourcing of work that does not immediately concern “normal and ordinary 
production activities” (Clause 13, Collective Contract 2010-2012), which has 
caused a lot of discontent amongst unionised workers. However, in addition to 
hiring external personnel, according to a team leader, Company X had embraced 
yet a new strategy in 2012, in order to circumvent hiring workers under the 
Collective Contract: 
 
“There is a new category of worker now, which you could call outsourced, but 
within the enterprise. These workers are outside the union and the collective 
contract, but directly hired by Company X. They are called ‘Personal Services’. […] 
These are workers who are not directly involved in production. […] It is a bit like 
money laundering, but ‘worker laundering’: Company X hires security personnel, 
having them work for two, three months at the gates. But then they decide they 
need more personnel in production, so they relocate security staff to the 
production line. […] This is a totally new system, introduced this summer. The 
union closes its eyes and does not want to talk about the issue.”177 
 
That is, employment security and resilience of permanent workers induced 
Company X in Mexico to either make extensive use of existing institutions that 
allowed for flexibility (the eventuales), introduced new or extended existing 
institutions (outsourcing after 1992), or, as observations by worker Rodrigo point 
out, circumvent existing institutions (“worker laundring”). 
 
In China, on the other hand Company X flexibilised its hiring practices through 
subjecting formal contracts to periodic renewal and by hiring new young entrants 
through labour agencies. Recalling the data presented in Table 1 (in chapter 3) 
                                                        
176 For example, facing a slump in US demand in 2001/02, Company X in Mexico laid off 1,250 
eventuales (Juárez Núñez 2006, p.13).  
177 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
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Company X/JV2’s Northern plant was officially the only one that employed 
dispatch workers.178 However, I interviewed various workers at Company X/JV1, 
who had contracts with a labour agency. They were both locals and migrants, the 
latter usually coming in regional cohorts – for example, most of my interviewees 
were from Gansu – which was a result of staff of the labour agency paying 
recruitment visits to the workers’ technical colleges at their places of origin. 
Permanency was as a rule only offered to those who already held a local hukou.179 
The confusion and statistical omission in the company data is most likely the result 
of the labour agency being an in-house company owned by JV1 – on paper it thus 
appeared as if Company X/JV1 employed these workers directly.180 Company 
X/JV2 not only hired dispatch workers, but also relied on large amounts of student 
interns. The higher likeliness of migrant dispatch workers to leave the factory, and 
the large amount of short-term student interns employed at Company X/JV2, 
resulted in particular training schemes, which will be the focus of the following 
section.  
 
4.2.  Training 
Qualification measures should bring success to the organisation 
and realise the value of our employees. That means we are 
interested in our employees identifying with the enterprise, so 
that they really make their whole labour power available to the 
enterprise. 
 
– German senior manager Vogt, Company X/JV2 
 
                                                        
178 A German senior manager at Company X/JV1’s Eastern plant for example claimed that he had 
never heard of the hiring of dispatch workers. Interview German senior manager Näher. His 
superior however admitted that dispatch workers were hired for particular assembly tasks, e.g. 
cockpit assembly. Interview German senior manager Rordorf. 
179 Interviews worker Lun, migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu, dispatch worker Ping. An 
exception was made at Company X/JV2 after the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, when workers from 
affected areas in Sichuan and Shandong were hired on permanent contracts – indicating that the 
company was responsive to certain political demands passed on through the central state owned 
Chinese JV partner; Interview chairman Qiao.  
180 Interviews migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu, dispatch worker Ping; author’s field notes. 
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In both Mexico and China Company X was confronted with an incompatibility of 
the respective national education systems and demanded skills on the shop floor – 
and in both cases it adopted training schemes broadly modelled after the 
experience of its operations in Germany. In Mexico, training was formally 
regulated through the collective contract. As a result of its earlier construction date 
and the incommensurability between the Mexican (technical) education system 
and on-the-job requirements, the Mexican plant had established its own on-the-job 
training processes and a vocational school that offered an extensive range of 
advanced training, from technical skills to language programmes. In the latter 
Company X trained specialists, such as electricians or mechatronic technicians, in 
an 80% technical, 20% theoretical scheme adopted from the German dual 
education system. In 2012 Company X had extended its facilities by another large 
training centre for workers to be employed at newly opened production sites (for 
more detail see chapter 8).181 Students of the vocational school were partly trained 
for Company X’s own demand in high-skilled workers, and partly for the supply 
chain or other car manufacturers in Mexico. However, while the gained skills 
would be transferrable at the upscale plant, manifest in accredited degrees, 
Company X’s main plant issues certificates that were only recognised by Company 
X and certain suppliers.182  
 
There were essentially two options to become a specialist worker at Company X in 
Mexico. New entrants could be hired as specialists if they were graduates from a 
(preferably Company X’s) vocational school – which meant they would have 
enrolled in a respective institution after completing their secondary education. To 
this end Company X offered scholarships to graduates of (the better) high schools 
in the area. Ordinary workers on the other hand were usually required to have a 
high school degree and received a basic training on the job, under rules stipulated 
in the Collective Contract. However, if they received good performance evaluations 
and qualified for a company-internal scholarship that enrolled them in the 
vocational school, they could train to become a specialist concurrent with their 
(reduced) participation in normal productive operations. Upon completion of their 
                                                        
181 Author’s field notes. 
182 I thank Judith Wiemann for clarifying this point. 
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training their employment status would change to empleados de confianza. 
Workers could also access non-comprehensive individual courses if they gained 
particular premiums through good work performance.183  
  
In China, Company X not established its own vocational schools, but hired 
graduates from Chinese polytechnic high schools and colleges and subjected them 
to in-house training processes. Research on these issues has been carried out only 
very recently, with the best available study being Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 
(2015), and certain aspects being re-constructible from Zhang (2014) and Lüthje 
et al. (2013). Jürgens and Krzywdzinski start from the puzzle that industrial 
upgrading requires higher workers with higher skill levels, but that Chinese labour 
market institutions incentivise the hiring of temporary and dispatch workers, 
which in turn suggests low investments in training of ordinary workers. The 
finding that automakers in China have installed comprehensive training schemes 
should therefore be seen as rather surprising. Jürgens and Krzywdzinski’s main 
argument is that the nature of a lean production system – which they see in place 
at Company X in China – requires polyvalently skilled ordinary workers due to 
their participation in kaizen processes: “Segmentation of training provision and 
career paths on the shop floor is dysfunctional in this situation.” (Jürgens & 
Krzywdzinski 2015, p.1222)  
 
This argument is supplemented with further qualifications, some of which are 
confirmed by my findings. For example, German managers at Company X/JV2 
underlined that the existence of training schemes was, as Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski argue, a response to the general shortage of skilled personnel. In 
fact, at nearly every plant I visited it was lamented that workers were insufficiently 
trained and qualified before entering Company X:  
 
“The lads here come either straight from the street or from university and have 
never held a wrench in their life.”184  
 
                                                        
183 Interview worker David.  
184 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
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With the foundation of a new subsidiary in 2005, German managerial personnel 
were therefore dispatched to Company X/JV2 to design a training system based on 
in-house training stations. Separate rooms on the shop floor of the respective 
departments should allow for training in basic skills; and in advanced skills where 
a “professional training room” was available. Expert training was for example 
available in the paint shop of the Western plant;185 and the training range offered 
in the Northern main plant covered product and automation technology, project 
management, lean training, design, management training and foreign languages.186 
 
However, apart from the fact that these training schemes were still under 
construction at the time of my fieldwork – i.e. about four years after Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski’s factory visits – my findings contradict three central arguments by 
the aforementioned. Firstly, as suggested in sections 2. and 3. the aspects of a lean 
system that would require workers’ pro-active involvement in production 
improvements were either only partially applied at Company X in China and/or 
dysfunctional due to a lack of incentives for workers to participate. Active 
participation beyond following job instructions, as well as high skill levels, was 
demanded from a rather small section of the workforce only. Secondly and 
consequently, rather than across-the-board general training, which Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski describe, my findings suggest that even where the respective 
facilities existed, training was in fact limited to a particular stratum of the 
workforce within a highly segmented internal labour market. Rather than by a lean 
production system, training requirements were driven by Company X’s rapid 
expansion in China, necessitating a constant intake of new workers, who required 
differentiated training and conditioning depending on their function in the 
segmented but integrated flow-production system (this will also be elaborated in 
chapter 8, where the geographic expansion process is in focus). Third and finally, 
echoing recent studies on the garment and electronics industry in China (Butollo 
2014), there is no necessary connection between industrial upgrading or higher 
capital intensity and demands for a higher-skilled (and higher-paid) workforce – 
                                                        
185 Interview (1) German senior manager Pietsch  
186 At Company X/JV1 certain training aspects have been concentrated at particular locations – one 
of the newer plants in the East, for example, is responsible for all aspects of lean training. 
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more than that, as I will argue in the following chapter, even the notion of 
industrial upgrading must be seen as controversial in the Chinese case. 
 
As will be substantiated further with a discussion of the technological aspects of 
production in the next chapter, because the labour process is strongly Taylorised 
and the range of models limited, respectively in such high demand that workers 
might end up with having to fulfil a very limited task range, it is sufficient to train 
the majority of the workforce only very superficially. All new workers received a 
basic training in certain motoric functions; the operation of certain tools; 
techniques to avoid production mistakes; how to fill in operative sheets etc. But for 
dispatch workers and interns – the former making up about a quarter of the entire 
workforce, the latter up to a third in certain labour intensive departments187 – it 
could be drastically reduced. Dispatch workers at Company X/JV2 were supposed 
to be trained for two to four weeks before they were successively integrated into 
regular work teams (which is already rather short), depending on models, 
particular tasks and learning capacity of the individual worker. In fact, however, 
their training was often cut short to a few days, before they were used in normal 
operations.188 As soon as workers had commenced regular shift work, additional 
training was limited by team leaders being allocated only a number of workers 
that allowed them to man their stations for normal operations, but not to release 
workers for regular training sessions concurrent with production.189  
 
Basic training was even more reduced for interns, who are not mentioned by 
Jürgens and Krzywdzinski at all, probably because that hiring practices was not 
that prevalent in 2009. Ideally, internships should match the students’ particular 
subject. This is however rarely the case. Though, for example, 98% of the 
graduates of Polytechnic College Y in South China – which, in anticipation of the 
                                                        
187 The number relies on Zhang (2014a, p.70) and the statement of a German senior manager 
(Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac). I could however not clarify how interns were 
recorded in the company statistics presented in chapter 3, section 1, i.e. if they were included in the 
figures of dispatch workers or simply not listed at all – and therefore to be added to the total 
number of employees.  
188 Interviews migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu, German senior manager Pongrac (1) 
189 The status of the apprentice (Auszubildende) in the German dual training system, in contrast, 
denotes that workers in training should not count as full productive workers when allocated to 
regular work teams. 
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newly opening Southern plant sent its students on internships to the 3000km 
distant Northern main plant – would ultimately find a job, only about half of them 
would later work in their field of study. Similarly, the training they received during 
their internships was not specific to their degrees – at Company X/JV2 they were 
used wherever production demanded it.190 As German senior manager Pongrac 
emphasised, the low practical skill level and work experience of these interns was 
reflected by assigning them easily learnable task on the assembly line: 
 
“The interns are students, young people, who, let’s say, attach some parts in the 
body shop, requiring a training time of one hour or so. Or if some welding is 
required, that’s something I might be able to teach to someone easily too.”191 
 
Team leaders and other supervisory personnel closely monitored the interns, to 
make out particularly talented workers, who might then be offered incentives to 
stay at Company X/JV2 for longer, i.e. to be hired after graduation from the 
vocational school. Incentives could for example be a scholarship for a higher 
education programme, if the worker agreed to return to Company X/JV2 after 
graduating from the respective, usually engineering, programme. A German 
manager estimated that between 30 to 35% of the Chinese engineers at Company 
X/JV2 had followed this career track.192  
 
That is, pace Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, basic training was only formally applied 
across the board, but in a comprehensive form reserved for formal workers.193 
Dispatch workers and interns only received training as required for immediate 
production. As a German senior manager simply put it: “it is learning by doing.”194 
The discrepancy interns experienced between their education and skills demanded 
on the job was replicated on higher levels as well. Formal worker Lun at Company 
X/JV1 explained:  
                                                        
190 Interview teacher Qian. 
191 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
192 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
193  Jürgens and Krzywdzinski’s findings adequately describe the training and recruitment 
processes at Company X in their functions, but these are insufficiently contrasted to the realities on 
the shop floor.  
194 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
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“What we do is a technical job that has nothing to do with our college degree. A 
senior worker might not have been to college, but his skill could be unparalleled in 
the team.”195 
 
Instead of following a career related to their degrees, workers undergoing training 
at Company X/JV2 could in theory earn certificates in accordance with official 
occupational certification schemes; and follow particular career paths resembling 
that of a German Facharbeiter, i.e. of a technical expert (described in detail in 
Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2015, p.1210ff.; Zhang 2014, chap. 4). Naturally, 
advanced training was limited to smaller sections of the workforce, which Jürgens 
and Krzywdzinski note as well (2015, p.1214ff.). My interviews with managers and 
workers suggest that both permanent and dispatch workers with particular 
responsibilities were considered for advanced training – operating special 
machinery, quality control, team leaders etc. However, even these advanced 
training processes focussed on specific techniques and skills and did not qualify 
the worker beyond the particular responsibilities of his or her immediate function 
in the production process.196 Team leaders for example received a lean training 
that included “5S” management systems and “3P” production techniques.197 The 
main components of the lean training were however related to practical aspects: 
how to fill in a malfunction report, stock up parts, repair paint damages etc. That is, 
aspects of lean production existed on the surface, but contrasted with the realities 
of a Taylorist production system, which negated the necessity of polyvalent 
training. As German senior manager Bohnert argued:   
                                                        
195 Interview worker Lun. 
196 In areas that demanded higher skills, Company X mainly relied on on-the-job work experience 
and reserved these areas for senior workers. German senior manager Pongrac explained: “Workers 
who work in final quality control are very experienced. […] Usually the same kinds of errors occur; 
and the workers know exactly what they are looking for. Singular errors are very rare. That also 
demands that I cannot exchange these workers every day. Those who do the reworking have so 
much experience, so much skill. They are not exchanged that quickly, but those who are exchanged 
are the ones that work cycle times, the ones on the assembly line.” Interview (2) German senior 
manager Pongrac. 
197 5S is usually translated as “Sort, Straighten, Shine, Standardise, Sustain”, summing up 
catchphrases to teach workers an orderly, clean, safe and time-efficient organisation and 
maintenance of their individual workplace and tools. 3P is a part of “lean” philosophy usually 
referred to as “Production, Preparation, Process” and based on the idea that employees from 
different departments/occupations (sometimes including clients/customers) convene to develop 
product improvements and innovations concurrent with the production process.  
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“Where a German worker could perform ten tasks in one cycle, a Chinese worker 
can maybe do two.”198  
 
It is therefore true, as Jürgens and Krzywdzinski argue, that in contrast to human 
capital theory, Company X in China did not solely rely on hiring workers who have 
acquired their general skills outside the company, but instead developed its 
internal training practices – both for specialists, and ordinary workers. However, 
in practice this general training was not applied across the board for new entrants 
to the factory, but strategically limited to sections of the workforce designated for 
longer-term employment, though interestingly, this did not clearly correspond to 
the formal/dispatch worker divide. Those receiving more limited training were 
migrant dispatch workers and interns. Moreover, and more generally, the content 
of basic training schemes was not comprehensive, but geared towards the 
demanded productive operations. This allowed for the reduction of training times 
for workers designated for simpler operations. In other words, Company X in both 
cases, but particularly in China, tried to keep training limited for those sections of 
the workforce that were most likely to leave voluntarily and/or functioned as a 
buffer in times of economic downswings.199  
 
In contrast to both the assumption that “industrial upgrading” leads to higher skill 
requirements and the contrasting argument of increasing automation and de-
skilling (Braverman 1974; for a critical debate, see Wood 1982), the logically most 
likely implication of industrial upgrading remains a segmentation between skilled 
core workers and low-skilled peripheral (temporary) workers. As I have argued, in 
the Chinese case the latter is not simply a consequence of the techno-
                                                        
198 Interview German senior manager Bohnert. 
199 There was also another rationale behind selective training, although this was apparently more 
pronounced in the past: labour piracy. That qualified workers were lured away by other companies 
had been a prevalent problem in the automotive industry in China. Apart from a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” (Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac) amongst German auto-producers to 
abandon this practice, limiting the training of migrant dispatch workers and interns to the 
immediate tasks fulfilled by each individual worker and reserving advanced training to a smaller 
section of the core workforce with better pay and working conditions helped to circumvent this 
problem.   
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organisational aspects of production, but (also) of those sections of the workforce 
that are the most likely to “exit” the factory receiving less training. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Superficially the institutions governing the labour process in China and Mexico 
show a high degree of convergence. In both cases there are collective contracts, 
meritocratic remuneration systems, teamwork and comprehensive training 
schemes in place. Similarly, the complaints that workers have converge to the 
largest degree, exceptions being the role of the union in Mexico, and housing, food 
and transportation in China. In practice, however, the governing institutions 
performed differently, depending on the ability of managers and workers to 
mobilise these or other resources to their advantage – or, in other words, due to 
different power relations between capital and labour.  
 
I have argued that in the case of contract relations and remuneration systems 
divergence between Mexico and China was attributable to certain path 
dependencies and conditions at the moment of the introduction of new 
institutions. In Mexico Company X sought to impose a unilateral strategy after 
1992, but although it introduced meritocratic remuneration and polyvalent 
teamwork it could not entirely do away with the relevance of the union in wage 
setting and collective contract revisions. On the one hand it would have radically 
broken with overall Mexican labour law. On the other hand, the strong grassroots 
resistance against the introduction of a new collective contract and new work rules 
in the 1992 conflict indicated that an elimination of the union could have further 
jeopardised the compliance of the workforce to an unsustainable degree. A viable 
option for management under the given conditions was therefore to curtail union 
influence in certain areas – influence over work rules and overall rank and file 
militancy – but retain its influence on routine operations, such as collective 
bargaining and wage setting. That the enterprise left regular union elections in 
place backfired when the strike under the central committee elected in 2000 
catalysed the resurgence of grassroots activism.  
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The real working of meritocratic wage systems in Mexico is retraceable to the 
power relations and process of relational agency resulting in the post-1992 accord. 
Workers in Mexico have more room for manoeuvre than in China, albeit within 
parameters strictly defined by union statutes and politics. How they mobilise these 
depends on union leadership and pressure from below. The decisions the 2000-
2008 committee made on the revision of the wage grades, and its co-determinist 
stance towards management indicate the direction in which the union intended to 
channel this agency. In other words, in 2000 the union was not reborn as a neutral 
vehicle of grassroots activism, but it followed a particular agenda – for which it 
was arguably voted into office. The implication is that an organisation of the 
production process based on stronger involvement of a trade union is ultimately 
more beneficial to workers, as it might also lead to increasing compliance of the 
union with managerial concerns rather than with working class politics. 
 
At Company X in China on the other hand, this union buffer did not exist – or was 
dysfunctional – and the institutions governing shop-floor relations were much 
more geared towards ad hoc interventions in cases of various forms of worker 
agency. Some of these ad hoc mechanisms, such as double wages and bonuses – 
arguably themselves institutions due to the regularity in their occurrence – 
depended on continuous economic expansion and could easily jeopardise workers’ 
compliance with production targets and rules governing the shop floor in cases of 
economic downswings. The likeliness of conflict in these cases gains plausibility 
not only because of the absence of channel mechanisms for workers’ grievances, 
but also due to the subcutaneous discontent amongst the workforce.  
  
I have further demonstrated that institution of teamwork and lean principles 
diverged rather far from both their ideal-typical form and their application in 
Germany, due to retained top-down hierarchies and managerial authoritarianism. 
This managerial behaviour was intentional and jeopardised the functionality of 
teamwork. In Mexico the union under the 2000 to 2008 committee made a pro-
active attempt to establish a more functional framework for the application of 
teamwork, which was however rejected by management. In China, in the absence 
of such an influence, teams were hardly more than smaller administrative units in 
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a strict hierarchy – begging the question of why they were introduced at all. In 
effect work organisation in both cases converged in design and practice – but 
ironically, the same institutions were in both cases similarly dysfunctional. Similar 
forms of managerial agency triggered similar responses amongst the workforce – 
mainly a reduction of effort, although this was more pronounced in China than in 
Mexico – which again reinforced managerial authoritarianism and the overall 
dysfunctionality of teamwork. A crucial aspect in which teamwork diverged 
between Mexico and China was however that workers in Mexico were indeed 
assigned polyvalent tasks – for which they had the necessary skills and training, 
given the higher average age and work experience of the workforce. However, 
workers were rather critical of performing a broader variety of tasks, as these 
usually involved job rotation that was assigned from above – and which workers 
openly resisted. In China on the other hand workers fulfilled a smaller variety of 
tasks, linked to less comprehensive training, less work experience, and 
technological aspects of the production process (to be discussed in the next 
chapter).  
 
In the case of Company X’s hiring and training practices I have demonstrated that 
the Mexican and Chinese cases diverge, as in the latter training is strategically 
curtailed for those sections of the workforce, who are prone to exit from the 
factory – and that this choice depends on workers’ mobilising alternative sources 
of income, respectively strategies for reproduction. In comparison to the Mexican 
case training in China is generally less comprehensive, which is related to the 
Taylorist organisation of production correlating with the technological 
composition of the production process that will be under scrutiny in the following 
chapter.  
 
Overall, I have argued that processes of relational agency have a demonstrable 
impact where the implementation of certain institutions leads capital and labour to 
adopt practical responses that are unintended by the institutional design – i.e. 
deviant behaviour. Where processes of relational agency have induced 
institutional change or alteration, this notion can be extended to the argument that 
relational agency not only hampers or forestalls the functionality of institutions, 
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but also proactively creates new institutional responses. This notion applied 
particularly to cataclysmic ruptures, as the 1992 conflict, but could also be 
observed in, for example, the adaptation of training schemes at Company X/JV2 in 
China to the exit strategies of migrant dispatch workers. However, as we will see in 
the following chapter, there are also factors that clearly constrain the space for 
relational, in particular workers’, agency by nature of their intrinsic properties, 
namely the technological aspects of the production process. 
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Chapter 6: Living in a Robot Age – Technology, Time 
and Relational Agency 
 
We are neither animals nor tools – we are human beings! 
– Worker Rodrigo of Company X in Mexico, 2012 
 
Company X! We are human beings, not robots! 
– Chinese worker of Company X/JV1 on tieba, 2012  
 
So far we have analysed institutions of the production process that immediately 
appear as “social” – the question of remuneration, work organisation and training. 
We have seen how processes of relational agency between workers and managers 
shaped how these institutions panned out in reality; and that certain forms of 
agency caused divergence between the Chinese and Mexican cases, while others 
rendered rather similar results.  In this chapter I will turn to a less immediately 
social aspect of production, namely the realm of technology and machinery. 
Though technological development itself has been convincingly deciphered as 
socially constructed – rather than self-evolving in the form of technological 
determinism (e.g. Noble 1986; Bijker & Law 1994; Hackett et al. 2008) – I will 
demonstrate in the following that the rigidities and constrains the use of certain 
machinery in a highly integrated, technology intensive production process imposes 
on all actors involved remain (intentionally) very strong. In order to understand 
how these constrains manifest themselves and are strategically mobilised in 
processes of relational agency between capital and labour Company X in China and 
Mexico, I will shed light on the particular technological composition of the 
production process; and, in a second step, on its implications for the time regimes 
governing the organisation of production.  
 
In a recent article Beverly Silver has argued, like many others before her, that the 
literature on technological change overwhelmingly stresses its debilitating effects 
on workers’ power (Silver 2014, p.51). The rationale behind such arguments is 
twofold. On the one hand, the substitution of dead for living labour with increasing 
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technological progress (Marx & Engels 1996, chap.XV; recently reiterated in non-
Marxist terms by Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2012; 2013) reduces workers’ market 
place bargaining power with growing unemployment (Silver 2014, p.54). On the 
other hand, technological development is perceived as the attempt by capital to 
establish control over labour in production (Marcuse 1964; Bahr 1970; Braverman 
1974; Panzieri 1976; 1980; Marglin 1982). Studies from the discipline of Science 
and Technology Studies have in fact substantiated their claim by showing that 
monopolising control in the hands of managements has dominated over efficiency 
and productivity when choices over competing machine designs had to be made 
(Marglin 1982; Noble 1986).  
 
However, the works of the operaists have shown that even if technological 
development was believed to fully take place under the control of capital (Panzieri 
1976; 1980), not only could it be interpreted as an adaptive response to workers’ 
struggles (Tronti 1974), but it could also open up new, unintended avenues for 
workers’ power on the shop floor (Alquati 1974; Panzieri 1976; 1980). Both 
notions were recast in Silver’s idea of the “technological fix”, and her argument 
that lean and just-in-time production increased workers power, as the reduction of 
buffers made the production process increasingly vulnerable to minor disruptions 
with severe knock-on effects (Silver 2014; Silver 2003, chap.3). We can therefore 
assume that there is no a priori unidirectional process of increasing technological 
development and tightened managerial control over labour, but rather an open, 
contradictory one of technologically mediated managerial strategies and adaptive 
responses or counter-strategies by workers and other stakeholders.  
 
Moreover, there is a rift between the design processes of machinery and their 
application in production. In the case of Company X this is further complicated, as 
the initial set-up of new production processes is the responsibility of separate 
planning teams, while the day-to-day operations on the shop floor are directed by 
another segment of management.200 The implication is that we cannot assume 
those who exercise control on the shop floor do so under conditions of their own 
choosing. Gertler, for example, has convincingly argued that different 
                                                        
200 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
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“manufacturing cultures”, i.e. institutional matrices associated with different 
managerial practices, have led to the same technology being utilised in very 
different ways, up to the point that it became nearly useless in cases where design 
processes and applications were too far apart (Gertler 2004). In short, the actual 
application of technology on the shop floor will depend on internal coherence in 
the composition of management – and its ability to implement and sustain its 
desired course of action.  
 
In this chapter I will build on these discussions and make two interrelated 
arguments. In the first part of the chapter I will scrutinise where, how and why 
technology creates certain path dependencies that not only lead to greater 
convergence in the production processes between the Mexican and Chinese plants, 
but also in its effects on workers and conditions for their agency. For the largest 
part I will confirm that technology is indeed a tool in the hands of capital, and that 
in many regards, in particular in the substitution of machinery for living labour 
and in effects on occupational safety and health (OHS), workers have little choice 
but to adapt to the given conditions – unless they challenge the production system 
as a whole. However, while I will provide empirical evidence on how management 
deploys technology flexibly across its different plants, I will argue that particular 
machine designs and the nature of certain tasks are at least in the short run 
constraining to the agency of management as well, limiting its capacity to flexibly 
adjust the fixed capital-labour ratio as well as day-to-day operations. That is, 
rather than only constraining the agency of workers, I argue that the effects of 
technological change work themselves out through a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between capital and labour.   
 
In the second part of the chapter I will turn to the question of time regimes at 
Company X – that is, working shifts, breaks, overtime and cycle time. I argue that 
even though technological processes between all plants converge to a high degree, 
and the most efficient utilisation of machinery demands its operation for as many 
hours as possible, actual time regimes could diverge within a technologically 
constricted space. I will show how this depended on particular managerial 
interests, workers’ coping strategies, and extraordinary events, such as accidents.  
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The main aims of this chapter are therefore to explore what capacities for agency 
the particular technological composition of the production actually offered to 
managers and workers in the cases of Company X in China and Mexico; how 
technology itself became a solution to social problems within and around the 
production process; and how technological requirements and social relations 
between labour and capital unfolded in certain time regimes.  
 
1.  Modular Production 
While all global car producers embarked on the same journey sooner or later, in 
the mid-1990s “Company X led the field in platform strategy” (Jürgens 2009, 
p.231), which it constantly furthered until the latest development of “modular 
production”. These continuous advances in flexible mass production were 
achieved through breaking down the non-visible main components of the car into 
variable combinations of standardised parts. Platforms at Company X were further 
subdivided, or “modularised”, into a ‘Modular Transversal’, respectively ‘Modular 
Longitudinal Toolkit’, depending on the orientation of the powertrain in the car 
(from German abbreviated as MQB, respectively MLB). The crux of the MQB/MLB 
is the definition of a few standard measurements, such as the distance between 
pedal box and axes or the inclination angle of the motor, not only across platforms, 
but also across components (for example different engine types). This means that 
the remaining parts of the substructure, and therefore the platform itself, can be of 
variable length and width, whilst any engine can fit any platform, irrespective of its 
fuel input (Figure 11). To enable the fitting of standardised components, such as 
air-condition units or controls, into any platform, all metal sheets utilised in its 
construction are given the same fixation points, irrespective of their length and 
width. Moreover, this system is not only applicable to the main brand of Company 
X, but to all brands within the company group (Anon 2012a). In short, all invisible 
parts are ideally subject to cost-effective standardisation, while leaving sufficient 
flexibility to allow for an adaptation to brand-specific features of the body and 
installation of components.  
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Figure 11: Passenger car based on Modular Transversal Toolkit (MQB) 
Source: Company X n.d. 
 
A ‘Modular Production Toolkit’ (MPB) reflects this flexible standardisation in 
production. Standardised fixation and welding points also mean that the respective 
tasks can be standardised even further across factories and suppliers (for details 
see chapter 7). This should allow for faster response time to market signals, 
because (ideally) any factory should be able to produce any model. In addition, the 
standardisation of parts further reduces costs and saves resources:  
 
“Company X gains even more economies of scale with this. We are big already, but 
because of this we can push costs down even further.”201 
 
Modular production was an innovative technological fix to productivity and 
profitability problems haunting Company X at the beginning of the millennium. As 
we shall see, while in some respects the implications for the techno-organisational 
structure of the production system – in particular the convergence of processes 
across different locales – have been profound, in others it has allowed a flexible 
adaptation to and exploitation of variable local conditions, which apart from 
                                                        
201 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
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labour cost and regulations also includes different levels of mechanisation. 
Compared to the preceding two big techno-organisational advances in automotive 
production – flow and lean production – the implications of modular production 
for work organisation at the terminal assembler are far less immediate. While flow 
production has been associated with repetitive monotonous tasks, and lean 
production with “management by stress” (Parker & Slaughter 1990), modular 
production, although it is compatible with the aforementioned, does not require a 
comparable alteration of established work practices. If anything, it rather implies a 
return towards increasingly standardised labour processes. As will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 7, the implications for the supply chain have however been 
profound, as the modular composition of the final product allows for increasing 
outsourcing of the production of such modules.  
 
2.  Technological Composition by Department 
All modern car factories consist of essentially the same four manufacturing 
departments – press shop, body shop, paint shop and assembly – each 
characterised by a specific type of technology. In order to understand the limits 
and potentials for management to embrace strategies of further technological 
change or upgrading – and the implications for workers and their agency – it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the particular technological composition of each 
department. I will argue in the following that the possibility for “technological 
fixes” varies significantly between departments, for reasons of cost calculations, 
machine operations, demands on quality or the nature of tasks to be fulfilled.  
  
2.1.  Press Shop: 
The press shop is the first manufacturing department in the flow production 
system of an automotive factory. Here, raw metal sheets are pressed into parts for 
the car’s substructure and body. Company X in both China and Mexico had limited 
its press shops to the production of large sheet metal parts and outsourced the 
production of smaller parts to suppliers. 
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Presses are heavy machinery that account for a huge share of the sunk cost in an 
automotive factory. They are therefore kept in operation for as many years as 
possible. Incremental upgrading is not only costly, but also technologically 
difficult; and it effects tend to be limited. In the case of the oldest press line still 
operating in the Northern plant in China it was for example possible to mechanise 
the process of passing sheets from one press to the next, saving time and 
personnel cost. The function and speed of the presses themselves however 
remained unaffected. These could be changed significantly only through their 
replacement by completely new machinery. Deconstruction of the first press line – 
the one relocated from the closed US manufacturing site in the late 1980s – had 
only recently begun and was still under way at the time of my fieldwork. Up to 
2012 it had been used to make parts for a 1980s model, which continued to sell in 
China mainly due to large public orders for taxis and police cars. Senior manager 
Pongrac commented:  
 
“This was not at all in keeping with the times. How they used to make cars here, it 
is unbelievable.”202  
 
Press shops with older machinery would thus generally have a higher number of 
workers, as certain processes could not be automated (at reasonable cost) or 
required more personnel and time. Usually, however, the particular machine 
operations of modern press shops – in place in Company X’s newer facilities in 
China and Mexico – made production highly automated, at ratios of 95% and more. 
Manual labour in direct production was reduced to quality control and the 
calibration, repair and changing of toolsets (the dies used for stamping). A tool 
change at Company X/JV2’s main plant for example was a matter of about twenty 
minutes (which was still considerably long – it could be as low as eight minutes at 
the most modern press line of a new upscale brand factory of Company X in 
Mexico).203 The only really labour-intensive tasks in the press shop were logistics 
and cleaning, as the presses required a dust-free environment – a fact on which 
German senior manager Bohnert commented:  
                                                        
202 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
203 Author’s fieldnotes. 
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“We have more cleaners than manufacturing staff here in the press shop.”204  
 
Overall, technological upgrading in the press shop – i.e. the installation of new 
press lines – was rare and usually linked to the construction of an entirely new 
production hall, which in turn depended on an increase in productive capacity or 
the introduction of a new model. Managerial agency to alter the technological 
composition was therefore rather constrained by the particular machine 
operations and high cost. 
 
2.2.  Body Shop: 
In Company X’s body shops in China and Mexico, where the sheet metal parts from 
the press shop were welded into substructures (‘platforms’) and bodies (‘hats’), 
automation was based on modern robotics. Welding robots were model-unspecific 
and could be flexibly programmed to fulfil a broad range of tasks, potentially 
allowing for very high automation rates.205 Unlike in the press shop these tasks 
could generally be fulfilled manually, though obviously at lower speed and 
precision. Management therefore sought to handle the substitution of machinery 
for manual labour flexibly, depending on considerations of productivity, quality, 
output and, first and foremost, cost. This was particularly relevant in the Chinese 
case: 
 
 “Normally, one can say: if high quality standards are not demanded, if welding can 
be done by hand, an employee should do it, because that is cheaper in China. 
Where quality is demanded […] one always uses robots. But because labour costs – 
I only know this from hearsay – increase ten to fifteen percent each year, if one 
extrapolates that: for three shifts, if I put one robot there or pay three employees, 
                                                        
204 Interview German senior manager Bohnert. 
205 By contrast, task-specific machinery was the norm in Western, “Fordist“ car-production up to 
the 1980s. 
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who can also get sick, absenteeism, vacation etc. – though that is not as high as in 
Germany – I begin to calculate.”206  
 
These calculations not only vary from model to model, but also depend on the 
number of units produced. Hence, the technological composition of the body shop 
at Company X/JV2 was reflective of broader socio-economic trends, such as wage 
levels and shifts in sales figures, respectively customer demand: 
 
“At 200 units per day one does not mechanise that much. […] Planners would have 
to calculate degressively at which number of units the cost for mechanised 
production decreases so much that it intersects with costs for manual 
assembly.”207 
 
In China automation rates were therefore nowhere near the comparable 90% to 
95% at Company X’s body shops in Germany.208 In the Northern joint venture they 
stood at 70% on average for established models with high output. In the Western 
plant they could be as low as 55% and 29% for older models with lower rates of 
output; and in Company X/JV1’s most recently constructed and modern plant in 
the East it stood at 42%. Hence the Chinese exceptionality that “the body shop is 
the department with the highest number of workers, about 4000 [in the North]. 
Normally the most labour intensive department is assembly. But that 
demonstrates the difference in automation rates here.”209  
 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the body shop of the more modern section of the 
plant operated on the basis of over 250 robots, which added up to an automation 
rate of 85%.210 This was mainly an effect of higher labour costs and higher quality 
demands, as the Mexican plant produced state of the art models for international 
markets. 
 
                                                        
206 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
207 Interview (3) German senior manager Pongrac. 
208 Even in Germany there are still elements of assembly in the body shop that require individual 
fitting and cannot (yet) be fulfilled by a machine, such as the assembly of doors or tailgate. 
209 Interview (3) German senior manager Pongrac. 
210 Author’s field notes. 
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With the increasing modularisation of production – already by 2005 the flagship 
model of the upscale brand was composed of 70% modular parts (Jürgens 2009, 
p.232) – there were, however, certain processes that required the uniform 
application of a particular technology across locations. Welding the seam for the 
roof of the car, for example, required laser welding. Such new machinery was 
usually introduced with new models and/or the construction of new production 
facilities. While laser welding was present in all factories I visited in both China 
and Mexico, an company-internally engineered “framer” – a huge device for the 
automatic and precise configuration and welding of the sides of the body to the 
substructure, adaptable to the production of four different models – was for 
example installed in the new Southern plant of Company X/JV2, but was still 
missing in older production halls in China, as well as in the Mexican main plant.211 
 
The body shop was essentially the department with the highest managerial 
flexibility to adjust the technological composition to local conditions – lower 
degrees of automation in cases of cheap labour, lower output and/or lower quality 
demands; higher degrees where productivity and (labour) cost pressure were 
greater. As we shall see, the consequences for labour were in either case 
unfavourable: workers were forced to fulfil strenuous tasks in the first case, and 
had to contend with a reduction of personnel in the latter.   
  
2.3.  Paint Shop: 
The finished but raw vehicle bodies are transferred into the paint shop, where 
anti-corrosive protection and the final paint is applied. Similar to the press shops, 
the paint shops in both Mexico and China were highly automated, due to the 
installation of cataphoretic dip coating212 and painting robots. Worker Jesús 
remembered the process of automation at the Mexican plant: 
  
                                                        
211 Interview (2) German white collar worker Hensch. 
212 The term quite literally describes the actual process: high voltage is used to apply a 10μm thin 
layer of anticorrosive coating to a negatively charged car body (acting as a cathode), which is 
dipped into a positively charged bath of paint (the corresponding anode). This process is used in 
most modern car plants. 
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“Today we are only 20 people on the line, down from 120 to 150, due to the 
implementation of robots. Every robot replaces ten or eleven people, if seen for all 
three shifts together.”213 
 
The remaining manual tasks were primarily concentrated in rework.214 Blue-collar 
workers who remained in the paint shop were either experienced senior workers, 
particularly in the Mexican case, or workers receiving special training, due to the 
difficult task of spray-painting by hand. Workers in quality control or the 
laboratory were either senior or white-collar workers, i.e. workers with 
experience and/or theoretical knowledge.215 Because older machinery remained in 
place considerably longer in Mexico and China than in Germany (due to the 
sustained demand for older models), in the 2000s workers in both cases 
experienced technological changes reminiscent of those occurring in the global 
North in the late 1980s and 1990s. The gradual but accelerating mechanisation of 
production in certain areas (mainly body and paint shop) caused a “polarisation of 
demanded skills” (Jürgens et al. 1989, p.356) – i.e. parallel de- and upskilling for 
different sections of the workforce.  
 
Workers in the paint shop, however, face another technologically induced problem 
specific to this department. Due to the particular machinery and operations, the 
paint shop is by far the hottest working environment in a car factory. The 
preparation (filtration, tempering and humidification) of the surrounding air, 
sprinkler systems and water recycling, drying cabinets, cataphoretic dip coating 
and other machinery have an energy consumption equivalent to that of 20,000 
households216 – and produce a substantial thermal discharge. In online forums 
paint shop workers of Company X/JV1’s Eastern main plant complained about the 
strain caused by the heat, with one of them stating: 
 
                                                        
213 Interview worker Jesús. 
214 Rework refers to the correction of production errors. 
215 Interview (2) German white collar worker Hensch, worker Daniel. 
216 Interview (2) German white collar worker Hensch; In an average car plant, the paint shop 
accounts for 45% to 70% of total energy consumption (Holt 2012). 
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“Today someone almost died in the new paint workshop in plant three. It’s fucking 
hot! They put some ice in the workshop though, but the idiot bosses do not allow 
us to take anything to drink with us. They just want to murder us workers in yet 
another way.” (Baidu Tieba 2013) 
 
Other workers reported that in order to get through the working day, they drank 
energy drinks or used traditional Chinese medicine and health care products 
(baojianpin) that Company X/JV1 handed out. Complaints about the heat were 
particularly pronounced where outside temperatures were already rather high – 
as in East or South China – and/or air conditioning systems insufficient.217 
Apparently, technological progress was insufficient to remedy the strenuous 
working conditions. 
 
Together with the body shop, the paint shop was a department at Company X in 
both Mexico and China where management could potentially adjust the ratio of 
machines and living labour flexibly. However, for reasons of quality demands, 
particularly for the latest models, high-tech inputs such as dip coating and robotics 
dominated; and the share of manual labour was rather low.   
 
2.4.  Assembly: 
Although the body shops at Company X/JV2 in China were a remarkable exception, 
it is usually the assembly department where the most labour-intensive operations 
are concentrated. Here, the car’s interior, engine, tires, electronics and other 
components are installed into the painted bodies delivered from the paint shop. 
Workers at Company X in China mainly assembled parts manufactured and 
delivered by external suppliers (which were however mostly joint ventures with 
Company X’s Chinese partner) – or, in the case of engines, produced by an external 
Company X factory. In Mexico the same was true for most components, but the 
assembled engines were still produced within the main factory compound.218  
                                                        
217 Interviews dispatch worker Ping, worker Lu. According to worker Lu, Company X/JV1 also 
offered special vacations to workers in particularly hazardous areas. 
218 Author’s field notes. 
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While the example of the body shop, particularly in the Chinese case, illustrated an 
adaptation of the technological composition to local conditions of demand and 
labour costs, a closer look at the assembly department illuminates how the 
continuity of classical conveyor technology in combination with highly flexible 
assembly tasks limits the scope for “technological fixes”. Apart from a shift to 
overhead transport systems, the major innovations in the Mexican and Chinese 
plants were buffers that cushion ruptures in the integrated flow production and 
prevent knock-on effects.219 The main plant of Company X/JV2 for example had 
both old and new conveyor technology in operation, depending on the respective 
construction date of the assembly line. Senior manager Pongrac explained the 
implications:  
 
“So, here you can see: These people stand about and have finished their tasks 
already, because somewhere else something is standing still. So that is the 
advantage of the other [newer] conveyor technology, where you could still work a 
few cycles now – while, if anything stops here, the entire line will stop 
immediately.”220  
 
Older and newer models could and had to be assembled with the existing 
technology indiscriminately: “the vehicle has to adapt to the conditions here.”221 
However, in the Chinese case it was not uncommon that, due to its recent rapid 
expansion (discussed in more detail in chapter 8), the introduction of new models 
went hand in hand with the construction of new production facilities, leading to an 
assembly line being used for a single model only. This was rather exceptional, as 
the normal modus operandi for car assembly sees different models appear on the 
assembly line according to incoming orders, requiring workers to flexibly perform 
different tasks. At Company X/JV2’s main plant, the existence of a single-model 
assembly line, however, made it sufficient to train workers for a limited range of 
simple repetitive tasks – sometimes, in fact, for only one single operation222 – 
                                                        
219 Alternative assembly systems at Volvo, however, were an important exception up to their 
abandonment in 2002. Assembly was organised in docking stations with long cycle times and 
autonomous work teams without fixed task prescriptions (Sandberg 1995). 
220 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
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which further aggravated the dysfunctionality of a continuous improvement 
philosophy as discussed in the preceding chapter.  
 
So far, technological solutions that could fully replace human labour in assembly 
have remained limited not by their high cost, but primarily by their insufficient 
flexibility. In the 1980s Company X constructed a new assembly hall in Germany, in 
which it mechanised about 25% of the assembly tasks. However, in the long run 
the technology proved to be too inflexible and failure-prone – and the experiment 
was ultimately abandoned.223 Automation rates are thus traditionally low in the 
assembly department – and against the historical trend in other departments they 
have been falling, rather than rising at Company X: 
 
“Doing everything with machines would be unaffordable. And I would not be 
flexible anymore. Man is the most flexible being, I don’t need to stress that point. 
That is why Company X and other car manufacturers have partly reversed the 
trend. With regards to metal sheets mechanisation is very high, but in assembly the 
rate of mechanisation used to be higher and one is going down again now. It is not 
flexible enough.”224 
 
As technological fixes were limited by the nature of operations, organisational 
rationalisation measures were the primary means used to increase productivity in 
the assembly department. Worker Lu, an assistant to a foreman, reported that 
Company X/JV1 was planning to reduce the team size from ten to eight or nine 
workers in 2013, under the slogan of “optimised resource allocation”.225 That is, 
increased productivity in the assembly department would be achieved via the 
intensification of work. On the other hand, the assembly line as the core technology 
of a flow production system also allowed workers to grind the entire production to 
a halt, if they pulled the emergency cord and stopped the line.  
 
                                                        
223 Mechanised assembly is currently deemed feasible for certain tasks, such as a robotised fitting of 
the windshield. This had however not yet been deployed in China at the time of my visit, though 
production managers suggested that it might be at a later stage.  
224 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac 
225 Interview worker Lu. 
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2.5.  Mechanisation and Living Labour 
The technological composition of production in China and Mexico largely 
converged where the more modern areas of the respective plants were concerned. 
The only department showing significant divergence was the body shop, where 
management in China kept automation at a lower level due to cheaper labour and 
lower pressure on productivity and quality. While automation had progressed to a 
higher degree in Mexico, the overall market situation of low wages and continuous 
demand for older models in China did not necessitate investments in robotics – 
neither for productivity nor for quality reasons. As long as older models sold well – 
and they did so much longer in the closed Chinese market than in the open 
European or North American markets – production techniques would not be 
upgraded. However, because profit margins have been shrinking with the entry of 
new competitors into the Chinese market, productivity increases will most likely 
become important in the future. But so far, new technology has been introduced 
primarily with the construction of new plants (the motivations being discussed in 
chapter 8): the newer the plant, the more advanced the production methods. 
Though arguably not imperative at the time of its introduction, deploying state of 
the art technology where high costs or technological limitations prohibited 
incremental upgrading, i.e. in the press shop, was an insurance against future cost 
pressure.  
 
From a managerial point of view increasing automation killed two birds with one 
stone: it improved both labour productivity and, by relieving workers from 
performing hazardous tasks, occupational safety and health. German senior 
manager Pongrac elaborated on this point when we observed two workers doing 
overhead welding:  
 
“Here, these workers have to weld all this by hand. […] It is dusty, dirty, filthy. But 
things like that are done by hand in China. One simply states: ‘That is a manual job, 
period.’ In Germany one would mechanise this first of all due to the cycle time, but 
even more so because of the working conditions. The works council would say: 
‘We won’t do this.’ In China no one cares. Some worker is positioned there and he 
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has to do it, period. […] Luckily the hall is not so hot today. But where you have to 
do welding, can you work just like that? You have to wear heavy leather clothing, 
due to weld splatter. Now, these guys truly know what it means to do this for eight 
hours.”226 
 
At a different work station, senior manager Pongrac – who had himself worked on 
the line for a few years and displayed genuine concern for health and safety issues 
– elaborated the difficulties in implementing incremental changes once the 
production process had been set up by the planning team: 
 
“If I want to set welding points in the middle of the body, I need a very long 
welding gun. Who is supposed to move that thing for a duration of eight hours!? 
Even if it is balanced well, it is still very heavy. If one is then supposed to work at a 
fast pace, what will happen is that one worker holds the gun in the back and a 
second one leads the front to the desired welding spot. No works council in 
Germany would allow that. I have witnessed it a few times that the planners have 
said: ‘No, it [the production line] has been constructed that way, we cannot change 
that again.’ So at the end one has to inform the board of directors: ‘Here, look at 
this. Is one supposed to work like that? We need two robots.’ […] These things 
happen, because the planners did not have any money left or the number of 
produced units was very small, so that one could say: ‘That should work. We have a 
longer cycle time here, so we will simply put two people here. We [only] have the 
money to cover the costs for two workers.’ But now look at how these people have 
to work! This is of course a rare and extreme example.”227 
 
Both quotations not only illustrate well how managers at Company X viewed the 
production process through the lens of standards and industrial relations known 
from Germany, but also how they approached issues of occupational safety and 
health – namely as technological problems. But, as further automation was 
essentially limited to the body shop, the room for technological solutions was in 
fact rather small. Once a production process had been set up in a particular way – 
                                                        
226 Interview (3) German senior manager Pongrac. 
227 Ibid. 
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in this case as a flow production system with highly divided labour – it created 
certain path-dependencies for future changes, if these were not to break with the 
principles of the original conception. In China, safer machinery and ergonomics 
could be found in Company X’s newer production facilities, simply because state of 
the art technology already came with improved OHS standards.228 But for the most 
part, Company X built on the fact that its young workforce was physically capable 
and mentally willing to withstand the harsher working conditions until they either 
left the factory or transferred in-house to a non-manual job. Asked why the 
German standard of ergonomics was not applied in China, manager Pongrac 
replied:  
 
“Because the team is still young and people do not complain that quickly.”229 
 
In Mexico, on the other hand, workers did indeed complain quite quickly – albeit 
with little effect on the implementation of new technology proper. As in the 
Chinese case, decisions on technological composition were at the sole discretion of 
the enterprise after 1992. However, for larger technological changes that involved 
the reorganisation of teams or the reduction of personnel, the union had to be 
informed – but only had the right to challenge managerial decisions on the basis 
that these measures were not economically necessary.230 Furthermore, this meant 
that although the union had no say in the changes actually being introduced if 
management desired them, it was often able to gain certain benefits for the 
affected workers, such as additional rest days or monetary premiums – something 
that will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.    
 
From the point of view of the enterprise the aim of particular methods of 
organising the production processes was to allow for high volumes of high-quality 
output at low unit costs. The technological composition of these processes – 
determined, as we have seen primarily by a mixture of technical feasibility and 
                                                        
228 By deploying the most modern technology, the new plant in the East for example had ergonomic 
equipment for assembly workers, such as chairs and conveyor technology adjustable to the 
worker’s height, improved air conditioning in the assembly hall, quieter assembly lines etc. 
Author’s field notes. 
229 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
230 § 56, Company X (Mexico) Collective Contract 2010-2012. 
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cost considerations – is however only one aspect of achieving this goal. The other 
is of course control over time, both in the sense of the total time spent at work by 
each worker, and in the sense of cycle times in the production process itself. A 
fuller analysis of the scope for relational agency, as developed in the following 
chapters, requires us to first build an understanding of the labour process that 
integrates material and temporal aspects of control over production; and it is to 
the latter that we turn now. 
 
3.  Time Regimes: Shifts, Overtime and Cycle Time 
Good, you invent a machine – what for? To make the work more 
pleasant, right? Or that it helps you with your tasks. But here, no, 
here they have a client-and-provider philosophy – and our 
providers are robots. Robots do not rest, and so don’t we. They 
speed them up, faster, faster… 
– Worker Jesús, Company X in Mexico, 2012 
 
On average, while producing similar models, Company X manufactured 47.5/65.7 
cars per employee/production worker in China and 32.4/45.7 in Mexico in 2012 – 
that is, about 46/44% more in China than in Mexico.231 What accounts for this 
discrepancy given that automation rates were lower in China – suggestive of lower 
labour productivity232 – and 2012 was a record year for output at Company X in 
Mexico (El Economista 2012)? As I will demonstrate in the following, one of the 
reasons is to be found in the longer working hours in China. Although working 
times and exhausting work rhythms were in both Mexico and China amongst the 
most pressing concerns that workers brought up in my interviews, there was 
rather little that they were able to do to improve their situation. In the sections 
                                                        
231 The figures are based on Company X’s annual reports, INEGI (various years), and personnel data 
obtained during fieldwork. The figure for Mexico is based on year-end production and employment 
2012; due to the lack of year-end personnel statistics for China, the respective figure is an 
approximation based on the average year-end production of 2012 and 2013, divided by the total 
number of employees as of September 2013 (obtained during fieldwork). The respective figures 
per year would be 43.5 cars per worker for 2012 and 51.6 for 2013. That is, even with the more 
conservative figure based on the lower 2012 output and the higher number of employees in 
September 2013, Company X still produced about 34% more per worker in China than in Mexico.  
232 Because no reliable data on the number of hours worked was available for either of the cases, 
actual labour productivity could not be calculated. 
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that follow I will provide empirical evidence of the technological factors, 
managerial decisions and limited responses by workers that produced the 
particular time regimes at Company X in China and Mexico. 
 
3.1.  Shift Systems, Working Hours and Rest Time 
Although in both China and Mexico the shift systems were designed to utilise 
technological inputs most efficiently by around-the-clock operations (apart from 
time used for maintenance), and even though in each case it was formally at the 
sole discretion of management to adjust the time regime, the particular way in 
which each shift system was organised differed. 
 
Company X’s joint ventures in China operated with two different shift systems. 
Company X/JV1’s main plant primarily used a two-shift system with flexible 
working hours. Within one week workers followed a schedule of two dayshifts, 
two nightshifts and two days off (Table 4). Shifts could be of three different lengths 
and workers were given a day’s notice to inform them of their actual working 
hours. Dayshifts could start at 5am, 6.30am or 8am, ending at 4.30pm; while 
nightshifts ran from 4.30pm to 1am, 3am or 4am, respectively. In short, workers 
followed regular 8-, 10-, or 11-hour schedules that varied with changing capacity 
utilisation. As there were three groups of workers, but only two active shifts per 
day, the respective third group functioned as a buffer that could be called upon 
spontaneously for excess orders or rework – or in case of a strike in one shift. The 
newer Eastern plant of Company X/JV1 operated on the basis of a similar system, 
but had regular ten-hour shifts and an additional seventh dayshift per week – i.e. a 
regular operation time of 6.5 days per week (6 days of 20h, 1 day of 10h).233  
 
Company X/JV2 on the other hand followed a three-shift system with eight 
working hours and bi-weekly rotation. In areas where output was lower there 
could also be two-times-ten or two-times-eight hour shifts.234  
                                                        
233 Interview German senior manager Rordorf. 
234 Interview German (2) senior manager Pongrac. 
 217 
 
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
Day A A C C B B Maintenance 
Night B B A A C C Maintenance 
Table 4: Shift system at Company X/JV1’s main plant 
 
At the Mexican main plant regular working hours were organised in three shifts 
spread over a five-day working week. Workers in the first shift (morning to 
afternoon) would have a regular total of 44 weekly working hours; those in the 
second shift (mid-day to night) a total of 42 hours; and those in the night shift a 
total of 40 hours. Saturday and Sunday were regular rest days. However, workers 
could also be temporarily or permanently allocated to discontinuous or special 
shifts, which respected the total number of working hours, but not the coinciding 
of rest days and weekends. Workers on the latter shifts received a bonus or 120% 
of a day’s salary for each rest day not coinciding with a Saturday or Sunday. Special 
bonuses of 35% or more were paid for a sixth working day per week for workers 
of all shifts.235 Usually, shifts would rotate on a monthly basis.236 However, after 
the 1992 conflict, decisions on shift allocation became the sole responsibility of the 
enterprise, while under the status ante the union had to give its consent.  
 
In both cases workers had a thirty-minute break per shift, though for the night 
shift it was added to the end of the shift in Mexico. If workers required a shorter 
break – for example to use the restrooms – the team leader had to give his OK and 
allocate another worker (sometimes himself) to cover at the vacated station. 
Formally, these interruptions, assuming they do not accumulate too much, should 
in neither of the two cases have negative effect on a worker’s evaluation, nor were 
there any wage deductions, as might be the case in the supply chain or other 
industrial sectors, particularly in China (Pun 2005; Xue 2008; Choi & Peng 2015). 
Vacation time at Company X in China reflected the legal minimum,237 while it was 
more generous in Mexico (Table 5). Overall, however, vacation and in particular 
break times at Company X in both China and Mexico were rather short and rigid. 
 
                                                        
235 Company X Mexico Collective Contract 2010-2012. 
236 Interview worker Miguel. 
237 Regulations for Paid Annual Leave for Employees (State Council Decree No. 514) 
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However, welcomed breaks were often provided to workers – discussed in more 
detail in section 3.4. – by technologically induced production stoppages. During my 
observations on the shop floor, I saw workers sleeping, chatting with their 
colleagues or playing with their phones during the many occasions on which the 
assembly line had stopped.238 Others would simply not fulfil their tasks properly. 
One of these moments occurred when German senior manager Pongrac showed 
me around the shop-floor. We were observing parts of the final quality control 
process, where during a test-run of the car’s electronic functions the battery is 
supposed to be connected to a charger. Seeing that workers simply omitted this 
step, he commented: 
  
“So here, this would be a point for the head of the assembly department to 
intervene and tell them: ‘Guys, what are you doing here!? You have to connect this! 
That is part of your job!’ That wouldn’t happen in Germany. […] In Germany you 
would appeal to the people and explain what they have to do – though they might 
say: ‘Why? The battery comes charged from the supplier.’ I would explain the 
reasons to them, that the customer might complain otherwise, and then they 
would say: ‘Hm, yes, alright I’ll do it.’ Here you can explain it three times and that’s 
the result.”239  
 
This episode illustrates how the purposive reduction of effort was a strategy that 
workers in China embraced to deal with work-related pressure – something that 
also aggravated the counter-effect against meritocratic remuneration and 
continuous improvement processes discussed in the preceding chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
238 Author’s field notes. 
239 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
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 Mexico Company X/JV1 Company X/JV2 
Working 
hours 
44, 42, or 40 per week + 
overtime 
8, 10, or 11 daily + 
overtime 
8 daily + overtime  
Working 
days/week 
5 or 6 6 (2 day, 2 night, 2 
off) 
6,5 (13 days work, 1 
off) 
Shifts 3-shift; monthly;  
special shifts 
2-shift; 3-shift 3-shift, bi-weekly 
Breaks 30 minutes; (none at night) 30 minutes 30 minutes 
Vacation 1-8 years: 14 days; 9-13 years: 
17 days; 14-18 years: 20 days; 
after that 3 days for each 5 years; 
plus premiums 
1-10 years: 5 days; 10-20 years: 10 days; 
over 20 years: 15 days 
Lowest cycle 
time 
60 sec  60 sec 58/60 sec 
Table 5: Time regimes at Company X’s main plants in Mexico and China 
Source: Company X Mexico Collective Contract 2010-2012, author’s field notes 
3.2.  Overtime and Fluctuating Capacity Utilisation  
Overtime in both Mexico and China was a double-edged sword for workers. On the 
one hand, it made up a sizeable proportion of their income; and a reduction of 
overtime could cause protest – as in Santiago’s story discussed in the preceding 
chapter. On the other hand, overtime in both China and Mexico could be so 
extensive that the more common response were complaints about long working 
hours and exhausting work rhythms (see also Table 2 in chapter 5). In the 
following I will analyse in more detail the mechanisms through which management 
in China and Mexico regulated overtime and what this implied for workers. 
 
At the time of my fieldwork, production at Company X/JV2 ran 326 days a year, 
that is, thirteen working days in a row, followed by one day off for maintenance.240 
In a two-times-ten/eight shift system overtime was usually added to the shift, 
either before or after the (next) regular working day. But in a three-times-eight 
system, overtime did not occur by prolonging shifts on the line, but either by 
making up for outstanding production targets on rest days; by re-working finished 
cars241 – or simply by the regular prescription of overtime through scheduling 
shifts for a duration of 13 days:  
                                                        
240 That there is only one day every two weeks to carry out repairs and maintenance is a unique 
peculiarity of Company X’s China business, in order to satisfy demand for the expanding market. 
241 The newer production halls at Company X/JV2’s main plant have been designed with a 
considerably larger open space for rework than the older halls.    
 220 
 
“Now we are building 1,5 million cars at two locations [North and West], and the 
assembly department operates 13 days in a row, only every second Sunday is a day 
off. […] Office workers usually have a five-day working week; sometimes they work 
on a Saturday. But production workers: 13 days in a row.”242 
 
Overtime was mandatory, could be regularly prescribed or announced with short 
notice at the discretion of the enterprise. The union chairman at Company X/JV2’s 
Western plant explicitly stated that the union would not interfere with the 
enterprise’s plans to allocate overtime.243 Senior manager Pongrac commented on 
this: 
 
“That issue is handled rather flexibly here. In Germany one would first have to 
consult the works council, which has to give its OK, and then it only works on a 
voluntary basis anyway. Extra shifts can be announced in advance here, but then 
workers are obliged to do them. This would only work on a short-term notice and 
a voluntary basis in Germany.”244 
 
Overtime in China is legally limited to 3 hours per day and 36 hours per month 
(Labour Law §41). The practice of regular eleven-hour days of overtime or 13 
consecutive working days would impose huge costs, was it calculated by the legal 
40-hour week or on an eight-hour day basis.245 In the mid-2000s various 
automotive producers therefore introduced comprehensive working hours 
systems that recorded every hour as contributing to the legal annual maximum of 
2080 hours – irrespective of how this time was accumulated on a daily or weekly 
basis. Overtime rates would then be paid en gros for the hours above the legal 
maximum at the end of this period (Zhang 2010, p.134). This not only allowed 
companies to balance capacity fluctuations between high and low order periods 
                                                        
242 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
243 Interview Chairman Qiao. 
244 Interview (1) German senior manager Pongrac. 
245 A normal working week in China has 44 hours, according to the Labour Law of 1994 (§36). This 
was however amended to 40 hours per week in the “State Council Regulations on Working Hours of 
Employees” of 1995 (§3). In addition, provincial or municipal rules might apply, so that most areas 
in China prescribe a 40-hour working week.  
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without paying full overtime benefits, but also to exceed the legal daily, weekly or 
monthly overtime limitations.  
 
Company X/JV2 still operated on this basis246 – arguably the reason why it could 
sustain a 13-day working week without running into serious legal trouble – but 
Company X/JV1, which had operated on this basis in 2006 (ibid.), had resorted to a 
different system by the time of my fieldwork, which was related to health and 
safety issues. Long working hours of course increase the risk of accidents – and 
they were apparently linked to the tragic death of a worker in 2009. Under the 
thread title “Company X/JV1 is a fucking killer factory!” (Baidu Tieba 2009a) 
workers used an online forum to discuss rumours about the death of a fellow 
worker at the Eastern main plant: he had allegedly been crushed to death by the 
assembly line after working eleven to twelve hour shifts for a period of nearly two 
months. Company X/JV1 supposedly compensated the family, but managed to keep 
the event from becoming public.247 One worker wrote: 
 
“The scene of the accident was really tragic and terrifying. But the company just 
said it was the worker’s carelessness that caused the accident. He was a 32-year 
old senior worker; it was working for 11 hours that killed him.” (Baidu Tieba 
2009d)  
 
Attributing the accident to exhaustion from overwork was a shared feeling among 
contributors to this and other online discussions. The problem was not new and 
some workers had called a legal advice-hotline that Company X/JV1’s trade union 
had installed in 2006 to complain:  
 
“The world is very much the same everywhere: the officials just protect 
themselves, and you have no way to reclaim your rights. I have dialled 12345 many 
times to complain about the overtime situation. They said they had passed it on to 
the Labour Bureau – and that an investigation of the situation at Company X/JV1 
showed no documentation or evidence at all. Now it is certain that a worker has 
                                                        
246 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
247 Workers Lun and Ping confirmed that they had heard of the events, but neither their 
information nor that of the online forums could be independently verified.  
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died, but we are still required to do 10- or 11-hour shifts. They call it 11 hours, but 
actually it takes a worker more than 12 hours if you include the commuting time. 
Company X/JV1 is hell! Company X/JV1 disregards workers’ health and safety!” 
(BBS Tianya 2009) 
 
Company X/JV1 addressed the problem in two different ways. First, it reorganised 
the shift system. In 2009 Company X/JV1 used to have only two groups to staff its 
two-shift system, meaning that workers could end up working eleven hour shifts 
for weeks or even months without rest days – especially since the refusal to work 
on Sundays would result in a wage deduction.248 The three-group-system brought 
workers some relief by officially having two rest days per week, which helped to 
avoid scenarios like that of 2009. However, it did not change the fact that workers 
were still forced to work eleven-hour shifts. The production workers I spoke to 
still complained about the exhausting nature of this work rhythm.249  
 
The second measure was the introduction of time accounts. Working hours 
exceeding the legal eight-hour day were recorded and accumulated until they 
reached 84 hours. The respective worker would then be paid an according bonus 
and the account reset to zero.250 In effect, workers were relieved from the most 
dramatic imbalances, but management could still avoid paying overtime benefits 
by keeping workers from reaching the 84 hours through assigning them rest days 
or less working hours (Figure 12).  
 
The introduction of a similar system, called banco de horas (“hours bank”), was a 
hotly debated issue during my fieldwork in Mexico. As this system would have 
involved a restructuring of the collective contract, union acceptance was required 
– and so far, every union leadership at the main plant has rejected this fiercely. 
However, as we shall see in chapter 8, the 2012-2016 leadership made 
                                                        
248 Interview worker Lun. 
249 Interview with two migrant dispatch workers Xun and Liu, dispatch worker Ping. Emblematic 
for the exhaustion that workers felt was that during the 45 minute shuttle transport from the 
factory to the dormitories, for which I joined two of my interviewees, none of the approximately 80 
migrant dispatch workers spoke a single word. A small minority was chatting on their 
smartphones, but the overwhelming majority fell asleep as soon as the bus got moving. Author’s  
field notes.     
250 Interview worker Zhang. 
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considerable concessions for new projects in Mexico. A member of the union’s 
central committee stated: 
 
 “The enterprise has insisted for many years in the banco de horas, that is, 
individual working time accounts. Fortunately this is not stipulated in the labour 
law, so we are not obliged, the workers are not obliged, to accept this. It would 
affect the entire economy of all our workers, and our compañeros don’t like it. […] 
We have not accepted this here.”251 
 
Time accounts 
 
The basic idea of a time account is a watering down of restrictions on regular 
working time through individual workers registering each hour beyond a 
stipulated core time (usually per day) in a comprehensive “account”. In times of 
low orders workers accumulate working time “debts” by being allocated fewer 
hours (usually without wage deductions), to be compensated by working more 
hours in times of high orders (usually with lower or no overtime benefits). If 
workers accumulate working time “credits”, these are compensated by reduced 
hours at times compatible with production requirements; or, if exceeding a 
stipulated limit, as overtime benefits. This system, that is supposed to avoid 
layoffs,252 reduces overtime compensation and substantially flexibilises working 
time – in other words it increases the employer’s “time sovereignty”, or command 
over the time of the employee.253 Company X/JV1’s working time accounts and the 
idea of a banco de horas in Mexico were broadly based on this model.   
Figure 12: Time accounts 
 
In the absence of time accounts, management at Company X in Mexico embraced 
other measures to deal with fluctuating demands on capacity. As in China, the 
allocation of overtime was at the sole discretion of management and compulsory 
for workers, but it required written notice to the union. Explicitly allowed were 
                                                        
251 Interview union representatives Carlos and Oscar. 
252 Though working time accounts are not unique to Germany, they are particularly wide-spread 
and were much-heralded as Germany’s “miracle” solution to avoid mass layoffs in times of 
economic crisis (e.g. Zapf & Brehmer 2010; Jacobs 2012). Actually, the main mechanism was the 
application of short-time work and the dismissal of temporary workers, rather than the 
accumulation of “debts” in working time accounts (Balleer et al. 2015). The same measure had been 
applied to the Mexican main plant in the “4 por 3” programme in the downturn of the early 2000s. 
253 Working time accounts could also work in favour of the employee, if he or she could freely 
decide on when to work more or less hours. However, the respective contracts hardly reflect this 
(Schulten 1998; Lindecke 2015). 
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also double shifts, which were compensated for by a following rest day.254 Though 
overtime could be excessive at times, in Mexico it was not a constant institution as 
in China. Workers rather struggled with the fluctuation between high and low 
order periods. During the latter the enterprise drained its pool of eventuales, 
and/or designated workers to stay at home for certain days. In 2012 workers 
complained about the fact that these “holidays” were announced from one day to 
the next, simply applied from above, subtracted from their vacation days – and 
combined with overtime on other working days.255 While the union committee of 
2008-2012 did not have an answer to the issue, the 2000-2008 committee had 
intervened when the enterprise announced the layoffs of 2,000 workers in 2003, 
suggesting instead a programme of short-time work, called 4 por 3 (four days 
work, three days off). It mobilised governmental support in the form of stipends to 
compensate for the drastic reduction in workers’ income, aided in its efforts by 
communication with the IG Metall and its experience with the application of 
Kurzarbeit at the German headquarters.256 After this episode, which was well-
received by my interviewees, mainly due to the compensation of income through 
the governmental stipends, management made Kurzarbeit a unilaterally 
determined institution that it reactivated in the wake of the financial crisis of 2009. 
Quite a few automotive enterprises made use of this tool – the paros técnicos 
mentioned in chapter 3 – to compensate for the collapse in sales: in January 2009 
Company X fully suspended 95% of its 10,300 workers for a period of three days 
and cut the pay of the five percent that remained working by half (El Economista 
2009b). Company X explicitly referred to the German experience, but remained 
silent on the point that in the German context short-time work required the 
support of the works council.257  
 
In sum, workers in both Mexico and China had to work rather long hours of 
overtime, although in China it was more frequent and extensive – in fact, overwork 
could reach the point of fatal physical exhaustion. In both cases could overtime be 
announced at will by the enterprise, although in Mexico this was subject to stricter 
                                                        
254 §37 and 40; Company X Mexico Collective Contract 2010-2012. 
255 Interviews worker Daniel and Jesús.  
256 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
257 Interview worker Miguel. 
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regulations. In China Company X used time accounts to avoid paying full overtime 
benefits and balance periods of high and low orders, whereas in Mexico lay offs of 
temporary workers and programmes of short-time work fulfilled that function. 
This was mainly due to the union’s refusal to accept the introduction of working 
time accounts. As will be discussed in section 4. – and was already indicated in 
Santiago’s story in the preceding chapter – workers in Mexico however 
strategically utilised overtime refusals to informally bargain with the enterprise. 
Before we turn to such issues in the context of production mistakes and 
managerial monitoring strategies, I will analyse the rhythms that workers at 
Company X were working in – and complaining about. 
 
3.3.  Cycle Time  
In day-to-day operations, the most important managerial mobilisation of 
technology to regulate the labour process is through the determination of the cycle 
time, i.e. the time required to perform a particular task from beginning to end. 
Cycle times are based on the classic Taylorist idea of breaking down the timing for 
the completion of a task into a comprehensive assessment of a worker’s individual 
movements. In a technology-intensive production process, the relevance of cycle 
times stems not so much from a determination of how fast workers could fulfil 
certain tasks, but from the reverse process. In most cases, the cycle time is taken as 
given – for example by a certain machine operation – and an industrial engineer 
will determine the most time-efficient and sustainable bodily movements, as well 
as the number of workers required.  
 
Cycle times varied according to models, the number of units produced and the 
technical difficulty of the tasks to be fulfilled. In China they could be as low as 60, 
or even 58 seconds, but at the Northern main plant of Company X/JV2 the lowest 
observed rates stood at 64 seconds in one assembly hall and 72 in another.258 In 
the past, planners at Company X in China set up processes on the basis of different 
cycle times – in the newly opened plants, however, they were always designed for 
                                                        
258 Author’s field notes. 
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a cycle time of 60 seconds, in the anticipation of high volume production. Despite 
the 58 second cycle time at the Western plant, German managers at both Chinese 
joint ventures pointed out that Company X usually does not operate with cycle 
times of below one minute anymore, as experience has shown that it is “humanly 
impossible”259 and “does not make technical sense”260 to work faster. Although it 
seems common sense to equate a shorter cycle time with a faster work rhythm, 
this is not necessarily so. The immediate implications for an individual worker’s 
bodily movements stem from the ratio between cycle time and tasks to be 
performed – the following example from China illustrates the point: 
 
How much time do you have to finish a task? 
“90 seconds.” 
And what is it that you do in this time? 
“I put the cover on and fasten it in place. It was 27 covers per hour in the past, but 
now it is 50, because in the past I had to do two different operations, but now it is 
only one.”261 
 
The individual intensity of work also depended on the size of the overall workforce 
and the volume of output. In Mexico, for the two sedan models that were in high 
demand, the cycle time was one minute, whereas for the compact model that was 
exclusively produced in Mexico for all global markets, but that was generally in 
lower demand, it was two minutes.262 This did however not imply that workers 
had twice the time to complete their tasks, but that instead the number of workers 
was reduced while the complexity or number of tasks performed per worker was 
increased. For workers, a longer cycle time with more complex tasks could 
therefore require a “faster” work pace than a short cycle time with a simpler task 
(although the latter would naturally be more repetitive). Worker Miguel described 
the situation as follows: 
 
                                                        
259 Interview German senior manager Näher. 
260 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
261 Interview dispatch worker Ping. 
262 Author’s field notes. 
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“Because they reduce the number of people, in two minutes you still have to do a 
lot of work. That is, at the end of the day there is no positive outcome for those 
compañeros [who work longer cycles]. There are a few stations where in the best 
case you may have ten, maybe fifteen seconds of breathing time. Within these two 
minutes you have fifteen seconds of ‘ahhhh…!’, you stop and return to arranging 
your tools and material. And then you get back to work. But in the worst case, 
there are those workers who work exactly on time, that is, they finish one task and 
immediately start with the next, because there is no formula or mechanism in 
place that allows them to have a rest.”263  
 
The quote also pertains to another issue: differences in individual work pace under 
conditions of teamwork and individual evaluations were prone to create conflict 
amongst workers, when those that worked faster blamed their higher workload on 
those that failed to fulfil their targets. On the other hand, the work pace of the 
fastest workers was often taken as the new standard in a process of continuously 
intensifying the work rhythm. Worker Daniel complained that management 
systematically utilised the precarious employment status of temporary workers – 
and their aspirations to be made permanent – for this purpose:  
 
“The eventuales are being pressured very hard to work at very fast rhythms – and 
that is then taken as an example to standardise their work pace across the board. 
So we have sometimes told the eventuales: ‘Don’t work like this – this is overwork. 
You cannot work running. Apart from that it is detrimental to the quality of your 
work.’ But they are under immense pressure from management.”264 
 
Pre-1992, changes in cycle time and line speed, or other changes of work rules, 
required the consent of the union. Post-1992, as in China – where industrial 
                                                        
263 Interview worker Miguel. In some cases, the cycle time could be shortened to such a degree that 
it rendered the application of ergonomics unfeasible. For example, workers who assembled the 
tires at Company X/JV1 were supposed to be relieved from physical stress by using a mechanical 
manipulator that lifted the tire into position. However, worker Lu reported that the manipulator 
could not keep up with the high speed of the assembly line, so that workers returned to assembling 
the tires by hand. Interview worker Lu. 
264 Interview worker Daniel. 
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engineering was moreover entirely the responsibility of the Chinese side265 – such 
changes would be implemented by the enterprise unilaterally. In China there was 
no compensation for an intensification of work other than double wages and 
bonuses. In Mexico, the strong discontent amongst ordinary workers over issues of 
“overwork” (sobrecargas de trabajo) – which some of my interviewees identified as 
the most pressing issue on the shop floor266 – together with the reduced but 
nonetheless continuous pressure from the shop floor representation resulted in an 
informal “convention” between enterprise and union. In areas where the line 
speed was increased, the union pushed for a wage raise along the regular pay 
grade of the respective workers: 
 
“Normally, if there is a problem, for example an augmentation of the line speed – 
let’s say from a one minute cycle time to 40 seconds – and the compañeros have to 
work harder, we first go down to the shop floor, assess the situation and speak to 
the coordinación, the bosses. And if we cannot reach an agreement, we stop 
production and take the issue to HR and the licenciados responsible for the work 
area. We will negotiate, and if they insist on increasing the speed, we will try to 
find some benefit for the compañeros, which is normally a wage increase in the 
form of a personal promotion outside the annual raise. […] That means that 
workers on this particular line are raised from one wage level to the next.”267 
 
Nonetheless some workers also resisted the increasingly complete control over 
their body and movements at the workstation, highlighting the important of even 
brief periods of rest. A member of the group of worker dissidents in Mexico 
complained: 
 
“The battles we have to fight around ergonomics are precisely fought from the 
same trench in which I am currently engaged in my role as a shop floor 
representative. You look for means through which the compañero who is 
struggling with his work can find some relief. ‘No, no, he has enough time’ 
[imitating an industrial engineer] – no, this is actually not his time, but time for 
                                                        
265 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
266 Interviews workers Daniel, Miguel and Arturo. 
267 Interview union representatives Carlos and Oscar. 
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you! This is the dilemma that we are facing with these ‘industrial engineers’, who 
are the ones that specify your time and movements. That is the battle. We on the 
bottom have to bear the brunt, in order to negotiate some form in which the 
pressure is not that high anymore.”268 
 
Apart from complaining to union representatives, who were often in favour of the 
enterprise’s strategy, the group of worker dissidents however had no strategy to 
deal with these issues – not to speak of the absence of a particular union response 
to the problem, other than negotiating an ad hoc pay rise. As the union in Mexico 
was not informed in advance about these changes (anymore) – and the unions at 
Company X in China not involved in these issues anyway – line speed 
augmentations usually came as surprise decisions to workers. In practice, 
however, they required prior planning, because once a production process was set 
up to operate with a certain cycle time, it would be a major organisational and 
time-consuming challenge to change it again. German senior manager Pongrac 
explained: 
 
“That requires long-term planning, because I also need the respective workers. 
Let’s assume we have a cycle time of two minutes that I want to reduce to one 
minute and a half: how many additional workers do I need, so that they can fulfil 
all the tasks? Do I have to re-clock certain parts, because one worker has little to 
do and another is unable to finish his work? So that concerns the human factor, but 
in addition I have to take account of the technology that is configured for a cycle 
time of two minutes. I cannot simply step on the gas and the bolt is screwed in with 
half the time. That demands a lot of smaller changes. But with early announcement 
such a change should be implemented within three to five months.”269 
 
The issue was complicated by the fact that depending on how integrated a work 
area was into the overall flow production system, an increase of the line speed in 
that area alone could lead to serious imbalances between its output vis-à-vis that of 
the remaining production process. Singular increases of line speed usually 
                                                        
268 Interview worker Miguel. 
269 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac.  
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occurred in areas that could be run somewhat independently or if an increase in 
stock of particular components was desired.  
 
In sum, management could not arbitrarily intensify labour in the short run, but 
was constrained by the integrated complexity of a flow production system and 
particular machine operations. This however merely meant that the respective 
changes had to be planned in the medium run, which was something that remained 
intransparent to workers. In the Mexican case management strategically pressured 
temporary workers to work particularly hard, and then used their efforts as a 
benchmark for normal operations. In the Chinese case, a certain consensus had 
developed to not decrease cycle times below 60 seconds anymore – and all newly 
opened factories of Company X/JV1 set up their initial processes accordingly. At 
Company X/JV2 cycle times varied more significantly between older and newer 
models, and higher and lower output. The intensity of work therefore depended on 
a range of factors – which in both China and Mexico were however at the sole 
discretion of management to assess and implement, with little particular 
responses from workers.  
 
3.4.  Mistakes and Monitoring 
Though all operations in Company X’s plants were precisely timed, reaching the 
daily targets without any problems or interruptions was nearly impossible. The 
complexity and level of integration of the production process made smaller 
mistakes prone to creating knock-on-effects – even though technological buffers 
attempted to minimise them. During each of my visits to four different plants of 
Company X in China, as well as in the Mexican plant, the intrinsic limitations of the 
deployed technology became apparent as production had to be stopped for shorter 
or longer periods in nearly every department I saw.270 As senior manager Pongrac 
elaborated:  
 
                                                        
270 Author’s field notes. 
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“I would say for larger body shops: half an hour to 45 minutes malfunction per 
shift, more must not happen. That is, not on-going, but many smaller malfunctions. 
Then every week, 10 days, two weeks we experience a malfunction – a robot is 
defunct – where one has to stand idle for two or three hours straight. That mustn’t 
happen, but it does. Because the machines run throughout three shifts, because we 
have to produce such a high number of units, there is way too little maintenance, 
cleaning and upkeep.”271  
 
The possibility of errors implies two techno-organisational challenges: How to 
detect such errors; and how to rectify them. Modern assembly departments are 
based on computerised monitoring technology that can retrace production 
mistakes to individual workstations – and individual workers. Company X/JV2 
used these processes in its most recent production halls, as for example the ones 
created for the upscale brand in the North. Older assembly halls in China and 
Mexico, however, drew on personal supervision to control workers’ performance. 
Errors could be detected at certain checkpoints and traced back by using the shift 
plan to determine who had been responsible for the mistake. In addition, workers 
were supposed to report and note down production mistakes that they observed 
or had committed themselves – which was of course a rather impractical solution:  
 
“Usually they are supposed to note that in their operation sheet, but which worker 
writes down his own mistake!?”272  
 
Where error detection primarily relied on personal supervision, tensions between 
management and workforce were likely to arise. My interviewees in Mexico 
reported multiple instances of conflicts and confrontations with authoritarian 
managerial personnel over the quality of production.273 The following anecdote is 
a telling example, not only for personal hierarchies on the shop floor, but also for a 
deeply engrained machismo, as well as for workers’ use of overtime-refusals as a 
strategic weapon: 
                                                        
271 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
272 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. Neither in China nor in Mexico did Company X 
employ financial penalties for production mistakes – other than not qualifying for certain bonuses.  
273 Interviews worker Daniel, Miguel. 
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“Our working day was from six to three, but because it was a new production 
process the cars sometimes came out with mistakes or much too late. So we had to 
stay four, five hours extra to finish the work. That meant we worked for about 13 
hours a day to meet the production targets. It [the conflict] was a question of the 
authoritarianism of the department manager. […] The boss came around, because 
the process was going very badly – we had to do a lot of rework, a lot! The 
mistakes mainly came from one team, so the boss went to the line and started to 
shout swear words around – first without addressing anyone in particular. But 
then he came back and picked out a union compañera, and she told me that he 
started shouting at her: ‘Why are you not working? Why don’t you get the work 
done that we pay you for? You look like…’ well, words that were very offensive to 
her. He failed to show any respect, which made us really angry. So amongst the 
compañeros we reached an agreement that we would not do the extra time; and we 
went home at three. This infuriated our boss. The next day he had called the union 
representation and wanted to find out who had instigated that we left early. He 
told us how many dollars of losses we had caused – we responded by saying that 
we would not permit his authoritarianism, nor that of the union, demanding that 
he would not again come down to the shop floor to address us directly, that for 
these issues he has his auxiliaries; and we demanded a shuttle service for the 
evening. […] This battle we won, but there are many, many frictions.”274 
 
This anecdote also helps to illuminate the social implications of the question of 
error corrections. In both China and Mexico, smaller errors and stoppages were 
handled by prolonging the working day either by operation the whole production 
process for an additional time span (where the shift system allowed it) or by 
ordering a certain number of workers to do rework in a separate area. As an 
indicator of how central rework was to final output, a German senior manager 
(Rordorf) at Company X/JV1 stressed that a ratio of 75% to 80% of cars leaving the 
plant without rework was a good result, as was a rate of 0.7 to 0.9 B-type errors 
per car.275 In order to reach target output in a desired time period, it was vital that 
                                                        
274 Interview worker Daniel. 
275 Interview German senior manager Rordorf. Errors are classified according to frequency of 
occurrence, which usually concurs with the gravity of the problem. A-type errors are minor 
aesthetic and easily fixable problems, like scratches or dents, making up about 70% of all errors. B-
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the flow production process did not stop. The flexible handling of overtime and 
allocation of personnel to rework was crucial to allow for the continuation of 
production, even after an error had been detected at an earlier stage in the 
process. German senior manager Pongrac elaborated this point: 
 
“If I have one hundred cars requiring rework, I can deploy five to ten workers on a 
Saturday or Sunday to finish them. But if we do not reach the target number, if I 
have no cars at all, I cannot do anything on a Sunday. That’s why it is very 
important not to stop the assembly line. If I need to build 1200 cars each day and 
someone stops the line every five minutes – that’s impossible.”276 
 
In other words, times of high production volume China meant that technological 
and human capacities would be pushed to the limit. This came at the price of more 
production errors – which was counter-balanced by the flexible allocation of 
overtime. The emerging bottleneck situation put workers under significant stress – 
but could also increase their leverage to bargain for concessions. Workers in 
Mexico strategically used overtime refusals, slowdowns, and sabotage to protest 
perceived injustices.277 
 
In this section I have put particular emphasis on the frequency of production 
mistakes, the monitoring techniques management employs to control the 
workforce, and the responses that workers have embraced. I have demonstrated 
that the most efficient exploitation of technological means was in both China and 
Mexico achieved through a flexible unilateral command over working and cycle 
time, which ironically however backfired in the case of Company X/JV2 due to the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
type errors require more rework and might negatively affect the functionality of the car, such as 
cracks or easily installable, but missing parts. C-type errors require most rework, but occur rarely, 
within a 10% range. They could concern, for example, more serious assembly mistakes or defunct 
(often electronic) parts (Brüggemann & Bremer 2012).    
276 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
277 The workers I interviewed who carried out such actions usually also established some 
connection to the union structure, either because they already held positions as grassroots 
representatives – or because the union apparatus intervened to resolve the issue through 
negotiations. As the union had stronger leverage (and arguably interests) to support permanent 
workers, these actions were however not so prevalent amongst temporary workers: “When I was 
an eventual I did not try anything, because as an eventual you are kicked out too easily.” (Interview 
worker Daniel) That is, the employment status mattered in determining the degree to which 
workers dared to take actions that put them at heightened risk of getting sanctioned.   
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limited time for maintenance work. Production errors thus became more frequent 
– which in turn was balanced with more overtime for workers. On the basis of an 
example from the Mexican case I have shown how personal supervision and 
managerial authoritarianism caused workers to protest. In this case they used 
overtime refusals as a strategic weapon, which was not necessarily linked to the 
issue of production mistakes, but rather a strategy that workers in Mexico 
embraced in various instances, as the anecdote of worker Santiago in the 
preceding chapter indicated. Time therefore became a contested terrain between 
managerial and workers’ interests – in which the former however clearly 
dominated. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the development and deployment of machinery 
is indeed to the largest extent controlled by capital, with few – if any – possibilities 
for workers at Company X in either Mexico or China to affect the technological 
composition of the production process itself. In cases where increasing automation 
replaced living labour, workers at Company X in China and Mexico indisputably 
found themselves at the receiving end of technological change. I have 
demonstrated that in order to exploit the properties of high-cost machinery to the 
fullest extent, management in both cases maintained flexible control over working 
hours and allocated extensive overtime – in particular in the Chinese case. In 
China, Company X used time accounts to balance fluctuations in capacity 
utilisation, while in Mexico – where the union refused the introduction of the 
banco de horas – forced vacations or layoffs of temporary workers were the 
preferred measures. In both cases an intensification of work through increases of 
line speed was at the sole discretion of the enterprise.  
 
However, I have also demonstrated that the fragmentation of capital into different 
managerial groups responsible for machine design, implementation in production 
and day-to-day operations can lead to situations in which the technological 
composition of the production process might in fact not reflect the interests of 
shop floor managers. The day-to-day agency of both managers and workers vis-à-
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vis the technological composition was constrained by the path dependency 
stemming from the machine design and production paradigm itself. Management 
was limited in its ability to freely modulate the production process, due to the 
sensitive timing of an integrated flow-production system – speed ups of 
production, recalibration of machinery or increasing automation require long-term 
planning and systemic adaptations of the entire production process.  
 
“Modular production” amplified the tendency to technological convergence, 
because the production of similar models at different locations requires the 
presence of certain specialised machines – such as those used for laser welding 
and dip coating, as well as Company X’s internally developed framer etc. This does 
however not imply that automation rates had to converge, although it seems likely 
that in those Chinese plants where they were still rather low, they would rise over 
time due to the phasing out of older models (with lower quality demands and 
hence more manual labour), and increasing pressure to raise productivity. Flexible 
substitution of machinery for living labour is essentially limited to the body shop, 
and to a lower degree the paint shop. This is so, because either – as an effect of 
automotive manufacturing being a highly competitive and mature industry – other 
departments have already been automated to the utmost degree, such as the press 
shop; or the demand on flexible operations limits (for the time being) the 
feasibility of technological fixes, which is the case for most assembly tasks.  
 
In this context, shop floor managers had to strike a balance between maximal 
efficiency and minimal disruptions. This was not always possible. At Company X in 
China operating hours were extended to an extent that technological disruptions 
occurred due to insufficient time for maintenance work – or caused fatal accidents 
as a result of workers being too exhausted. Furthermore, the technological 
limitations of worker agency could not fully preclude smaller acts of defiance or 
evasion, which gave workers some relief from the exhausting work rhythm – at 
Company X/JV2 for example the omission of certain tasks, socialising or having a 
nap when the assembly line stopped etc. In Mexico, worker agency took a more 
coordinated form through the union, which bargained for ad hoc wage increases in 
cases of an augmentation of the line speed. Outside the union workers in Mexico 
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also made strategic use of overtime refusals to bargain for concessions of various 
types. However, all these measures had little effect on the technological 
composition – though the time regimes could be adjusted, as for example at 
Company X/JV1 in 2009. This means, ex negativo, that where technological change 
happens, it comes from outside the production process proper – e.g. from strategic 
decisions by the board of directors or from its systemic disruption. 
 
Concurring with the arguments of the operaists and Silver, the connection between 
technology and worker agency might therefore indeed reside in an external 
confrontation of the entire production system itself, by targeting technologically 
determined nodal points and bottle-necks. Management has tried to find further 
intra-paradigmatic technological solutions to the problem of increasing buffer-
reduction making the production process ever more failure-prone. In this context 
workers potentially have substantial structural power through their capacity to 
bring the entire process to a halt with minimal effort – sabotaging a machine, not 
delivering parts in time, stopping the assembly line etc. Increasing automation also 
eases collective organising, as fewer workers need to be mobilised to carry out 
effective action. However, this structural power remains a mere potentiality and 
neither in Mexico nor in China – arguably with the exception of the 2000 strike in 
Mexico mentioned in the preceding chapter, in which workers turned to sabotage 
and slowdowns – did workers at Company X actually mobilised it.  
 
So far we have analysed the internal labour process at Company X in China and 
Mexico. However, its current form of a concentration on core manufacturing 
activities resides on the provision of external services and the supply of parts, 
components and pre-assembled modules. As Silver and others have suggested, the 
just-in-time integration between terminal assemblers and suppliers implies that 
worker agency in the supply chain could potentially have severe knock on effects 
for terminal assemblers. It is for that matter that in the following chapter we will 
turn to a closer analysis of the linkages between Company X and its suppliers, and 
the smaller and larger institutional changes that worker agency in the supply chain 
has triggered in China and Mexico.  
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Chapter 7: Outsourced Trouble – Worker agency in 
the Supply Chain and Institutional Change 
Outsourcing, the out- or subcontracting of activities previously performed by an 
enterprise’s direct personnel, investment and processes, is not a new phenomenon 
– historically, enterprises have always contracted suppliers to fulfil functions 
beyond their own capacity. However, since the 1980s outsourcing has become a 
deliberate cost-saving business strategy. Moving away from high vertical and 
broad horizontal integration, which enabled economies of scale and centralised 
control, but which also involved high direct and overhead costs, new managerial 
thinking in the 1980s encouraged enterprises to “lean” their businesses down to 
certain core activities (Lonsdale & Cox 2000) – a philosophy that was shortly 
thereafter epitomised for the car industry in Womack et al.’s The Machine that 
Changed the World (1990).  
 
Automotive factories first began to outsource services – such as the canteen, 
security, cleaning and maintenance, and following advances in IT and data 
processing, logistics and administrative activities. While the complexity of the 
product had always required the supply of prefabricated parts, platform strategies 
and the modularisation of production enabled terminal assemblers – with 
Company X taking the lead – to outsource entire segments of their production 
processes: such as the manufacture of seats, bumpers, or the cockpit. As terminal 
assembly plants became “leaner”, rather than through economies of scale it was 
“increasingly through better logistics and supply chain management that efficiency 
and productivity [could] be achieved, leading to significantly reduced unit costs” 
(Christopher 2011, p.5). Lead firms put suppliers under considerable pressure 
(Sturgeon et al. 2008), leading to low profit rates and fierce competition, but to 
high demands on expertise and significant production costs, which supply firms 
began to compensate through concentration and expansion. In a nutshell, 
automotive suppliers became squeezed by “the necessity to compensate declining 
margins through size and a larger share of the value chain – and the limited 
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resources to meet these necessities” (Jürgens 2011, p.24).278 These limits had 
severe effects on working conditions and wages in the supply chain. As Juárez-
Núñez has concisely formulated:  
 
“The transfer of productive processes is not solely a technical issue. It is about a 
reduction of the overall cost of labour through contracts that establish parameters 
for wages and benefits inferior to those in terminal assembly plants.” (Juárez 
Núñez 2005a, p.147) 
 
In other words, the cost pressure on suppliers was to a large extent translated into 
deteriorating wages and working conditions – and a relief of terminal assemblers 
from higher labour cost, as I have argued for in the case of Company X in chapter 4. 
In this chapter I will engage these issues in more detail with regards to the case of 
Company X’s supply chain in Mexico and China; and in doing so I will pursue two 
arguments.   
 
In 2003 Beverly Silver still assumed that the Mexican and Chinese car industry 
would remain characterised by a “lean and mean” model – lean production and 
little job security – which would perpetuate an associated dynamic of growing 
workplace bargaining power and cycles of relocation (Silver 2003, p.72). She 
contrasted the Mexican and Chinese cases to those of a “lean and dual” model – i.e. 
lean production with secure employment for a core workforce and little job 
security, as well as lower pay and worse working conditions, for a peripheral 
group of workers. In these cases, Silver argued, the centre of labour unrest would 
shift towards “the lower-tier workers in the subcontracting system. Yet, in these 
sites, strong grievances do not go hand in hand with strong workplace bargaining 
power. Moreover, while upper-tier workers are likely to have strong workplace 
bargaining power, they are also likely to have fewer grievances, and at the same 
time they are likely to be physically and psychically separated from lower-tier 
workers with greater grievances and less structural power.” (Silver 2003, p.73) 
                                                        
278 Terminal assemblers, on the other hand, lost control over innovation processes and new 
technologies with competencies being increasingly concentrated at the suppliers of the respective 
modules – a reason why Japanese automakers, such as Honda and Toyota, have not jumped on the 
modularisation-bandwagon to the extent that Company X has (Jürgens 2011, p.24).  
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It is not without irony that Silver’s student Zhang found that by the mid-2000s an 
increasing number of automotive enterprises in China had moved towards the 
“lean and dual” model (L. Zhang 2014a, p.40) – and that, as we have seen, the 
findings presented for Company X in both China and Mexico point towards the 
same direction (although caution is demanded when characterising production at 
Company X as “lean”). In other words, while Silver’s 2003 predictions pictured the 
Chinese and Mexican automotive sectors as strongholds of a “lean and mean” 
model, the evidence presented so far and in this chapters confirms Zhang’s 
findings for both cases: they have moved substantially towards the “lean and dual” 
ideal type. Similarly, I will show that, as the model predicts, labour unrest does 
indeed seem to concentrate in the supply chain in both the Mexican and Chinese 
case. Pace both Silver and Zhang, I will however argue that caution is required 
when interpreting these trends as indicators for a sector-wide cyclical recurrence 
of capital relocations and labour unrest (Silver 2014; L. Zhang 2014a; 2014b). 
Rather, the distinctiveness of conditions, coping strategies and leverage for 
workers in the supply chain suggests that recent strikes in the supply chain do not 
indicate the emergence of strong labour movements across the entire automotive 
sector, but rather suggest that they are specifically limited to the autoparts 
industry. I will supply empirical evidence for recent strikes occurring in the 
autoparts supply chain in China and Mexico, and for cases in these regions where 
workers employed coping strategies other than striking.  
 
Second, vis-à-vis institutionalist arguments of convergence and divergence, I argue 
that the means by which Company X manages its supply chain diverge between 
China and Mexico – which however is not reflected in a divergence in working 
conditions, pay and other issues concerning the workforce in the supply chain. On 
the other hand, I argue that the 2010 autoparts strike wave in South China caused 
the emergence of new institutions, providing strong evidence for growing worker 
agency leading to institutional change through a process of relational agency. I will 
shed light on how worker agency in the supply chain was responded to by policy 
makers and capital, showing in particular how in both Mexico and China 
corporatist unions provided the preferred tools to depress worker agency and 
install channels controllable by management and local governments. I will 
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therefore make a case for the interpretation of institutional change as an 
unintended consequence of the interaction of these stakeholders, which was not 
attributable to the sole interest of a single party.  
 
I will first briefly outline the particularities of Company X’s outsourcing efforts in 
China and Mexico and its relation to its suppliers, before discussing working 
conditions and workers’ grievances at some of Company X’s and other autoparts 
suppliers. Zooming in on particularly significant strikes in the autoparts industry 
more recently, I will provide the necessary empirical foundations to then 
demonstrate in more detail how in the Chinese case these have induced 
institutional changes in labour market institutions and shop floor relations 
between capital and labour.  
 
1.  Relations between Company X and Suppliers in Mexico  
Outsourcing at Company X in Mexico took off on a large scale only after the 1992 
conflict. With the new collective contract the union had lost the right to influence 
decisions on the distribution of workers within the plant, and on in-house 
production versus external subcontracting. Worker Miguel commented: 
 
“In ’92 they removed this, that to a certain point we could protect the work areas – 
today there is nothing of the sort; the enterprise can simply notify the union: ‘You 
know what: this, this and this, I do not need that here anymore, they will make this 
externally from now on. We can relocate the workers, and those who do not want 
to, can leave.’ Nothing more.”279 
 
As outlined in the preceding chapters, Company X demanded a leaner organisation 
of the production process, with shorter timespans and lower storage capacity for 
delivered components. In light of the obligation to source a majority of parts from 
the NAFTA region, the German headquarters pressured its Mexican subsidiary to 
restructure the supply chain (Pries 2000). In the contract renegotiations of 1996 
and 1998 it proposed that certain modularised parts for a model to be newly 
                                                        
279 Interview worker Miguel. 
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introduced in 1998 should be produced by workers of external suppliers, who 
would work alongside Company X’s unionised personnel within the facilities of the 
main plant. The truck factory that Company X opened in 1996 in Brazil – where the 
only in-house workers were those in quality control, and all other activities, 
including final assembly, purchased from suppliers – inspired this proposal.280 
While the collective agreement still allowed the union to firmly reject this, it could 
not prevent the outsourcing of the respective processes per se (Juárez Núñez 
2006). Consequently, Company X continued to pressure its traditional German and 
other foreign suppliers – which had been involved in the design phase of the 1998 
model – to relocate to the next-door and newly constructed supply park (Pries 
2000). 
 
This early power constellation set the course for two long-term results. On the one 
hand, Company X had full discretion to use market pressure in order to restructure 
the supply chain. Over the course of the outsourcing project, various suppliers 
have been replaced; and certain components, such as seats, were sourced from two 
competing suppliers at the time of my fieldwork, both of which were present in the 
nearby supply park.281 In the long run global players ended up replacing the pre-
1992 pool of Mexican suppliers nearly entirely on the higher tiers of the supply 
chain (Juárez Núñez 2005c, p.204ff.). On the other hand, Company X “created” a 
new layer of suppliers by outsourcing more and more segments of its highly 
vertically integrated production process. The first areas affected were the 
assembly of wire harnesses and the production of small metal parts, as well as 
indirect activities, such as the canteen and logistics, for which two different 
suppliers were subcontracted in the 1990s (Bensusán & Martínez 2012). By 2005, 
suppliers made up 60% of the total value of the 1998 model (Juárez Núñez 2005a, 
p.157).  
 
                                                        
280 This model was initially seen as a prototype for all future ventures, but ultimately not deemed 
effective enough, mainly due to the decentralisation of control and the vulnerability to disruptions 
within the pool of suppliers. 
281 As mentioned, initially supply firms tried to create a counterweight to the power of terminal 
assemblers through concentration, expansion and product diversification. 
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In sum, the post-1992 power constellation between management and union could 
prevent the establishment of a truly fragmented factory as in the Brazilian case, 
but not large scale outsourcing more generally. In the absence of any non-market 
institutions that could shield the Mexican supply industry, the result was a highly 
competitive environment for the suppliers of Company X, in which only the largest 
– non-Mexican – suppliers had the chance to establish a long-term cooperation 
with Company X. 
 
2.  Relations between Company X and Suppliers in China 
At the time of my fieldwork the overall structure of Company X’s supply chain in 
China, including the degree of outsourcing, was the same as in Europe. Cost 
reductions did thus not result from an additional leaning of in-house production, 
but from the fact that Company X’s traditional global suppliers were substituted 
with cheaper Chinese ones, or that these global suppliers could offer lower prices 
due to lower production cost in China.282 However, the relationship between 
terminal assembly and suppliers in China was deeply shaped by Company X’s joint 
venture structure, which created different means of control that Company X could 
mobilise against its suppliers. This gave rise to very different supply chain 
structures at Company X/JV and -/JV2. While the 50/50 ownership structure of 
Company X/JV1 granted the German side a higher degree of control over the 
sourcing process, the 60% majority holdings of JV2 made it favour suppliers within 
its own company group.283 In fact, at the time of my fieldwork, all tier one suppliers 
of Company X/JV2 were joint ventures with JV2.284 
                                                        
282 Interview German senior manager Schütte. 
283 Company X’s upscale brand, that held 10% of Company X/JV2, however made use of the 
ownership structure in another peculiar way. It made an extra profit by shipping high-tech – and 
high-value – components such as GPS and information technology in from Germany: “The premium 
brand only holds ten percent in the joint venture, so its profit margins in China are rather low. One 
seeks to make money through the import of components. These components are of course not 
imported for free, but classically sold from one plant to the other – with a certain mark-up” 
(Interview German senior manager Schütte). In other words, JV2 and other divisions of Company X 
would cover ninety percent of the purchasing costs. 
284 Interview German senior manager Schütte. There is a range of European and American suppliers 
that Company X traditionally sources from and that it desires to be present in China as well. At 
Company X/JV2 its interests clash with those of JV2, which intends to secure as many orders as 
possible for suppliers under its own roof, in order to maximise profits and gain managerial and 
technological expertise. According to senior manager Schütte this led JV2 to attempt to circumvent 
German suppliers, especially when it concerned the production of higher value components. 
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In the following, and on the basis of the quality problems haunting Company X in 
China, I will briefly discuss how the particular ownership structure of Company 
X/JV2 created limits and potentials for interventions into the supply chain. This 
will allow me to illustrate not only the vulnerability of terminal assemblers to any 
kind of problems occurring in the supply chain – including strikes, which have 
been taken as an argument for the increasing power of supply chain workers 
(Silver 2003; L. Zhang 2014b) – but also the particular means Company X/JV2 had 
at hand to resolve such issues.  
 
Low quality of supplies was lamented by German managers of both joint ventures 
at multiple locations – especially at those of Company X/JV2. German senior 
manager Pongrac for example estimated that a change of the supplier of bumpers 
alone would reduce the rate of production errors by twenty percent.285 However, 
because Company X could not penalise or withdraw a contract from a supplier 
through market relations and without prior approval of its joint venture partner – 
which was unlikely to punish companies under its own roof – suppliers had more 
leverage than usual in lead-firm driven automotive chains (contrasting to e.g. 
Sturgeon et al. 2008). This power relation was well illustrated when the German 
management of Company X/JV2 rejected a delivery of faulty bumpers, whose 
supplier refused to re-work them or adjust its processes. For three days both the 
German side and the JV2-supplier remained adamant, which meant that no 
bumpers were delivered and 6,000 cars had to be assembled without the missing 
parts. Supplies were only resumed after the Chinese side of Company X/JV2 
facilitated a compromise between the German side and the JV2-supplier.286 
  
The example indicates that the effect of faulty or undelivered parts is immediate 
and drastic. The German side of Company X/JV2 therefore embraced certain 
counter-measures. First, in order to force suppliers to deliver the desired quality, 
German managers insisted that component prototypes had to be sent to the 
                                                        
285 Interview German senior manager Pongrac. Low quality bumpers are however not necessarily a 
China-specific problem. The complexity resulting from many other parts being assembled within 
and around the bumper make it a component that is rather difficult to manufacture, therefore 
always resulting in certain problems. 
286 Interview German senior manager Vogt.  
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German headquarters for initial approval.287 Second, they sought to establish 
monitoring processes, which involved not only a technological quality check of the 
product itself, but also personal visits to suppliers, during which Company X 
asserted pressure on process optimisation. As senior manager Schütte explained:  
 
“When the first parts arrive there will be an assessment: are they good or bad; why 
is that so; what can be optimised etc. The supplier will then be told what to change 
and optimise. Usually, but that is China-specific, the solution is dictated to the 
supplier, because Chinese suppliers are not – or not yet – able to do that by 
themselves. So one really has to go there and tell them: ‘This is the way these 
processes have to be operating.’ So one does indeed intervene at that stage.”288 
 
According to German senior manager Schütte, such interventions were frequent 
and supported by JV2 – and serve to illustrate yet another point. Due to the 
influence of the Chinese joint venture partner over the supply chain – and the 
proven feasibility of interventions for the sake of process optimisations – the 
potential for the lead firm to affect working conditions and wages along the supply 
chain were extraordinarily high in the Chinese case. It is of course unsurprising 
that despite Company X’s extensive CSR agenda, no such efforts were made by 
either the German of Chinese side (for a note on CSR see the Appendix). In fact, 
Company X’s German supply chain managers in China had no illusions about low 
wages being one of the main reasons that the China business was still lucrative – 
and argued that working conditions and wages in the supply chain were beyond 
the responsibility of Company X.289  
 
In sum, the particular ownership structures of Company X’s joint ventures in China 
– in particular its minority holdings at Company X/JV2 – endowed it with less 
discretion over utilising market pressure to structure the supply chain. Instead, it 
had to rely on its joint venture partner to establish satisfying conditions along the 
supply chain, which could lead to certain animosities between the German and 
Chinese side. Hypothetically speaking, the fact that the majority of Company 
                                                        
287 Interview German white-collar worker Hensch. 
288 Interview German senior manager Schütte. 
289 Interviews German senior manager Schütte, Bohnert, Näher. 
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X/JV2’s suppliers were part of the JV2 conglomerate could have shielded the 
supply chain from lead-firm induced pressure on wages and working conditions, 
but this potential was, unsurprisingly, not realised.  
 
3.  Working Conditions in the Supply Chain 
Before I discuss the grievances and agency of workers in the supply chain in more 
detail, the following table (Table 6) gives a brief overview of working conditions at 
some of Company X’s – and other companies’ – suppliers in Mexico and China. 
Mexparts 1 is an internal logistics provider; Mexparts 2 a tier two supplier for 
metal engine components and carpets; Mexparts 3 a tier one supplier of seats; and 
Mexparts 4 a tier two supplier of break pedals, hinges and other metal and plastic 
parts. Chinaparts 1 produced break pedals, handles and door locks in the East of 
China; Chinaparts 2 was a tier two spring supplier; and Chinaparts 3 a tier one 
supplier of electronic components – both were located in South China. The Honda 
gearbox factory is the one that triggered the 2010 strike wave in, and beyond, the 
autoparts industry in China. Apart from the latter and Chinaparts 2, all companies 
were suppliers of Company X.   
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 Ownership Product Class composition  Time regime Remuneration  Overtime 
benefits 
Minimum 
wage 
Mexparts 1 German Logistics Temporary contracts, 
fluctuating heavily: 3,500 
(2000); 750 (2012) 
Flexibly adapted to 
Company X’s shift system 
(3 shifts à 8h + overtime) 
$82/day (min); 
$194/day (team 
leader) 
Yes $63/day 
Mexparts 2 German Metal 
components, 
carpets 
360 permanent workers, 
mostly male 
In 2012: 7 days à 12h, no 
rest days 
$70/day (min); 
$153/day + premium 
(12 years seniority) 
Yes $63/day 
Mexparts 3 US-
American 
Seats Plant 1: 550 workers 
Plant 2: 450 workers 
Plant 3: unknown 
4 days à 12h  
(week: 48/45/42h 
morning/day/night shift) 
$85/day (min) Not fully 
paid: banco 
de horas 
$63/day 
Mexparts 4 US-
American 
Break pedals, 
hinges, metal 
components 
470 workers; 40% 
female; division of 
permanent/contract 
workers unknown 
4 days à 12h  
(week: 48/45/42h 
morning/day/night shift) 
$700-$1,900/week 
(including allowances, 
bonuses, premiums) 
Not fully 
paid: rest 
days used 
$63/day 
Honda China Japanese Gearboxes 1,800; Formal migrant 
workers; interns (2010: 
45% of assembly) 
3 shifts Regular workers: 
¥1,500/month 
Yes ¥770 (2010)  
¥1,530 (2012) 
Chinaparts 1 Taiwanese Break pedals, 
handles, door 
locks 
Ca. 500; formal migrant 
workers, interns 
Contractual minimum: 
180h/month  
Formal: 
¥1,680/month (2013) 
Interns: 
¥1,280/month  
No ¥1,620 (2013) 
Chinaparts 2 Japanese-
Taiwanese 
Springs Formal: 400 Dispatch: 
100  
5-day week, 2 11h shifts, 
bi-weekly rotation; high 
orders: 2 day/night/rest 
shifts à 11h + 
¥1,300 (2010) 
¥2,270 (2013); 
including allowances, 
excluding bonuses 
Yes ¥770/month 
(Jan 2010)  
¥1,530/month 
(2012) 
Chinaparts 3 Japanese Electroparts Formal workers: 1480 
(70% migrants) 
Dispatch: unknown  
5-day week, 2 11h shifts, 
bi-weekly rotation;  
high orders: 2 day/night/ 
rest shifts à 11h + 
Similar to Chinaparts 
2; up to ¥4,500 with 
bonuses, benefits  
Yes ¥770/month 
(Jan 2010)  
¥1,530/month 
(2012) 
Table 6: Working conditions in the supply chain, China and Mexico 
Sources: Interviews workers Maria, Rafael, migrant workers Wang and Zhao, worker Shao; Damián Jiménez 2009b; Bybee 2010; MSN 2010; Juárez Núñez et al. 2012; 
Bensusán & Martínez 2012; Lau 2012; Liang 2013. 
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3.1.  Workers’ Grievances in the Supply Chain 
Workers’ grievances in the autoparts supply chain in China and Mexico concerned 
not only absolute but also relatively low wages, long working hours and exhausting 
work rhythms. This is hardly surprising, as these conditions were not only much 
lower than at Company X’s terminal assembly plants, but also much closer to the 
legal minimum more generally.   
 
At Mexparts 2, 3 and 4, long working hours combined with high work intensity and 
physical strain, due to working standing-upright, produced intense pressure on 
employees, particularly on women shouldering the double burden of factory and 
housework: an average working day for my interviewee at Mexparts 2 meant 
getting up at three in the morning, cleaning and preparing meals for her husband 
and her two children, leaving for the factory around five, working her shift from six 
in the morning to six in the evening, returning home, preparing dinner, cleaning, 
resting and sleeping – every day for the last eight months. As she commented: 
 
“It wears you down. As a woman it wears you down. The hours that we sleep are 
very few.”290 
 
Workers at Mexparts 3 and 4 complained about similar conditions, aggravated by 
sexual harassment and the regular dismissal of pregnant workers (MSN 2010; 
Juárez Núñez et al. 2012). 
 
At Mexparts 1 work was exhausting not so much because of the nature of the tasks, 
but rather because of the intensity of the work rhythm, which mainly resulted from 
the marginal number of employees (see section 4.3.  for more details). As Rafael, a 
team leader, remarked:  
 
“Because they manage people, their profit is that you work for two; that is how 
they make a profit. And because that is not well-defined they try to get the utmost 
                                                        
290 Interview worker Maria.  
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from what you do, so that they don’t have to hire another person – that is where 
the profit of the supplier comes from.”291 
 
Echoing Silver, on top of the managerial pressure, workers at Mexparts 1 indeed 
suffered from a certain “psychical” dissociation from the permanently employed 
workers of Company X. Several of my interviewees reported that they had 
witnessed how Company X workers ridiculed and harassed the workers employed 
by the suppliers, or even paid a logistics worker a share of their benefits to do their 
overtime, while going home themselves.292 Consequently, the relationship between 
unionised workers and those of the suppliers within the plant could be rather 
tense, as the following anecdote exemplifies:  
 
“In the restrooms you can read scribbles: ‘Fucking workers of Company X.’”293 
 
In China, working conditions at the Southern suppliers, including the Honda 
gearbox factory, had improved since the strike wave in 2010 (discussed in more 
detail in section 4. ). A randomised survey amongst the workforce of Chinaparts 2, 
organised by the restructured trade union in 2012, indicated that the main 
complaints amongst the workforce regarded pay and food quality.294 Overtime 
could be, periodically, excessive and working days generally extended beyond 
eight hours, but workers usually had at least one rest day per week, which kept 
physical exhaustion in check.  
 
Conditions were, however, much worse at Chinaparts 1 in East China. Although my 
interviewees considered the working environment to be safe – under the 
conditions that “you are careful, pay attention, wear the safety equipment and 
make no mistakes” – they also said that accidents were frequent: “Just two days 
ago, someone snapped the sinews in his wrist,” which one of my interviewees 
attributed to carelessness, the other one to exhaustion.295 As at Company X/JV1’s 
                                                        
291 Interview worker Rafael. 
292 Interviews worker Arturo, Rodrigo, Jesús. 
293 Interview worker Rodrigo. 
294 Interview worker Lai. 
295 Interview migrant workers Wang and Zhao. 
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main plant, which was located nearby, the combination of long working hours and 
the subtropical climate put a particular strain on workers. Similar to the strategies 
embraced at Company X/JV1’s paint shops, “if we get tired from the long work and 
heat, the company gives us health care products (baojianpin) against dizziness and 
heatstroke.”296  
 
Apart from the exhausting work rhythm, workers at Chinaparts 1 were extremely 
unhappy with their living conditions. They lived in a superficially decent looking 
complex of dormitories, which housed migrant workers of ten different Company X 
suppliers. Most of the workers were housed in cohorts according to their place of 
origin and were 19 or 20 years old, only a few senior workers being older than 22. 
On the inside, however, the dormitories were badly maintained, with no 
administrative personnel on site. Eight people shared one 20m² room and a 3m² 
shower and toilet. Due to leakages the dormitories were constantly wet and dirty, 
and as a consequence swarming with cockroaches. The company deducted a 
monthly ¥100 from their payroll – i.e. a total of ¥800 per room. This contrasted 
rather sharply with the pre-strike situation of the Honda gearbox factory, where 
student interns were housed in double rooms in a small hotel, and changed to 
dormitories only when they became formal workers.297  
 
What was most frustrating to the workers of Chinaparts 1, however, was the way 
they had been recruited. An HR representative had come to their vocational school 
in Gansu and advertised internships at Company X/JV1, after which many signed 
contracts on the spot. Only upon arrival did they realise that they were actually 
working for a supplier; and therefore felt they had been cheated.  
 
Most autoparts workers in China were young domestic migrants, and their 
grievances could be interpreted as indicators of the discontent amongst the so-
called “second generation of migrant workers” (dierdai nongmingong) (e.g. Lu & 
Pun 2010; Pun et al. 2010; Butollo & ten Brink 2012; Elfström & Kuruvilla 2014). 
                                                        
296 Ibid. 
297 Interview worker Shao. 
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In a striking example, worker Shao, who had worked at Honda until 2011 
remarked as follows:  
 
“Young people, our generation, cannot accept being treated like machines.”298  
 
However, the fact that both young non-migrant workers in China, as well as older 
workers in Mexico complained about essentially the same issues and even 
embraced the same metaphors – emphasising their refusal be treated like 
“machines”, “tools” or “robots” (see chapter 5) – indicates that discontent with the 
experience of industrial labour is neither a label pinned to a particularly young 
segment of the working class, nor anything uniquely Chinese. It is rather a shared 
perception amongst automotive, and arguably any industrial, workers, 
independent of location or age. This, in turn, confirms Silver’s assumption that the 
car industry produces similar conditions and class-reconfigurations everywhere, 
although, since in the following I will show how the presented grievances resulted 
in different coping strategies and patterns of conflict, this is probably where the 
explanatory value of such similarities ends. 
 
4.  Coping Strategies and Labour Conflicts in the Supply Chain 
 
‘What did you feel during the strike?’ 
‘Revolution!’ 
– Worker Shao, a leader of the 2010 Honda strike 
 
In both China and Mexico there have been larger strikes and labour conflicts in the 
supply chain since the early 2000s, the most prominent arguably being the one at 
the Honda gearbox factory in South China that kicked off a nation-wide strike wave 
in the summer of 2010. In the following I will analyse the coping strategies and 
strikes in the autoparts supply chain and the institutional responses they 
triggered. The latter are particularly far-reaching in the Chinese case and will 
therefore be analysed in more detail in a separate section.  
                                                        
298 Interview worker Shao. 
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4.1.  Strikes at Company X’s Autoparts Suppliers in Mexico 
The automotive supply chain around Company X’s main plant in Mexico saw 
multiple labour conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s, kicked off by a strike of 
female workers at a German supplier of electronic components in 1999, followed 
by strikes at Mexparts 1 and another logistics provider in the spring, respectively 
summer of 2000 (Juárez Núñez 2006). The Company X union – and the group of 
dissident workers, and other grassroots activists – offered their support to 
workers at the suppliers, but failed to bring them under the roof of the union. 
Worker Miguel explained:  
 
“The statutes allow for an expansion, but the union does not see the benefits, nor 
does it bother to embrace this strategy. The primary reason is that it is threatened 
by the enterprise. As soon as the union establishes a branch at a supplier, Company 
X will revoke the contract with that supplier and give it to someone else. This has 
always been a problem; that there has never been any success with a widening of 
the union base, because of this scheme with the suppliers.”299 
 
All these strikes, as well as the two more recent ones at Mexparts 3 and 4 
discussed below, had the recognition of independent unions as part of their aims, 
and, defying their assumed “docility”, were in the majority started, organised and 
maintained by women. The strikes at Mexparts 3 and 4 illustrate very well not only 
the potential and limits of local organising and struggle – in particular the degree 
of violence worker activists face – but also how after an apparent victory 
management and policy makers retaliated through the implementation of 
institutional changes that allowed them to reinstate formal or informal control 
over the workforce.  
 
By 2010 Mexparts 3 operated three plants (in the following plants 1, 2, 3) in close 
proximity to Company X’s main plant, all unionised under corporatist unions. At 
plant 1, which employed 550 workers that were unionised in the CROM, workers 
had repeatedly (2006, 2008, 2009) been fired on the basis of the exclusion clause 
                                                        
299 Interview worker Miguel. 
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when demanding to be shown the collective contract. Facilitated by a local 
Workers Support Centre – which a female leader of a 1999 strike at a German 
electroparts supplier had set up in 2001 – dismissed workers at Mexparts 3 
formed a transnational coalition with US-American unions to protest working 
conditions and the autocracy of the CROM. This included the sending of a 
delegation of Mexican workers to Mexparts 3’s headquarters in the US in 2010 
(Bensusán & Tilly 2010; Bybee 2010), which, however, was entirely futile as the 
US-American headquarters remained adamant.  
 
Nonetheless, while solidarity rallies for plant 1 continued in the US, in May 2010 
100 workers at plant 2 went on strike over the annual profit sharing of only $104 
(£5.56), their numbers swelling to 400 of the 450 production workers over the 
next three days. During the strike workers demanded the insourcing of 
subcontracted workers and a disaffiliation from the Confederación de 
Organizaciones Sindicales (COS), which organised plant 2 and was linked to the 
local PRI government. After the third day, the enterprise agreed to the demands, 
paid workers $1,300 in shared profits and allowed the formation of an 
independent union.300 Briefly celebrated as a success by activists and observers 
(MSN 2010; Damián Jiménez 2010; Martínez 2010), the strike however turned out 
to be a failure when the unfolding dynamic between the different stakeholders 
resulted not only in violent clashes, but also in backroom deals that facilitated the 
final closure of plant 2 in 2012. In the following I will briefly reconstruct the course 
of events.  
  
At the end of the strike, under consultation of the Workers Support Centre and US 
American unions, the strikers decided to set up their new union as a local section 
of the mineworkers union SNTMMSSRM. This was a tactical move to lift the 
question of union recognition to the federal state level – where all metallurgical 
unions are organised – and avoid leaving it to local authorities to make that 
decision (Nolan Garcia 2013, p.126). Once the federal labour board had recognised 
the union, on the local level workers only had to show that within the enterprise 
                                                        
300 Pressure from US American unions might have played a role in determining the enterprise’s 
different stance in the case of plant 2 (Barrett 2010), and in facilitating the formation of a new 
union (Nolan Garcia 2013). 
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there was a majority in favour of an affiliation to the mineworkers union – which 
they did. Elections for the central committee took place shortly after the strike and 
a new collective contract was drafted and proposed to the enterprise (Damián 
Jiménez 2010).  
 
However, Mexparts 3 delayed the process of recognising the new collective 
contract, giving the COS the chance to send around 70 thugs into plant 2, beating 
up and injuring 8 people – amongst them two pregnant women – and, joined by 
two low level managers, holding two members of the central committee captive for 
seven hours, forcing them to sign resignation letters (Martínez 2010). Workers 
reacted with a blockade of the highway and another strike, which was settled after 
three days with an agreement to reinstate and compensate the injured workers 
and investigate the role of the two supervisors (Anon 2010a). After that incident it 
became quiet around Mexparts 3, but members of the Workers Support Centre 
were physically attacked, received death threats and saw their offices vandalised 
(MSN 2011).301 Regular wage negotiations took place at plant 2 in April 2011, 
resulting in a 7.5% increase. However, and at first glance out of the blue, in March 
2012 Mexparts 3, citing financial reasons, announced the closure of plant 2, despite 
a ten percent revenue for the NAFTA area during the fiscal year 2011 (Juárez 
Núñez 2012).  
 
Workers complained that the company had begun to lay off personnel and 
redistribute machinery and orders to plants 1 and 3 from summer 2011 onwards, 
without the union responding adequately. At the final decision to close the plant, 
there were allegations that the union had never intended any resistance in the first 
place anyway. In fact, the closure was announced during the negotiation period for 
the annual wage revision, in which workers hoped the union would address the 
continuing non-payment of bonuses and premiums and other irregularities (Puga 
Martínez 2012c). Instead, and even though the national union federation officially 
                                                        
301 The workers support centre was closed and its leader temporarily exiled to Canada in June 2012, 
after one of her co-workers had allegedly been abducted and tortured for days (Anon 2014). 
Although the circumstances of this abduction are far from clear, other activists and academics 
confirmed the destruction of the offices. At the time of my fieldwork a feminist collective used the 
former premises of the Workers Support Centre. Interviews Rosa, Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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condemned the plant closure – two days after all workers had been fired 
(SNTMMSSRM 2012) – it demanded a higher compensation for the laid-off, and a 
reinstatement of the formerly employed at other facilities, including the possibility 
of re-opening the old facilities (which did not occur). Because the only two ways to 
close a factory under Mexican labour law were with the consent of the union, or 
through a formal process in which the enterprise would have to demonstrate the 
economic unfeasibility of continuing operations – which was not engaged – 
suspicions about union complicity aggravated over time. As Juárez-Núñez 
explained:  
 
“It was a pact. On the day of the closure, instead of just leaving the factory, workers 
were awaited by union buses that took them to the Junta [the local labour 
administration] to collect their compensation. […] Bit by bit the issues came to the 
surface, and now they blame two men, two of the national delegates. The executive 
committee at Mexparts 3 was not at all leftist, not at all [implying that it did not 
resist the decision from above]. The compañeras of the initial executive committee 
were simply bought off by the company – four, five months after the movement 
they were offered money and left.”302   
  
In sum, the victory of Mexican workers against one of the largest global autoparts 
suppliers turned out to be short-lived. The tactic to avoid local union recognition 
through the affiliation to the SNTMMSSRM backfired when it turned out that the 
union leadership had made a deal with Mexparts 3. No significant repercussions 
were felt at Company X. The support structure collapsed with the attacks on the 
Workers Support Centre; and no long-term institutional changes were 
implemented as the SNTMMSSRM had damaged its legitimacy and plant 2 was 
closed. 
 
The conflict at Mexparts 4 started out similarly. In December 2011 three female 
workers with 14 to 17 years of seniority were fired and urged to accept a 
compensation of $38,000 (which they refused) – the reason being that they had 
demanded a copy of the collective contract from the CTM-affiliated enterprise 
                                                        
302 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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union (Juárez Núñez & López Barajas 2013). The laid-off workers began to develop 
what turned out to become a year long campaign, accusing the company of various 
labour rights violations – such as regular twelve-hour shifts; no overtime benefits; 
unjustified layoffs and insufficient or no compensation payments;303 harassment 
through supervisors and security personnel etc. Apart from their reinstatement 
and a general improvement of working conditions and pay, they also demanded 
the resignation of the CTM union leader. Similar again to Mexparts 3 they accused 
him of embezzlement of the weekly $40 membership fees, collaboration with 
management and a assumption of a proactive role in lay-offs of dissident workers 
by invoking the exclusion clause (Puga Martíńez 2012a; Juárez Núñez & López 
Barajas 2013).  
 
The campaign was initiated through the publication of the laid off workers’ stories 
in local newspapers (Puga Martínez 2012a; Tirzo 2012), and at its critical stage 
mobilised crucial support from parts of the Company X union (in particular the 
small group of worker dissidents discussed in chapter 3), the local university, the 
union of Mexican telephone workers and a delegation of the US American United 
Automobile Workers (UAW). Most important, however, was the careful 
mobilisation of their former colleagues inside the plant – one of whom was fired 
and joined the core group of organisers in May 2012304 – to whom they made 
house-calls and debated the issues throughout the spring of 2012. The organising 
efforts resulted in a carefully prepared strike early one morning in June 2012, with 
the night shift remaining inside the plant, the morning shift entering and refusing 
to commence work, and the laid-off workers with their supporters picketing the 
outside gates and preventing deliveries from leaving the compound.  
 
Workers, assisted by a local university professor as their asesor, entered into 
negotiation with the enterprise, but did not succeed in gaining the reinstatement of 
the four laid off workers. However, the enterprise accepted the formation of an 
independent union (Anon 2012b). In the following months the movement engaged 
                                                        
303 Workers accused Mexparts 4 of having security personnel examine the bags of employees it 
wanted to dismiss, finding ‘stolen’ parts amongst their belongings, leading to instant dismissal 
without legal compensation (Puga Martí́nez 2012a).  
304 Another twelve were laid off shortly thereafter. 
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in further negotiations but lost momentum over the awaited legalisation of their 
union through the Local Conciliation and Arbitration Junta – the step strategically 
avoided in the case of the Mexparts 3 conflict.  
 
Meanwhile, the CTM union leader at the plant announced that he would defend the 
titularidad “with blood” (Macuil Rojas 2012) and together with the provincial CTM 
representative started a smear campaign against the activists and in particular the 
workers’ asesor, who received threats against his person and family (Puga 
Martínez 2012b). In August the CTM attempted to pre-empt the formation of an 
independent union by formulating a new collective contract with Mexparts 4 
through a different national branch, which excluded the contentious CTM 
enterprise union leader. Workers at Mexparts 4 rejected the new collective 
agreement and the mobilisation efforts of the CTM at plant 2, but altered course 
when, in September, the local authorities denied the recognition of their 
independent union. They agreed to an assembly with the provincial CTM. In this 
assembly, which took place in November 2012, workers accepted the new 
collective contract and integrated their union – whose leaders were elected in the 
assembly – into the CTM as a local section. In January 2013, salaries were 
renegotiated and a seven percent increase and improved benefits and allowances 
agreed, as well as the reinstatement of one of the four laid-off workers (Juárez 
Núñez & López Barajas 2013). At a later stage, Mexparts 4 retracted from any 
offers of reinstatement again; and the conflict ended in October 2013 with the laid-
off accepting a higher compensation offer (e-consulta 2013).      
 
The strike at Mexparts 4 did not backfire as dramatically as the one at Mexparts 3. 
However, what looked like a promising campaign with the potential to trigger 
more significant institutional change by ousting the CTM, was turned around by 
the concerted efforts of enterprise management, local policy makers and national 
CTM representatives, who managed to re-install a corporatist union under a new 
leadership. Nevertheless, both cases illuminate well that even under rather 
adverse conditions of corporatist union control and easy dismissal of potential 
troublemakers, workers managed to organise effective strike action. Local support 
was crucial, though not without risks, as external advice did not necessarily work 
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out in favour of the workforce (e.g. the suggestion to affiliate with the 
SNTMMSSRM). Most important seems to have been the ability to build networks of 
solidarity between laid-off workers and their still employed colleagues. In both 
cases the strikes were relatively short-lived and had no significant repercussions 
for Company X. Institutional changes were nullified with the plant closure at 
Mexparts 3; and bound back into a constellation that allowed political authorities 
and union leaders to retain control on the shop floor at Mexparts 4. It is the latter 
dynamic that unfolded much more pronounced in the case of the 2010 strike wave 
in China – up to a degree that it caused large-scale formal institutional changes. In 
the following I will briefly recapitulate the events of the strike wave before 
analysing the institutional changes in more detail in section 5. 
 
4.2.  The 2010 Autoparts Strike Wave in South China 
The most prominent case of conflicts and strikes in the Chinese autoparts industry 
is that of the Honda gearbox factory in South China – and consequently it has been 
covered extensively in the literature (e.g. IHLO 2010; Carter 2010; Wang 2011; Lau 
2012; Chan & Hui 2012; Chan & Hui 2014; K. Chang 2013; Gray & Jang 2014; L. 
Zhang 2014b; Lüthje 2014). Based on these accounts, in the following the course of 
events will therefore only be briefly rehearsed, in order to provide the necessary 
background for a more in-depth discussion of the institutional changes they 
triggered.   
 
The strike at Honda’s gearbox factory in Nanhai involved 1800 workers and lasted 
from May 17th to June 1st 2010. Though prepared and initiated by two experienced 
workers, migrant assembly line workers, about a third of them on student 
internships, became the backbone of the strike. The immediate reason for the 
strike was that the latest increase in the legal minimum wage was not reflected in 
workers’ actual pay, as the company had reduced certain benefits in parallel. The 
initial demand of an ¥800 increase for both permanent and temporary workers 
ultimately came down to still significant increases of ¥500/33%, respectively 
¥600/70%.  
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The spatial condition that entailed management confining workers to the factory 
grounds enabled strikers to build cohesion across employment status through 
face-to-face communication with colleagues; and to stop production effectively 
without risking confrontations at an outside picket line. Solidarity building was 
also eased by modern communication technology, enabling a quick spread of 
information through QQ groups and online message boards. Workers used these 
means to release statements and document events within the factory compound 
for the outside world, which was particularly important before and after the brief 
window of Chinese news reporting between May 27th and 29th. The temporally 
changing power dynamics between workers, management, the union and an 
outside legal advisor triggered a dynamic of cumulative causation that fuelled the 
strike – or, as worker Shao, one of the strike leaders, explained: 
 
“The longer the strike lasted, the more disappointed I got with management not 
doing anything about our demands. And the more frustrating it got, the more did 
we feel that it was necessary to stand together.”305 
 
The first inconclusive meeting with management on May 20 and 21 fuelled the 
anger of a larger number of workers and provided the critical mass not only to 
continue the strike, but also to revise and escalate the initial wage demands 
upwards. A repetition of the same dynamics on May 24 drew the whole workforce 
into the conflict. Internal cohesion decreased briefly after the company encouraged 
college principals to threaten interns on May 29, but was restored after 200 
outsiders wearing union caps entered the factory ground and physically attacked 
workers on May 31. As a consequence, riot police began to cordon off the factory 
on June 1. But what looked like a de facto lockout was resolved when the company 
management agreed to respond to the demands within three days. Workers 
returned to work and engaged a university professor in drafting the final 
settlement of June 4, which included the final pay raise and an agreement to 
reorganise the enterprise union.   
 
                                                        
305 Interview worker Shao. 
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The Honda strike sparked a spatiotemporal and cross-sectoral expansion of 
copycat actions throughout the summer of 2010, most of which resulted in similar 
wage gains of between 20% and 40% (Gongchao 2010; Butollo & ten Brink 
2012).306 Although autoparts suppliers in other regions of China experienced 
strikes as well, the repercussions for Company X were negligible – differing from 
Honda, whose entire Chinese production ground to a halt.307 Chinaparts 2 and 3 
witnessed strikes within two months after the Honda strike, not because of any 
immediately pressing issues at their enterprises, but as a response to strike-
induced wage hikes at autoparts firms in the surrounding area.308 Learning 
processes about the rationale, low risks and high yields of a strike at this particular 
point in time and in this especially highly interconnected industrial sector were 
crucial. As at Honda, the results were a ¥500 wage increase – quick settlements 
being partly induced through visits by Honda managers – and a restructuring of 
their enterprise unions, which in the cases of Chinaparts 2 and 3 was not 
demanded by the striking workers, but rather an implementation from above 
through the city and provincial branches of the ACFTU.  
 
The 2010 strike wave was unprecedented in China, not only due to its cross-
factory, cross-sectoral and spatial expansion, but also due to the institutional 
changes it triggered. Before I analyse these in more detail in section 5. , in order to 
understand the peculiarities of the recent strikes in South China and at Mexparts 3 
and 4 it is important to contrast them to other cases, where similar structural and 
institutional conditions did not result in comparable strike action. 
  
                                                        
306 As many of these strikes occurred in Japanese-owned enterprises, there were allegations that the 
strike wave was driven by anti-Japanese sentiment. This was denied not only by the strike 
participants I interviewed in South China, but also by most first-hand and academic accounts of the 
case (IHLO 2010; Chan & Hui 2012; Lyddon et al. 2015). As worker Shao explained: “It was not 
about Japanese managers, but about managers.” (Interview worker Shao, similar sentiments were 
conveyed in the interviews with workers Sheng and Lai). 
307 This is mainly explained by geographical factors, since even though the strike wave spread to 
other locales than the South, it did not affect any of the supply networks close or linked to any of 
Company X’s plants. As senior German manager Schütte explained: “We also had a few cases [of 
strikes in the supply chain], but they were limited. We have some Japanese suppliers too, but not to 
the degree of suppliers from Europe or the US. No, we were not affected in any meaningful way; to 
my knowledge we did not notice anything.” Interview German senior manager Schütte. 
308 Interviews worker Lai; Sheng. 
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4.3.  Perseverance, Exit and Substitution 
The strike wave in, and beyond, the autoparts industry in China in 2010, and the 
examples of Mexparts 3 and 4 of course do not necessitate the conclusion that the 
harsher working conditions in the supply chain automatically triggered protest 
and large-scale conflicts. Chinaparts 1, as well as Mexparts 1 and 2, were examples 
of suppliers with similar conditions, where, despite workers’ discontent, strikes 
occurred on a much smaller scale or were entirely absent.  
 
In the case of Mexparts 1, which had an independent union, there were multiple 
smaller strikes around the annual wage negotiations from the early to late 2000s, 
resulting in considerable wage increases (García 2000; 2002; Toledo 2008). 
However, the total workforce of Mexparts 1 shrank from about 3,500 workers in 
2000 to 750 in 2012, due to a new logistics centre built at Company X in 2002,309 
the emergence of competing suppliers, and the deliberate strategy of Mexparts 1 to 
break the collective agreement by firing the workforce and rehiring it in part under 
worse working conditions (Damián Jiménez 2009a; 2009b). Mexparts 1, although 
it had seen strikes that made it one of the best paying suppliers of Company X by 
the early 2000s ended up like most other suppliers of Company X: with low wages, 
exhausting work rhythms and high labour turnover (Juárez Núñez 2006; Bensusán 
& Martínez 2012). Worker Miguel of Company X, who with other members of the 
clandestine group (presented in chapter 3) had supported organising efforts at 
Mexparts 1, commented on this:  
 
“Mexparts 1 suffered changes of different kinds, which reduced it from the second, 
first or second, best paid supplier to just another one on the pile. […] Ultimately, 
practically all the suppliers enter this dynamic in which workers have no other 
option than quitting. You can see the ads in the newspapers all the time, in which 
                                                        
309 At its peak Mexparts 1 employed around 2300 workers, each specialised in a particular task – 
forklift drivers, quality and quantity control, administrators, dolly drivers, and distributors on the 
production line. The 2002 opening of the new logistics centre caused the immediate dismissal of 30, 
respectively 50% of ordinary logistics workers, respectively administrative personnel, reducing the 
workforce to 743 by 2008. Each worker now had to fulfil multiple tasks at once, in particular quality 
and quantity control, which was aided by the introduction of a barcode system and synchronised 
data processing, reducing error rates, time and miscoordination between flow production and parts 
delivery (Martí́nez & Salgado Cortés 2005; Bensusán & Martí́nez 2012).   
 261 
they are looking for people, they are always looking for people. But everyone 
knows that already, saying: ‘Well, yes, I need a job, but I end up losing more than 
they pay me – transport, food, coming and going – so I better look for something 
else.’”310 
 
Migrant workers at Chinaparts 1 also considered exit options the most feasible 
form of agency, feeling unhappy with the work, and being particularly frustrated 
with the hiring process. Of my interviewees’ initial cohort of 100 interns, only 
twenty to thirty remained on the job. Worker Wang commented:  
 
“I don’t really know what I should do. Of course I am not satisfied with the low 
salary and the long working hours. I will wait for the next pay rise and then see.”311 
 
They did not consider protesting or striking a realistic option, although they knew 
that workers had gone on strike in 2010 to demand more overtime pay after 
management had augmented the production targets. The main reason to abstain 
from striking were the perceived risks: 
 
“I don’t want to go on strike, because the strike leaders are punished, lose their 
salary and get disciplined (chufen) by the manager in front of the crowd;” and “it is 
difficult to gather people for a strike, because everyone is afraid of the punishment 
– especially when there are no leaders who could assist.”312 
 
This contrasted rather sharply with the strike perception of workers in South 
China, who saw strikes as a much more rational way to improve their salaries. 
Worker Lai commented on the strike at Chinaparts 3: 
 
“A strike was something that greatly excited those on the assembly line. A strike, if 
successful, brings only benefits to them; if failed, little harm. So I think most 
                                                        
310 Interview worker Miguel.  
311 Interview migrant workers Wang and Zhao. 
312 Their paycheque provided evidence of this fact: it included a separate position reading “strike 
deduction” (bagong fakuan). Author’s field notes. 
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workers on the assembly line were eager to participate in a strike. It’s like an 
instinct to that particular group of people.”313 
 
However, the sentiment of workers Wang and Zhao was felt by worker Maria at 
Mexparts 2 as well. The conditions at Mexparts 2 were virtually identical to those 
of Mexparts 3 and 4 at the outbreak of the strikes in 2010, respectively 2012: 
working conditions, hours and pay were similar if not worse; and the enterprise 
union – in this case the FROC-CROC – collected the weekly $30, but was otherwise 
“practically showing its presence through neglect.”314 However, Mexparts 2 had 
never seen a strike. As Maria explained, the enterprise was quite rigorous in laying 
off potential troublemakers:  
 
“Normally, if someone raises their hand to say ‘I speak for my compañeros, I want 
that this or that improved’, well, the first thing we gain is the street. ‘You know 
what!? You are provoking trouble, you are making a racket amongst the 
compañeros, get out!’ – and they kick us out.”315 
 
However, Mexparts 3 and 4 had laid off workers in similar ways and still seen 
larger-scale strikes. Reasons why this was not the case at Mexparts 2 might include 
that the laid off workers, having lost their leverage in the plant, did not resort to 
organising efforts around their former employer – and workers inside the plant 
became cautious not to share their fate. In the cases of Mexparts 3 and 4, outside 
support or at least external contact persons – the Workers Support Centre, 
students, the Company X union – were crucial in kick-starting organisational 
efforts, and arguably at maintaining the dynamism throughout the conflicts, 
although their role has to be seen much more ambivalently here, due to 
patronising interventions.  
  
Similar to the case of Chinaparts 1, Maria also looked for an individual exit 
strategy, stating “I don’t think I will enslave myself there for much longer.”316 As 
                                                        
313 Interview worker Lai. 
314 Interview worker Maria. 
315 Interview worker Maria.  
316 Interview worker Maria. 
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her children were close to finishing school, the financial pressure on the household 
would soon diminish – in fact, she hoped that the company would make her 
redundant, so that she could claim compensation.317  
 
Higher pressure and worse working conditions in the supply chain, although 
leading to similar grievances amongst supply chain workers in China and Mexico, 
do not lead to the same practical responses. Small scale organising efforts on the 
local level were required in the Mexican case, while in South China workers could 
mobilise the structural power accruing to them due to the labour shortage, making 
an offensive direct-action strategy a low-risk option. Where these external 
conditions were different, and where no solidarity organising developed around 
victimised workers, the necessary social cohesion for collective action did not 
materialise and workers’ chose to pursue smaller-scale or individual coping 
strategies. However, where worker agency did turn into a cross-sectoral and 
spatially expansive wave of unrest, the implications for institutional change were 
significant.  
 
5.  Institutional Changes in South China after the 2010 Strike 
Wave 
The 2010 strike wave turned into a precedent with which to transform local labour 
policies into a more institutionalised framework under the auspices of the 
provincial ACFTU. The medium-term result was the establishment of a de facto 
and, since January 2015, also de jure collective bargaining system (GPRCC 2014). 
Despite their different interests, participants of the strikes, union leaders and local 
government officials all agreed on one point: the emergence of collective 
bargaining in the automotive supply chain around Guangzhou was an effect of the 
2010 strike wave.  
 
                                                        
317 Working in subsistence agriculture in addition to earnings from industrial labour also seemed to 
be more widespread amongst households of workers in the supply chain, than in the terminal 
assembly plant of Company X. Both of my interviewees at Mexparts 1 and 2 had plots of land in the 
surrounding areas, confirming that many of their colleagues pursued the same strategy for 
reproduction. In fact, while these two workers lived in the city, they claimed that many of their 
colleagues actually resided in the rural surroundings, indicating that industrial wage labour was an 
additional, rather than a primary source of income.  
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In Nanhai, Honda was one of the biggest taxpayers, contributing 220 million RMB 
in 2012 alone.318 The collapse of the automotive supply chain had immediate 
repercussions on the public budget (Figure 13). Fear of social destabilisation and 
straightforward economic pressure produced strong incentives for the local 
authorities, including the provincial ACFTU, to act. As the former Chairman of the 
municipal ACFTU concisely put it:  
 
“In China it usually takes a big social incident to initiate any kind of reform.”319 
 
I will use the examples of Chinaparts 2 and 3 to analyse processes of collective 
bargaining on the enterprise level, with emphases on the composition of 
enterprise unions and negotiation teams, bargaining procedures and the content of 
final agreements. Addressing the emergence of cross-factory coordination amongst 
enterprise unions and employers, I will exemplify the process of institution 
building as an effect of the particular processes of relational agency in the 
aftermath of the strike wave. This also allows for an improved assessment of the 
benefits and limitations accruing to the main stakeholders in the emergent 
collective bargaining procedures on enterprise and sectoral levels.  
 
Figure 13: Tax revenue Shishan town (the location of Honda and other autoparts suppliers) 
Source: Nanhai Investment Promotion Bureau 
                                                        
318 Interview government official Nanhai Investment Promotion Bureau. 
319 Interview Chairman Li. 
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Composition of enterprise unions and collective bargaining teams 
A first measure the ACFTU embraced after the summer of 2010 to deescalate the 
situation was enterprise union elections. In both Chinaparts 2 and 3 elections took 
place within less than a year after the strike wave; and in neither case were they 
explicitly demanded during the strike. As usual, enterprise union representatives 
were selected indirectly in a pyramid format: members of a directly nominated 
pool of representatives would select amongst themselves a smaller group 
representing the next higher level until after repeated rounds of selection a small 
number of candidates remained – in the case of Chinaparts 2 a group of six. Of 
these six the higher-level union “recommended” three candidates, from whom the 
six would single out one person as the union chairman (see also Howell 2008).320 
This process is prone to follow the desired course of the higher union levels – and 
to be influenced by the company. Citing his own example, worker Sheng of 
Chinaparts 2 however assessed that external interference stopped short of 
affecting the final election of the chairman.  
 
“Maybe the company suggested its desired candidates to the higher-level union for 
recommendation. But when the six candidates elected the chairman, there was no 
interference at least – neither from the central trade union nor the company. 
Because when they were having the conversation with me, I confessed to them that 
I was not inclined to become the chairman.”321 
 
This election process was similar at Chinaparts 3. It is important to note that both 
cases followed standard procedure, which had not been significantly altered by the 
strike wave. The preceding union chairman at Chinaparts 2 had been elected the 
same way – and he was the company’s administration manager. What changed 
with the strike wave were therefore not formal election procedures but the 
strategic preferences and degree of interference of higher union levels. The 
selective process still ensured a flexible degree of higher-level union control to 
keep undesired workers from taking up posts in the union. At Chinaparts 3 
assembly line workers, who were the backbone of the 2010 strike, ended up not 
                                                        
320 Interviews worker Sheng, Lai. 
321 Interview worker Lai. 
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being represented in the union committee at all, while – as at Chinaparts 2 – a 
foreman became chairman of the union. Follow-up studies on the Honda plant 
have shown that it was not possible to replace the union chairman (Lüthje 2011), 
that grassroots labour leaders had left the factory (Lau 2012) and that higher 
levels of the provincial ACFTU continued to paternalistically intervene in 
consultation and negotiation processes (Chan & Hui 2014). While in the past the 
ACFTU tried to avoid the emergence of any linkage between labour conflicts and 
union elections, it embraced them in 2010 as a divide and conquer strategy to co-
opt a segment of strike participants. 
 
For collective bargaining, a separate committee would be formed to negotiate on 
behalf of workers, composed of representatives from the enterprise union and the 
Staff and Workers Council, formally selected by the latter. At Chinaparts 3, the 
bargaining round of 2013 was preceded by the aforementioned survey amongst 
the workforce (this chapter, section 3.1.). Prior to negotiations with the 
management delegation – made up of all division managers and the company 
director – union/SWC representatives took part in a joint meeting on the 
company’s sales and profits. Information from the survey and the company 
briefing entered into the formulation of their proposal.322  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these observations. Firstly, union control over 
election processes continued to ensure a high degree of quasi-state control over 
enterprise union formation and collective bargaining procedures. However, an 
inclusive shift in the preferences of the provincial ACFTU was practically visible in 
the encouragement of non-managerial staff to become trade union leaders. Higher 
levels seem to have kept enterprise unions on a longer leash, monitoring election 
and bargaining procedures and making “suggestions”. Secondly, a shifted focus 
from blatant interference towards the professionalization and formalisation of 
bargaining procedures is observable. With a lowered risk of open conflict workers 
demands are kept within the confines of company profitability – the survey and 
company briefing at Chinaparts 3 are telling indicators in this regard.    
                                                        
322 After various rounds of negotiations a final 11.5% direct wage increase emerged from the 
original 15.7% versus 9.2% proposals by the union, respectively the enterprise. Author’s field notes. 
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Sectoral Collective Bargaining in the Making? 
It has been argued that the domination of foreign invested enterprises in South 
China hindered the development of local employers’ associations that could 
bargain with the union on a sectoral level – and that the provincial ACFTU thus 
failed in its endeavour to develop “an institutionalised response to labour market 
instability.” (Friedman 2014b, p.498). While this might have been true at the time 
of Friedman’s fieldwork, it is undeniable that the 2010 strike wave triggered an 
institutional shift. Similar to experiments in Zheijiang (Liu 2010; Pringle 2011; 
Friedman 2014b) this shift remained limited to the particular geographical 
locations of the respective sector. The close integration of the autoparts supply 
chain, as well as good communication networks amongst rank and file workers – 
and the continuous demonstration of their willingness to strike – produced strong 
incentives for the ACFTU and employers to coordinate wage increases between 
their respective companies. Though collective bargaining remained confined to the 
enterprise level, informal but regular communication amongst enterprise unions 
emerged:  
 
“In the development zone, we have a federation of trade unions for us component 
manufacturers; 11 enterprises in total. […] They were more or less affected [in 
2010]. But there were strikes in no more than half of the 11 enterprises. […] The 
unions of these 11 enterprises have meetings every one or two months. Typical 
topics include the big issues the companies face; we exchange ideas with one 
another and stay informed.”323  
 
This was mirrored by coordination amongst employers, usually through their 
membership in local business associations.  
 
“Among Japanese companies, the bosses themselves have communication over the 
same issues, trying not to pay workers too much. The two levels of communication 
are quite compatible now.”324  
 
                                                        
323 Interview Sheng. 
324 Interview worker Lai. 
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The linchpin of wage negotiations remained Honda. The employers’ association 
therefore not only coordinated individual enterprises, but also lobbied the 
provincial union levels to interfere favourably in negotiations:  
 
“The annual collective bargaining rounds at Honda Nanhai have become something 
like a weather vane for autoparts manufacturers in the area. All companies will 
have to raise their wages in correspondence to the increases at Honda. This is why 
the head of the Guangdong Automotive Parts Association once asked me if I could 
help to slow down the income raises at Honda.”325 
 
In the particular case of the autoparts industry in South China, sectoral collective 
bargaining can be said to have emerged, yet on a level that until very recently used 
to be neither legally formalised nor completely informal. It was de facto 
coordinated through the provincial ACFTU’s new emphasis on inter-enterprise 
union communication and the involvement of the employers’ federation in wage 
setting. According to chairman Li, wage growth in the autoparts sector decreased 
with each round of collective bargaining since 2010.326 At Chinaparts 2 collective 
bargaining took place in 2011 and 2012, leading to monthly wage rises of ¥250 
and ¥220 respectively.327 Taking the low starting point of wage increases in 2010 
and the general post-crisis labour shortage in South China into account (C. K.-C. 
Chan 2010; CLB 2011), if compared to the status ante – i.e. a situation 
characterised by disruptive strikes and the absence of formalised bargaining – 
workers’ economic gains decreased since the introduction of collective bargaining.  
 
The emergence of collective bargaining can therefore neither be said to be a 
necessary condition nor the most effective route to sector-wide wage increases. As 
indicated by the experiences of Chinapart 2 and 3, the Honda strike triggered a 
learning process, with workers beginning to perceive strikes as a high-yield, low-
risk strategy. The precedence of the ¥500 increase prompted copycat demands in 
succeeding strikes. Given the particular structure of the autoparts industry in the 
area, management across the supply chain was forced – sometimes under direct 
                                                        
325 Interview Chairman Deng. 
326 Interview Chairman Li. 
327 Interview worker Sheng. 
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influence of Honda personnel – into a de-facto sectoral collective agreement. The 
evidence suggests that non-institutionalised labour relations resting on an active 
participation of ordinary workers in a conflictive direct action-centred strategy can 
lead not only to single-factory success stories, but to geographically extended, 
sectoral gains. 
 
5.1.  Governmental and Union Rationale Behind Collective Bargaining  
Ironically, in the medium term, local policy makers and foreign capitalists found 
the strike wave to have had a positive impact. The strike-related wage increases 
alleviated the effects of the labour shortage, as more workers became attracted to 
the area. Local authorities claimed to have made a virtue out of necessity in 
utilising the heightened media attention to realise more investments: 
 
“In 2010 we have attracted seven or eight Japanese enterprises. After the strike in 
Nanhai we became famous with Japanese companies. We go to Japan every 
year.”328 
 
The official inferred that the improved relationship with Japanese enterprises was 
a result of how the government had dealt with the strike wave. Instead of a case by 
case and ad hoc intervention, which was the preferred governmental strategy of 
the past, the 2010 strike wave triggered a concerted effort between provincial and 
local authorities and the ACFTU to establish new institutions to deal with workers’ 
demands in the future: 
 
“First, we launched the collective bargaining system. Second, we established a 
party branch to gather information from workers and transfer it to the local 
authorities. And we regularly send government officials to companies to talk to 
workers.”329  
 
                                                        
328 Interview government official Nanhai Investment Promotion Bureau. 
329 Ibid. 
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While the provincial and Shenzhen municipal governments began to draft a new 
legislation on collective bargaining in 2010 – which was withdrawn after 
opposition from foreign chambers of commerce and Hong Kong trade associations 
the same year – the ACFTU national leadership intensified its calls for a step up of 
collective contracts and negotiations in foreign-invested and private enterprises 
(Ligorner & Liao 2010; Wu & Sun 2014). In the meantime the provincial ACFTU 
was already carrying out described collective bargaining procedures along the 
automotive supply chain, as well as supporting the aforementioned governmental 
surveillance efforts:    
 
“A permanent online connection has been built between the unions on the city and 
district level. We, the provincial union, have a system to survey the public opinion 
on the Internet. This system allows us to be informed on time when- and wherever 
a strike is breaking out. You can also get such information through formal 
channels, but at a horribly slow rate. It cost us several hundred thousand RMB to 
build this system.”330  
 
The union not only monitored workers’ online communications on weibo and QQ, 
but also engaged them in direct conversations via these channels. When workers at 
Honda were effected by the wave of anti-Japanese sentiments raging in China prior 
to a one-day strike on March 18th 2013 (Cheung 2013), union members tried to 
deescalate the situation by using QQ to contact workers, who expressed that “they 
have long been eager to punch their Japanese managers.”331 This is but one 
example of the union overseeing workers’ behaviour in order to contain 
spontaneous excesses and to present itself as the voice of reason: “It is the union 
that persuades workers not to carry out drastic behavior like damaging machines 
or people – instead, just refer to the union for help.”332  
 
                                                        
330 Interview Chairman Deng. The union also installed an online consultation system for workers to 
submit their complaints to the union. 
331 Interview Chairman Deng; Again, it is worth noting that worker Sheng, the union Chairman of 
Chinaparts 2, gave a rather rational explanation of the concentration of strikes in Japanese 
enterprises: “From my own perspective, why strikes often take place in Japanese rather than in 
Chinese companies is because profits in Japanese companies are higher, and workers know that 
they have advantageous conditions to bargain.” Interview worker Sheng.  
332 Interview Chairman Deng. 
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A closer look at the tactical behaviour and strategic rationale of the provincial 
ACFTU in this 2013 strike is quite illustrative. 100 assembly line workers went on 
strike, because they were unhappy with negotiations between union 
representatives and the company, which had provided them with 9.6% less of a 
wage increase than senior employees (Cheung 2013). They achieved an additional 
3.8% increase after the intervention of chairman Deng, whose perception of the 
situation is worth quoting at length: 
 
“Workers felt that a 10.2% income raise was not enough, knowing that they had 
had income raises of 20% over the past three years. […] Management proposed a 
10% income rise initially. That reduces the efforts of the union to a 0.20% 
compromise, making it 10.2%. This is a terrible strategy! So I told them, if they had 
initially proposed an 8% raise and compromised on 11%, then an extra 3% would 
have been attributable to the union’s bargaining efforts. But instead workers felt 
that the union had not achieved much. So they were neither pleased with the union 
nor with the Japanese management. […] Because of the strike, the Japanese were 
forced into re-negotiation. At the end, they agreed to a 14% raise. So we analyzed: 
‘If you had started with an 8% increase and we compromised on 13%, then there 
would have been 5% attributable to the effort of the union. Workers would not 
have gone on strike. But instead, now you have to pay more and have earned a bad 
reputation.’ So this time they really screwed up.”333  
  
ACFTU reformers realised that if well-handled, strikes could enable them “to build 
faith and trust amongst workers”, so that “when workers’ rights are infringed they 
are willing and ready to seek support from the trade union, instead of taking 
irrational risks.”334 This, however, would only be possible if the union had practical 
results to show for their efforts. In the quoted example the provincial union 
therefore attempted to broker a deal with management towards the end of a 
moderate compromise that was not only acceptable to all sides but also justified 
the existence of the union. Essentially, provincial ACFTU reformers envisioned the 
                                                        
333 Ibid. 
334 Ibid. 
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union to become a stabilising arbiter between capital and labour. A major obstacle 
to be overcome is the “irrational” demands of workers: 
 
“I think collective bargaining is good, but what we should focus on now is how to 
make it sustainably compatible with the growth rate of companies. If income 
demands rise above the economic capacity of companies, they are likely to 
relocate. […] Workers do not use authoritative and objective figures as reference 
for their demands. […] The issue at stake at the moment is not the lack of cohesion 
amongst workers, but rather the irrationality of the demands they propose, which 
is a headache for the union. Not only does the union have to hold the workers 
tightly together, but it also has to guide them towards more reasonable 
demands.”335 
 
Neither during the 2010 nor the 2013 Honda strike were workers’ demands 
oriented towards company profits or the legal minimum. Such “irrationalities” 
cause “headaches” that the ACFTU sought to alleviate through an extension of 
formal procedures, one of which was a new legislation on collective bargaining 
(Guangdong Provincial Regulations on Collective Contracts, hereafter: GPRCC). In 
this law, the provincial ACFTU saw some of its described practices formalised. For 
example, collective negotiations were to be based on overall enterprise 
profitability and comparable industry-wide or regional wage increases (§10 and 
11). Employee negotiation teams should be headed by a union representative and 
either chosen by the enterprise union or elected through union organised elections 
(§13). During negotiations employees were bound to fulfil their contractual duties 
and prohibited from striking, picketing or disturbing public order (§24). However, 
certain “worker-friendly” clauses that ACFTU reformers wanted to see 
implemented were removed from an earlier draft (§17; 26; 30, GPRCC (draft) 
2013). In particular, a clause was excluded that banned the dismissal of workers 
for striking in reaction to the enterprise’s failure to respond to a collective 
bargaining request – a politically delicate article that made a case for strike action 
going unpunished by either the enterprise or local authorities (§59).336 ACFTU 
                                                        
335 Interview Chairman Li. 
336 Lyddon et al. (2015, p.10) have convincingly argued that Honda workers ignoring the threat of 
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reformers also desired the formalisation of industrial collective bargaining – but 
were met by resistance from the local government.337 Policymakers instead sided 
with Hong Kong trade associations that had, amongst others, demanded the 
amendments (IHLO 2014).338 
 
Were the practices of the ACFTU and their ex post facto formalisation in the GPRCC 
a sign of state-led models of collective “negotiation” and “consultation” 
transforming into collective “bargaining”? The described cases do of course not 
allow for a representative picture. However, given that the Southern Province can 
be considered the most open and inclusive when it comes to labour conflicts, we 
can assume that the described institutional transformations were as far-reaching 
as possible at that time. If the examples give direction to a new “Southern model” 
then we can indeed observe a move beyond existing laws, regulations and 
practices elsewhere in China (Wu & Sun 2014): enterprise unions and employers 
gained more room to manoeuvre both de facto and de jure, so that agreements – at 
least in the autoparts chain – did indeed become results of actual negotiations. Yet, 
this room to manoeuvre still depended on the goodwill of the local authorities and 
the ACFTU, with the different versions of the GPRCC indicating that their 
respective perceptions differed by degree.  
 
But whatever the range of collective negotiations, there can be no doubt about 
local authorities having favoured business interests and the provincial ACFTU 
having pursued a paternalistic and co-optative approach towards workers. Strikes 
were not met with repression but with a step-up of surveillance, “guidance” of 
disaffected workers, top-down mediation and a general effort to set up enterprise 
unions and regular collective negotiations under the auspices of ACFTU control. 
The element of immediate collective agency and empowerment, including 
collective learning processes and the possibility of developing autonomous forms 
of organising, was subverted by an institutionalised form of conflict resolution 
                                                                                                                                                                  
their 2010 strike being “illegal” remained without consequence, because there was simply no legal 
stipulation on the legality and illegality of strikes – an issue that has changed with the GPRCC.  
337 Author’s field notes. 
338 Though some, arguably essential, provincial ACFTU initiatives are missing in the final draft, it 
stretches the point to speak of local authorities “sidelining” the ACFTU (Friedman 2014b, p.499) – 
rather, both instances supplemented and depended on each other’s efforts. 
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leading to indirectly achieved results, oriented towards company profitability and 
competitiveness. Rather than to the empowerment of ordinary workers, the 
overall strategic aim of the institutional changes, indicated by the formalisation 
and professionalization of enterprise level negotiations, and the practices and 
visions of ACFTU reformers, points to a Fordist linkage of wage increases and 
profit rates.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
What have been the conditions for and effects of worker agency in China and 
Mexico’s automotive industry in the face of extensive outsourcing? In the broadest 
sense, Silver’s predictions of a convergence of social contradictions and labour 
unrest in the automotive industries of Mexico and China hold, however with 
important qualifications.  
 
First of all, the relationship between terminal assemblers and suppliers differed 
for the Chinese and Mexican cases. While Company X in Mexico could mobilise 
strong market pressure to control and penalise suppliers, in China it was 
constrained by the fact that most of its suppliers were subsidiary joint ventures of 
its own Chinese joint venture partner. However, these differences were not 
significant enough to diminish the power of the lead firm to a degree that would 
have reflected positively on labour-related issues at suppliers in China. Working 
conditions and salaries in the supply chain in both cases instead showed a high 
degree of convergence – although Company X’s interventions into the supply chain 
were frequent in China, but remained limited to issues of process optimisation. 
Vice versa, the effects of supply chain strikes on terminal assemblers were limited 
in the case of Company X – in Mexico, where strikes occurred at its first tier 
suppliers, mainly due to quick settlements – but, in comparison, severe for Honda 
during the 2010 strike wave. As the Honda case and Company X’s concerns over 
component quality indicate, just in time deliveries made terminal assemblers 
increasingly vulnerable to strikes in the supply chain. This implies that while 
autoparts workers’ “workplace bargaining power” might have been low due to low 
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job security – which was clearly the case in Mexico – their potential power to 
disrupt the overall production network was indeed significant. 
 
Lead-firm pressure, workers’ grievances and strikes clearly indicate that working 
conditions in the supply chain in both Mexico and China were comparatively harsh 
and perceived as such by the workforce – although degrees of variation have to be 
acknowledged. In both cases long working hours, frequent dismissals and 
exhausting work rhythms were combined with incomes much lower than in 
terminal assembly plants and closer to the legal minimum. However, in 
comparison to the wages and working conditions at Company X, the gap was much 
wider in Mexico than in China, at least for the autoparts producers in South China. 
In fact, the 2010 strike wave and follow up wage increases lifted the potential 
income for workers at Chinaparts 3 up to nearly the same level as at Company 
X/JV2, if benefits, overtime and other bonus payments were included. In Mexico, 
on the other hand, incomes at the reviewed suppliers were about 50% of what 
workers at Company X made on average.  
 
I have demonstrated that these conditions alone were insufficient to explain recent 
strikes at autoparts suppliers in China and Mexico – but that in a broader 
perspective the gravitational centre of labour unrest was located in the supply 
chain, rather than in terminal assembly plants, Company X in particular. More than 
that, and adding support to Silver’s convergence thesis, the form, dynamics and 
results of labour unrest in China and Mexico’s autoparts industry showed 
considerable similarities.  
 
All strikes at the reviewed autoparts producers were wildcat strikes, initiated and 
maintained by grassroots organising, and to some degree externally supported 
and/or shaped by external advisors, unions (other than the ones in the respective 
workplace), mutual help networks, and/or the clandestine group of workers 
discussed in chapter 3. In all cases local governments, enterprise management and 
workplace unions formed a formidable coalition to suppress these strikes, 
although their strategic positions changed over the course of events. In the cases of 
Mexparts 3 and 4 and the South China strike wave it was particularly the role of 
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official unions that was crucial – and straightforward: they either remained 
passively absent (Chinaparts 2 and 3) or openly opposed to the strike while the 
latter was still ongoing. Upon realising that a confrontational approach had failed 
and that a settlement would have to involve certain concessions to the rank and 
file, these unions – in the cases of Honda, Chinaparts 2 and 3 and Mexparts 4 – 
turned towards a more inclusive corporatism, supported by policy makers and 
enterprise management. In the final settlements external advisors played an 
important role – in the cases of Honda and Mexparts 4 university professors for 
labour relations; in the cases of Chinaparts 2 and 3 and the follow up strike at 
Honda the provincial union chairman.  
 
Of course, these strategies varied by degree: violence, blatant corruption and 
backroom deals between management and “democratic” unions were more 
pronounced in the Mexican cases, whereas in South China the strike wave induced 
a remarkable strategic and concerted reorientation of governmental and ACFTU 
approaches to industrial relations, shifting form ad hoc interventions to changes in 
union strategy and legal institutions. These far-reaching transformations provide 
strong evidence for processes of relational agency between capital and labour – 
which in this case were in fact retraceable to the pro-active agency of workers – 
inducing institutional change. Interestingly though, the nature of these changes in 
South China points towards a convergence between the Mexican and Chinese 
cases: the emergence of an institutional web of worker-inclusive organisations that 
are characterised by bureaucratic centralism, top-down hierarchies, state 
corporatism and paternalism; and labour laws that legally circumscribe the room 
to manoeuvre for worker agency and open “excesses” to legal persecution and 
repression.339 Compared to the treatment of labour relations in other Chinese 
SOEs, however, these transformations were rather exceptional – and we will see in 
the following chapter how these differences played out when Company X/JV2 
opened a new assembly plant in close proximity to the Honda gearbox factory.  
                                                        
339 It is in this case important to emphasise, that the conciliatory approach in China might be related 
to the fact that at the event of the strike wave no inclusive institutions and laws existed yet – the 
comparative tolerance of wildcat strikes might change towards selective repression and a divide 
and conquer strategy, once the new formal organisational and institutional channels are enforced 
and define what are legal and what are illegal forms of worker agency.  
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Chapter 8: Geographies of Power – Capital Relocation 
and Enterprise Expansion 
In the preceding chapter we have seen how the agency of workers in the supply 
chain has resulted not only in large-scale institutional change in South China, but 
also in local wage increases and a sustainably high level of strikes. In light of 
Silver’s core argument that “the successive geographical relocation of capital 
constitutes an attempted spatial fix for crises of profitability and control” (Silver 
2005, p.39), why of all places would Company X/JV2 open its latest subsidiary in 
the middle of this trouble spot?  
 
This chapter revisits the rationale behind the spatial development of Company X in 
this and other cases in China and Mexico from a perspective of dynamic power 
relations and processes of relational agency between policy makers, managers, 
unions and workers. The planning and opening of new production facilities during 
the time of my fieldwork in both China and Mexico provided a unique opportunity 
to revisit these processes empirically. On the basis of an analysis of Company X’s 
most recent projects in both countries, I will argue that the rationale for Company 
X’s spatial development is rather different in each of the two cases, and only partly 
echoes Silver’s grand developmental pattern. I will pay particular attention to the 
role of labour in these processes, both from the receiving end – i.e. the implications 
for working conditions and labour-capital relations following spatial change – and 
the constitutive effects of its practical interventions into decision-making 
processes dominated by policy makers and managers. As these factors are rather 
different in China and Mexico, I will discuss the cases separately before 
synthesising the findings in the conclusion. For the Chinese case this will concern 
the examples of Company X/JV2’s Western and Southern plant; and in Mexico the 
latest projects of a new engine plant and a terminal assembly factory for its upscale 
brand. 
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1.  Power Relations and the Spatial Organisation of Production 
at Company X in China 
Company X has expanded rapidly in recent years, surpassing its previous 
expansionary leap after the mid-1990s crisis in which twelve new production sites 
were opened in only four years (including components factories) (Pries 2003, 
p.62). In 2013 alone seven new manufacturing facilities went operational in China. 
The scope of this expansion and the related pressure on timing and cost has in fact 
transformed Company X’s philosophy of plant construction. Greenfield assembly 
plants now follow a standardised design and layout to save planning and 
construction costs and to ease the installation of established processes for later 
productive operations. The first plant to follow this design was one opened in the 
United States in 2011, followed by one in East China in 2012. All of Company X’s 
new plants opened after this date in China have adopted this standard – including 
the one in South China. The same design seems to have been adopted in the 
construction of the new upscale brand plant in Mexico (Company X 2013). 
 
The main driving force behind this expansion was market access. Car sales in China 
are comparably localised because preferential policies for military and strategic 
(bulk) goods like grain, coal or ores limit train capacity for automobile cargo.340 
Those who had been the first to venture into new geographical areas were 
therefore likely to become regional market leaders. Similarly, different regional 
demand patterns could require the construction of new factories with an adapted 
model range. German senior manager Schütte explained why the South was chosen 
as the location for Company X/JV2’s new assembly plant: 
 
 “Simply because there is a market. We build our smaller models there. In South 
China the market is different from the rest: smaller cars are in higher demand. The 
other reason is that one simply wanted to be present in that region as well. It is 
usually the case in China that things are bought where they are produced. Thus one 
                                                        
340 CKDs and components are transported by train from an Eastern plant to the one in the far West, 
which is an exception stemming from the latter’s remote geographical location – all other logistics 
for the Eastern plant are handled by trucks. Models that are only produced in one location are also 
distributed all over the country, but transported by trucks. Interview Chinese manager Lao.  
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had to move down there to get this piece of the cake as well – our competitors 
were there already.”341 
 
It is important to stress that the rationale behind Company X/JV2’s expansionary 
drive is not cost-push pressure, particularly not labour cost. Both areas of the new 
Company X/JV2 locations had higher minimum wage levels, and Company X/JV2 
did not offer lower wages at these locations (however, these new locations also 
have higher living expenses, which will be discussed in the next section).342 Rather, 
it was a tightening of Company X’s traditional local markets that drove the 
expansion. Senior manager Pongrac explained: 
 
 “The gigantic leaps in growth of twenty, thirty, even forty percent that we had in 
the past will not occur anymore. In East China there is certain saturation and not 
that much growth. But in the inner parts of the country there are so and so many 
megacities that don’t have car dealers for our premium brand, and only a few for 
our main brand. And that is where we have to go now – then we will still have 
growth rates of five, six, seven percent. It is at least the long-term projection that 
we will still reach that dimension.”343 
 
Confirming findings from the literature (Thun 2006; Chin 2010; L. Zhang 2014a), 
the actual implementation of Company X’s new Chinese ventures was shaped by 
bargaining processes with local and central policy makers. For local governments 
the successful attraction of a terminal assembly plant offers strong potential for 
the development of a local supplier industry, and usually leads to substantial 
preferential policies. Yet, regional differences appeared to persist:  
 
“That [support] depends on the local government. In the North and West there 
were almost no problems, because the headquarters of JV2 are located in the 
North. There is a very close political connection through the party and the 
                                                        
341 Interview German senior manager Schütte. 
342 This appears to have been slightly different for the expansion of Company X/JV1, which opened 
new greenfield plants in relatively close proximity to its Eastern main plant. While this was also an 
expansionary drive, minimum wage levels in these areas were lower than in the Eastern metropolis 
of the main plant, where they were amongst the highest in the country (L. Zhang 2014a).  
343 Interview (3) senior German manager Pongrac. 
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provincial government. I think JV2 alone is responsible for almost eighty percent of 
the Northern province’s tax base; it is essentially the cash cow of the region. In the 
West it was similar. The government was more than willing to support us, saying: 
‘We will build you this, this and this.’ In the South, the location of the new plant, it 
was different. The province is rather rich and already had everything, including a 
supply industry and automotive manufacturers. It proceeded rather sluggishly 
there and took a long time until we had all the building permits etc.”344  
 
Despite these suspicions towards local authorities and the actual adversarial 
lobbying of existing Japanese car producers in the area, it was interference from 
the centre rather than local dynamics that forestalled the timely construction of 
the Southern plant. As in the case of the Western plant,345 the local government in 
the South was rather eager to attract another global car manufacturer – and 
provided support and incentives by building roads and highways, granting land 
lease exemptions, tax breaks and subsidies to the construction of the surrounding 
industrial and logistics park.346 However, the central National Development and 
Reform Commission delayed the construction permit because Company X was 
hesitant to develop innovative technology, designs and models in China. Company 
X, for example, remained adamant to not share its battery technology for hybrid 
cars. 347  The central government introduced new regulations, making the 
permission for factories in new locations dependent on global car manufacturers 
developing indigenous brands or new-energy vehicles. In exchange for the 
Southern plant Company X/JV2 thus constructed a prototype of an electric car. The 
prototype was however never intended for serial production (Xu 2011). Similarly, 
in exchange for the permission to expand further in Eastern China, Company X/JV1 
had to construct an assembly facility in China’s far West.348  
 
                                                        
344 Interview senior German manager Schütte. 
345 While construction works could be finished according to schedule, the Western plant also had to 
delay the start of production of its first model. Though it had been approved in 2007 already, 
production did not commence until 2009 due to shareholder hesitations after the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake and new macroeconomic policies for the development of the Western regions of China. 
(Interview Chairman Qiao). 
346 Interviews government official Nanhai Investment Promotion Bureau; senior German manager 
Schütte; Chairman Qiao. 
347 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
348 Interviews German white-collar worker Hensch, senior managers Rordorf, Pongrac. 
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In short, Company X’s expansion in China was primarily attributable to the large 
but fragmented domestic market – and it was willing to make certain concessions 
towards the end of gaining a larger share of the pie. The fact that Company X was 
expanding rather than relocating was also aided by the capital-intensity of 
automotive production and the depth of its supply networks, which made the 
abandonment of old production sites a costly undertaking. In comparison, more 
labour intensive industries, such as electronics, garments or toys, do in fact 
relocate from their former largest agglomerations, e.g. in the South, due to falling 
profit rates, cost-push pressure and governmental policies fostering industrial 
upgrading (Lüthje et al. 2013; Butollo 2014) – all of which goes hand in hand with 
defensive labour struggles.349 Before I discuss in more detail how Company X/JV2 
dealt with its expansion into the 2010 hotbed of autoparts strikes in section 1.2. , I 
will shed light on another peculiarity stemming from the rapid expansion in China. 
This takes us back to Company X/JV2’s training schemes and its flexible 
managerial command over labour.  
 
1.1.  Expansion and Labour Turnover 
In a globally unique system Company X/JV2 concentrated the training of all 
workers, independent of their employment statuses, at the Northern main plant, 
before they were redeployed to the subsidiaries in the West and South.350 
Aggravated by its extensive use of short-term interns, the production run ups in 
the West and South implied that huge sections of the workforce would be 
periodically replaced. 
                                                        
349 Chairman Deng summarised this development as follows: “I am dealing with the calculation at 
the moment, but I believe that in the Pearl River Delta there are daily strikes of different sizes. 
Those sensational enough to attract mass media are few but smaller strikes are common 
occurrences. [They agglomerate] in autoparts, electronics, garments, toys and transportation – in 
fully foreign-owned enterprises. Two aspects account for most of the strikes: first, higher wages 
and better welfare; second, when an OEM relocates out of the Delta, workers are unwilling to 
relocate, so they demand compensation from the company. But the company argues that it did not 
dismiss you, and you could accompany it. These OEM – electronics, garments, toys – usually have 
humble profits. They cannot afford the increase of all sorts of costs in the area. That’s also why 
Foxconn gradually moves its factories out of the Delta, because of the low profits. The government 
also encourages such kinds of enterprises to leave for reasons of industrial upgrading.” Interview 
Chairman Deng. 
350 Interview German senior manager Vogt. 
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When Company X/JV2 decided to expand into the West, it hired 3,500 local 
workers and sent them to the Northern plant for training, before construction of 
the plant itself was finished. Usually, the investment in training staff prior to its 
productive utilisation is considered to be too costly. However, the booming market 
situation in China gave rise to the coincidence between expanded demand for 
workers at the Northern plant and the training requirements in the West. Future 
workers of the Western plant could thus be utilised productively in the North 
while receiving their (anyway limited) training. Though the training in the 
Northern plant would not correspond fully to the production requirements in the 
Western one – due to the different range of models in the North – this arrangement 
was still preferable to training local personnel at the German headquarters, which 
was for example the chosen procedure for the recently opened US plant. Similarly, 
the Southern Chinese plant hired 280 local workers prior to the opening in mid-
2013 and sent them to the North for training.351  
 
The specific arrangement of shifting thousands of workers from one plant to two 
other facilities – new production launches in Western China and in the South 
occurred almost simultaneously – led to significant challenges in the North, as a 
large part of the workforce needed to be replaced once or, in some departments, 
twice a year, depending on the length of the internships. German managers of the 
assembly department in the North complained because the personnel strategy is 
developed independently of their requirements. Meeting production targets could 
thus become a challenge in times of high turnover: 
 
“At the moment when you recall, let’s say, 2000 or 3000 [workers], the 
departments in the North get a massive problem too. Because they have had the 
colleagues on the job, in training, in special processes. They play an active role – 
they build cars there! Now you take them away again, replacing them with new 
ones. Hence, this is an unbelievably challenging task, which, for this location 
[West], developed with, let’s say, one or the other obstacle, but overall truly 
superbly – if we consider the first phase, well, first and second phases. We had to 
struggle pretty hard though, because the production departments were of course 
                                                        
351 Interview (1) German senior manager Pietsch. 
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not interested in releasing people who are qualified. They hold fast – and we pull. 
Indeed, now and then one had to go through the board of directors.”352 
 
If the planned turnover due to training requirements was already creating 
problems, the situation was aggravated by the regular replacement of interns that 
were hired across the board for normal operations, but also functioned as 
temporary placeholders for workers relocated to the Western plant. This issue was 
criticised by German managers at Company X/JV2, in particular as due to the 
German-Chinese managerial division of labour, their influence on human resource 
management was strongly limited. A German manager at the Northern main plant 
explained the rationale behind that system:  
 
“One does simply save a lot of money: ‘interns’ they are called, working for six 
months – in comparison, a permanent worker with 10 years of experience would 
earn two and a half times as much. […] In Germany one would have said: ‘due to 
quality concerns I cannot simply exchange a large batch of the workforce every six 
months’, but that is exactly what happens here. That adds to profits, but the 
Germans are vehemently against it. But 60% of the shares belong to the Chinese JV 
partner, so they do it. […] But, if I really want to have quality, I cannot simply 
exchange the team, I would say a third of the team, every six months! But that’s 
what makes for high profits [shrugging his shoulders].”353 
 
The challenges that labour turnover produced in the Northern main plant were 
however not felt in the new Western plant, which was still in the process of 
commencing serial production. A German manager at the Western plant put it 
quite simply:  
 
“Turnover doesn’t matter. We constantly enlarge production at this stage and thus 
have a constant inflow of new employees. If some people leave, we simply hire a 
few more.”354  
 
                                                        
352 Interview German senior manager Wendler. 
353 Interview (2) German senior manager Pongrac. 
354 Interview German senior manager Bohnert. 
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That is, Company X/JV2’s expansion strategy rested on unilateral control over 
labour, which allowed it to employ workers on short-term contracts or internships 
and to relocate them flexibly between plants. 
 
1.2.  Strike Vaccination: Unionism at Company X/JV2’s Southern Plant 
That Company X/JV2 opened a new subsidiary immediately in the hotbed of the 
2010 strike wave did not imply that it considered the danger of labour unrest to be 
negligible. Quite the opposite was the case as Company X/JV2 reacted to the strike 
wave in two ways. In an offensive move against its competitors, it spread rumours 
of ordinary workers at its new Southern plant having the possibility to earn wages 
of up to ¥5000 within three years (Anon 2010b). When asked about this number, 
chairman Peng at the Northern plant however replied:  
 
“I don’t know where you got this number from. That does not seem plausible.”355 
 
Apart from the fact that Company X/JV2’s intention to actually pay such wages 
therefore seems rather dubious, the rumours alone were enough to give workers 
at Honda an important reference point in the collective bargaining rounds after 
2010.356  
 
In a defensive move, Company X/JV2 began to prepare itself for the possibility of 
strikes at its new Southern location. When asked on his perception of the 2010 
strike wave, chairman Peng of the enterprise union at Company X/JV2’s main plant 
emphasised that the conditions in the South and the North were very different. In 
the North the majority of the workers were local residents with stable families, 
which had a “harmonising” effect on labour relations. At the Honda plant in the 
                                                        
355 Interview Chairman Peng. 
356 Chairman Li explained: “There is fierce competition in the auto industry. In the South Japanese 
auto companies prevail. Since Company X/JV2 moved into the district right next to Honda, it 
strengthened Honda workers’ demands for income raises. The first strike of Honda had nothing to 
do with Company X/JV2, but it has influenced more or less every single strike at Honda afterwards, 
because Company X/JV2 proclaimed to raise workers’ income to ¥5000 within three years. So 
workers at Honda would take that into account when making their demands. It is more than double 
of what Honda workers’ wages are after seven rounds of collective bargaining.” Interview Chairman 
Li. 
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South on the other hand, workers were temporarily employed and came from all 
over the country – “wages are very important to them; and fluctuations can result 
in disaffection and strikes.”357 Pointing out that he had, in fact, dedicated time and 
effort to “analyse the situation,”358 he was worried about the more heterogeneous 
composition of the workforce in the South. Already in 2013, before the factory was 
fully operational, the workforce was composed of local residents; relocated 
workers from the Northern main plant; and workers from an additional eight 
provinces. Tensions in this case were indeed likely to rise, in particular for 
relocated workers from the North, as their wage level would be held constant, but 
they would now find themselves in an area that ranged amongst the top ten most 
expensive cities in China. Chairman Peng’s hope was therefore that similar 
“harmonising” effects would over the long run result from workers with long-term 
contracts settling down and building a family in the South.359  
 
Apart from these hopes that were rather detached from managerial influence, 
Company X/JV2 pursued the strategy of consulting the local trade union in the 
South over mechanisms of strike prevention.360 Chairman Deng – who shortly after 
my interview would visit Company X’s German headquarters for an exchange on 
industrial relations in Germany and China – explained:  
 
“They [Company X/JV2] are aware of potential competition and dangers. Because 
they know that strikes are common in the area that they are moving to, they also 
fear seeing them in their own branch. So they invited me to tell them particularly 
how to prevent strikes.”361  
 
In this communication process, certain rivalries surfaced: both enterprise and 
district union insisted that it was their respective responsibility to represent the 
                                                        
357 Interview Chairman Peng. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Interview Chairman Peng. 
360 Managerial consultation of unions or labour NGOs for the sake of strike prevention does in fact 
not seem to be an isolated case. In September 2015 the German Chamber of Commerce in China, for 
example, offered a seminar for German managers with a Chinese labour lawyer and a 
representative of a labour NGO on “Strikes – Strategies and Risk Prevention from a legal 
perspective & the Role and Function of NGOs.” (German Chamber of Commerce in China 2015) 
361 Interview Chairman Deng. 
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workforce at Company X/JV2’s Southern plant. Although these issues were also 
linked to the question of who collected the union dues,362 the real contention was 
rooted in the inclusive-corporatist approach of the provincial and district union on 
the one hand, and the hierarchical style of the Company X/JV2 union on the other. 
Chairman Li of the municipal ACFTU in the South elaborated the differences with 
an anecdote: 
 
“Two years ago I went to Shanxi for a national conference of union chairmen, 
where I argued that both buttocks of the union should be sitting on the workers’ 
chair, rather than one on the side of management. And immediately I was 
challenged by the union chairman of the Northern city [where Company X/JV2’s 
main plant is located], who argued that unions should be neutral, rather than 
siding with workers. So here you can see, if the chairman of the city union 
embraced neutrality, what else could you expect from the Northern way of dealing 
with labour issues?”363 
 
What emerged from this dispute was that the Company X/JV2 union retained full 
control over the internal affairs of the enterprise, while local unions merely 
assisted, consulted and provided information. Chairman Deng of the provincial 
union emphasized that Company X/JV2 would receive notice if relevant 
information was gathered through the internet surveillance system installed after 
2010. He also stressed that, even though he was displeased with Company X/JV2 
insisting on relying on “staff that they fly in all the way from the North, while it 
takes us one hour to reach the Southern plant,”364 they could rely on the local 
unions if push came to shove:     
                                                        
362 Chairman Li explained: “This problem here is not uncommon. According to national union 
stipulations, the enterprise union is supposed to be under control of the local district union. But JV2 
wants it to be different, which has to do with the distribution of union fees. Because if JV2 
subordinates its enterprise union to the district union, the fees will be distributed to the district 
authority, and not to Company X/JV2’s Northern headquarters. So there is conflict of interests in 
terms of finances. But this situation will change on August 1st this year when a revision of the law 
comes out that requires companies to pay their taxes on the basis of an inclusion of union dues, 
which means that the union at JV2’s headquarters will probably lose this part of its income. 
However, it would still retain direct control of its union in the South. But I still think that since the 
Northern headquarters are miles away from here, if the enterprise union does not cooperate with 
the district union, it will not be able to run functionally.” 
363 Interview Chairman Li. 
364 Interview Chairman Deng. 
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“If there was a strike in Company X/JV2’s branch in the South, we would still be 
there for them anyway.”365  
 
Though workers played no active part, neither immediately nor through the union, 
in the decision-making process on the expansion and new locations of Company X 
in China, the potential risks of strikes at its new Southern plant caused Company 
X/JV2 to consider preventive measures. Despite its opposition to the union reform 
efforts in the Southern province, it approached union leaders and ultimately found 
a compromise, which allowed it to maintain its unilateral and vertical management 
style, while drawing on the resources of the local union structure. The strategy 
chosen by Company X/JV2 is not surprising and the example arguably tells us more 
about the flexibility and actual purpose of trade union reforms in China, namely 
the creation of intermediary channels to appease labour conflict and prevent 
strikes. 
 
2.  Power Relations and the Spatial Organisation of Production 
at Company X in Mexico 
The present collective contract applies only and exclusively 
 to the industrial unit under the ownership of Company X  
that is located at… 
– 2010-2012 Collective Contract of Company X in Mexico  
 
That labour cost was not the decisive factor in the calculus on plant locations is of 
course a case-specific result of the large Chinese domestic market. 366  In 
comparison, Company X’s recent projects in Mexico were more strongly driven by 
cost considerations, and – as the overall share of labour in total cost is very low – 
by questions of flexible control over the production process. Local and central 
governments attempted to shape the geographical distribution of operations in 
                                                        
365 Ibid. 
366 In the late 1990s Company X for example took advantage of lower labour costs stemming from 
the devaluation of the Brazilian real to relocate a large part of its South American production 
facilities from Argentina, which maintained its currency pegged to the dollar (Tuman 2003, p.38). 
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Mexico in similar ways to the Chinese case, but union politics and worker agency 
played a more significant role in the actual application of Company X’s “spatial fix”. 
 
At the time of my fieldwork, Company X was developing two new projects in 
Mexico: an engine plant in the North, opened in early 2013 and about to commence 
pre-serial production; and a new terminal assembly plant for Company X’s upscale 
brand, for which construction was underway within the same local state, about 
forty miles from the main plant. Contrary to China, the union shaped the decision-
making process on the geographical location by means of its influence on 
industrial relations, working conditions and salaries. The context in which the 
particularities of this expansion unfolded was, once again, a hangover from the 
1992 alteration of the collective contract, respectively the inability of Company X’s 
workers and union to muster sufficient strength and tactical coordination to de 
facto disable a central post-1992 clause: the limitation of the Company X collective 
contract to the single industrial unit of the main plant. The former 2000-2008 
general secretary of the Company X union put this into the context of what he 
perceived to be a cyclical recurrence of large-scale clashes between enterprise and 
workers: 
 
“My theory is that because a collective contract lasts for 10 years, the enterprise 
wants to implement important changes after each 10-year period. And because it is 
unable to achieve these changes through the regular contractual revisions, it 
creates a conflict. These conflicts usually take the form of intra-union conflicts, that 
the enterprise uses as a pretext to impose its plans as desired. […] In ´81 this 
concerned outsourcing, the permission to bring in third party providers for service 
and maintenance work – and today, many of these services are in fact in the hands 
of external suppliers, for example the canteen, logistics, civil engineering. In ´92 
they managed to introduce a paragraph whose application we are witnessing at 
the moment, namely that when Company X installs a plant outside the existing 
industrial unit, this plant does not necessarily have to be represented by Company 
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X’s independent union. This is what is happening to the new engine plant – and the 
new upscale brand plant will probably have the same ‘luck’.”367 
 
In fact, the new upscale brand plant turned out to be “lucky” in yet another way, 
which was the outcome of the particular strategy of the Company X union after its 
experience with the case of the engine plant. Although Company X’s rationale 
behind both projects was the reduction of labour costs and de-regulation of 
working time, in the following both projects will be addressed separately. 
 
2.1.  The Engine Plant in North Mexico 
At the time of my fieldwork the 2012-2016 central committee had succeeded the 
2008-2012 leadership. Construction works at the new engine plant in the North 
had finished and Company X began to gradually staff the facility towards the end of 
the year. By that time it had surfaced that workers at the new plant would neither 
be hired under the collective agreement of Company X’s main plant nor be 
represented by Company X’s independent union. Instead, the titularidad – union 
recognition and responsibility for the collective contract – had gone to the CTM. 
The actual course of events that had led to this situation was still not fully 
transparent to either scholars or workers at that time, and the new union 
leadership was eager to present its own particular interpretation. The following 
account is based on my interviews and observations, but greatly indebted to 
Antonio Espinal Betanzo’s detailed reconstruction of the case (2015).368  
 
It is difficult to satisfactorily determine the reasons for the decision to locate the 
new plant in the North, rather than at the location of the main plant. While the 
managerial response was simply that “there is no more space here for an extension 
                                                        
367 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
368 Espinal Betanzo undertook research on the historical changes of industrial and union-worker 
relations at Company X at the same time I carried out my fieldwork. We discussed our findings on 
multiple occasions.   
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of the plant,”369 the 2012-2016 union leadership pointed to the lack of preferential 
policies offered by the local government:  
 
“It was different with the engine plant and the preceding PRI government. […] The 
governor only offered them the building ground and no other benefits – but two 
other states up North did. And one of them [where the plant is located now] also 
has a well developed inland port.”370 
    
Logistics considerations might indeed have played an important role, as the plant 
would primarily produce engines for export to the terminal assembly plant in the 
United States that commenced operations in 2011. However – particularly in light 
of the negotiations on the new upscale brand plant discussed below – the 
introduction of new work regulations, especially a deregulation of working time 
through banco de horas, was most likely a factor in the calculations made by 
management. In addition, according to Juárez Nuñez, the central government – 
more precisely the Secretary of Labour – intervened to lobby for the CTM and the 
location in the North, i.e. a local state notorious for its hard stance on independent 
unions.371 Whatever the reason, the decision on the Northern location was deeply 
troublesome for workers and the union at Company X’s main plant.   
 
There were two accounts of how the union behaved and intervened in this process. 
The first, shared by workers and union representatives prior to and after 2008-
2012, attributed the failure to unionise the Northern plant within the confines of 
the Company X union to strategic and tactical errors committed by the 2008-2012 
union leadership:  
 
“The former general secretary broke off relations with the UNT [Union Nacional de 
Trabajadores, the national union federation Company X joined under the 2000-
2008 central committee] and the IG Metall [the majority union at Company X in 
Germany] and tried to work on his own. […] He did not pay much interest to the 
                                                        
369 Interview Mexican manager Joel. 
370 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016). 
371 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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issue in the North; but all this also coincided with the election campaign for the 
new central committee – and he focussed on his re-election, rather than on the 
new plant opening.”372 
 
While nearly all my interviewees confirmed that the 2008-2012 leadership 
focussed its attention on the main plant, decreasing its efforts to branch out to 
suppliers and the general public, the neglect of international relations has been 
contradicted by the union leader’s own account (discussed in Espinal Betanzo 
2015). According to him, the enterprise offered him the recognition of the 
Company X union at the Northern plant in exchange for acceptance of the banco de 
horas system. When he refused to compromise on this issue, the enterprise in 
Mexico communicated to the German headquarters that the Company X union was 
not interested in representing the Northern plant and that therefore negotiations 
with the CTM would be initiated. This, in turn, brought the IG Metall and the works 
council at the German headquarters onto the scene. Both sent representatives to 
assist the Company X union in Mexico, and invited its general secretary to Germany 
in order to pressure the German headquarters to revoke any agreements with the 
CTM. The IG Metall succeeded in convincing the enterprise to sign the collective 
contract with Company X’s independent union. This implied that the 2008-2012 
union leadership, amongst others, would have had to administer the process. 
While my interviewees, in particular the 2012-2016 union leadership, blamed 
their predecessors for neglecting the issue of the Northern plant over their interest 
in re-elections, Espinal Betanzo argues that it was mistrust between the preceding 
and succeeding leaderships that forestalled the formation of an agreement, 
ultimately leading to a loss of the contract to the CTM (Espinal Betanzo 2015, 
p.239f.). Similarly, Juárez Nuñez, investigating the issue, found that the 2008-2012 
leadership had indeed signed a first agreement, but that the succeeding central 
committee failed to retain it over the course of events unfolding in the spring of 
2012.373 
 
                                                        
372 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016). 
373 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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It does indeed seem plausible that the particular failure to gain union recognition 
in the North is attributable to the 2012-2016 central committee. However, it is 
debateable that this was simply an issue of neglect or misunderstanding. For 
although the new central committee might have failed to take up the issue of the 
agreement again at the beginning of 2012, the event that finally turned the tide 
was a strike of 137 blue- and white-collar trainees at the Northern engine plant in 
April 2012. These trainees, who were funded by a scholarship from the local 
government, approached the CTM over their discontent with working conditions 
and pay (Hernández 2012). The CTM for its part seized the opportunity and 
assisted the trainees in organising a strike, demanding that their situation be dealt 
with by signing a new collective agreement for the plant in the North. This new 
agreement was at that time valid for the entire future workforce, although there 
were no directly employed Company X workers yet (Anon 2012d). The Company X 
union at the main plant was surprised by this move and before the enterprise 
signed an agreement with the CTM only managed to demand that an election on 
the titularidad should be held – a proposal that the local government was eager to 
support. Such governmental enthusiasm was a rarity in itself, and arguably 
indicated that local politicians were anticipating a result in their favour. In effect, 
the Company X union had merely two days to organise its electoral campaign and 
mobilise amongst the trainees:  
 
“When we entered office, the issue of the Northern plant had nearly been lost, and 
we went there to proselytise, talking to the muchachos, asking for their votes. We 
presented ourselves, who we are, how an independent union compares to a 
centralist one, but we were not very successful. When the elections came we 
gained about a third of the votes – but I am sure that if we had had more time, we 
would have gained this collective contract.” 374 
 
                                                        
374 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee, Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016). 
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The Company X union lost the vote, but at the time of my fieldwork was still in 
communication with workers in the North, and considering demanding re-
elections after a certain legal waiting time.375 
 
In hindsight, that the Company X union was unable to establish a foothold at the 
new plant was the result of a chain of events, which, following Espinal Betanzo, 
was set in motion by the union’s inability to retain the deal on the titularidad – 
signed at a moment when the balance of forces was in its favour (i.e. after the IG 
Metall intervention) – through the period of leadership transition. The CTM seized 
this moment to instigate a strike amongst trainees, who were financially 
dependent on the local government, which in turn paved the way for suspiciously 
prompt elections on the titularidad. However, in the absence of more detailed 
information the issue still remains obscure and a final evaluation inconclusive. 
Why, for example, if the 2008-2012 committee had signed an agreement already, 
did the 2012-2016 committee not simply demand its enforcement in the April 
conflict, but instead agreed to the more risky election over the titularidad? 
 
Irrespective of who won union recognition in the North, each opening of a new 
plant presents unions in Mexico with a dilemma that structurally increases the 
room to manoeuvre for the enterprise: when should a collective contract be 
formulated? Although under Mexican law union recognition depends on majority 
support amongst the respective workforce, it is also legal for a company to sign a 
collective contract for an industrial unit before the respective workforce is hired or 
even before the physical facilities exist. An independent union waiting for the 
hiring and election process might therefore result in the enterprise signing an 
agreement with a different, usually management-controlled or state-affiliated 
corporatist, union (CTM, CROM, CROC, FROC) prior to the elections. These 
collective agreements usually take the form of “protection contracts” and offer 
conditions worse than those in comparable independently unionised plants – as 
was the case for Company X’s Northern plant (for details see Table 7). It is this 
dilemma that determined the strategy of Company X’s union in the case of the new 
upscale brand plant. 
                                                        
375 Ibid. 
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2.2.  The Upscale Brand Plant  
Multiple variables need to be factored into the final decision to locate the new 
upscale brand in close proximity to the existing main plant of Company X. In a 
change of the local government in 2011, a coalition led by the PAN came into 
power, which offered substantial preferential policies to Company X, including a 
twelve-year tax break and other infrastructure measures.376 In addition, with a 
projected (initial) workforce of 3,800 blue and white-collar workers, the terminal 
assembly plant had a much higher demand for skilled workers, which could be 
provided through the training facilities at the main plant, as well as through 
unemployed and already qualified automotive workers in the area. Good 
connections to a port on the Atlantic coast and the fact that the upscale brand 
shares supply networks with the existing main plant may have added to the 
decision.377  
 
The union at the Mexican main plant on the other hand was eager to see the new 
plant established in close proximity, figuring that it would increase the likeliness of 
influencing the titularidad in their favour. In the 2013 revision of the main plant’s 
collective contract, the union maintained a compromising stance and agreed on a 
reduction of the individual premium for punctuality in exchange for a new 
collective quality-dependent premium (based on the percentage of cars with B-
type mistakes within one year). Judging by interviews with union personnel 
carried out by Espinal Betanzo, the rationale was to increase chances for attracting 
the new upscale brand plant, signalling to the enterprise that the union was 
committed to proactively co-managing quality problems; and, more generally, 
willing to negotiate and compromise without wider conflict (2015, p.258f.).  
 
Most likely, however, is that the final decision on the location was determined by 
the question of the new plant’s collective agreement. According to Juárez-Nuñez, 
                                                        
376 According to an interview carried out by Espinal Betanzo (2015, p.242), the preceding union 
leader approached the local government once he learned about Company X’s intention to build a 
new upscale brand plant in North America, in order to convince them to intervene in the decision-
making process.  
377 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016), Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
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the German union and works council representatives were eager not to repeat the 
debacle of the Northern plant, and pressured the German headquarters to sign the 
collective contract with the Company X union.378 The Company X union for its part 
sought to ensure the titularidad by compromising on one of the most controversial 
issues amongst Company X workers – the banco de horas:  
 
“Yes, the collective contracts of the engine plant in North Mexico and the one of the 
new upscale brand factory here do have banco de horas. […] If the upscale brand 
brings its collective contract along and we don’t accept it, the CTM, FROC or CROM, 
or some other union will. So we were basically forced to accept banco de horas, in 
order to gain recognition for the collective contract. We managed to negotiate 
some changes, because the company wanted to allocate a huge number of working 
hours to the banco de horas, which we managed to get down to 120, I think [it is 
180 hours]. So once the work commences, we will try to lower this number further, 
which is something that we know they are doing in Germany as well.”379 
 
The twofold pressure of the upscale brand plant being located somewhere else and 
the titularidad going to a rival (and corporatist) union federation caused the 
Company X union to make substantial concessions. These, however, extended far 
beyond the introduction of working time accounts. In comparison to the main 
plant, the collective contract for the upscale brand stipulated lower wages and, in 
particular, lower benefits and allowances; had a longer working week; less 
vacation days; relaxed rules for the employment of third party providers; extended 
discretion of the enterprise over work rules; and a special clause that fixed the 
increase of wages at 5.8%/year, without growth in benefits and allowances or the 
possibility for renegotiation until the year 2019.380 In fact, the contract for the 
upscale brand plant left workers in nearly every regard worse off than their 
colleagues, not only at the main plant but also than the ones at the CTM-unionised 
                                                        
378 Interview Huberto Juárez-Núñez. 
379 Interview Carlos and Oscar, members of the central committee Company X union in Mexico 
(2012-2016). 
380 In case that the inflation rate exceeded 5.5% at the end of the year, or fell 2% over three 
consecutive trimesters, the wage rate would be renegotiated.  
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engine plant (Table 7). The entire procedure as well as the content of the 
agreement caused shock and outrage amongst workers at the main plant:  
 
“Our union leader has announced that the collective contract for the new upscale 
brand factory is already deposited at the Labour Secretariat. Some compañeros 
know the particular clauses, and there are some that implement the banco de 
horas, which they will apply from 2016 onwards – that is, they have signed a 
collective agreement in advance; there are no workers yet, but they have already 
signed an agreement! Impossible! This is simply impossible! A collective contract 
that will be valid for all the workers, but there is not a single worker there at 
all!”381 
 
In both cases of the engine and upscale brand plant, the Company X union failed to 
unionise the prospective new workforces under conditions comparable to the 
standards at the main plant – in the first case because it had to concede the 
titularidad to the CTM, in the second because it felt pressured to water down its 
demands to a compromise that was even worse than the collective agreement of 
the engine plant. Apart from the fact that this casts doubt on the relevance of a 
clear-cut dichotomy between corporatist and independent unions in Mexico, the 
examples illustrate that union agency – arguably rather that of the IG Metall and 
CTM than of the Mexican Company X union – did indeed shape Company X’s spatial 
development in Mexico. How beneficial this has been to the workers of Company X 
is however another story. 
                                                        
381 Interview worker Jesús. 
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 Main plant Upscale plant  Engine plant 
Union Company X  Company X CTM 
Weekly working hours 44, 42, or 40 + overtime (comp.) 48, 45, or 42 + overtime (comp. 
>2h/day, or >6/week) 
48, 45, or 42 + overtime (comp. >2h/day, or 
>6/week) 
Working days/week 5 or 6 6 6 
Shifts 3 shifts; special shifts (comp. norm. shifts: 6th day 
135%, Sun 145%; comp. special shifts: 1 day 120% 
premium; 6th day 135%, if Sun 220%) 
3 shifts; special shifts (comp. Sun 
125%) 
3 shifts; special shifts (comp. Sun 145%) 
Breaks 30 minutes 30 minutes 30 minutes 
Working time accounts No +/- 180h; no limit; application at 
enterprise discretion* 
+/- 100 hours; no more than 2 times 
≤2h/week (50% comp./50% in time 
account); application with union consent* 
Vacation 1-8 years: 14 days (comp. 16/25/29 days);  
9-13 years: 17 days (comp. 31 days);  
14-18 years: 20 days (comp. 31 days);  
after that 3 days for each 5 years; 
1 year: 6 days;  
2 years: 8 days; 
3 years: 10 days; 
4 years: 12 days; after that 2 days 
for each 5 years until max. 24 
days; (comp. 125%) 
1 year: 7 days;  
2 years: 9 days; 
3 years: 11 days; 
4 years: 13 days; 
5-9 years: 14 days;  
after that 2 days for each 5 years; (comp. 
200%) 
Paid leave Marriage: 5 days (+ $700);  
Birth: 2 days (+ $700);  
Death of parent/partner/child: 3 days (+ $700);  
Union duties; Sports  
Marriage: 2 days;  
Birth: 2 days; 
Death of parent/partner/ 
child: 2 days 
Marriage: 2 days;  
Birth: 2 days; 
Death of parent/partner/child: 2 days 
 
Work on rest days Requires union consent (comp. as overtime + 6th 
day/Sun premium) 
At enterprise discretion (added to 
time account) 
Union notified (added to time account) 
Third party providers Outside regular tasks; services (further restrictions 
apply; union needs to be notified) 
Outside regular tasks; services; 
“quality stabilisation”; temporary 
increases in demand  
Outside regular tasks; services 
Lowest/highest daily 
wage 
176/605 (includes separate grades for team 
leaders) 
180/500 (+ 2 days salary/month 
for team leaders) 
180/360 (+ 10% for team leaders) 
Remuneration Meritocratic (evaluations: 9 months; ascend along 
wage grade) 
Meritocratic (evaluations: 6 
months; bonuses)** 
Seniority/meritocratic (12 months; ascend 
along wage grade, given targets fulfilled) 
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Benefits/allowances Health and life insurances above legal minimum; 
food stamps: $2039/month; savings account: 
$150/month; educational material: $1,254.84/year; 
Christmas bonus 58 days salaries; stipends for 
workers enrolled in further studies; lottery for cars; 
lump sum paid to union for each sports and cultural 
promotion 
Social security as legally 
stipulated 
Life insurance above legal minimum; 
Food stamps: pesos 510/month; Christmas 
bonus 20-30 days salaries 
Premiums/bonuses Punctuality (monthly/yearly); since 2013: quality; 
Profit sharing: 14 days salaries in Dec; 18 days 
salaries in May 
Team: ≤5% of monthly wage each 
for quality/quantity; 
Individual: ≤5% of monthly wage 
after half year evaluation; profit 
sharing according to law 
Profit sharing according to law 
Transport/Food Transport paid by enterprise/canteen price $5.41 Proportionally paid by workers Transport not stipulated; canteen price 
10% of daily minimum wage in Mexico City 
Voluntary retirement 
compensation 
≥17 years seniority: 3 months salary + 20 days 
salaries/year of seniority 
6-3 months salary before age 60-
63 
No stipulations 
Layoffs As legally stipulated As legally stipulated + if internal 
work rules violated*** 
Mechanisation; economic reasons (union 
notified) 
“Social stability pact”  - 2012-2019; wage increase: 5.8%; 
stagnant benefits and allowances 
2013-2015; increase of wages, benefits and 
allowances: inflation + 1.5% 
Table 7: Collective contracts at Mexican plants of Company X Group 
Source: Collective contracts of Company X’s plants in Mexico  
* The banco de horas at Company X’s upscale brand plant recorded hours below or above the regular working week up to a limit of 180 hours. Time exceeding the 
regular working day/week by two/six hours was not recorded in the time account, but paid at regular overtime rates. As long as the account did not reach 180 
positive hours, the respective additional working time was compensated at a normal rate. Once the account showed 180 hours, it was cleared and the worker paid 
the overtime benefits. Time accounts were reset every four years, all respective positive hours compensated, negative ones transferred to the next period. If the 
employment relationship terminated, positive hours were compensated and negative ones deducted from the worker’s salary (§12,  Collective Contract upscale 
brand of Company X in Mexico). The banco de horas at the Northern engine plant was similar, but stipulated a threshold of 100 hours; was cleared every year; and 
compensated half of the hours in the time account as overtime (§19, Collective Contract Northern engine plant of Company X in Mexico). 
**Although the contract specified different wage grades, it did not stipulate what criteria determine which wage grade individual workers were allocated to. 
*** This referred explicitly to a violation of the “social stability pact” attached to the collective contract, which stipulated the latter’s irreversibility until 2019 (i.e. 
any action on the side of the union to revise the agreement can be interpreted as a violation, justifying dismissal). 
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2.3.  Intra-company Competition and Pressure on Labour 
The clear contractual discrepancies between the different plants increased the 
structural power of management, by putting workers at the main plant under 
competitive pressure. Worker Miguel explained: 
 
“Economic pressures, and the pressure within the [Company X] Group, will begin 
to harm us through a strategy in which they will make us compete with the upscale 
brand plant for orders and jobs. Independent of what happens in the global 
economy, now we also have to be concerned about the local economic situation. 
For years Company X has tried to change the working conditions here, but for one 
reason or another they have not managed, at least not totally, to make our contract 
disappear in order to lower costs. They couldn’t do it. Now, these two new 
strategies put us under pressure, if we want it or not, with this stupidity of ‘If you 
don’t give in, there are others that will do it more cheaply.’ We do not know the 
wages they have in US City XY at the moment, but those they had at the beginning 
were well under the average of what they pay in the North American car industry. 
The new upscale brand plant will also pay much less than the Mexican average. 
Hence, if we want it or not, this puts a lot of pressure on us at Company X in 
Mexico.”382 
 
In the long run, it is therefore likely that the new plants will put workers at 
Company X’s main plant under growing pressure to water down the collective 
agreement. However, Company X also embraced the utilisation of space as a 
managerial lever for increasing intra-workforce competition on a smaller scale. 
Most factory compounds of Company X in China and Mexico possessed multiple 
departments of the same type. Modern greenfield sites for example were 
deliberately designed to allow for the “mirroring” of the factory in the process of 
increasing productive capacity and the introduction of new models – i.e. an exact 
copy of the existing productive facilities would be constructed on an already 
acquired neighbouring plot of land. As a by-product, the mirroring increased 
                                                        
382 Interview worker Miguel. 
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internal competition within the workforce of the plant, as workers’ performance in 
each plant section would be compared to the other. For workers in one section of 
the plant there was always the threat that particularly lucrative orders – those 
with overtime (if overtime is paid accordingly, which is not always the case in 
China) – would not be placed in their area, but in the other. In the Mexican case, 
workers from the East factory were for example allowed to share in the overtime 
of a project in the West factory, but when the distribution of work was reversed, 
workers of the West factory were not invited to partake in the benefits accruing to 
the East factory.383  
 
3.  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have discussed the geography of Company X’s operations in China 
and Mexico under the particular question of the rationale for its spatial 
reorganisation. I have demonstrated that the case of Company X does not show 
evidence of capital relocation proper. The opening of new plants coincides with 
neither a disinvestment in other regions nor with a downsizing of productive 
capacity (although this might occur in the future). It is pure and simple expansion. 
Power relations between local and central policy makers, capital and labour, 
respectively the processes of relational agency between them, have shaped the 
rationale and effects of Company X’s expansionary drive to diverging degrees in 
China and Mexico. 
 
In the Chinese case, at least of Company X/JV2, this is straightforwardly driven by 
considerations of market access. Pace Silver, Company X/JV2 neither employs a 
“spatial fix” in response to problems of labour control nor as a result of cost-push 
factors, including labour costs, as it pays roughly the same wages at all of its plants. 
Arguments of a profit-squeeze do also not hold fully – although profit margins 
were shrinking due to competition and saturated markets, Company X did not 
abandon or downsize facilities with lower profit rates in exchange for an 
expansion in new locations (although this might happen in the future). This 
however did not mean that considerations of labour and worker agency were 
                                                        
383 Interview worker Daniel. 
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delinked from this spatial dimension. First, Company X/JV2 benefitted from 
rumours about the earning potentials for ordinary workers at its new Southern 
plant, which put pressure on its competitors, as workers began to utilise an alleged 
¥5,000 salary as a reference point in their collective bargaining rounds. That this 
strategy would ultimately drive up the wage level for all companies in the area was 
apparently less of a concern.  
 
Secondly, the speed of the expansion posed challenges of adequate hiring and 
training to Company X/JV2, which it solved in a unique way by circulating 
thousands of workers between its headquarters and the new subsidiaries and 
keeping a flexible stock of interns to compensate for any personnel bottlenecks. 
This strategy required management’s unilateral command over labour in terms of 
hiring and firing, and labour force allocation between different geographical 
locations.  
 
Finally, Company X/JV2 began to realise that its vertical management style could 
backfire when it moved to regions with higher labour turnover and strike activity. 
It therefore sought the assistance of the provincial and city union in the South – 
famous for their allegedly “labour-friendly” stance (Friedman 2014c) – to learn 
from their experience with strike mediation and prevention through inclusive 
channels. In effect the Company X/JV2’s enterprise union retained full authority 
over factory-internal affairs, while the local union federation offered its support by 
sharing its intelligence on strike activity, and by remaining on standby for a 
potential ad hoc intervention in case of a strike.    
 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the main reason for the particular geographical 
choices were indeed labour cost and control related – echoing some of Silver’s 
arguments. As in the Chinese case, the main protagonists in the decision making 
process were local policy makers and management, but Mexican and German 
workers’ representations and rank and file workers had a more proactive role. In 
the case of the engine plant the action of central and local policy makers affected 
the decision to locate the engine plant in the North, while critical strategic 
mistakes and coordination problems within the Company X union, aggravated by 
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effective manoeuvres of the CTM, gave management sufficient leverage to achieve 
the unionisation of the plant outside the Company X union and the collective 
contract. This provided a precedent for the new union leadership and the Company 
X union in Germany when it came to the negotiation of the location of the upscale 
brand plant. In this case the union chose to take a cooperative stand, which, given 
that the German union mustered sufficient pressure, succeeded in having the plant 
represented by the Company X union, but on the basis of a collective contract far 
inferior to the agreements at the main plant and even the engine plant. The most 
likely effect is that workers at the main plant in Mexico will come under increasing 
pressure to lower the standards of the collective agreement in the future.   
 
Returning to the initial question, working conditions and labour-capital relations 
converged between the Chinese subsidiaries of Company X/JV2, as market access 
was the driving momentum behind its geographical expansion. In Mexico on the 
other hand, a divergence in these issues – i.e. an exploitation of local idiosyncrasies 
– has most likely been the reason why Company X chose the particular spatial 
organisation for its new subsidiaries. The agency of workers and unions in Mexico 
clearly had effects on a negotiation process dominated by policy makers and 
capital, while these aspects were absent but anticipated as potential future events 
by Company/JV2’s management in China. In short, the agency of workers and 
unions modulated the development and outcomes of Company X’s recent 
expansion, but the critical decisions remained concentrated in the interactions of 
policy makers and managers. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Through a comparative case study of a global automotive manufacturer and its 
subsidiaries in China and Mexico, this study has engaged with the puzzle of a 
transnational company’s institutional resilience, i.e. its adaptation – or lack thereof 
– to local political economic conditions. It has further addressed the research gap 
identified in the existing institutionalist and state-centric explanations of 
institutional convergence and divergence by studying the contribution of worker 
agency to these processes. By asking how, why, and under which conditions 
worker agency has shaped the convergence and divergence of Company X’s 
operations in China and Mexico, it has provided empirical evidence for instances in 
which processes of relational agency between workers and other social agents 
have led to unintended consequences in the company’s strategic development and 
day-to-day operations. I have argued that the main trajectory of the effect of 
worker agency on the company is a deflection of the agency of managers and 
policy makers. In addressing these questions, I examined broader institutional and 
structural conditions of worker agency in both China and Mexico, and contrasted 
them with episodes and instances of worker agency on and beyond the shop floor. 
In doing so, I have demonstrated that workers creatively mobilise institutions and 
structures, such as overtime or alternative sources of income, in order to increase 
their leverage against, or to evade, the agency of other social agents. I have argued 
that these forms of mobilisation often defy the behaviour that less labour-focused 
and/or more static readings of the institutional matrix would have predicted. I 
have shown that different forms of worker agency can trigger such a deflection to 
greater or lesser extent: large-scale open conflict and strikes; defiance; evasion; 
exit; and negotiation, albeit in a mediated form through trade union 
representatives. On the other hand, I have identified areas in Company X’s 
operations in the global South where workers have had hardly any influence, 
particularly the technological composition of the production process.  
 
This study therefore contributes empirically to an enhanced perspective “from 
below” on industrial development, enriching seminal studies on the case such as 
the works of Zhang (2014), Montiel (2001, 2010) or Juárez-Núñez (2005, 2006). 
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Crucially, it embraces a comparative perspective on Company X in China and 
Mexico to move beyond the realm of national specificities to which the 
aforementioned studies remain wedded, and to put the idea of company-specific 
“profit strategies” and “productive models” to the test. The empirical findings lead 
to a reconsideration of the driving forces of industrial development and “varieties 
of capitalism”, implying that a move beyond explanations based on a dynamic 
state-capital nexus; the conceptual development and comparison of static 
institutional ideal-types; or patterns of cyclical recurrences is demanded.  
 
In this conclusion I will briefly review the main findings of the thesis, paying 
particular attention to the structural conditions which constrain and enable 
processes of relational agency to affect outcomes, before looking at how and why 
such processes play out differently, with important implications for institutional 
convergence and divergence. I will then tease out the implications of my findings 
for both existing theories and for theory-building going forward, before turning to 
the implications for policy design. Finally, a section on the unavoidable limitations 
of this thesis and desirable avenues for future research will conclude this chapter. 
 
1.  Key Findings 
1.1.  The Conditions for Relational Agency 
Throughout this study I have argued that the relevance of comparative 
institutionalism, as well as Silver (2003) and Wright’s (1985) forms of workers’ 
“structural power”, are useful tools to chart a heuristic map of conditions that 
could potentially be mobilised as resources in processes of relational agency. 
However, for an explanation of historical change, an analysis of the latter is 
demanded, which remains external to the theoretical and methodological edifice of 
institutionalism, structuralist Marxism and Silver’s WST. In the following section, I 
will briefly recapitulate the most crucial conditions for worker agency identified in 
this particular case study. 
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In chapter 3 I have shown that a labour shortage in China at high levels of 
economic growth versus sustained population growth at a crisis-torn economy in 
Mexico suggested higher levels of workers’ “marketplace” bargaining power in the 
former. On the other hand, different union cultures pointed to higher 
“associational” power in Mexico. In Mexico, the Company X union was a vehicle for 
grassroots activism, although this function was severely curtailed after the 1992 
conflict. In China, on the other hand, the Company X union was essentially party- 
and management-controlled and at best acted paternalistically on workers’ behalf 
– but usually did not object to managerial decisions.  
 
The legal setting for worker agency in both places has recently moved towards 
converging characteristics, albeit from different starting points. Mexico’s “labour-
friendly” laws were reformed to flexibilise work rules, remuneration, and hiring 
and firing, as well as to curtail trade union influence and the right to strike. In 
China, on the other hand, the 1994 labour law – with its loopholes and lack of 
sanctions for transgressions – was reformed over the last decade to widen the 
influence of the ACFTU, to formalise labour relations, and to create legal channels 
for workers’ grievances. Most recent legal reforms, as in the case of the GPRCC, are 
moving closer to a system of legal definitions of (and therefore constraints on) 
worker agency, as exists in Mexico and most other countries.  
 
In chapters 5 and 6, I identified institutional and structural setups on the shop 
floor that appeared to converge at first glance in both cases - meritocratic 
remuneration systems, teamwork, training schemes and time regimes. These 
institutions were however mobilised in different ways by workers and managers. 
The technological composition of the production process varied between Mexico 
and China, and between different Chinese plants. This was determined by multiple 
factors that ultimately narrowed down to questions of cost - labour was just 
another factor in a calculation driven by considerations of demand, output and 
quality. I have argued that technological composition was indeed beyond the 
immediate influence of workers. 
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In chapter 7, I confirmed Silver’s (2003) argument that the “technological fix” of 
just-in-time production increased the vulnerability of terminal assemblers to low 
quality or non-delivery of parts and components. The supply chain therefore 
becomes a nodal point for worker agency, by virtue of strikes potentially having 
severe knock-on effects on other suppliers and lead firms. I have shown that with 
its modular production system, Company X relied on a high degree of outsourcing 
that, at least in theory, made it particularly vulnerable.  
 
Despite its limited value to genealogical explanations, throughout this study I have 
demonstrated the virtues of comparative statics in charting a heuristic map of 
conditions that could potentially be mobilised as resources in processes of 
relational agency. However these heuristics only chart possible outlines of change 
processes, the actualities of which depend, in part, on how processes of relational 
agency actually pan out. 
 
1.2.  How and why worker agency affects institutional change and the 
strategic development of Company X 
I have argued that structures and institutions that at first glance appear as stable 
constraints governing human behaviour, are in fact subject to constant re-
interpretation, reproduction and transformations through the agency of those 
supposed to be governed by them. Following Knafo and Konings (both 2010) I 
have suggested that institutions and structures should therefore be perceived as 
idle agentic capacities that become activated, and a historical force only when they 
are practically mobilised in processes of relational agency. In chapters 5 and 6 I 
have shown that such processes are present in a less visible form in the 
reproduction or gradual change of day-to-day routine operations. In chapters 3 
and 7 I have demonstrated that worker agency can take the form of cataclysmic 
conflicts with stronger implications for institutional and structural change, such 
as? What changes?. And throughout this study I have shown how processes of 
relational agency unfolded along formally defined routes of interest representation 
through unions and other organisations, particularly in the Mexican case. I first 
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summarise the findings of how workers and managers have utilised the existing 
institutions and structures described in the preceding section, namely, labour 
shortage and alternative sources of income. Thereafter, I extract the different 
forms worker agency has taken in these instances, and the effects it has had on 
institutional and structural changes of Company X. 
 
1.2.1.  Mobilising the Conditions for Agency 
The agency of autoparts workers in South China seems to have been influenced by 
a wider labour shortage, but similar strikes have happened at individual autoparts 
suppliers in Mexico as well. The labour shortage in China therefore does not 
provide a strong argument in itself for the outbreak of strikes in individual 
enterprises, but helps to understand why the signal effect of the Honda strike 
could trigger an extensive wave of strikes amongst labour-intensive manufacturing 
enterprises. In Mexico on the other hand, the strikes at Mexparts 3 and 4 remained 
isolated cases, although structural and institutional conditions at other suppliers 
were very similar. Company X specifically did not suffer from a labour shortage in 
either China or Mexico, as its wages compared favourably to alternative forms of 
income. Workers with permanent contracts in both China and Mexico were 
unlikely to exit the company, though in China they more frequently sought in-
house transferrals to less strenuous jobs.  
 
The exception to the latter trend were migrant dispatch workers, who at least 
temporarily saw a viable outside option in a return to the countryside, where they 
or their family still held usufruct rights to a plot of land. In short, migrant dispatch 
workers could mobilise an alternative strategy for reproduction in their favour, 
that fully proletarianised workers with an urban hukou could not. As I have 
demonstrated, one of the effects of this was that a seemingly comprehensive 
training scheme at Company X was in fact deliberately limited for migrant dispatch 
workers (and interns), i.e. groups of workers that were most likely not to stay with 
Company X for longer. 
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Legal institutions played a significant and very direct role in labour conflicts in 
Mexico. The trade union routinely declared strikes to coincide with the annual 
wage bargaining rounds, and management had strikes declared illegal through the 
Secretariat of Labour in 1992 and 2000. While workers hardly used the law in 
practice, for the clandestine group of worker activists it functioned as a discursive 
reference point in their organising efforts amongst colleagues. 
 
I have shown that Company X employed different means to exercise control over 
its supply chain, stemming from the variations in ownership structures between 
Mexico and China. In China, Company X’s joint venture partners had direct 
influence on production and labour relations in the supply chain, as the first tier 
suppliers were part of their wider corporative structure. This could give the 
Chinese side of the joint venture a faster reaction time to deal with issues in the 
supply chain if it was willing to intervene. Company X also departed from lean-
production principles and increased storage capacities as buffers against late or 
non-deliveries of parts and components. In Mexico, on the other hand, Company X 
regulated the supply chain more directly through competition and market 
pressure, which was maintained by having multiple suppliers of similar activities 
compete with each other. In this case, Company X influenced strikes at its supplier 
units by its potential to withdraw its contract, forcing suppliers to quickly settle 
conflicts with their labour force in one way or another. In both cases, strikes in the 
supply chain either did not occur or had a limited impact on Company X. 
 
A significant area where worker agency in both China and Mexico had no 
immediate effect was the technological composition of the production process. 
While particular techno-organisational changes could be a response to disruptions 
caused by worker agency as Silver and the operaists have argued (Silver 2003; 
Tronti 1974; Alquati 1974; Panzieri 1980), or could empower workers through the 
comparably easy way of disruption flow and lean production systems; but, I found 
that workers had no influence on the implementation of technology itself in either 
China or Mexico.  
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Worker agency has affected institutional and structural changes at Company X and 
beyond through three different pathways. These differ according to the level of 
confrontation seen, which can vary from formal union negotiations to hidden acts 
of refusal to open conflict. The outcomes in each case are quite different, ranging 
from a extensive reshuffling of the institutional matrix, to compromise solutions or 
smaller-scale effects. 
 
1.2.2.  Cataclysmic clashes 
As I have demonstrated through the reconstruction of the 1992 conflict, the strikes 
at Mexparts 3 and 4, and the aftermath of the 2010 strike wave in South China, 
cataclysmic clashes between workers, union leaders, managers and policy makers 
set off institutional and structural changes on and beyond the shop floor. They 
thereby created a certain (soft) path dependency for the future development of 
Company X and transformed the conditions for the agency of all stakeholders 
through new rules and regulations. I have emphasised two important aspects in 
this context.  
 
In 1992 in Mexico, Company X mobilised the legal and repressive capacities of the 
government, and was therefore able to implement the changes it desired to a large 
extent. However, due to strong grassroots resistance, it could not do away entirely 
with the union and its influence over wage setting and contract negotiations. This 
implied a continuous, albeit reduced presence of formal channels for worker 
agency on the shop floor. In the struggles at Mexparts 3 and 4, on the other hand, 
workers gained certain short-term concessions, which were eventually cancelled 
out by union corruption, or in the case of Mexparts 4, subsumed under corporatist 
union control. 
 
In China, the 2010 strike wave caused political instability and financial losses for 
capital and the local government. In reaction to the strikes, Honda managers 
intervened into the supply chain to quickly settle copycat strikes, while ACFTU and 
local policy makers began to implement significant institutional reforms. These 
reforms - such as an emergent collective bargaining system, new preferences in 
 310 
enterprise union elections and a step-up of Internet surveillance - reflected neither 
the demands of striking workers, nor a governmental master plan. Of all the agents 
involved, the changes arguably adhered most closely the interests of ACFTU 
reformers. If anything, the post-2010 reforms in South China have strengthened 
the role of the ACFTU in mediating in labour conflicts.  
 
Second, the emergence of clandestine groups of worker activists in Mexico after 
the 1992 conflict, as well as the 2013 follow-up strike at Honda in China, 
demonstrated that the newly implemented institutions (i.e. legal institutions, 
collective bargaining, etc.) were (so far) unable to restructure the behaviour of 
workers towards greater passivity. The result was a situation of continuous 
discontent at the grassroots, standing in tension with both managerial authority 
and union incorporation.  
 
To summarise, the outcome of these cataclysmic events did not follow a 
predetermined logic – of capital accumulation, pressure on productivity increases, 
a rebalancing of the developmental model etc. – but was an unintended 
consequence of the tactical and strategic behaviour of the involved agents. The 
playing field for worker agency was rearranged as a side effect, but not to a degree 
that made it disappear. 
 
1.2.3.  Acts of defiance and refusal 
While cataclysmic events are by their nature both relatively rare and extremely 
visible, other forms of worker agency are more continuous and harder for 
company management (and researchers) to detect. I have shown how workers’ 
less visible acts of defiance and refusal, in relation to the agency of management, 
had effects on Company X’s day-to-day operations. 
 
As argued in chapter 5, certain forms of agency of both management and workers 
ran into an impasse that rendered some of the institutions governing the 
production process dysfunctional in practice. Although teamwork and quality 
circles were implemented in both the Mexican and Chinese case, their function to 
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motivate workers to pro-actively engage in self-management and productivity 
improvements, was severely impaired due to an authoritarian management style 
from above, which was countered with frustration and a reduction of effort from 
below. Other institutions, such as the aforementioned training schemes at 
Company X/JV2, were adapted to workers’ exit strategies.   
 
Workers also used any room for manoeuvre opened by technological factors, in 
order to get some (even marginal) relief from the exhausting work rhythm. The 
implications for capital were however rather minor – workers in China omitted 
certain tasks they were supposed to do, or used stoppages of the assembly line to 
socialise with their colleagues or even to have a short nap. These instances also 
indicated that workers more generally treated the disciplining efforts of 
management with a certain non-confrontational neglect. 
 
As issues of overtime and overwork were amongst the core grievances of workers 
in both China and Mexico, they also constituted a terrain for struggle, especially in 
the Mexican case. In multiple instances, workers in Mexico refused to do overtime 
when they were disaffected by the behaviour of managerial personnel, usually 
resulting in the union stepping in to negotiate a compromise solution.  
 
The aftermath of the strikes at Company X in Mexico in 1992 and 2000 also 
indicated that workers used less visible forms of resistance, such as sabotage, to 
retaliate against management or as an alternative to a more overt, and hence more 
easily defeated, strike strategy.  
 
1.2.4.  Formal channels 
Of course, worker agency can also manifest itself indirectly through channels of 
formal representation, such as the legal system, political parties or unions. As I 
have shown in chapters 2 and 3 there is a tendency in the literature to approach 
labour as a social agent, if at all, exclusively through the lens of trade unions or 
works councils. Arguing that the autonomy of workers’ representatives can set 
them apart quite significantly from rank and file interests, I have consciously 
 312 
differentiated between the agency of workers and that of union leaders or advisors 
throughout this study.  
 
Confirming findings from the literature on unions in China’s automotive sector 
(Huang et al. 2008; L. Zhang 2014a) I have shown that workers at Company X in 
China regarded the trade union as useless or even counterproductive. This was a 
result both of the unions being under straightforward managerial control and of 
their practical policies on the shop floor, which mainly exhausted themselves in 
the organisation of cultural and social events, measures to improve productivity, 
and in some cases, offering support through telephone hotlines or Internet forums.  
 
In Mexico on the other hand, the Company X union had always been characterised 
by a tension between leadership and rank and file. However, until 1992 it had 
institutions in place that allowed worker agency to take place to a large extent 
within the union structure. After 1992 the intermediate levels of the union were 
severely cut down, which limited the agency of workers within union confines, 
widening the gulf between the central committee and the membership base, and 
allowing management to corrupt union leaders. In periods of “benevolent 
leadership”, as between 2000-2008, union leaders chose to reinstate some of the 
intermediate institutions and revived rank and file activism. As demonstrated in 
chapter 4, the other side effect of the 1992 transformation was the birth of 
clandestine forms of workers organising. 
 
One of the main channels through which unions exert influence on the enterprise 
is collective bargaining and formal negotiations with management. These can 
result in concrete changes though it remains a political question to assess how 
beneficial they actually are to the workforce. The very different union structures in 
Mexico and China unsurprisingly generated quite asymmetric results. In Mexico, at 
times, when the leadership was willing, the union retained the role of a modulator 
of Company X’s developmental strategy through its role in collective bargaining. In 
chapter 5 I have shown that although the union at the Mexican plant lost much of 
its former influence on the shop floor after the 1992 conflict, it retained a crucial 
role in collective bargaining over wages and overall changes to the collective 
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agreement. This could at times deflect the more drastic managerial intentions for 
change into processes with less negative effects on the workforce. Collective 
bargaining also caused the institution of meritocratic remuneration, which was in 
place in both China and Mexico, to function differently in the two cases.  
 
However, I have demonstrated that the results the Mexican union bargained for 
were, in each and every case, substantial compromises that at least the workers in 
the dissident group thought of as insufficient. In chapter 7 I have discussed the 
behaviour of the Company X union in Mexico in the process of the foundation of 
new subsidiaries, and shown that the dichotomy between progressive independent 
and regressive corporatist unions in Mexico does not illuminate much about actual 
union politics and gains for workers. In fact, it rather suggests that the most 
relevant factor is the balance of forces between rank and file versus union 
leadership, and this en bloc against management and governmental authorities. 
With the post-1992 transformation, the Company X union had severed the direct 
link to the grassroots, and therefore lost a form of insurance against its leadership 
pursuing policies similar to those of the CTM. 
 
As I have argued in chapter 7, in the Chinese case, the institutional changes after 
the 2010 strike wave opened up the possibility for the Company X/JV2 union to 
transform its branch in the new Southern plant into a more inclusive corporatism 
through collaboration with the reform-oriented provincial union. It chose not to 
take this route. Instead, the provincial union agreed to offer surveillance of 
workers activism and ad-hoc interventions in case of a strike at Company X/JV2. I 
have argued that this was but one indicator of the ACFTU remaining paternalistic 
and hierarchical, even in its reformed version that aimed at the implementation of 
a collective bargaining system based on a quasi-Fordist linkage of wages and 
company performance. 
 
In sum, the strategies of unions offered ambivalent channels to worker agency, and 
were in certain cases clearly aimed at constraining rather than enabling it. While 
the assessment of these strategies is ultimately a political question, a 
methodological implication is that a comprehensive research programme on 
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labour issues and their social impact has to differentiate clearly between unions 
and ordinary workers – a point that is often neglected in the literature on the 
automotive industry. 
 
1.3.  Issues of convergence and divergence  
We are now able to address the three main questions of convergence and 
divergence. First, what is the likeliness of an emergence of strong automotive 
labour movements in China and Mexico? Second, do the operations of Company X 
in China and Mexico show a convergence with the “Company X model”? Third, if 
not, is there evidence for a convergence between the Chinese and Mexican cases 
that would allow us to speak of a “peripheral model” of Company X’s global 
operations? Not surprisingly, the tension between Company X’s interest in a 
coherent integration of its global operations into a functional system, and its 
interest in an “exploitation of local idiosyncrasies” does not lead to a definite 
conclusion on either convergence or divergence. If at all, dynamics of convergence 
and divergence can be shown for different aspects of Company X’s operations that 
are combined in different ways. In these concrete operations processes of 
relational agency between workers and managers have had a determinate impact. 
 
Of course, a single company case study does not allow for a revision of 
assumptions derived from large data samples, as in Silver’s study (2003). In her 
study of the Chinese automotive industry, Zhang (2014) confirmed Silver’s 
hypothesis of the emergence of strong labour movements, inferring her conclusion 
in particular from the 2010 strike wave. While it is certainly true that the strike 
wave was significant, it has been rather quiet around terminal assemblers in China. 
In Mexico, on the other hand, the labour movement at Company X and beyond 
seemed more dynamic and similar strikes as in the Chinese autoparts sector had 
taken place at Company X’s suppliers. As a prediction of future developments must 
remain speculative, it is arguably better to rephrase the question in terms of the 
conditions for worker agency and the success rate of automotive strikes, which 
seems to be more favourable in the Chinese case due to the conditions of higher 
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profit rates for automotive companies and the persistence of an overall labour 
shortage. It is also important to stress that recent strikes in both cases occurred in 
the supply chain, where conditions bear more similarities with other labour-
intensive sectors such as the electronics industry, than with capital-intensive 
terminal assemblers. It therefore begs the question of whether it is legitimate to 
subsume the 2010 strike wave to a long cycle of automotive sector strikes 
extrapolated from dynamics that occurred primarily when the sector was still 
characterised by a high degree of vertical integration.  
 
The answer to the second question can still be given with relative confidence. In 
the 1990s Streeck spoke of the “beneficial constraints” of German neo-
corporatism: rigid industrial relations would force capital to embrace product 
innovations, investment in transferrable skills, co-determination in corporate 
decision making, and restricted managerial command over labour on the shop 
floor (Streeck 1992, p.32ff.).  In many ways these conditions were epitomised by 
Company X in Germany. However, as we have seen, none of these “beneficial 
constraints” have been transferred to China, and only a few of them to Mexico 
prior to the 1992 conflict, e.g. the stronger union influence on work rules. In the 
Mexican case a divergent pathway was inaugurated by the conflict of 1992, where 
management sought to strengthen its control over shop floor relations by 
diminishing the power of the union and rank and file workers. In China on the 
other hand, divergence was partly a result of the influence of the Chinese joint 
venture partners who followed their own modus operandi, and partly because 
management had full unilateral discretion to determine shop floor relations to 
begin with. In short, the Chinese and Mexican subsidiaries do not converge with 
the Company X model in the aforementioned regards.  
 
The question however is whether the “Company X model” in Germany still is what 
it used to be. The “German” institutional setting that Streeck had in mind in the 
1990s has changed rather substantially over the following two decades (Streeck 
2009, pt.I), providing indications that the “Company X model” has been eroding 
since the mid-1990s, as argued in chapter 3 (Jürgens 2009). The divergence from 
principles of co-determination, the harsher pressure on labour cost and work 
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rules, the segmentation of the workforce, and other dynamics observable in the 
foreign subsidiaries could also be read as effects of a strategic shift in corporate 
governance at the German headquarters. More plausible though, is a reversal of 
the causation: the competitive pressure from divergent foreign subsidiaries on the 
German headquarters has fostered the erosion of the “Company X model” in its 
erstwhile heartland. Either case would indicate that the particular power relations 
and processes of relational agency in the Global South and at the German 
headquarters have co-constitutive effects – the actual causal directions requiring 
further careful investigation of such processes. 
 
However, there is at least one area where one might expect strong convergence 
across all plants, namely the technological composition of the production process. 
Platform strategies and modularisation suggest that similar models will be 
produced in similar processes at different locations. And indeed, at its newer 
plants, Company X consistently deployed state of the art machinery. However, 
because the pressure for technological upgrading has been lower in China and 
Mexico, older models and older machinery are kept alive for longer than in Europe. 
In practice therefore the time at which a given factory is established determines 
the technological means by which production is organised. This point heavily 
qualifies two other widely held assumptions: one, that pressure on productivity 
would lead to continuous technological upgrading; the other that the replacement 
of human labour by machines could be applied uniformly throughout a 
manufacturing plant. The result is that the technological composition in 2012/13 
was still rather different between individual plants, even within one factory 
compound. There was no incremental technological upgrading (yet), partly due to 
technological rigidities (e.g. in the press shop and assembly department), or 
because the pressure to increase productivity and depress real wages was still low 
enough to maintain automation at lower levels for certain models. Still, within the 
technologically imposed constraints, management gave priority to an adaptation of 
the technological composition to local circumstances – e.g. in the body shops in 
China.  
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Regarding the third question, at first glance the institutions supposed to govern 
the shop floor seemed to be rather similar in China and Mexico – meritocratic 
remuneration, teamwork and kaizen processes, in-house training processes, time 
regimes – giving rise to the temptation to speak of a “peripheral Company X 
model”. Additionally, the convergence of autoworkers’ grievances in China and 
Mexico could be taken as an indicator that automotive production indeed recreates 
similar social contradictions across countries. However, two qualifications apply. 
Firstly, workers’ grievances were for the most part so general – insufficient pay, 
exhausting work rhythms, no career options, unfair superiors etc. – that they could 
in fact apply to any manufacturing job, or any form of wage labour. Secondly, as I 
demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, how the institutions governing the shop floor 
worked in reality depended on the particular power constellations and processes 
of agency between management and workers. This could indeed lead to 
convergent results as in the case of the impasse between management and 
workers causing dysfunctional teamwork and processes of continuous 
improvement. It could, however, also take rather divergent forms, where workers 
were able to exert influences on management that were absent in the respective 
other case. Relevant examples of these influences were the retained role of the 
union in wage setting or workers’ overtime refusals in Mexico; the exit strategies 
of migrant dispatch workers affecting training schemes in China; or the role of the 
Mexican union, in concert with the IG Metall, to shape decisions on the geographic 
expansion of Company X.  
 
In sum, the empirical investigation has demonstrated that the 
convergence/divergence puzzle is unresolvable on the level of a comparison of 
ideal typical structures and institutions alone. An understanding of the strategic 
development and operations of transnational companies requires a deeper 
analysis of the power dynamics and actual processes of relational agency between 
workers, managers and other social agents. 
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2.  Theoretical implications 
As mentioned above, the prime motivation for the central research question was a 
theoretical lacuna in the diverse literature seeking to explain processes of 
divergence and convergence in the development of economic institutions. My main 
argument throughout has been that labour relations, and more specifically the 
relational agency of workers, must be ”brought back in” to provide a full and 
coherent explanation of these processes. Having developed and analysed a 
theoretically informed contrastive case study, I can now draw implications for the 
development of theory going forward. 
 
The lack of focus on worker agency and the refusal of whole branches of theory to 
view such agency as relational vis-à-vis capital, contrasts starkly with the amount 
of attention that has been given to the relationship between state and (different 
factions of) capital. It is undeniable that the interaction between central and local 
governments on the one hand and transnational corporations on the other remains 
the determining factor in the initial set-up and external institutional regulation of 
subsidiaries. However, an a priori theoretical and methodological limitation to 
these two factors ignores the capacity of worker agency to at least deflect the 
decision making process between state and capital.  
 
Similarly, as argued above and throughout, the tools of institutional analysis are 
useful in developing the structural framework within which agency can unfold, but 
as I have shown, even that is fraught with danger, especially when actual outcomes 
lie outside of the framework of the expected. While such outcomes can be 
accommodated by the theory to a degree, they cannot satisfactorily be explained. 
The beauty of an institutionalist argument when confronted with deviant agency is 
of course to point out that this deviance is itself an effect of the institutional matrix. 
For our example, institutionalists could argue that workers turn to clandestine 
organising and wildcat strikes precisely because the institutions for their interest 
representation are ineffective and exclusive. Such arguments have to be 
deciphered as sleights of hand, because they can only be made at the expense of 
violating a crucial axiom of institutionalist theory: namely that institutions explain 
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human behaviour. If this axiom is watered down to “institutions shape human 
behaviour, but knowing the properties of the institutions does not allow us to say 
how”, the explanatory value of institutionalist reasoning becomes severely limited 
– and an analysis of actual processes of agency necessary.384 In fact, such a position 
would be very close to what I have proposed in this study, although I set off from a 
different theoretical starting point.  
 
There is thus room for constructive debate, in particular because institutionalists 
are one step ahead of capital-logic or market-logic explanations, offering 
arguments for intra-capitalist variation and therefore avoiding the downplaying of 
divergence under a grand theme of the law of value (or profit). The argument that 
capitalist property relations impose converging constraints on all social agents in 
the form of a necessity to secure their reproduction in the market can, in and of 
itself, not explain how these constraints pan out in reality. On the one hand, there 
is the question of the impact of alternative sources of income or substitutes for 
wage labour, which have not (yet) been subjected to market relations, such as 
subsistence agriculture or unpaid housework – an aspect of particular relevance in 
the Global South. On the other hand, even under an ideal-typical uniform 
capitalism, individual and collective agents still have a range of options to pursue 
different strategies for reproduction – ranging from occupational choices to crime 
– which make for different macro-structural effects. Moreover, there are many 
different ways in which a company can achieve a given rate of return, especially in 
the short and medium term – the necessity to reproduce alone does not condition a 
particular type of behaviour. There is thus always an explanatory gap, which 
structural approaches of any kind can only close by the abandonment of their 
method and an ad-hoc incorporation of historical analysis. The claim as regards 
theory-building is simple: Theory should be treated as a radical heuristic, instead 
of a claim to true representation.  
Developing theory as history, I have provided empirical material that allows for 
such an endeavour, centred on the idea of processes of relational agency. In 
                                                        
384 Similar arguments can be made against utility theory, which of course underlies some of the 
variants of the institutionalism. 
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particular I have shown that workers’ continuous grievances with the exhausting, 
monotonous and heteronomous nature of work constitute an always present albeit 
latent source of conflict that could become acute in strikes and acts of defiance. My 
findings therefore suggest that institutional compromises and productive models 
might be less stable and continuous than widely assumed in the literature; or at 
least that their reproduction rests on a fragile, politically upheld balance of forces. 
In other words, institutions change not (only) because of intrinsic qualities that 
might erode or transform over time (the ideas of institutional layering and 
exhaustion; Streeck & Thelen 2005); or because elite decisions result in the pursuit 
of a different productive strategy (North et al. 2009; Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989). 
Rather, the social foundation on which any productive model rests is based on two 
antagonistic but interdependent strategies of reproduction (through the sale of 
labour power, and through the exploitation of the same) that constantly 
undermine its stability. It is therefore useful to chart these social conditions in the 
form of structural and organisational power, in order to map out the ‘playing field’ 
for the involved social agents. However, this still tells us very little about when, 
how and why these resources, institutions or structures are mobilised in processes 
of relational agency, and even less about what happens if they are. These questions 
cannot be addressed on the level of assumptions on structural forms of power, nor 
on institutional matrices providing an incentive structure for rational 
(employment of) agency. What is required is an agency-centred analysis of actual 
historical processes, beyond their a priori closure as expressions of pre-
determined ideal types or cyclical developmental patterns.   
Finally, rather than intra-theoretical revision, much of the implications to be 
drawn from this study could simply be addressed through a methodological 
commitment to inquire what “non-elite groupings of people actually do” without 
stopping short at this point, but relating it back to its effects on the strategies and 
agency of elites. This requires a move beyond comparative statics and a 
genealogical approach, which in turn necessitates longitudinal observations and 
sufficient empirical data. This in turn, would imply an approach to fieldwork that 
does not only rely on official channels, but rather explicitly seeks out the real, if 
often hidden, activities of non-elite groups through intensive and long-term 
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qualitative study. Re-theorisation could become a productive enterprise once this 
data exists at a sufficient scale to facilitate comparison across different periods and 
spaces. 
   
3.  Policy implications and possible future scenarios  
The policy implications of this study are clearly dependent on the vantage point of 
the respective social agents – governments, managers, union leaders and workers 
would most likely draw different conclusions. The first two perspectives tend to be 
dominant in discourses on development, industrial policy and institution building. 
There are clear implications for both, pertaining to the minimisation and 
containment of industrial strife so as to ensure the smooth flow of production and 
sales. Workers and their representatives on the other hand, are more likely to wish 
to learn from the experience of others engaged in seeking to better their conditions 
at work. However, as argued above, the interests of workers and unions should not 
be conflated. Union leaders might also view themselves as intermediaries between 
the workforce and management, and therefore be more interested in pacification 
of worker agency, formal negotiations, and indirect representation. 
 
Judging by past and recent trends, policy makers in both China and Mexico are 
likely to further mobilise the virtues of trade unionism as a de-escalating channel 
for worker agency, in order to stabilise shop-floor relations characterised by strict 
managerial hierarchies and unmediated coping strategies from below. In areas 
with higher labour turnover and strike activity, such as the location of Company 
X’s new Southern Chinese plant, state-controlled collective bargaining and more 
inclusive enterprise unions have been developed to fulfil these functions. In 
Mexico, where a wider array of unions exist, government and enterprises are likely 
to make a concerted effort to substitute state corporatist for independent unions 
as in the case of Company X’s engine plant or Mexparts 4; to corrupt independent 
unions as in the case of Mexparts 3; or to manoeuvre them into situations in which 
their options are severely constrained, as in the case of Company X’s new upscale 
brand plant.  
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For executives at Company X, the newly opened plants in Mexico and China 
provide a new playing field to implement cooperative unions after the image of the 
German social partnership model in the context of diminished and strictly limited 
influence of rank and file workers. Its interest in social stability within its plants 
thereby coincides with the efforts of local governments and union reformers in 
South China. It is not surprising that it is there that Company X’s German 
headquarters seek communication with trade union officials and labour scholars. 
In light of the retained emphasis on managerial authority in the Chinese and 
Mexican plants however, it is unlikely that a substantial shift towards an inclusive 
unionism that would open up greater room to manoeuvre for the rank and file will 
occur. This also implies that the impasse of pressure from above and resistance, 
refusal and evasion from below will most likely persist.  
 
Implications for workers are challenging. In comparison to the Chinese case, it is 
undeniable that the existence of the union in Mexico opened up channels for rank 
and file activism at times of benevolent leadership; and that, even though 
management curtailed their influence, certain intermediate level institutions – 
such as the divisional representatives – gave workers a certain influence on day-
to-day operations.  On the other hand, the union leadership repeatedly engaged in 
compromise agreements that were ultimately detrimental to working conditions 
and workers’ influence on the shop floor. Against this backdrop, clandestine forms 
of organising seemed a better option for workers in disagreement with official 
union politics. Of course, this comes with certain risks, and is by nature limited to 
small-scale activism or vanguardism. Clandestine organising might also be the only 
feasible option in China, if workers want to avoid incorporation into the 
undeniably top-down controlled, paternalistic ACFTU (even in its reformed 
version).  
 
In short, the political implications to be drawn from this study depend on the 
reader’s perspective and his or her political evaluation of the presented evidence. 
While the interests of governments and businesses might overlap in this regard, 
there is clearly no win-win situation involved in which all agents would benefit. 
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4.  Limitations and avenues for future research 
This study has focused on the relationship between agency and institutions. In 
doing so it has addressed how particular strategies of workers and managers to 
mobilise the structural and institutional conditions they find themselves situated 
in has caused changes in these or other institutions and structures. I have outlined 
areas where worker agency has mattered or could potentially matter, but more 
research needs to be done to reliably determine the relative relevance of these 
processes in comparison to, for example, narratives that focus on the interactions 
of state and corporations. 
 
A limitation of this study has been the qualitative nature of the data collected, 
which confined me to establishing my arguments on logical and historical grounds 
but not on statistically representative ones. Testing these issues through statistical 
methods would require extensive data collection, of the type discussed at the end 
of Section 2, which is notoriously difficult for the automotive sector, particularly in 
China.  
 
Limitations on data collection also pertain to the small, and to a certain extent, 
asymmetrical sample of interviews (in particular the larger amount of interviews 
with management in China) that was partly a result of the sensitivity of the 
research topic and the limited accessibility of the industrial sector. Another factor 
was the comparative cross-country framework of this study, which limited the 
amount of time that could be spent conducting fieldwork on each of these cases. 
However, in my view this disadvantage is made up for by the increase in analytical 
depth and richness that results from the comparison made. To my knowledge, no 
comparative study on working conditions and worker agency in the global 
automotive industry in China and Mexico – and Latin America and Asia more 
generally – exists so far. In order to move beyond single-country studies and their 
tendency to stress the uniqueness of their respective case, these limitations were 
consciously taken into account and tolerated. Clearly, future research could aim at 
an extension of the empirical basis for this study, and increase the number of 
comparisons made in a systematic manner. 
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In chapter 6 I touched upon the relationship between worker agency in the 
machine-building industry, design processes of particular machinery, and their 
social effects in the production processes where they are applied – for example in 
the automotive industry. This issue was necessarily beyond the scope of this study, 
but would make for a worthwhile investigation in the future.  
 
Lastly, readers might argue that the role of the state vis-à-vis capital and labour, for 
example as a facilitator of the general institutional matrix for capital accumulation, 
industrial policy and labour laws, has not been systematically explored or 
compared in its country-specific differences. In this study I have consciously given 
priority to an analysis of the agency of workers, managers and union leaders to 
address the research gap of their interactions in broader discourses on industrial 
policy, varieties of capitalism, WST and structuralist versions of Marxism. Future 
research to elaborate on these relationships might arguably be most productive, 
not in the area of theoretical refinement, but in a closer “worker-centric” historical 
and empirical revision of cases that are results of processes that have excluded 
labour as an explanatory factor. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Trade Relations in the Automotive Industry of China 
and Mexico 
The “rise of China” has caused debate amongst Mexican – and more generally Latin 
American – observers about whether new opportunities for bilateral trade could 
outweigh the potential pressure on domestic producers stemming from cheap 
imports and competition over Mexico’s traditional export markets (e.g. Dussel 
Peters 2005; Dussel Peters & Trápaga Delfín 2007; Dussel Peters et al. 2008). This 
question has more specifically concerned the automotive sector as one of Mexico’s 
largest export industries (e.g. Juárez Núñez 2005b; A lvarez Medina 2007; Rueda 
Peiro 2011; Gachuz 2011; Dussel Peters 2012). Here, we are interested in trading 
patterns not for the question of competitiveness in its own right, but mainly for the 
reason that the “China threat” is a trump card played by management to increase 
its leverage by pitching different locations against each other in negotiations over 
new projects (Juárez Núñez 2006). As the general secretary of the Mexican 
Company X union between 2000 and 2008 remarked: 
 
“All the years, every year at the time of negotiations – publicly through the media 
and internally in the negotiations – Company X threatens that production might go 
somewhere else, not only China, but also Slovakia, Poland, Argentina. There is 
always the threat of losing production, but there is also the threat of not attracting 
new projects. […] So you always have to consider that although this is a fight 
amongst equals, the work should go to Mexico instead of going to China. I think this 
has a huge impact on you having to engage in negotiations over flexibility, 
respectively negotiations convenient to the enterprise.”385 
 
The following section will thus briefly assess how real this threat actually is on the 
basis of data on international trade.  
 
Since the mid-1990s both Mexico and China have become increasingly export 
dependent (Figure 14), up to the degree that the Chinese government has 
                                                        
385 Interview Alejandro, general secretary Company X union in Mexico (2000-2008). 
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announced it will “rebalance” growth through increasing domestic consumption 
and welfare, industrial upgrading, R&D etc. (officially announced with the eleventh 
five year plan and reiterated with the following five year plans, including the most 
recent thirteenth for 2016-2020; Huang 2015). The picture for the automotive 
industry is however rather different, with China running a substantial trade deficit 
(Figure 5), which is however offset by exports from other (light industrial) 
industries and sectors. Mexico on the other hand is a net exporter of finished 
vehicles, which in the majority are exported to North America. Nearly 70% of 
passenger cars made in Mexico and over 90% of autoparts and components were 
exported to the US in 2013 (Table 8 and Table 9). The vulnerability of Mexico’s 
automotive industry is therefore its dependence on the US market, which not only 
implies that demand crises in the US have grave repercussions on the sector in 
Mexico – as seen in 2008-2009 – but also that competitive pressure from foreign 
car manufacturers mainly manifests itself as competition over US market shares. 
As passenger car imports from China go to different and dispersed target markets, 
in this market segment the “China threat” is virtually negligible (Table 8). For the 
time being, China mainly exports domestic brand cars to developing countries, 
because these products, although cheap, cannot (yet) compete with European-, US- 
or Japanese-made cars in terms of quality.  
 
 
Figure 14: Exports as percentage of GDP, China and Mexico 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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 China Mexico   
Rank Destination Value (m USD) Percentage Destination Value (m USD) Percentage 
1. Russia 639.44 15.6 USA 22,148.57 69.1 
2. Iran 408.78 10.0 Germany 2,072.85 6.5 
3. Chile 404.60 9.9 Brazil 1,954.38 6.1 
4. Algeria 245.69 6.0 China 1,386.16 4.6 
5. Ukraine 165.81 4.1 Canada 1,374.82 4.3 
6. Colombia 162.98 4.0 Argentina 801.38 2.5 
7. Peru 157.44 3.8 Italy 219.69 0.7 
8. Uruguay 150.82 3.7 Russia 174.00 0.5 
9. Egypt 123.145 3.0 Colombia 162.98 0.5 
10.  Iraq No data No data Japan 160.04 0.5 
Total World 4,090.20 100 World 32,046.68 100 
Table 8: China and Mexico's top ten export markets for passenger cars 2013 
Source: CAAM 2014, INEGI, OECD.Stat386 
 
 
Table 9: Mexico, foreign trade in autoparts 2013 
Source: INA 2014 
 
However, competitive pressure on the Mexican autoparts industry is indeed 
increasing, as Chinese exports of parts and components to the US have grown 
steadily in recent years – although much more slowly than exports from Mexico 
(Figure 15).  
 
                                                        
386 Ranking for the Chinese top export markets is based on number of units, following CAAM 2014. 
In order to compare data between the two cases, the value of trade volumes in passenger cars is 
based on OECD.Stat. 
 Exports Imports 
Rank Destination Value (m USD) Percentage Origin Value (m USD) Percentage 
1. USA 52,031 90.1 USA 20,872 54,6 
2. Canada 1,547 2.7 China 4,488 11.7 
3. Brazil 825 1.4 Japan 2,317 6.1 
4. Germany 398 0.7 Canada 1,774 4.6 
5. China 388 0.7 Germany 1,737 4.5 
6. UK 236 0.4 S. Korea 1,713 4.3 
7. Japan 185 0.3 Brazil 606 1.6 
8. S. Korea 184 0.3 Spain 539 1.4 
9. Thailand 148 0.3 Nicaragua 519 1.3 
10. Nicaragua 147 0.3 Taiwan 516 1.1 
Total World 57,833 100 World 38,897 100 
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Figure 15: China and Mexico automotive exports to the US 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
At the same time, China has become an increasingly important trading partner for 
Mexico, and a pattern of growing exports in finished vehicles from Mexico and 
increasing net-imports of Chinese autoparts is emerging (Table 9 and Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16: Composition of automobile exports from Mexico to China 
Source: OECD Stats 
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Exports of autoparts to China have remained relatively stagnant, but the value of 
exports in finished vehicles has increased sharply after the 2008 crisis (Figure 17), 
which is most likely due to the devaluation of the Mexican peso in the financial 
crisis and its sluggish recovery (Graham & O’Boyle 2011). 
 
 
Figure 17: Value of Mexican automobile exports to China 
Source: INEGI 2014, HKTDC 
 
More generally speaking, it is important to recall that global car manufacturers do 
for the largest part not export finished vehicles from China – and that as a 
consequence in 2013 the overall volume of China’s exports in passenger cars was 
eight times smaller than Mexico’s (Table 8). Sales figures for Company X illustrate 
this fact very well: In 2012 Company X had an output of 2,642,789 domestic 
market-designated cars at its Chinese ventures (3,134,665 in 2013). In Mexico 
604,508 cars were produced, of which 520,438 or 86.1% were exported.387 The 
main reason for the limited exports from China is of course its huge domestic 
market potential, but it is also linked to two other factors: on the one hand, most 
global car manufacturers operating in China do not possess the necessary export 
licenses (for the time being); on the other hand, the industrial relations at 
Company X in Germany might forestall an increase in exports from China, in order 
to limit competition with German factories. A senior manager of Company X 
explained the implications of this arrangement: 
 
                                                        
387 Company X annual report 2013 
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“No there is no plan to export, and that also has political reasons. The works 
council in Germany, for example, does not want a car to be exported from China to 
Germany, or even to Australia. Because where does the car for Australia come 
from? From Germany. So, that is the reason – and because the [Chinese] market 
still allows for it. […] The cars only have licenses for sales in China; and as long as 
we can sell them here, there is simply no need to export. If the need to export from 
China did actually arise, I have no idea how the negotiation process would turn out. 
[…] There would be a real struggle between different locations, and one would say: 
‘You have never had the license to export from China, now see to it that you fix 
your problems.’”388  
 
To sum up, the competitive pressure for Mexico stemming from automotive 
production in China is for the time being negligible as far as it concerns finished 
vehicles389 – on the contrary, China is emerging as a new target market for cars 
made in Mexico. However, this trend is reversed for the autoparts sector. Not only 
is competitive pressure on Mexico increasing with Chinese exports to the US 
(Figure 15), but Mexico has also become a net-importer of autoparts from China 
(Table 9). The “China threat” to terminal car assemblers therefore has to be seen 
more as a tactical weapon in the hands of management than a reality – although a 
different picture emerges for the autoparts sector. 
  
                                                        
388 Interview (2) senior manager Pongrac 
389 Only very recently has a US American car manufacturer announced the intention to export its 
China-made cars not only to emerging markets but also to the US – which caused protest by the 
United Automobile Workers union (Reuters 2013; Bomey 2015). 
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Appendix II: A Brief Note on Corporate Social Responsibility 
They even got a prize for being a ‘Socially Responsible 
Enterprise.’ They still have to explain to me what  
that is supposed to mean, ‘socially responsible’... 
– Worker Santiago at Company X in Mexico 
 
In 2002 Company X signed a document with the International Metalworkers’ 
Federation and the Company Group’s Global Works Council, entitled the 
Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at Company X. This 
document stipulated the Company X Group’s commitment to local minimum labour 
standards as well as to the ILO core conventions on freedom of association; 
discrimination; and forced and child labour (Company X 2002). The Declaration 
has been followed up by charters on labour relations (Company X 2009), 
temporary work, i.e. contract workers (Company X 2012), and vocational training 
(Company X 2015). Although with its European and Global Works Councils 
Company X has international bodies of workers representations involved in 
negotiating and monitoring these charters – something that sets them apart from 
CSR initiatives and codes of conduct at most other global car manufacturers – they 
leave a lot of room to manoeuvre in adaptation to local conditions and standards, 
establishing mostly suggestions and non-binding benchmarks.  
 
Despite Company X’s public relations efforts to portray an image of sustainability 
and responsibility (e.g. Automobilwoche edition 2013), the efforts undertaken so 
far are limited to its direct subsidiaries – with considerable (downwards) 
deviation in the Chinese, Russian and US-American cases.390 The effects on the 
supply chain remain rhetorical and factually negligible. The 2002 Declaration 
merely “encourages its contractors to take this declaration into account in their 
                                                        
390 The document that goes furthest in its binding prescriptions is arguably the Charter on labour 
relations. It lays out details of the right of labour representations affiliated to the European or 
Global Works Council to participate in and co-determine managerial decision making, in principle 
translating industrial relations at the German main plant to the global level. The aim is to “enable 
stable labour relations” through “the spirit of co-operative conflict management” (Company X 
2009). The actual form and content of labour-management relations are however to be determined 
by agreements between the respective local parties, meaning that company-wide standards find 
their limits in the actual application on the ground – which has been visible most clearly in the 
Chinese, Russian and US ventures (on the latter, see Eidelson 2015).  
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own respective corporate policy” (Company X 2002). Debates on CSR and codes of 
conduct on social standards along the Company X supply chain (e.g. Koplin et al. 
2007; Beske et al. 2008; and for the Mexican case Bensusán & Tilly 2010), can be 
cut off quite shortly, simply because the initial approval and later reviews of 
suppliers do not require an assessment of social and working conditions. Contrary 
to rhetorical commitments of Company X and the ILO that are also replicated in the 
academic literature (Bensusán & Tilly 2010, p.65) there are no legal regulations 
that would bind Company X to do so, nor does the Declaration establish any hard 
criteria for the choice of suppliers (e.g. compliance with local labour standards).  
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Appendix III: List of interviews 
 
Mexico 
Code Position (and age) Duration of 
interview 
Date 
    
David Worker at Company X, late 
40s 
1.09h Oct 15, 2012 
Focus group 
interview Miguel, 
Santiago, 
Fernando 
Workers at Company X 1.32h Oct 21, 2012 
Miguel Workers at Company X, 
early 40s 
1.17h 
 
Oct 24, 2012 
Santiago Worker at Company X, 
early 50s 
2.14h Oct 26, 2012 
Alejandro General Secretary at the 
2000-2008 Company X 
union, mid 50s 
1.05h Nov 12, 2012 
Arturo Worker at Company X, mid 
50s 
1.55h Nov 13, 2012 
Joel  Human Resource manager 
at Company X 
52h Nov 19, 2012 
Daniel Worker at Company X, 
early 50s 
2.26h Nov 22, 2012 
Fernando Worker at Company X, 
early 50s 
1.46h Nov 22, 2012 
Ricardo Worker at Company X, 
early 40s 
1h Nov 23, 2012 
Jesús Worker at Company X, late 
50s 
1.39h Dec 5, 2012 
Rodrigo Worker at Company X, late 
40s 
2.08h Dec 5, 2012 
Maria Female supply chain 
worker, late 40s 
42min Dec 8, 2012 
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Rafael Supply chain worker, 
mid 40s 
1.21h Dec 8, 2012 
Huberto Juárez-
Núñez 
University professor 1.12h Dec 12, 2012 
Rosa Local political activist, late 
30s 
1h Dec 18, 2012 
Carlos and Oscar Members of the 2012-2016 
union leadership, mid 40s 
and early 50s 
48min Jan 19, 2012 
Lourdes Alvarez University professor 1.18h Jan 22, 2012 
 
China 
Code Position  Duration Date 
    
Pietsch German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
27min; 1h June 8, 2013; 
July 30 2013 
Wendler German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
1.11h June 8, 2013 
Bohnert German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
34min Jun 8, 2013 
Chairman Qiao Chairman of the enterprise 
union at Company X/JV2’s 
Western plant 
1.36h June 8, 2013 
Li, Wang, Zhang Chinese HR managers at 
Company X/JV2’s Western 
plant 
21min June 8, 2013 
Liang Worker at Company X/JV2 47min June 8, 2013 
Sheng Worker and Union 
Chairman at Chinaparts 3 
2.16h June 14, 2013 
Hensch German white-collar 
worker at Company X/JV2 
1.58h; 2.47h July 3, 2013; 
Sept 9, 2013 
Government 
official Nanhai 
Investment 
Promotion Bureau 
Official at the Nanhai 
Investment Promotion 
Bureau 
1.45h July 19, 2013 
 369 
Qian Teacher at a Polytechnic 
College in South China 
1.24h July 20, 2013 
Chairman Deng Ex-chairman of the 
provincial ACFTU in South 
China 
3.03h July 25, 2013 
Shao Ex-worker at the Honda 
gearbox factory in Nanhai, 
early 20s 
1.11h July 26, 2013 
Chairman Li Ex-chairman of the city 
ACFTU in South China 
1.50h July 27, 2013 
Vogt German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
1.07h July 30, 2013 
Pongrac German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
43min; 
1.50h; 1.38h 
July 30, 2013; 
July 31, 2013 
Chairman Peng Chairman of the enterprise 
union at Company X/JV2’s 
main plant 
43min July 31, 2013 
Schütte German senior manager at 
Company X/JV2 
1.03h Aug 1, 2013 
Bo and Peng Chinese managers at 
Company X’s China Group 
36min Aug 3, 2013 
Rordorf German senior manager at 
Company X/JV1 
37min Aug 13, 2013 
Näher German senior manager at 
Company X/JV1 
42min Aug 13, 2013 
Lao Chinese manager at 
Company X/JV1 
27min Aug 13, 2013 
Lu Worker at Company X/JV1 1.22h Aug 14, 2013 
Zhang Worker at Company X/JV1 1.30h Aug 15, 2013 
Wang and Zhao Dispatch migrant workers 
at Chinaparts 1 
1.25h Aug 16, 2013 
Xun and Liu Migrant dispatch workers 
at Company X/JV1 
1.35h Aug 17, 2013 
Ping Worker at Company X/JV1 1.58h Aug 18, 2013 
Liao Dispatch worker at 
Company X/JV1 
1.13h Aug 19, 2013 
 370 
Lun Female worker at Company 
X/JV1 
2.10h Aug 21, 2013 
Lai Worker and member of 
union leadership at 
Chinaparts 2 
1.58h Sept 5, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
